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Abstract 
Broadcasting is undergoing a period of profound change. Convergence and 
digitisation are reshaping production and consumption. In the multi-channel 
environment, public service broadcasting (PSB) finds itself under threat, as traditional 
funding models are threatened by increased choice, new modes of delivery, and, for 
commercial public service broadcasters, a reduction in advertising revenue. In the UK, 
the industry base has undergone significant restructuring over the last twenty-five years. 
This has occurred following the creation of Channel 4 in 1982, and the emergence of the 
independent television production sector (ITPS) , coupled with a steady process of 
employment and industry deregulation. Labour in the sector is now predominantly 
freelance (Skillset, 2006a, 2007a), and increasingly concentrated in the ITPS, largely in 
London but with growing production bases at a regional level. Furthermore, the 
independent sector itself is reshaping, from a sector predominantly made up of small 
'one-man band' lifestyle companies, to the more commercially facing, vertically 
integrated 'super-indies' which now dominate the sector (Mediatique, 2004). 
In this context of transformation, this thesis is an investigation of creative labour 
in the ITPS in the UK, focused specifically on factual television production. Based on 
extended qualitative research of a group of twenty individuals over a six-month period, 
and supplementary interviews with company managers, the research examines the nature 
of work and production for individuals in this industry. The sample is cross-generational 
and includes a wide range of production positions, from researcher to series producer. 
The research focuses on the consequences of casualisation and risk for television 
workers, exploring how they manage their careers in the face of rampant insecurity. 
Drawing on Sennett's (1998) method of narrative sociology, the thesis explores the 
personal consequences of flexible labour markets (of which television is exemplary) on 
working individuals. It focuses on the subjective response of individuals to working in 
this area of the cultural economy, exploring the attractions of cultural labour despite the 
ontological insecurity and (self)-exploitation which often accompanies such work. It 
examines the emergence of 'network sociality' (Wittel, 2001) in the creative labour 
market, and the implications of this for recruitment and access to the television industry. 
Finally, it utilises the notion of 'craft' (Sennett, 2006), in order to explore the impact of 
flexible accumulation on television workers' production values. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis is an investigation of the working lives of a group of individuals working 
1n the independent television production sector (ITPS). It focuses on the nature of 
creative work in the sector, within the context of industry transformation, driven by 
wider economic and social transformations. Theoretically, it is concerned with 
investigating the nature of contemporary cultural work in this industry, where such 
labour is often highly casualised and de-regulated, where careers are managed through 
dense social networks, and where creative occupations have become psychological sites 
of intense affective investment and self-actualisation. In short, this thesis aims to connect 
global sociological changes that have occurred in the last thirty years, including flexible 
accumulation (Harvey, 1990), reflexive modernisation (Beck et a~ 1994) and 
individualisation (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), to comprehensive industry 
transformation within broadcasting; exploring the effect of these transformations on 
individuals working in this sector, their ability to do creative work, and their subjective 
attitudes to this work. This chapter introduces the scope of the research, the theoretical 
rationale behind it, and the methodological approach taken. 
1.1 Broadcasting in transition 
Television production in the UK is undergoing a period of profound change. These 
changes are economic, technological and cultural, and represent a clear challenge to 
broadcast television's cultural hegemony in a period of increasingly diverse and rich 
digital, multiplatform media content. Economically, the means of funding broadcasting is 
threatened by disruptive technological innovation. In the commercial sector, 
broadcasting has traditionally relied upon television advertising to fund production and 
generate profit; however, multi-channel television means that there are fewer viewers 
watching specific channels, leading to a dramatic fall in advertising rates (Nesta, 2006; 
Of com, 2004a). Technologically, the rise of the Internet, and high bandwidth download 
capacity, means that fewer people are watching television, further impacting on the 
advertising revenues that commercial broadcasters can command.! 
! According to a recent research survey of more than 2,400 households in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Australia, there is growing evidence that internet usage 
10 
Public service broadcasting is also facing challenges. For the BBC, these are painful 
times. The latest licence fee settlement with the Government means that it is forced to 
make 3 per cent annual savings, to meet a £2bn funding gap; ironically at a time when it 
feels compelled to diversify its offer and launch new channels in order to remain 
competitive, and offer a full choice of programming in an age of digital content. To meet 
this shortfall, significant job cuts are currently being made in core public service areas 
such as news, current affairs and factual programming (Conlan, 2007). Announcements 
have been made outlining 2,500 job cuts, plans to sell off the corporation's West 
London headquarters in Shepherd's Bush, and reduce the amount of television it makes 
by a tenth (Gibson, 2007). 
Culturally, television is also facing a challenge to its dominance. Increasingly 
technological innovations through the internet, computer games, social networking and 
other forms of rich multimedia content are attracting growing numbers of people. For 
example, television shows such as Coronation Street were able to command audiences of 
27m at their peak (Barker, 2005). However, year on year television viewing figures are 
down, as new forms of delivering and receiving content proliferate, and new forms of 
entertainment, such as computer games, appeal to more people. Now, it is extremely rare 
for any televised event or programme to be watched by more than 10 million people 
(BARB, 2007). As Anstead has noted: 
The media market has become atomized, not only because many homes have 
many more than the five terrestrial channels, but also because of the 
development of DVDs, computer games and the Internet. (2007) 
Indeed, describing the changing 'ecosystem' of media consumption, Naughton has 
argued that television, in the form that we know it (the broadcast to the many by the 
few) is slowly but surely being replaced by more interactive forms of entertainment and 
information, which are facilitated by online environments: 
Twenty years ago, a show like The Two Ronnies could attract audiences of 20 
million. Now an audience of 5 million is considered a success by any television 
now rivals television consumption time. For example, 66 per cent reported watching 1-4 hours 
of TV per day, whilst 60 per cent reported the same levels of internet use (Berman et al, 2007). 
11 
channel. In five years time, 200,000 VIewers will be considered a miracle. 
(Naughton, 2006) 
Using the metaphor of an 'ecology', Naughton argues that television is not about to 
disappear (as he argues, certain events such as a World Cup final are best disseminated 
through the few to many model), but that it will become increasingly marginal as a media 
form. Although television is still the most popular leisure activity, new research from 
Of com shows that the number of people watching the main channels (lTV and BBC) 
has declined dramatically (Of com, 2004b). As such, Naughton argues: 
Broadcast TV is being eaten from within, by narrowcast digital television - in 
which specialist content is aimed at subscription-based audiences and distributed 
via digital channels. But waiting in the wings is something even more devastating 
- Internet Protocol TV (lPtv) - television on demand, delivered via the internet. 
And it's coming soon to a computer screen near you. (Naughton, 2006) 
The phenomenal success of the BBC iPlayer, an internet based application which allows 
viewers to watch the majority of BBC programmes up to seven days after being 
broadcast, would appear to confirm this prediction. Since launching on December 25 
2007 with the promise of 'making the unmissable, unmissable', take-up has been 
remarkable. The last available figures for this thesis show that in April 2008, the total 
number of requests for downloads and streams of BBC programmes was 21 million, 
rising from 17.2 million and 11.2 million in January (1<1ss, 2008). 
1.1.1 The continued significance of television 
Despite this context of transformation and adaptation, television remains of huge 
cultural significance. This is reflected in terms of consumption; regardless of declining 
audiences, television is still hugely popular. Its significance can also be seen in the way 
that shows such as Big Brother become sources of national discourse and media 
speculation (e.g. Coleman, 2006; 1<:ilborn, 2003). It is reflected in the fact that 'fakery' 
scandals around television production are so high-profile (l<:ilborn, 2003: 150; Sanders, 
2003: 53-62). And crucially, in terms of the focus of this thesis, it is also evident in the 
fact that independent television production is one of the largest areas of cultural 
employment in the UK, employing over 20,000 people (Skillset, 2007).2 
2 With a further 20,800 working in terrestrial television according to the latest census figures 
(Skillset,2007a). 
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Furthermore, it is likely that much of the content which delivers high audiences 
will continue to be made by production staff within production companies that operate 
with the economies of scale necessary to employ individuals with the requisite 
production skills, and to afford the equipment and technology which ensures the 
production quality that many audiences expect. The means of distribution may be 
changing radically and rapidly, but the desire for high quality content remains. 
1.2 Studying creative labour in the independent television production sector 
This thesis focuses on the production community and the nature of creative 
labour in the sector. More specifically, it is an investigation into the working lives of a 
small sample of individuals involved in the production of television, working in the 
independent television production sector (ITPS) , largely as freelancers, some as staff 
employees or company managers, within this changing context. Furthermore, all of those 
studied work in the area known broadly as 'factual television' - encompassing current 
affairs, documentaries, 'reality' television, and factual entertainment shows. 
The 'indie' sector has undergone rapid commercial growth and regulatory change 
in recent years (Hewlett, 2005; Martinson, 2005). Effectively brought into existence in 
1982 with the creation of Channel 4, it is now one of the largest cultural production 
sectors in the UK (Skillset, 2006a). The ITPS is now a key sub-sector of the broadcasting 
industry, comprising of more than 800 UK-based companies (Mediatique, 2005).3 
Furthermore, the independent sector is an area of high growth set to generate revenues 
in 2005 of £820m solely from first-run commissions (ibid.: 3). Indeed, it is estimated that 
by 2011 the sector will be producing revenues from first-run commissions of over £1 bn, 
not including programme and format sales (ibid.: 16). When other factors are taken into 
account, such as non-traditional sales, it is estimated that the sector could see revenues 
of £1.47bn by 2014. 
3 The exact number of 'independent' production companies is a matter of some dispute. For 
example, Skillset, the sector skills council, assert that there are over 1,000 independent 
production companies (Skillset, 2006a). However, in their recent report on the sector, Mediatique 
(2005) have argued that there are in fact 800 companies that qualify for independent status under 
the relevant legislation, excluding those companies that have significant ties to a UK terrestrial 
broadcaster such as Talkback Thames (Five) and Granada Productions (lTV). 
13 
As chapter 3 will explore, the creation of Channel 4 in 1982, and the emergence 
of the independent production sector in its contemporary form, had a catalytic effect on 
the wider broadcasting industry, marking a movement from a relatively stable, highly 
unionised working environment, to a mode of production associated with flexible 
accumulation (pratt, 1997; Saundry, 2001), notable for casualisation, a flexible network 
structure, and an absence of union activity (Sparks, 1994). Moreover, in recent years, the 
sector has changed again, away from the formative structure of a large number of small 
'indies' - often known as 'one-man bands', that moved in a precarious fashion from 
commission to commission - to a more commercialised and consolidated sector, as 
evidenced by the rise of large production companies such as RDF and Endemol, who 
are able to corner a bigger share of the production market, and who can generate further 
income through the exploitation of intellectual property rights (Mediatique, 2004). 
The rise of multi-channel television means that there are now far more outlets 
for independent production companies (IPCs) to produce content for. Regulatory 
change has also had an effect: the 1990 Broadcasting Act introduced the independent 
quota, under which 25 per cent of qualifying hours of broadcast television must be 
sourced from qualifying independent companies, creating a huge boost to the sector. 
More recently changes to the terms of trade between broadcasters and programme 
suppliers in the Communications Act 2003 now mean that IPCs are able to retain 
ancillary rights to the programmes they make. With non-first-run revenue sources such 
as merchandise, mobile, book tie-ins, and multi-channel TV now increasing, this is vital. 
Finally the BBC has announced a new initiative, the Window of Creative Competition 
(WOCC) , which means that the broadcaster will make 50 per cent of its original 
programming budget available to outside suppliers. 
These changes have significantly altered the structure of the independent 
television sector, bringing about the emergence of a small number of much larger IPCs 
producing content for an increasingly global market, with the smaller IPCs being 
squeezed out of the market. Research shows that we are witnessing a rapid 
commercialisation and growth of the independent sector, as global investors discover a 
rich source of profit (Mediatique, 2005). However, as the industry becomes more profit-
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oriented, this research indicates that senous question marks hang over the future 
potential for creative innovation. In fact, recent research shows that there is an 
increasing 'innovation gap' between what public service broadcasters are delivering, and 
what the audience expects (Blinc Reseach, 2007). 
1.2.1 Creative work in independent television 
The independent television industry labour market is typical of those within the 
cultural industries, with a highly casualised, freelance workforce, characterised by 
precarious conditions of work.4 Yet it was not always so. The television industry as a 
whole in the UK has undergone significant change to its employment structure since the 
late 1980s, having moved from being a highly unionised, stable labour environment, to a 
far more freelance, 'flexible' industry under the deregulating, de-unionising political 
dynamics of neoliberal policy reform (Sparks, 1994; Saundry, 2001). The structural 
reconfiguration of the broadcasting labour market was brought about, in part, as a result 
of industry-specific shifts such as the creation of Channel 4, which introduced an 
external commissioning structure to the industry, and acted as the catalyst for the growth 
of the cindie' sector (Harvey, 2000). It also occurred as a result of a dominant 'neoliberal' 
policy environment from the 1980s onwards which favoured deregulation, 
deunionisation and free-market capitalism.s At a deeper level, this reconfiguration of the 
television industry has also occurred as a result of global socio-economic changes 
including the economic restructuration caused by flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1990) 
and the increased acculturation of the economy (Lash and Urry, 1994); the ideological 
impact of a deregulating, free-market enterprise culture (K.eat and Abercrombie, 1991); 
and the sociological impact of 'reflexive modernisation' (Beck et al, 1994).6 
4 See Miege (1989) for an overview of the historically precarious nature of employment in the 
cultural industries. 
S The term 'neoliberal' has become highly confusing and problematic. Here, I refer to neoliberal 
as indicating policies which embody the belief that free unregulated markets are the most 
efficient way of organising capitalism. This will be explored further in the next chapter. However, 
suffice to say at this stage that there are many different versions of 'neoliberalism', some which 
are more radically in favour of total deregulation, whereas more recent iterations (most notably 
New Labour's version) favour a 'third way', encouraging free markets, with a focus on social 
justice (see Finlayson, 2000; also Harvey, 2005). 
6 These sociological issues and terminologies will be explained in chapter 2. 
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In recent years the digitisation of production, the nse of multiskilling, the 
continued growth of the indie sector, and increased multi-channel competition has 
increased the pace of change within the industry, arguably with a detrimental effect on 
production values and on the skills base within the industry (Ursell, 2003, Born, 2004: 
194). Clearly, increasing casualisation has led to an erosion of training within the public 
service broadcasting environment, which was traditionally the training ground for the 
industry. 
However, despite these shifts, there has been little academic research done into 
the independent television production sector, either in terms of analysing its structure 
and history, or in terms of examining its production environment and the nature of 
creative labour within it.7 Addressing this gap, this thesis sets out to investigate creative 
work in the ITPS, in light of the transformations that have occurred within the 
broadcasting industry labour market from a more stable working environment, to the 
predominantly freelance, casualised, increasingly consolidated and highly commercialised 
industry that exists today. 
1.2.2 Methodology 
Methodologically, this study focuses on the working lives of twenty individuals 
working in the independent television production sector. This sample is cross-
generational, and cross-occupational, ranging from junior researcher to series producer. 
The study is also supplemented by three interviews with a mixture of company directors 
and executive producers, who are responsible for hiring individuals, and were 
interviewed in order to gain a wider perspective on the labour market. The study is 
qualitative, with 'ethnographic intent' (Gray, 2003). The sample was studied between 
October 2005 and July 2006, with each participant studied longitudinally for six months 
by means of in-depth semi-structured interviews, diary and email evidence. The field 
research was concluded with a series of final interviews with my respondents. Although 
not an 'ethnographic' study in the conventional sense, the research was informed by 
elements of this methodology. Site visits were undertaken, as well as field visits to 
industry events. The research was conducted within the working milieu of these 
7 For welcome exceptions to this trend, see Ursell (1997, 2000, 2003), Paterson (200la, 2001 b) 
and the British Film Institute (1999). 
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professionals, which included locuses of the informal 'night-time economy' (GLA, 2005) 
and cafe-culture, which constitute the environment where contacts are forged and deals 
done. Attention was paid to the narrative aspects of the respondent's talk about their 
work, demanding close listening and ethnographic attention to detail (Sennett, 1998). 
The site visits enabled this 'talk' to further be placed in the context of the workplace. 
1.3 Research questions 
The focus of this study is on the working lives and identities of these individuals. 
It is concerned with a number of key issues, which guide the empirical analysis in 
chapters 5-7. The research questions are directed at understanding the nature and 
implications of new forms of creative labour in the independent television industry. How 
do creative workers deal with such high levels of insecurity in their working lives? What 
is the impact of contemporary discourses such as 'creativity' and 'talent' on the work-
based subjectivities of television workers? How important are personal qualities such as 
cultural capital in negotiating this precarious terrain? How does the 'network sociality' 
that is at work in the sector impact on the labour market, and on cultural diversity? What 
is the impact of a growing commercialisation and a changing production environment on 
production values? From these initial research questions, the empirical analysis is focused 
around specific areas, which are described below. 
1.3.1 Insecurity, exploitation and emotional labour 
The immediate focus of the research is on the material reality of an highly 
individualised, precarious working environment in the independent television industry. 
Drawing on sociological theories of emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983, 2003), 
governmentality (Rose, 1989, 1999) and the 'humane workplace' (Ross, 2004), the 
research attempts to understand these individuals' subjective responses to the working 
conditions they find themselves in. A number of writers have pointed to the centrality of 
the cultural industries not only as the providers of symbolic content, but also as 
industrial sectors that act as templates for new models of production and labour in 
contemporary society (Florida, 2002; Leadbeater, 1999; McRobbie, 2004). Whether or 
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not this is actually the case,s it is certainly true that work in the cultural industries labour 
markets is marked by a number of features which are becoming increasingly prevalent 
across all sectors of the economy. Cultural production tends to take place across 
mutually interdependent networks of production, where micro companies, or sole 
traders, provide services, often on a freelance basis for large media conglomerates. 
Production largely occurs within geographical 'clusters' within a creative ecology of small 
independent production companies, working to flexible arrangements for larger, often 
international companies, with a global reach. Under such conditions, creative labour 
markets are largely project based, freelance and insecure. 
These features of work are all evident in the ITPS. Risk is devolved in this 
situation from the company to the individual, so the response to this insecurity is highly 
individualised. Self-exploitaiton is rife, hours are long, the work is deunionised, and there 
is no clear demarcation between work and leisure time. However, whilst there exist 
tremendous financial and creative rewards for the lucky few, it is also clear that the 
majority of workers in this sector put up with (and indeed often embrace) extraordinarily 
high levels of risk and self-exploitation, for the self-actualisation that comes from 
working in a 'creative industry'. 
This thesis explores the material reality of working in the television industry, and 
then seeks to understand the attractions of this form of creative work. It is concerned 
with the individualised and subjective response of these workers to making a living in 
such a casualised sector of the cultural economy. If 'creativity' has become a discursive 
regime within late modernity, then how does this discourse work with disciplinary effect, 
as a highly effective 'technology of the self' (Foucault et ai, 1988)?9 Here, culture and 
economy elide, for it is increasingly clear that this discourse has an economic purpose, in 
that it works to validate particular ways of working, and as a disciplinary tool used to 
extract maximum efficiency and productiveness from cultural workers. As du Gay (1996) 
S Recent sociological evidence suggests that the 'portfolio career' as the future model of work 
across all sectors of the economy appears increasingly untenable. For example, the ESRC's 
Future of Work programme, which reported in 2002, actually noted that permanent employment 
was increasing in the UK, and the length of job tenure rising. See Taylor (2002). 
9 The concept 'technology of the self comes from the work of Michel Foucault, and refers to the 
ways in which discourses have a regulatory effect on individuals through the process of 
subjectivisation, so that an individual's very subjectivity, their desires and needs, are shaped by 
these 'discursive regimes'. See Foucault (1988). 
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has shown, organisations make use of key discourses in order to embed particular values 
that are aligned with their economic interest at the level of subjectivity. 
The ambivalence that creative workers feel about their work is also explored: on 
the one hand they feel the structural pains of uncertainty, risk and exploitation. On the 
other hand, they are enthused about the potential for creativity and self-actualisation that 
their work gives them. It is clear that increasingly cultural labour in post-industrial society 
has become a self-reflexive site encompassing values such as personal meaning, 
autonomy and self-fulfillnent. These workers are not the traditional subjects of alienation 
and 'false consciousness' (Marx and Engels, 1959), rather creative labour offers them the 
opportunity to find 'pleasure in work' (Donzelot, 1991). Therefore, understanding labour 
processes in the independent television sector means understanding how powerful 
cultural discourses operate in the formation of economic subjects 'who have been 
configured to perform in, and understand, particular modes of discipline, subjects that 
are both subject to particular discourses and creators of them' (Amin and Thrift, 2004: 
xxi). 
Therefore the research is concerned with analysing self-identity for these creative 
workers, exploring the tension between building a 'creative persona' (Nugent, 2004) 
within the neoliberal post-Fordist economic structures of late capitalism. As Slater and 
Tonkiss note, 'being a knowledge worker or cultural intermediary requires aestheticised 
work on the self and its presentation' (2001: 178). The culturalisation of the economy 
(Amin and Thrift, 2004; du Gay and Pryke, 2002) is particularly noticeable in the 
structuration of advanced capitalist labour markets, so that the creative, the affective and 
the emotional aspects of human experience have become part of a new mode of 
organisational management, closely linked to the exploitation and control of the 
workforce (du Gay, 1996; Heelas, 2002; O'Connor, 2004). 
1.3.2 Network sociality, cultural capital and diversity 
The thesis also investigates issues of access and exclusion to the television labour 
market. In common with other creative fields, television labour markets are increasingly 
organised through networks, where access can be highly opaque. My research shows that 
in the independent television industry one's 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu, 1984) is 
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paramount as a determinant of success or failure. 10 High levels of cultural capital seem 
almost to be a precondition of success in the television industry, favouring individuals 
from better-off backgrounds, and from particular social class groups. 
However, this research suggests a shift from the 'old boys club' which was 
evident in earlier studies of television (Tunstall, 1993). While social class and educational 
background still clearly play a role in terms of access to these industries, my research 
suggests that a networking dynamic now dominates, where new communication 
technologies elide with an emergent meritocratic subjectivity (Finlayson, 2000), and 
where advantage is clearly gained through the active exploitation of one's 'loose ties' 
(Granovetter, 1973). The 'network sociality' (Wittel, 2001) that is evidently in play within 
the labour markets of the cultural industries, and which functions as a way for my 
respondents to find work, in the place of transparent employment policies, means that 
job-finding, and ultimately success in this field becomes a highly opaque process. 
Furthermore, the necessity for the majority of people entering the industry to 
work for nothing also favours individuals with high levels of economic capital, who can 
afford to undertake unpaid work experience for extensive periods of time (Skillset, 
2005b). Clearly, this impacts negatively on the diversity of the television workforce, as it 
remains largely a white, middle-class dominated industry (ibid). In turn this impacts on 
the creativity of the sector, as it is widely recognised that creativity occurs in diverse and 
open contexts Oeffcut and Pratt, 2002). In this thesis I explore the implications of a 
network culture on the cultural diversity of the industry, and the subsequent questions 
this raises for creative expression. 
1.3.3 Production values 
10 The issue of cultural capital will be outlined in greater depth in chapters 2 and 6, but in brief, 
Bourdieu argues that cultural capital is accumulated over a lifetime and is transmitted through 
numerous processes of formal and informal education and membership of social groups 
(Bourdieu, 1986, 1993). As Johnson notes, cultural capital 'equips the social agent with empathy 
towards, appreciation for or competence in deciphering cultural relations and cultural artefacts' 
Gohnson, 1993: 7). Cultural capital, when legitimated, is converted into symbolic capital and 
gains prestige and recognition. The conversion of cultural capital to symbolic capital occurs for 
the middle classes, and is a means by which their tastes and dispositions are coded as inherently 
'correct'. This works to exclude different (working class, minority group) cultural tastes and 
competencies as hierarchically inferior to those of the middle class, which translates into a 
pervasive form of inequality (Lawler, 2000: 116). 
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Finally, I investigate how the transformed production environment within the 
ITPS impacts on the production values and the content being produced. In considering 
the nature of production in this sector, I explore the impact that this production 
environment has on the production values of the production community, and on the 
possibilities for the development of craft skills over time.11 My research shows two key 
forces impacting acting to constrain certain forms of creativity and innovation within this 
sector. The first is a structural shift: as the industry becomes more commercialised, there 
is less space for innovative, challenging, risk-taking programming. This can be seen in 
the endless production of derivative 'reality' programming, as broadcasters are forced to 
take fewer risks in a far more commercially competitive multi-channel and multi-
platform environment. The second force is microcosmic, at the level of production and 
the individualisation of risk within creative labour markets. Here it is evident that the 
structure of the labour market within this sector has a clear impact on the individual 
ability to be creative, and on the production values within organisations. As Ursell has 
commented: 
There is a relative silence on the issue of what happens to media production 
arrangements under different regulatory regimes. In particular, there seems to be 
a failure to consider that changes in conditions of work and employment have 
consequences for the extent to which television workers find themselves able to 
meet professional goals and standards, or perhaps begin redefining their notions 
of professionalism. (2003: 34) 
In addition, my research indicates that a more precarious working environment 
produces a less diverse, more homogenous workforce (Holgate and McKay, 2007). 
Paradoxically, this study shows that the culture of risk-taking that is evident in building a 
creative career, does not seem to extend to creating the programme content itself, as 
more producers are forced to 'play it safe' in order to secure their next contract. 
Therefore, despite the rhetoric associated with the notion of the 'creative economy' 
(DeMS, 1998; Smith, 1998a, 1998b; Florida, 2002), there is evidence that the growing 
penetration of market forces into this cultural industry are impacting on the very 
conditions that breed creativity and innovation. 
11 This follows Ursell, who has argued that casualization and flexible labour market conditions 
have had a significant impact on the production 'values' of factual television (2003: 44); and 
Sennett (2006), who argues that contemporary flexible capitalism militates against the 
development of craft skills at work. 
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1.4 Re-evaluating creative work 
This study positions itself within the wider academic re-evaluation of creative 
labour that is currently occurring within media studies, sociology, cultural studies, 
economic geography and associated disciplines. Since 1997, with the rhetoric of the 
'creative industries' becoming a central pillar of the UK Government's focus on a 
'knowledge economy', much emphasis has been placed on the 'creative industries' as 
drivers of economic growth and social policy agendas (such as education, social inclusion 
and urban regeneration).12 The growth in the number of people entering into creative 
labour fields is dramatic; as is the number of young people undertaking degrees in the 
hope of entering these fields. The latest statistics from the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA) show that the number of students enrolled in media courses has grown 
between from 13,600 to 26,700 between 2001 and 2006 (Dewsbury and Vincent, 2006). 
These sectors have become glamorised sites of intense affective investment - perceived 
by some as spheres for the attainment of self-actualisation (Ross, 2004; McRobbie, 
2002b) . Yet the reality of work in these sectors has been widely neglected by policy-
makers, and to a certain extent by academics, who have often focused on media 
consumption and forms of macro-political economy. 
This situation is now changing. In recent years, there has been an explosion of 
interest in creative work. The findings of numerous writers have provided evidence of an 
emerging broader picture where creative work is now understood as an exemplary site of 
post-Fordist labour, in that it is highly casualised, often exploitative, deregulated, a 
sphere for affective investment, where work-based subjectivities are oriented towards 
embracing the discourses and practices of contemporary capitalist accumulation and 
production (e.g. Gill, 2002; Neff, 2005; Ross, 2004; McRobbie, 1998, 2002b; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007). 
Therefore, studying cultural production in this manner raises broader questions 
about the nature of work in what Sennett (2006) has called 'the new capitalism', an age of 
deregulated global capital flows which intensifies individual insecurity and exploitation, 
12 The Department for Culture, Media and Sport divides the creative industries into thirteen sub-
sectors, which comprise of advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, 
designer-fashion, fUm and video, interactive leisure software, the performing arts, publishing, 
software and computer services, television and radio (DCMS, 1998). 
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unsettling the life narratives of individuals, whilst seeking to deliver shareholder return. 
The nature of work in the ITPS is paradigmatic of a new mode of flexible labour, where 
the 'spectre of uselessness' hangs over many of its workers, as craft skills are displaced by 
'potential', 'flexibility' and mobility (Sennett, 2006). It is the networker, able to move 
between different spheres and make deals, who is now the feted figure within capitalism, 
and so too within the cultural industries. 
Indeed, it is the resciess, dynamic, anti-authoritarian, creative figure of the 
'network-extender' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), who is the contemporary ideal-type 
worker that has been so relenciessly promoted within management discourse since the 
1970s. With the promise of 'autonomy', work within the new capitalism becomes a zone 
for internalised control, where individuals actively invest in the accumulation of personal 
capital through engagement with project-based work. The kind of work epitomised 
within the 'creative industries', and the enthusiastic response of insecure, exploited 
individuals to this kind of work, is of growing theoretical importance. It is in this mode 
of work that we can see how capitalism has managed to produce a new ideology and 
modality of work which incorporates the 'artistic critique' of capitalism that emerged in 
the 1960s, in that it advocates authenticity, self-expression and freedom, whilst 
simultaneously creating a more ruthlessly efficient, individualistic and asocial mode of 
capital accumulation than ever before. Therefore, studying television workers also 
provides an opportunity to see how individuals in such labour markets respond to the 
prevailing conditions, and to speculate on what this means in terms of work and 
capitalism in the creative economy. 
1.4.1 From public service to privatised growth? 
Finally, in studying the television production labour market, I am concerned with 
the importance of the cultural industries as spheres of cultural and political influence, 
which form a crucial part of the 'public sphere' (Habermas, 1989). I should preface any 
discussion about the public sphere in relation to this study by saying that my sample is 
small, and therefore any conclusions must be tentative. Moreover, it was beyond the 
scope of this study to examine television content, as my focus was on working lives. 
However, despite that, the evidence from this research chimes with other recent reseach 
in this field (e.g. Born, 2004; Ursell, 2003) which suggests that a deregulated, 
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commercialised environment is detrimental to creativity within the broadcasting industry, 
which in turn must surely impact on the nature of the public sphere? 
This need to examme the conditions of contemporary cultural production is 
therefore not purely a matter of theoretical interest, but also a pressing issue for the 
health or otherwise of the public sphere and on the quality of commercially produced 
cultural products. For example, recent research has shown that the often exploitative and 
deregulated working conditions faced by television workers has had a direct impact on 
the quality of content produced and on the creative health of the industry (Ursell, 2003). 
As Ursell has pointed out, 'the values of completeness and factualness have already been 
tested and damaged by tightened budgets, reduced manpower, raised workloads, and 
accelerated production schedules' (2003: 44). Similarly research by Gitlin (1994) has 
shown that rampant commercialism coupled with a corporate desire to avoid risk in 
contemporary cultural production (in prime-time television in the US) leads inevitably to 
creative stagnation and formulaic repetition. Moreover, McRobbie's (1998) work on the 
fashion industry again shows the damaging impact that a hyper-commercialised 
environment has on creative incubation. This relationship between the working 
conditions of cultural production and the creative content produced is a key area of this 
research that is explored in the analysis chapters to follow. 
An empirical analysis of the impact of new modes of production and a 
transformed labour market on the public sphere is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it 
is important to signal that it is an issue that pervades the entire rationale for this thesis. 
Ultimately, the research is not concerned with an analysis of television's working 
conditions for the sake of it, but rather because of the significance of this area of 
employment at a cultural and political level. Ironically, this thesis describes a field -
television production - that many have argued is on the verge of vanishing, under the 
impact of digitisation, interactivity and transformations in the structure of audience 
demand. Moreover, television production, as it has been known, is facing new and highly 
powerful threats as outlined at the start of this chapter. Yet if by television we mean the 
production of visual content for a wider audience, then this will surely remain, even if 
the medium for watching it is no longer the television set as we know it. 
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For that reason, I believe it remains crucial to study the conditions under which 
this form of cultural production occurs, as the forces of commercialism push out older 
public service ideals. Ultimately we must question the cultural cost of heading relentlessly 
down such a path. As Sussman notes, 'As an institution that links citizen to civil, state 
and economic society, television cannot be entrusted to motives that serve only profit 
and that inevitably lead to insatiable commercialism and tabloid excesses' (2002: 10). 
1.5 Overview of chapters 
The following outline of chapters is intended to guide my reader through this 
thesis. In Chapter 2, I outline the theoretical and empirical work that contributes to an 
understanding of creative labour within contemporary society. I engage with three 
strands of literature here. First, I outline television production studies as a key field 
within media studies, first discussing key texts from the early generation of production 
studies, and then turning to the more contemporary studies which serve to contextualise 
my own work. I then provide an overview of the central social, political and economic 
transformations that have occurred within recent decades and which are central to an 
understanding of contemporary creative labour markets. This section engages with 
contemporary theoretical debates to do with neo-liberalism, reflexive modernisation, 
individualisation and governmentality. Finally, this chapter engages with those texts 
which have analysed cultural production in the wake of these transformations, where 
issues such as networks, affective labour, and casualisation have become prominent. 
Chapter 3 then focuses on the field of study, presenting a historical and political 
economic account of the emergence of the the independent television production 
industry in the UK. As well as describing the key policies and events that contributed to 
the emergence of the ITPS, this chapter also provides a detailed account of New 
Labour's policies towards creativity and the creative industries, which have been central 
to shaping broadcasting policy since 1997. Chapter 4 assesses methodological and 
epistemological issues. This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of my 
methodological approach, my epistemological location during the research process and 
the ways in which this has shaped my methodological framework. This chapter also 
describes the research sample, the methods of analysis and the longitudinal approach of 
the study. 
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Chapters 5-7 present the empirical findings of the fieldwork, in the areas 
outlined earlier. Chapter 5 is concerned with insecurity, exploitation and emotional 
labour within the ITPS. Chapter 6 describes the centrality of network sociality for my 
participants, and analyses the importance of cultural and social capital in this field. 
Chapter 7 then investigates the impact of the precarious working conditions and the 
dominant discursive values of the industry upon my participants' production values. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with an overview of the key findings and 
contributions of the research. While acknowledging the limitations of a small-scale study 
such as this, it then reflects on the implications of the findings for the wider broadcasting 
industry. Finally, it tentatively considers the implications of the 'creative turn' not only 
for the ITPS, but for wider society under conditions of contemporary capitalism. 
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Chapter 2. Creative labour and social change 
This chapter explores the theoretical concerns of this thesis, providing an 
intellectual context for the study of television production. First, it provides a brief 
overview of foundational theoretical engagements with the cultural industries, 
demonstrating the continued relevance of studying cultural production. Second, it 
examines the key literature specific to television production in order to illustrate the scale 
of the transformation that has occurred within the industry during that period, exploring 
the shift from a heavily regulated, highly unionised, secure sphere of employment, to the 
deregulated, commercialised and casualised industry that exists today. Third, it provides 
an account of the macro-sociological and structural changes that have occurred globally 
since the 1970s, which necessitate a renewed look at creative labour as a focus of intense 
sociological and political interest. Finally, it provides a critical analysis of the key research 
which has looked afresh at emergent features of creative labour in recent years, where 
questions of emotional labour, autonomy, subjectivity and exploitation coincide. 
In order to make sense of the dynamics of production within the independent 
television industry, this chapter undertakes three different levels of analysis. First, at the 
organisational level, specifically focused on television production, it is vital to recognise 
and understand the significance of specific changes within the broadcasting landscape 
that have underpinned the formation of the independent television industry as we know 
it. In terms of labour processes, this is the shift from a heavily unionised, stable working 
environment, based around a duopoly between the BBC and lTV, to a flexible, 
casualised, precarious labour market. This chapter focuses on the literature that has 
examined television production, in order to demonstrate the scale of the changes that 
have occurred within this area. 
Second, at a 'macro' level, the chapter then puts these transformations 1n a 
broader context by assessing the significance of global economic, political and 
sociological transformations, including flexible accumulation, the rise of neoliberalism, 
and the emergence of new modes of selfhood and society as a result of 'reflexive 
modernisation' (Beck et al, 1994). This provides an outline of the structural, ideological 
and sociological changes which have accompanied the transformation of cultural labour. 
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The shift from a Fordist economy based around mass production, to a post-Fordist 
economy based around an advanced service economy (in the wealthy developed world at 
least), is central to understanding the valorization of creativity in the contemporary 
historical juncture. As Castells (1996) has argued, society is increasingly organised around 
global networks of exchange, both culturally and also economically, leading to supra-
national organisations, and institutional actors who operate on a global scale. As the 
economy becomes increasingly networked, so too has labour become more precarious, 
as network processes constandy threaten to 'switch off' unproductive nodes in the 
clrcUlt. 
The ideological shift towards a free-market, deregulating mode of politics, known 
as neoliberalism, underpins these structural changes, and its influence can certainly be 
detected in broadcasting policy decisions that have impacted on the restructuring of the 
television industry, as explored in the previous chapter. At the sociological level, it is 
argued that the emergence of an increasingly 'reflexive' modernity has brought about a 
dynamic of individualisation, where, in the context of the accelerated dis embedding of 
individuals from traditional social structures, they increasingly seek to fashion their own 
selves from a bewildering plethora of lifestyle possibilities, seeking self-actualisation in 
both their personal and professional lives (Giddens, 1991). In this chapter, I argue that 
individualisation and the compulsion to be an 'autonomous' choosing individual can also 
be understood as a form of 'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991), which encourages the 
subject to act upon herself in ways that are aligned to neoliberal values, through the 
practices of 'freedom' (Rose, 1999). 
Third, at the 'micro' level of individual identity within creative working 
environments (and the 'cultural economy' more broadly), I analyse the literature that has 
looked at questions of identity, subjectivity, individualisation and emotional labour 
within the cultural industries. There, the issues of autonomy, affect, precariousness, 
exploitation and exclusion emerge consistendy in the more recent research on the 
cultural industries. In attempting to make sense of the significance of new modes of 
work in the cultural industries, researchers have drawn on a number of theoretical 
approaches, and explored a variety of pressing features including: the re-emergence of 
class and gender divisions in cultural production, as new hierarchies emerge which 
exclude particular groups from creative labour (McRobbie, 2000; Gill, 2002); the 
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significance of 'immaterial labour' (drawing on the work of Lazzarato, 1996), where 
creative industries are seen as representative of a new mode of capitalist accumulation 
with labour increasingly based on knowledge, skills, and affect (Neff, 2005; Neilson and 
Rossiter, 2005); the importance of individllalisation and reflexive modernisation as tools for 
understanding new modes of creative labour, where such work offers opportunities for 
self-actualisation and the reflexive shaping of the self as an ongoing project (McRobbie, 
2004; Ursell, 2000); the concept of 'precarity' and 'risk' in increasingly insecure cultural 
labour markets (Deuze, 2007; Neilson and Rossiter, 2005; Tsianos and Papadopolous, 
2006); the emergence of 'network sociality' as a mode of interaction and recruitment 
(Wittel, 2001); and the importance of subjectivity and identity in the new cultural 
economy, where the discourse of creativity operates as a mode of governmentality, 
shaping individual identities in ways that make them amenable to the demands of 
neoliberal capitalism (McRobbie, 2002b; du Gay, 1996; Ursell, 2000). Research such as 
this stresses the importance of qffective labollr, as a mode of governing subjects through 
their most intimate desires, aspirations and emotions. 
In critically engaging with this literature, I hope to show the pressing need to re-
evaluate the production process in the British television industry, in the face of 
organisational, structural and sociological change. There is a clear gap in the literature 
that studies television production in the context of such forceful changes, and that 
provides a basis for understanding the changes that are occurring within television 
production at a grounded level, one which engages with identity, subjectivity and affect. 
In the argument that follows I shall explore the scale of these changes, and then consider 
how a number of emergent studies in the field of cultural economy point towards a new 
direction for understanding creative labour in the present juncture. 
2.1 Studying cultural industries 
The study of cultural industries has been of great interest to scholars ever since 
the publication of Adorno and Horkheimer's (1973) critique of the 'Culture Industry', 
written in 1947. Cultural industries are seen as important within society for a number of 
diverse reasons. It has been argued that they are the primary means within society of 
producing symbolic goods and texts within a capitalist society (Garnham, 1987; 
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Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 3).13 As Garnham argues, "'cultural industries" refers to those 
institutions in society which employ the characteristic modes of production and 
organisation of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form 
of cultural goods and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities' (1987: 
25). Furthermore, cultural industries also playa key a key role in the constitution of a 
'public sphere' (Habermas, 1989), being the dominant intermediaries in the processes of 
democracy, allowing a mediation point for the transmission (and contestation) of 
dominant ideological values. 
Moreover, Hesmondhalgh has argued that they are 'agents of economic, social 
and cultural change' (2002: 6). The argument here is that the cultural industries are not 
only increasingly important sources of wealth creation in modern economies, but in an 
informational age, where symbolic content is increasingly central to social and economic 
life, they arguably provide a model for transformations in other industries (Lash and 
U rry, 1994). In terms of public policy, this has been connected to an instrumentalist view 
of cultural industries (and creativity) as being central to economic growth, evident in a 
range of UK government policy documents, and academic work (DCMS, 200la, 2001 b; 
GLA, 2002; Florida, 2002). Furthermore, it has also been argued that cultural and 
creative industries foster social inclusion (DCMS, 1999; Arts Council England, 2003; 
Reeves, 2002); regenerate economically deprived cities and regions (Evans and Shaw, 
2004; Florida, 2002; Minton, 2003);14 and may even help tackle physical and mental 
health issues (Health Education Authority, 2000). 
Adorno and Horkheimer's orginal thesis was a critique of the commodification 
of culture, far removed from the celebratory tone of the 'creative industries' which has 
its linguistic antecedents in this term. They denounced what they saw as the 
industrialisation of culture under modernity. Influenced by Marxism, and appalled by the 
consumerist nature of post-war America, they argued that culture had become intensely 
commodified, shallow, and standardised. Putting their theoretical approach within a 
historical context, it is important to remember that this was a time of industrialisation, 
mass production, and Fordism. Much as the assembly lines were producing identical cars 
and other standardised products, they believed that the Culture Industry was also 
13 However, others have argued that all industries are involved in this process, and that cultural 
labour is no different from other work (Wolff, 1993). 
14 See Nathan (2005) for a discussion of why Florida's theory does not work. 
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producing standardised cultural products, marked by pseudo-individuality, but devoid of 
any depth or complexity. Standardisation, then, provides cultural products with the 
veneer of difference, whilst essentially ensuring their easy duplication in a process of 
mass-production: 
The public is catered for with a hierarchical range of mass-produced products of 
varying quality, thus advancing the rule of complete quantification. Everybody 
must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his previously determined 
and indexed level, and choose the category of mass product turned out for his 
type. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 123) 
W ors e still, the Culture Industry was seen as the ideological conduit of 
capitalism, with the pernicious effect of transmitting the values of consumerism and 
capitalism to the population, thereby suppressing any radical critique of capitalism as a 
system. The Culture Industry, for Adorno, was a crucial ideological site of academic 
interest, acting as the means by which capitalism was able to reproduce itself 
ideologically. It turned viewers into passive consumers, and stopped them taking 
collective action or thinking radically. The Culture Industry was a tool of the State, and 
of the ruling class, functioning as a means of controlling the masses, acting as as an 
impediment to radical social transformation. For Adorno and Horkheimer ' .. .it seemed 
as though the possibility of radical social change had been smashed between the twin 
cudgels of concentration camps and television for the masses' (quoted in Strinati, 2004). 
Therefore the study of the cultural industries has a Marxian background. Yet, 
Adorno's analysis was too severe for many critics, leaving no room exploring the more 
positive aspects of contemporary culture. Meanwhile, the evident success of capitalism 
forced Marxists to provide cultural accounts of its persistence and of the potential for 
resistance to it. As O'Connor contends, 'In this context Adorno's Culture Industry, as 
cultural collapse or as total system, was subjected to increased scrutiny; on the one hand 
the Culture Industry had grown enormously in scope and visibility since his first writing, 
but on the other, it was clear that his account of it was simply not adequate' (2007: 18). 
In the 1970s and 1980s a loosely connected group of academics began to re-
evaluate Adorno's thesis (Miege, 1987; Garnham, 1987, 1990; Ryan, 1992). They felt that 
it was too economically deterministic and elitist. They were interested in examining 
cultural industries as sites not just of economic and ideological determination, but of 
31 
contestation, complexity and struggle. Questions emerged about the value differentiation 
that was implied in Adorno's work between 'high art' and 'low culture', with questions 
being asked about whose interests high culture served, and what funding arrangements 
might allow it to be produced. There was a stronger engagement and positive evaluation 
of popular culture, no longer seen as the ideological conduit of State power, but 
recognised as a space for resistance and play (de Certeau, 1984). 
Examining the specific and differentiated features of the 'cultural industries', 
these theorists explored issues such as why a cultural industry would produce a text that 
was antithetical to capital's interests. They asserted that cultural industries primarily seek 
to produce texts as profit-generating commodities, but operating within a context of 
great risk, and so needing to do what they can to get a 'hit' (Garnham, 1987: 25). 
Strategies used by cultural industries to ensure profit are numerous and include the 
following: maximising the repertoire to produce product differentiation, which provides 
a greater assurance of a hit among the many sure misses, in order to deal with the 
'uncertainty principle' (Caves, 2000; Curran, 2000: 20; Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 19); the 
creation of artificial scarcity through strategies such as retaining copyright on the cultural 
product, and vertical integration, allowing the company to control the release of cultural 
products (Garnham, 1990); and through corporate strategies such as 'concentration, 
internationalisation and cross-sector ownership' (Curran, 2000: 20). Such political 
economic analysis enabled scholars to take a more sophisticated approach to cultural 
industries. 
Therefore, the term 'cultural industries' itself was a response away from the 
'culture industry', which had become a shorthand for discussing the shortcomings of 
contemporary cultural life. As O'Connor points out: 
It involved a conceptual shift that by the early 1980s had given rise to a much 
more sophisticated and empirically based understanding of the complex structure 
and variable dynamics at work in the cultural industries. (O'Connor, 2007: 27) 
The use of the plural term 'industries' is significant, because this school of thought 
rejected the use of the singular term, which implied a 'unified field', 'where all the 
different forms of cultural production which co-exist in modern life are assumed to obey 
the same logic' (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 16). Miege (1987) also rejected Adorno and 
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Horkheimer's nostalgic attachment to pre-industrial forms of cultural production. For 
Miege, whilst cultural production had brought about a greater commodification of 
cultural goods, it also offered the possibilities for culture to develop in new, innovative 
directions. The commodification of culture was also seen by these writers as incomplete, 
as contested, rather than the always already complete process suggested by Adorno and 
Horkheimer. The 'cultural industries' approach seeks to research the experiential terrain 
of labour for cultural producers and examines the distinctive features of cultural 
commodities. This approach is more successful, because it acknowledges the complex, 
contested nature of the cultural industries, one that allows for both structure and agency. 
As Garnham argues, 'the cultural market ... cannot be read as a destruction of high 
culture by vulgar commercialism or as a suppression of authentic working-class culture, 
but should be read as a complex hegemonic dialectic of liberation and control' (1987: 
61). 
Simultaneously, there was an increasing interest in creative labour, an issue totally 
ignored by Adorno. Sociologists such as Miege (1989) and Ryan (1992) explored the 
features of creative work. Ryan was able to show how cultural industries have to give 
artists relative freedom and autonomy, as opposed to other workers within capitalism, 
because this was needed for the artist to produce a successful product. In this sense 
capital seeks ways to control other aspects of the production process but is forced to 
grant (limited) autonomy to cultural producers (1992: 44). Miege showed that as a result 
of the autonomy given to creative workers, there was a massive oversupply of labour for 
creative jobs, explaining why artists tend to suffer from underemployment, and insecurity 
(1989: 82-3). 
The cultural industries approach is central to my research in that it is concerned 
with studying cultural producers who are almost entirely absent from much media 
political economy research from Adorno onwards. As Hesmondhalgh argues, in a period 
of media conglomeration, deregulation and concentration 'the cultural industries 
approach has emphasised the conditions facing cultural workers as a result of these 
processes' (2002: 34). The cultural industries approach is at pains to stress the link 
between the conditions of labour on the ground for cultural workers and the cultural 
texts that are produced within those working conditions. Indeed, as McRobbie has 
argued, there is now a pressing need to consider the connection between the new 
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reconfigurations of cultural and media labour markets, and the type of media that we 
consume (McRobbie, 2000: 256). 
By deepening our understanding of the cultural industries, and through providing an 
account of the features of creative labour, the cultural industries writers were vital in 
bring cultural producers back under a theoretical gaze. It is through a political economic 
and sociological interest in cultural production that the study of television production 
first emerged, an area I shall now explore. Yet as we shall see, social and economic 
transformations have meant that new theoretical questions have had to be added to the 
list of concerns that preoccupied the early television production scholars. 
2.2 Television production studies and organisational change 
Television production in Britain has changed fundamentally in the last thirty 
years, just as significantly, if not as visibly, as the type of content that gets produced. 
When the early researchers of the industry were writing about television production, they 
described a relatively stable labour market environment where television professionals 
appeared to be in possession of a job for life (Schlesinger, 1987; Silverstone, 1985; Burns, 
1977). Such professionals were invariably working within the duopoly system of the BBC 
or lTV, large bureaucratic organisations with deeply embedded public service obligations 
and values. As Paterson notes, 'those recruited into the industry before the early 1980s 
had usually entered a relatively stable sector in the industry and were trained and 
employed either by the BBC or one of the lTV companies' (2001a: 498). It was a highly 
unionised environment, where labour was organised, and occupational identities were 
protected and fixed (Burns, 2001; Sparks, 1994; Saundry, 2001). As a result, entry to the 
industry was often very difficult, entrepreneurialism was discouraged, and labour 
mobility was low (cf. Darlow, 2004; Paterson, 2001 b). 
Today this has changed radically. Paterson notes that 'Where before the 1980s, 
there was controlled entry and a high level of staff jobs in broadcasting organisations, the 
onset of independent production and the end of a "closed shop" in television led to a 
profusion of new entrants willing to work within the freelance employment mode' 
(2001 b: 203). As the following chapter will explore, constant deregulation throughout the 
1980s and 1990s led in part to the introduction of multi-channel television, greater 
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competition, and a steady erosion of the power of the unions active in this field. The 
emergence of the cindie' sector is integral to this shift. Television production is now 
highly casualised, flexible and deunionised (U rsell, 1997; Paterson, 2001 a). Many 
television workers are freelance, shuttling between the cindie' sector and the increasingly 
casualised BBC and lTV companies, working on a project-by-project basis. Indeed, 'the 
working lives of most creative personnel in the television industry are marked ... by 
uncertainty' (paterson, 2001a: 498). Today's television workers are compelled to find 
work in a labour terrain of short-term or non-existent contracts, sometimes even having 
to work for free in order to build up their portfolio for the possibility of paid work. 
In this context, new studies of television production have emerged which engage 
with this transformed environment, armed with new theoretical approaches and research 
questions. Clearly, there are parallels between the research interests of the earlier 
television production studies and those carried out more recently. Decision-making, 
constraints on creative expression, effects of ideology, temporal demands of production, 
cultural and production values are all shared themes of research. Contemporary 
television production research continues to be concerned with such issues, as they are 
pivotal to an understanding of production. However, as I shall show, there are also 
significant theoretical differences, with contemporary research in television exploring 
emerging issues of subjectivity (and subjectivisation) (Ursell, 2000), casualisation 
(paterson, 2001a, 2001b; Saundry, 2001; BFI Publishing, 1999), deunionisation (Sparks, 
1994), the impact of flexible working environments on production values (Ursell, 2003), 
commercialisation (Daymon, 1997), gender issues (Willis and Dex, 2003) and ethnic 
diversity (Holgate, 2007). 
In contrast, the earlier work on television production exhibits an overwhelming 
theoretical interest in sociological questions of structure, and the impact of those 
structures (institutional, ideological, professional), on the production process. This 
structuralist approach echoes the wider theoretical preoccupations of the day (Althusser, 
1971). Analysing this earlier literature enables us to see how the television production 
environment has changed, and also how the theoretical and empirical concerns of 
research in this area have also shifted. As I shall argue, the changes which have occurred 
in the industry necessitate a return to an examination of creative labour in this industry. 
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2.2.1 Early television production studies: structure and agency 
Schlesinger's (1987) study of BBe News, Putting Reality Together, is an exemplary 
sociological study of media production. Undertaken using participant observation and 
interviews, drawing on 90 days of field work carried out between 1972 and 1976, he 
describes the production process inherent to television news production in minute 
sociological detail. Schlesinger's main empirical focus is on the decision-making process 
of media professionals working in news production, where he explores the impact of 
ideology and institutional culture on the decisions that are made about the content of the 
news. 
Schlesinger uses a Marxian analysis, drawing on Althusser's account of 'ideological 
apparatuses' (1971) in order to attempt to show how the mass media is part of the 
system of disseminating and normalising capitalist ideology. Schlesinger is concerned 
with how the news journalist's notion of news-judgements and news sense is shaped by a 
dominant ideology that is naturally resistant to radical dissent. Schlesinger and other 
sociologists from this period are concerned with what Althusser (1971) would call the 
'hidden codes' - the ideological apparatuses by which power reproduces itself by shaping 
subjects to the demands of a dominant capitalist ideology. In this sense, media workers 
are seen to be 'interpellated' by the 'rules of the established order' (ibid.: 127) and 
become part of the wider process of reproducing the dominant ideology. As Althusser 
argues: 
All the agents of production, exploitation and repression, not to speak of the 
'professionals of ideology'... must in one way or another be 'steeped' in this 
ideology in order to perform their tasks 'conscientiously'. (ibid.: 128) 
Therefore Schlesinger is concerned with understanding how a dominant ideology is 
unconsciously inculcated within BBe professional journalists. In assessing how BBe 
journalists establish a certain 'know how', he is also concerned with how 'know-how 
must take place in forms of ideological subjection' (Harris, 2002). 
Other production studies of this early period also raIse important questions 
about the way that the structural constraints within which they work tend to impact on 
the cultural producer's prized perceived autonomy. For example, Silverstone (1985) 
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examines how the expectations of a particular format impact on the autonomy of the 
production staff, through a focus on the production of one Horizon documentary. IS In 
contrast to Schelsinger's study, Silverstone focuses on the actions of an invididual 
producer, and appears to be less interested in the structure of the BBe. Silverstone 
exposes the tension between creative autonomy and the difficulties of attaining that 
autonomy within the political economic circumstances of a commercial media 
organisation. Silverstone concludes that it is difficult for a fllmmaker to realise his artistic 
and intellectual ambitions beyond the demands of a formulaic strand: 
He is faced by a narrowly bounded, deeply entrenched and persistently 
reinforced set of constraints and expectations which if he is like Martin he well 
understands; the result of political and economic and more broadly cultural 
imperatives which he will ignore consistently at his peril. (1985: 165-6) 
The research shows how the producer Martin sets out to make a different kind of 
Horizon, one that is creative and challenging (1985: 40). However, much to his own 
surprise, he ends up making a programme very similar to all the others. As he says after 
the programme is completed: 
Its an absolutely straight up and down Horizon. I have never done it before ... no, 
I don't mean in message ... the message may be more critical than many Horizons 
often are, but, no, in terms of format. (1985: 140) 
Burns (1977) also exarrunes how structural forces within the BBC impact on 
production. Like Schlesinger and Silverstone, Burns is interested in the complex interplay 
of factors involved in getting television onto the screen, but Burns' study is much more 
concerned with the internal culture of the entire BBC, the rise of 'professionalism' as a 
discourse within a practitioner community and how the internal culture of the BBC 
impacts on the production of the news that is reported. He shows how the BBC was 
obsessed with 'professionalism' and the impact of that on the 'private world' of the 
corporation. As with the other research, it is useful to see how values which are used to 
drive organisational restructuring become part of the language within the private world 
of cultural industries, as with other industries, and are taken up by the workers as norms 
which must be adhered to. This is something that is important to bear in mind when one 
considers the complex process of identity formation at work in the cultural industries, a 
15 Horizon is the BBC's flagship serious science documentary strand. 
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concern that becomes central in the more recent production studies (for example, see 
Ursell, 2000; Ross, 2002). Moreover, through a focus on professionalism, Burns hows 
how people turn an occupation into a profession, as broadcasting shifted from being a 
rather more amateurish affair concerned with public service values above all else, to an 
occupation concerned with professionalism: 'in which the central concern is with quality 
of performance in terms of standards of appraisal by fellow professionals; in brief, a shift 
from treating broadcasting as a means to treating broadcasting as an end.' (1977: 125). 
These and other studies of the period are vitally important for providing insights 
into the study of television professionals, who are often unconscious of the structures 
that impact on the decisions that they make, and ultimately the content that they 
produce.16 However, there is a very strong sense in which these studies not only depict a 
world that has now vanished - that of the stable career within a media industry - but 
also a theoretical approach which now seems outmoded and slightly old-fashioned. The 
explicit focus on structure as a determinant of content is important, but much as 
Adorno's work on the Culture Industry was accused of economic determinism, there is a 
sense in which some of this work is equally deterministic, refusing to allow cultural 
producers any significant agency in the production process. Structure seems 
overwhelmingly powerful, and agency is diminished. Yet as Bourdieu (1993) has shown 
us, in his work on the sociology of culture, the habitus of production is not over-
determining, but rather indicates a range of possibilities that can occur within it. Here we 
can begin to understand the tension between the demands of the 'field' of cultural 
production and the agency of the social agent who operates within this field but who 
cannot be reduced to a mere automaton in the process of production (see Bourdieu, 
1993). 
Indeed, Bourdieu offers a vital theoretical model for understanding cultural 
production and consumption that is crucial for my research, one that complexifies the 
relationship in this sphere between structure and agency, and that conceptualises the 
relationship between culture and the reproduction of social power: 'art and cultural 
consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a social 
16 For example, see Alvarado and Buscombe's (1978) study of the making of a television drama 
series, which explores decision-making within a creative environment; other earlier work in 
production studies reached similar findings about the hugely powerful influence of institutional 
norms on individual agency for cultural producers (see Gans, 1980, Tunstall, 1971). 
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function of legitimating social differences' (1984: 6-7). For Bourdieu the field is the 
discursive and social space that 'grounds the agent's action in objective social relations, 
without succumbing to the mechanistic determinism of many forms of sociological and 
"Marxian" analysis' (1993: 2). The habitus is the total ideationaL .. environment of a 
person, part of a system of 'durable, transposable dispositions' (Bourdieu, 1990: 53) and 
shapes how the agent will behave in the field, without ever determining it, for it allows 
for some flexibility, for the 'creative, active and inventive capacities of human agents' 
(Bourdieu, 1993: 5). As Johnson argues: 
Bourdieu's work in the sociology of culture attempts to reinsert issues such as 
the meaning and value of works into the multiple and complex set of historically 
constituted social relations which authorise and sustain them. Oohnson, 1993: 25) 
Holding Bourdieu's concept of habitus in mind is helpful when considering decision-
making in cultural production, which acknowledges the powerful shaping effect of the 
field (the structure of the organisation, ownership, ideology, capitalism) without reducing 
the agents involved in production to automata, mere subjects. As Murdock writes: 
[H]abituses are not habits. They do not entail the application of fixed rules and 
routines. Rather, they provide the basis for structured variations, in the same way 
that jazz musicians improvise around ... a theme. (1989: 243) 
2.2.2 Contemporary television production studies. 
More recent work in television continues to be concerned with questions of 
structure and agency, of creativity and constraint, and of changing professional norms. 
But crucially this research takes place within a transformed production environment, 
where deregulation has led to a massive casualisation of the industry. This research is 
therefore highly concerned with the structural changes to the organisation of creative 
production, and the implications of those changes for creative work. The new 
production environment in television is far more commercialised and precarious, a shift 
explored in the previous chapter. Some of this research explores the implications of this 
shift. Moreover, new research questions have emerged within the field, connected to 
issues such as gender, diversity, subjectivity and emotional labour. As chapter 3 will 
argue, the change in television is partly as a result of internal political dynamics and 
debates around public service broadcasting, as well as policy decisions that were taken 
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which led to the creation of Channel 4, and the formation of the indie sector. But these 
changes have also taken place within a broader context of economic, political and 
sociological transformation, a question I shall return to in the following section of this 
chapter. This research examines the impact of these changes on the ground, and how 
have they impacted on factual television production in particular. 
Born's (2004) ambitious ethnographic account of the BBC during a particularly 
turbulent period in its recent history examines the impact of massive corporate and 
cultural change within the organisation from the mid-1990s to 2003, a period spanning 
the leadership of John Birt and Greg Dyke.17 The study looks at the effect of political, 
economic and structural change within the corporation, with case study examinations of 
particular production environments such as the current affairs programme Newsnight, and 
the BBC Drama department. Born investigates the impact of casualisation, 'new 
managerialism', corporate change and constant restructuring on the internal culture of 
the BBe and in particular on the production process. Significandy, she spends some time 
describing the transformed labour market both within the BBC and the broader 
television sector (179-211). What moves her account on from previous accounts of the 
BBC is her focus on working conditions, where she describes the 'casualisation of 
creativity' (180-85); the erosion of skills (193-97), and employment diversity (and the lack 
of it) (197-208). Examining the impact of neo-liberal deregulatory policies on 
broadcasting production, she concludes that 'the last decade has seen a general 
degradation in the output of Britain's television system' (11); and places the blame firmly 
at the internal restructuring that occurred under Birt, concluding that 'Birtist 
management was responsible for eroding the BBC's creativity' (6). 
Born's anthropological approach reveals rich details which are crucial to the 
examination of the internal values and competing discourses that are shown to exist 
within the BBe. Vividly, she describes the discursive tension at the heart of the new 
BBC between the 'older' values of public service broadcasting, and the entrepreneurial, 
market-facing values of the 'new managerialism' which was introduced by John Birt 
during his tenure as Director General. As I shall explore in chapter 7, through an 
examination of production values in the industry, a similar discursive tension is evident 
in the ITPS. 
17 John Bitt was Director General of the BBC from 1992 to 2000; Greg Dyke from 2000 to 2004. 
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A rich strand of recent work has examined the implications of an increasingly 
casualised broadcasting industry. The British Film Institute (1999) carried out an 
extensive tracking study of 450 production workers between 1994 and 1998. The authors 
of the report found a highly casualised environment, causing production workers high 
levels of stress. Increasing numbers of people left television in their thirties and beyond, 
as the pressures of insecurity and constantly moving from contract to contract became 
too much. The authors found that the pivotal factors motivating their decision to leave 
the industry included a growing need for security, as well as the incompatibility of getting 
a mortgage, and having children, with a television career. Existing research suggests that 
deregulation and the increased casualisation of the industry have also been shown to 
impact negatively on equal opportunities, albeit in ways that are more connected to the 
need for security and a less stressful lifestyle, rather than direct discrimination. For 
example, as Dex and Willis (2003) show, gender barriers to career progression appear as 
a significant factor in this context, as many women face difficulties returning to the 
industry after childbirth. 
This research is vital as an empirical and theoretical backdrop to my study. 
Indeed, many of the trends that were discovered in this work have intensified since the 
1990s. Following this research, a number of publications have explored issues emerging 
from the data. For example, Paterson examines the implications of a transformed labour 
market within television, which he describes thus: 
The television labour market in Britain has been significantly transformed since 
1980 with an increase in freelance employment as a consequence of new labour 
laws and reduction in union power and membership, the rapid pace of 
technological change, and the emergence of a large, but poorly capitalized, 
independent production sector. (2001 b: 202) 
Paterson argues that this new labour context of freelancing, particularly in the 
independent sector, has opened up access to the industry, which was previously very 
much a 'closed shop' (ibid: 204). This has led to a huge rise in freelance employment, 
with 60 per cent of an estimated 28,000 people working in the British television industry 
working as freelancers (ibid). Paterson contends that casualisation has created a 
paradoxical situation where 'firms require the trust and commitment of their employees 
to sustain creativity and provide a competitive advantage in the search for commissions', 
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yet shows that this is undermined as a result of the uncertainty that exists within the 
labour market (ibid: 205). Deconstructing the 'glamour' of the industry, he describes a 
sector with high levels of poorly paid young entrants,18 and a long hours culture amongst 
all workers, with 36 per cent of the sample working more than 50 hours a week (ibid: 
206). Casualisation is shown to mean a lack of benefits for many workers, including 
pensions, sick leave, holiday pay, maternity benefits and the ability to get a mortgage 
(ibid: 208). Multiskilling, exploitation and gender issues all emerge as key considerations 
(209-13), and Paterson considers the implications of this insecure working environment 
for encouraging creativity (213). 
Meanwhile, also using the BFI data, Dex et al (2000) have explored the impact of 
uncertainty on production workers, and investigated the strategies which they use to 
negotiate this casualised labour market. As they show, risk has been individualised to the 
level of the worker, away from programme controllers and broadcasters (ibid: 285). 
Workers have to negotiate rates individually, whereas before they would have received a 
fixed salary (ibid). Their research shows that workers deal with uncertainty by building 
informal networks as a means of finding consistent work, by diversifying their income 
source, often through teaching, and by thinking of leaving television altogether (ibid.: 
283). Informal contact through building and maintaining networks was a key factor, but 
their research also shows that formal agencies and avenues of finding employment were 
rarely used (ibid: 299). Clearly, this has implications for the transparency of recruitment 
processes in the industry. 
In a related vein of analysis, Saundry (2001) and Sparks (1994) have investigated 
the impact of deregulation on the internal labour politics of the industry, exploring the 
history of this process, and also the implications of it for televison production culture. 
Savagely attacked as 'the last bastion of restrictive practices', the industry is now an 
exemplary model of free-market flexible labour (Barnatt and Starkey, 1994). As they 
show, prior to the deregulation of the 1980s, industrial relations within broadcasting 
were highly formalised, with agreements between the unions and the broadcasters 
ensuring minimum basic rates of pay, and working conditions (Saundry, 2001: 25). They 
argue that this had an impact on skill levels in the industry, where 'the industrial relations 
system within television provided for the recruitment and retention of a highly skilled 
18 Indeed, low pay was also gendered, with women earning significantly less than men (ibid: 207). 
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and trained labour force' (ibid). Unions exercised control over recruitment, and much of 
the industry was effectively a closed shop (ibid). But as the industry was radically 
restructured during the 1980s, as a result of deregulation, and with the growth of the 
independent sector, freelance working increased profoundly, weakening the power of the 
unions drastically as membership levels fell (ibid.: 27-31). In this context, a number of 
exploitative working practices have evolved, particularly in the less regulated independent 
sector, such as paying below minimum rates of pay specified in collective agreements, 
and the open-ended use of work experience (ibid.: 30). As John Willis has noted, this has 
led to 'the media equivalent of the pupil system for lawyers - only kids with well-off 
parents and good contacts need apply. More glamorous than most jobs but sweatshop 
television all the same' (Willis, 1996). This research helps us to understand the 
depoliticised working environment within independent television production, where 
there is now an almost total lack of collective bargaining for better working conditions. 
In separate research, Ursell has also examined the impact of a transformed 
production culture within the freelance television labour market in the North of 
England. Her research echoes many of the findings of the BFI research, in terms of the 
growing casualisation of the industry. She shows that exploitation is rife (2000), and that 
production values have suffered a decline as a result of the growing demands placed on 
television workers (2003). Networking also emerges as a key theme, as it does in other 
related literature on television (Ursell, 2000: 811-13; Spence, 1999). Yet differing from 
the BFI research, Ursell takes a more Foucauldian perspective, where she shows that 
television work, despite its exploitative nature, enourages a particular 'technology of the 
self' (Foucault et ai, 1988), which is associated with the demands put upon workers by 
late capitalism. For Ursell, workers seek to commodify themselves within this context, in 
order to make themselves more attractive on the labour market (2000: 822). Here, 
strategies of self-governance (Rose, 1999) are shown as vital to maintaining a career in 
the industry, encouraging 'a technology of the self which requires self-entrepreneurship' 
(Ursell, 2000: 809). Pleasure at work is seen as a key factor in this process, where 'The 
willingness of individuals to work in television production is partly to be explained by the 
tantalising possibilities for securing social recognition and acclaim, that is self-affirmation 
and public esteem, and partly by the possibilities for self-actualization and creativity (be it 
aesthetic or commercially entrepreneurial)' (ibid: 819). 
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Ursell's insights are theoretically crucial for my research, as she shows that issues 
of subjectivity and affect are vital to understanding labour markets in the cultural 
industry. Furthermore, in reference to television journalism, she shows how the new 
culture of cost-cutting and casualisation has led to an erosion of production values, 
particularly in relation to timely and expensive functions such as fact-checking. The craft 
and skill associated with television production is shown to be under threat in this new 
mode of production. 
Surveying these studies, it is clear that television production has been 
transformed in recent years. But what are the broader social, political and economic 
forces driving this transition? Can this more recent research on television production be 
placed within a historical context of global transformation? In the following section 
these questions will be explored, through an examination of the macro-changes within 
advanced capitalist societies since the 1970s, which can be seen as the pivotal decade 
when capitalism shifted to a new mode of production, leading to a new ideological 
framework, widely known as neo-liberalism. 
2.3 Social, political and economic transformation: understanding the 'creative 
economy' 
In order to understand these changes in creative labour, one must also 
understand the structural, political and sociological shifts that have accompanied them. 
Most clearly, these are: flexible accumulation and the rise of the 'knowledge economy' 
(Harvey, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994); the rise of neoliberalism (Keat and Abercrombie, 
1991; Harvey, 2005); and the social ruptures caused by 'reflexive modernisation' (cf. Beck 
et al, 1994). 
The global economic restructuring from Fordism to post-Fordism, or flexible 
accumulation (Harvey, 1990), that took place in the wake of the 'Long Downturn' 
between the 1970s and 1990s, is the crucial macro-structural factor which has impacted 
on the cultural industries in recent years. The rise of free-market neo-liberalism, which 
occurred in the wake of this economic downturn, is the political context under which 
deregulatory policies in the media and cultural sphere have occurred, leading to an 
accelerated process of marketisation within the cultural industries in the UK (and 
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globally). Together, these factors have transformed not just the cultural industries, but 
the organisation of labour, of the economy, and of the dominant hegemonic political 
values within society. Yet at the same time, longer-term sociological shifts such as 
reflexive modernisation and individualisation have taken place alongside these structural 
changes, which have impacted on society and work in a number of ways. 
2.3.1 Flexible accumulation and the 'Long Downturn' 
Before the series of economic crises that hit the global economy in 1973, and 
recurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s, capitalism had enjoyed a period of relatively 
stable growth in advanced industrial nations from the end of World War 2 in 1945. Job 
security was high, pay was steadily improving for the majority of workers, and the future 
looked bright. As Hesmondhalgh has noted 'for the "advanced" capitalist economies of 
Europe, North America and Australasia, the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s 
was one of steady economic growth, rising standards of living, and a relatively stable 
system of liberal democratic government' (2002: 85). Indeed, some economists have 
argued that this period was 'the golden age of capitalism' (Marglin and Schor, 1992). 
However, in the 1970s, this situation dramatically changed. In the advanced capitalist 
countries, profits fell markedly across all sectors, and particularly severely in 
manufacturing. Commentators have given a number of reasons for this. Harvey (1990) 
argues that international movements of capital started to undermine the stability of the 
system from the early 1960s. Others point to the increased power of labour vis-a.-vis 
capital, which led to a growth in wages, undermining profits (Armstrong et a!, 1991). 
Over-accumulation was also seen as a key factor as increased capitalist competition 
globally led to an surplus of capacity, particularly in manufacturing (Brenner, 2000: 8). 
As Perelman notes, 'New entrants from developing regions, especially East Asia, 
combined cheap labor with relatively advanced techniques, creating a sharp 
intensification of international manufacturing competition beginning in the late 1960s' 
(2003: 1282). On top of all this, there is a general consensus that the OPEC oil crisis of 
1973 acted as the catalyst to push the world into recession. 
Fundamentally, this crisis stands as a dividing line between two dominant modes 
of capitalist accumulation: Fordism and flexible accumulation. Fordism is the mode of 
production pioneered by Henry Ford in Detroit in the 1914, when he introduced the 
five-dollar, eight-hour day for his workers at Dearborn, Michigan (Harvey, 1990: 125). 
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Ford created a strictly controlled centralised production line at his plants, based on a 
strict hierarchy and on each worker performing a very specific task in a repetitive 
fashion. By dividing the labour involved in producing a car into specific acts, Ford was 
able to hugely increase productivity. The approach was hugely influential and swept the 
globe in the post-war period. As Harvey writes, 'what was special about Ford ... was his 
vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass consumption, a new 
system of the reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour control and 
management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalised, 
modernist, and populist democratic society' (1990: 126). Fordism meant routinised 
labour, devalued the need for traditional craft skills, and gave the worker practically no 
autonomy or involvement in the design and structure of the production process (ibid.: 
128). In short, it had the effect of automating human labour, creating a strict temporal 
and productive regime in the workplace, turning men into little more than machines at 
work, whose reward was then to go out and spend their money consuming the vast 
output of new products that had also been produced along similar lines of accumulation 
and production. 
With its focus on centralised, bureaucratic, hierarchical and highly automated 
production, Fordism dominated organisational and economic life in advanced capitalist 
countries around the globe until the sharp global recession of 1973. In this period 
between 1965 and 1973, the rigidities of Fordist production had became apparent: the 
long-scale planning that was needed for Fordist production was too risky, and a far more 
precarious consumer market had emerged where innovation was increasingly being called 
for in order to gain the competitive edge. As Harvey suggests: 'There were problems 
with the rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-
production systems that precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable 
growth in invariant consumer markets' (1990: 142). Heavily unionised labour markets 
also meant that the system of accumulation was rigid: companies were locked into strict 
labour contracts, and allocations, and attempts to overcome these led to the waves of 
strikes and disruptions that occurred throughout this period. As the world emerged from 
this crisis, it became clear that a new form of production was emerging that marked a sea 
change, which is perhaps best understood as flexible accumulation. 
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Flexible accumulation, the new dominant mode of capitalist accumulation that 
emerged out of the recession of 1973, has a number of key features. It is a more flexible, 
adaptive regime of accumulation and production which is better able to respond to the 
need for innovation and speed within production and labour markets. As Harvey notes: 
Flexible accumulation ... is marked by a direct confrontation with the rigidities of 
Fordism. It rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, 
products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of 
entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and 
organizational innovation. (1990: 147) 
Flexible accumulation involves a number of key economic restructurations: a new labour 
structure emerged, with a 'core' and a 'periphery' to whom lower-skill or less critical 
processes were outsourced internationally; 'just-in-time' modes of manufacturing were 
introduced; an exponential growth took place in the service industries with a 
simultaneous decline in extractive (e.g. mining and agriculture) and to a lesser extent 
trans formative (manufacturing) sectors. 19 Consumption changed, with constant product 
innovation, niche marketing, and fast fashion turnaround. There was an increasing 
polarisation in company size, with the growth of huge global conglomerates, and the 
concomitant rise in small businesses, acting as sub-contractors. Flexible accumulation 
encourages innovation, mobility, and flexibility, and has driven the rise in commodified 
knowledge, global information systems, and 'immaterial' forms of labour.20 On a global 
scale, new global financial systems emerged which broke down national boundaries, 
speculation on currency markets grew, individual nation-states had less control, and 
instead global financial markets were increasingly regulated by transnational institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Harvey, 1990: 147-64). 
2.3.2 Neo-liberalism 
As this new mode of capital accumulation emerged, so too did a new political 
ideology which facilitated the policies necessary in order to shift to a new mode of 
production, and which attempted to 'fix' the economic crisis. Advanced capitalist states 
19 See Castells (1996: 311) for a full discussion of this shift. 
20 The concept of 'immaterial labour' comes from Lazzarato (1996), who argues that in today's 
economy, work is becoming increasingly intellectual, cognitive, and knowledge-based. 
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responded to the crisis politically by attacking labour movements, and withdrawing from 
the state intervention policies of the post-war period, where government spending would 
be used to sustain economic growth where consumer spending was insufficient (Harvey, 
1990: Part II). This was followed by cutbacks in public spending, and a steady process of 
deregulation. This formed a central part of neoliberalism's dismantling of so-called 'Big 
government' (ibid.: 164-70). Harvey argues that neoliberalism represents a doctrine that 
'human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade' (Harvey, 2005: 2). New Left writers such as 
Hall (1988) have mounted a convincing critique of neoliberalism, arguing that it is a 
class-based ideology that seeks to dismantle the welfare state. Moreover, writers such as 
Gill (1996) have suggested that neoliberalism is a disciplinary regime which seeks to 
legitimate global capitalist domination, through the hegemony of 'progress' associated 
with 'market civilisation'. And it has been incredibly successful, with Harvey arguing that 
now 'it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live 
in, and understand the world' (2005: 3). 
Neoliberalism marks a radical ideological shift within the politics of the 
industrialised world, with its almost religious belief in the power of the lightly regulated 
free market to guarantee economic growth. Neoliberalism accompanied the rise of 
flexible accumulation, and was seen in its most extreme versions in the US and UK, 
under President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Neoliberal 
politicians forced through a series of measures to undermine the power of the unions, 
giving companies far greater power over hiring and firing and reducing wages in real 
terms. Governments across the political spectrum attempted to lower labour's bargaining 
powers in order to reduce wage costs. As Brenner has argued, 'Credit was restricted 
through the raising of interest rates, which forced unprofitable firms out of business, and 
weakened labour still further through the spread of unemployment' (Brenner, 1998: 181) 
These political and economic changes helped to produce a dominant 
entrepreneurial culture of competitive individualism, which advocated the belief that 
individuals should be 'freed' from the state, to pursue their own ambitions within a 
market capitalist society (Harvey, 1990: 170-72) . As social security spending was cut 
back, and as job security waned, so too did an ideology emerge of self-reliance, 
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consumensm, enterprise and individualism. Neo-liberalism not only became the 
dominant political ideology of advanced capitalist states, but its focus on enterprise, 
entrepreneurialism and individualism can be seen to have produced a new cultural 
climate where these values were instilled in subjects through the media, advertising and 
other modes of discourse. As I shall explore in chapter 5, the ideological structures of 
neoliberalism are vital to understanding subjectivities at work in the cultural economy, as 
these values are clearly evident in the subjectivities of workers in the research that has 
been done. 
2.3.3 Reflexive modernisation and sociological transformation 
As well as these macro-structural and political transformations, a set of 
sociological shifts has also occurred with important ramifications for the study of 
cultural workers. The key sociological change of the last thirty years revolves around the 
transition to 'reflexive modernisation', as a means of understanding particular trends 
within contemporary society, such as individualisation and 'risk', and the increasing 
reflexivity of social agents to make 'lifestyle' choices (Giddens, 1991; Beck et al, 1994). 
Reflexive modernisation's theorisation on the individualisation of identity, and on the 
growing risk within late modernity, provides useful models for understanding new 
modes of work within postmodern societies (Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002). 
There has been intense controversy within sociology as to whether these shifts 
do indeed register a new mode of society, geared around the individual, or whether in 
fact reflexive modernisation offers an essentially neoliberal conception of selfhood, where 
the individual is seen to be a reflexive, planning, adaptive agent, able to meet the 
challenges of a new flexible mode of capitalism (Mestrovic, 1998; O'Brien, 1998). 
Indeed, some have suggested that the reflexive modernisation agenda, and its 
enthusiastic adoption by central left governments (particularly in the UK under New 
Labour), with its uncritical acceptance of capitalist relations, its emphasis on active 
citizenship, and a shift from equality of outcomes to equality of opportunities, can be 
understood as a mechanism of control of subjects under neo-liberalism (Avis, 2000; 
Barnett, 2002). As Rose and Miller have argued, such a shift in leftist thinking can be 
seen as a neoliberal configuration of the subject, where: 
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... the political subject is less a social citizen with powers and obligations deriving 
from membership of a collective body, than an individual whose citizenship is 
active. This citizenship is to be manifested not in the receipt of public largesse, 
but in the energetic pursuit of personal fulfilment and the incessant calculations 
which are to enable this to be achieved. (1992: 1) 
However, despite these tensions, it is clear that reflexive modernisation theory is useful 
in terms of describing particular central features of late modernity, and it is also helpful 
in thinking through questions of reflexive selfhood within contemporary society. 
Reflexive modernisation theory seeks to explain the new set of conditions that 
have emerged as a result of a fragmentation of the social order within late modernity, 
taken to refer to the period of history after the Second World War. Following reflexive 
modernisation, late modernity is characterised by the end of meta-narratives, and a 
breakdown of traditional structures and institutions such as the family, through to the 
nation-state. For Beck, reflexive modernisation is the 'radicalisation of modernity' which 
disrupts the traditional industrial order and creates the possibility of another kind of 
modernity (1994). It is 'reflexive' on the basis that it represents a modernity that is 
increasingly focused on its own institutions, processes, outcomes and risks, that is 
explicitly and implicitly concerned with its own trans formative implications. Reflexive 
modernity is an era defined by self-confrontation and individualisation as the universal 
values, traditions, practices, politics and identities of modernity are called into question 
and replaced by multiplicity, fluidity and an awareness of social construction (Beck et aI, 
1994; Giddens, 1991). 
2.3.3.1 Individualisation 
The shift to reflexive modernity has been seen to have significant consequences 
for the theorising of identity. Theorists such as Beck, amongst many others, have argued 
that as an outcome of such shifts, 'individualisation is itself becoming the social structure 
of second modernity' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 1), replacing the collective social 
forms and categories that previously anchored subjects, and in many ways determined 
their life course. Individualisation occurs as people are disembedded from traditional 
social ties of kinship, class and geography and become more fluid and mobile in their 
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social relationships.21 As Lash writes, 'individualism is a result of the retreat of the classic 
institutions: state, class, nuclear family, ethnic group' (2002: ix-x). With the shift from 
industrial to post-industrial societies, the rise of secularism, the impact of new 
technologies, and increased globalisation, the traditional foundations of ascribed and 
seemingly fixed identities have been increasingly eroded and displaced. 
In this context, subjects gam increased choice and agency over their life 
trajectories. Increasingly freed from the external constitution of their life course, they 
instead come to impose their own set of meaning and definitions on the 'self' - a shift of 
authority over the 'self' from 'without' to 'within' (Heelas, 1996, 2). However with these 
new freedoms come new risks and uncertainties that individuals must negotiate in their 
day-to-day lives, and within the processes of self-construction. In this context, and 
lacking external guides for one's life course, individuals must place themselves at the 
centre of this process and reflexively plan their life narratives. The 'reflexive self' 
(Giddens, 1991) of late modernity is a subject immersed within an inescapable project of 
self knowledge and self-actualisation: the choices subjects make about their private and 
public lives become increasingly significant to the production of identity, surpassing or 
transforming the impact of traditionally dominant predictors. As such, the choices an 
individual makes in relation to education, work and personal relationships become 
dominant definers of the self. Subjects reflexively engage with - and manage - the 
freedoms as well as the risks afforded by a widening of opportunities for self-
construction in an attempt to maintain a coherent but adaptable self-narrative. Giddens 
notes that 'In the settings of. . .late modernity ... the self, like the broader institutional 
contexts in which it exists, has to be reflexively made ... amid a puzzling diversity of 
options and possibilities' (1991: 3). 
However, these new freedoms are laced with the risk of failure, and that risk is 
devolved away from the state to the individual. Here, responsibility for one's life course 
is delegated to the self, so failure too is individualised. As Bauman contends: 
21 'Disembedded' is the term that Giddens uses to best describe how individuals and institutions 
are 'set free' from traditional modes under the dynamics of 'reflexive modernity'. See Giddens 
(1991). 
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'individualization' consists in transforming human 'identity' from a 'given' into a 
'task' - and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task 
and for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance. (2002: xv) 
As such, subjects in individualised societies must take responsibility for themselves. If 
things go wrong, the answer lies not with society, but with their own personal failings. 
The risk that Beck (1992) describes is individualised, particularly in the sphere of 
employment, as full-time employment over the course of the life cycle drastically reduces. 
This has led to a situation where individuals are compelled, to become 'entrepreneurs of 
the self' (Burchell et al, 1991: 300); to realize their 'true identities' by means of looking 
inwards and improving themselves. As Bauman puts it, 'Modernity replaces 
determination of social standing with compulsive and obligatory self-determination' 
(Bauman, 2002: xv). 
The concepts of 'risk' and individualisation are vital for understanding work in 
the independent television industry, as they provide a theoretical way of understanding 
the challenges facing subjects in these new conditions. Cultural labour offers a clear site 
of self-actualisation within an individualised society, where the tropes of choice, 
autonomy and freedom characterise late modern biographies, and allows individuals to 
set about planning and living 'a life of one's own' (ibid). However, in a climate of 
pervasive risk, and through the disciplinary context of individualised failure, cultural 
producers are less inclined to take risks, to innovate, for fear of falling off the 'tightrope' 
created by a society of individualised insecurity (Beck, 2000). Yet, despite its explanatory 
power, there are significant theoretical problems with the reflexive modernisation thesis, 
in particular its tendency to sideline questions of class, gender and race as old categories. 
Reflexive modernisation contributes significantly to the theoretical approach taken in 
this thesis, which seeks to assess how cultural workers come to identify with new modes 
of autonomous labour, and how they plan their careers in the midst of overwhelming 
risk and uncertainty. As such, the notion of reflexive selfhood is central to such an 
investigation into how freelance television workers negotiate questions of self-
actualisation, 'good work', and risk, and in so doing construct a life trajectory in these 
new times. However, there are limits to the contribution that this argument can make to 
understanding the experiences of individuals within the cultural industries, particularly in 
terms of questions of class, power and subjectivity. 
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2.3.3.2 Neoliberalism by another name? Individualisation and 'governmentality' 
Reflexive modernisation theory has been criticised by a number of commentators 
who argue that the 'old' political-economic categories of class, gender and race are 
sidelined through its normative focus on 'individualisation' and selfhood (cf. Mouzelis, 
2001). It has been criticised for failing to take on board the fact that some are more able 
to pursue their project of reflexive selfhood than others (Leggett, 2002: 425). In short, it 
sidelines the political, economic, and ideological rationale for reflexive modernisation, by 
focusing on the cultural. For example, examining Giddens' cultural and technological 
reading of globalisation, Benton argues that in fact economic globalisation 'is an 
important strategic weapon in the hands of politically and economically powerful groups 
and institutional complexes, not a secular tendency of a certain phase of "modernity'" 
(Benton, 1999: 47). In short, reflexive modernisation fails to acknowledge the continuing 
unequal stratification of life-chances and social position as a result of the logic of market 
capitalism (Leggett, 2002: 434). This is a valid critique, borne out in the empirical analysis 
of this thesis which clearly shows the impact of these social structures on people's ability 
to progress within the labour market of television. 
Is reflexive modernisation just neoliberalism by another name? Foucault's 
concept of governmentality is a useful theoretical way of understanding the significance 
of how reflexive modernisation theory has been taken up in the British context by New 
Labour (Barnett, 2002). For Foucault, governmentality is concerned with the 'conduct of 
conduct', the means by which we are encouraged to act on ourselves in certain ways that 
suit the prevailing neoliberal climate, allowing us to understand the paradoxical 
simultaneous occurrence of manipulation and freedom (Hodgson, 2001). Foucault 
described governmentality as the way in which contemporary subjects are governed 
through self-regulation, arguing that: 
The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way 
they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think government. Governing 
people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force 
people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with 
complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and 
processes through which the self is constructed or modified by oneself. 
(Foucault, 1999: 162) 
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It explains how control over political subjects is managed through the management of 
freedom. Here the management of subjectivity is linked to subjection; we are controlled 
by the very aspects of society which appear to make us free. As Barnett argues, 'In this 
interpretation, essentially neoliberal modes of government rely on modes of power 
which work through the freedoms and nurtured capacities of the governed' (2002: 314). 
Reflexive modernisation's focus on the autonomous, choosing individual can be seen in 
this poststructuralist reading as the ideal political subject for the neoliberal project. As I 
shall explore in my analysis, this insight is particularly useful when thinking about the 
control of subjects within creative labour markets who willingly comply with their 
subjection to negative working conditions because of the attractions of 'creative' work. 
For example, using the theory of governmentality, in chapter 5 I explore how the 
discourse of individualisation functions as a means of control within the precarious 
labour market of television production, as actors are forced to fall back on their self as a 
means of understanding the 'compulsory peformativity' that operates within this 
deregulated working sphere. A Foucauldian and Bourdieusian theoretical approach, 
which is evident in some of the recent research in this area, can deepen the theory of 
reflexive modernisation by attending to such questions. A Foucauldian approach allows 
us to consider how 'freedom' operates within late modernity as a means of control 
(Rose, 1989, 1999), an issue that is directly central to issues of autonomous labour with 
the 'creative industries'. Bourdieu's notion of 'field' and 'cultural capital' allows us to 
understand how class and cultural capital work to structure cultural labour markets, 
excluding individuals for socially determined reasons (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986, 1993). 
2.4 A renewed analysis of cultural production 
Acknowledging these material, ideological and sociological transformations, 
recent studies of cultural production have approached the field with fresh theoretical 
insights. This literature has examined the rise of networking, the appearance of new 
socialities in the workplace, new modes of emotional labour, and the emergence of 
particular forms of selfhood and subjectivity amongst cultural workers, which it is argued 
54 
are aligned to a 'technology of the self encouraged by neo-liberallate capitalism.22 This 
work is disparate, encompassing a broad range of concerns and creative occupations, 
often polemical , and indicative of potential new research routes and methodologies. 
Giving an exhaustive account of this literature would be impracticaL However, from a 
theoretical, methodological and political perspective, particular aspects of this work are 
central to the approach undertaken in this thesis. 
2.4.1 Flexible accumulation and the organisation of cultural production 
Responding to macro-changes in society and economy, cultural production 
researchers on a global level have examined the implications of flexible accumulation on 
the structure, evolution, and management of the cultural industries. Influential work has 
emerged from the field of human geography and economic sociology, investigating 
issues such as 'clustering' (pratt, 2004a), co-location (pratt, 2005, 2006), cultural 
regeneration and gentrification (Zukin, 1982), and globalisation (Scott, 2000, 2004, 2005). 
This work has been closely linked to questions of urban geography and culturally led 
regeneration, and has used empirical methodologies in order to investigate the material 
features of creative environments. Other work has explored the impact of flexible 
accumulation on cultural production from the perspective of the media or cultural 
organisation itself, exploring the changing economic and organisational structures of 
cultural production (e.g. Blair, 2000; Randle et ai, 2003). 
Flexible accumulation within media production has meant that there has been a 
process of decentralisation and a rise in casualisation: increasingly key creative functions 
are carried out by networks of companies, who employ people largely on a contract 
freelance project basis. As Curran et ai argue: 'post-Fordist production methods have, 
among other things, introduced decentralised networks of companies and highly skilled, 
flexible and professional workforces' (2000: 27). Crucially, flexible accumulation has 
meant that media organisations outsource more of the creative work of cultural 
22 For an excellent overview of the nature of contemporary cultural work which explores 
these debates in detail, see Banks (2007). In this book, the author assesses how different 
sociological traditions have sought to understand the creative, cultural worker, and questions 
whether the creative worker is the archetypal creative, autonomous agent, or purely a victim 
of the industrialisation and commodification of culture within capitalism. Banks' focus on the 
nature of creative work and his theorisation of the tension between creativity and neoliberal 
capitalism is highly relevant to this thesis, which shares many of the same concerns. 
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production and concentrate on the core functions of financial operations, distribution 
and commissioning. 
A number of researchers have examined cultural production under conditions of 
flexible accumulation, Scott (2005) has focused on Hollywood, exploring the distributed 
geography of cultural production, and has made useful links to the organisation of 
cultural industries generally. Miller (2005) has analysed the outsourcing of Hollywood 
production processes, in what he calls that 'New International Division of Labor' 
(NICL). Pratt (1997, 2002, 2006) has drawn on human geography to explore the creative 
ecology in a number of spheres including advertising, and new media, in places such as 
San Francisco and Soho, London. This research has pointed out the densely interrelated 
and highly mobile spatial and human geographies of creative labour markets. Networks 
are the ubiquitous organising dynamic of these industries, in terms of recruiting, finding 
work, sharing knowledge, and support (pratt, 1997, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Scott, 2000, 
2005). In the highly casualised, flexible labour markets of the cultural industries, this 
networked organisational dynamic enables individuals to negotiate risk, develop social 
capital and gain crucial industry knowledge which acts as a means of competitive 
advantage. Therefore, this work shows us the crucial importance of place as a way of 
understanding the dynamics of cultural production. Despite the so-called 'death of 
distance' (Cairncross, 1998), this research has shown that in fact the opposite largely 
holds true in creative industries: proximity to colleagues and competitors is crucial as 
'clusters' of production are the dominant model for successful and high-growth creative 
ecologies. 
2.4.1.2 Network society and network sociality 
In such an environment, interaction between firms and between individuals often 
takes place within networks. Here, we are dealing with two separate issues. Firstly, the 
economic structure of production and of organisation has become increasingly 
decentralised and networked (Castells, 1996). Secondly, research has pointed to the 
appearance of forms of 'network sociality' within late capitalist labour markets, 
particularly amongst individuals working in the cultural industries (Wittel, 2001). Clearly, 
these two issues are connected, but it is important to think through the nature of the 
connection. The 'network society' does not necessarily automatically produce 'network 
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sociality', but rather that network sociality emerges as a response to a) information 
communications technology transformations which facilitate networked modes of 
communication (i.e. email, texts, mobile phones, instant messaging and social networking 
websites23); b) precarious labour markets, where individuals need to find new ways of 
finding work and making contacts; c) as a vastly technologically intensified form of the 
networking that has actually always occurred within creative labour markets. While there 
is an obvious link between the network society and 'network sociality', it is important to 
recognise that network sociality is not purely a determined feature of the network 
society, but reflects both macro-changes, and also internal specificities within particular 
creative labour markets. 
But what is meant by the term 'network society'? Castells has argued that 
fundamental changes in communications technology, most importantly the development 
of the Internet and instantaneous global communications systems, mean that we have 
entered the age of the 'network society' (1996). For Castells, 'A technological revolution, 
centered around information technologies, is reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material 
basis of society.' (1996: 1). Echoing Harvey's (1990) work on flexible accumulation, 
Castells argues that in the network society: 
Capitalism itself has undergone a process of profound restructuring, 
characterized by greater flexibility in management; decentralization and 
networking of firms both internally and in their relationships to other firms; 
considerable empowering of capital vis-a.-vis labour, with the concomitant 
decline of influence of the labor movement; increasing individualization and 
diversification of working relationships. (1996: 1) 
In this context, labour has fundamentally changed, as a tension emerges between the 
global co-ordination of capital, and the individualisation of labour, or 'between the bare 
logic of capital flows and the cultural values of human experience' (1996: 476). In this 
restructured context of networked capitalism, and as creative workers are increasingly 
freelance, mobile, and have no fixed stable workplace, the network becomes increasingly 
important in terms of finding work, socialising, sharing information and learning new 
skills. Castells' magisterial thesis has been criticised by a number of writers for tending 
towards technological determinism, and for over-playing the effects of these changes on 
23 Social networking web sites are becoming increasingly popular, such as www.facebook.com. 
which at last count had over 66 million active users (Facebook, 2008). 
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everyday life (Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Calabrese, 1999); however, his work is still 
important to any understanding of work and communication in the current period. 
Exploring the consequences of the shift to a network society, Wittel (2001) has 
argued that network sociality functions within the cultural industries as a new means of 
sociality, one that is fleeting, ephemeral, intense, but ultimately shallow and 
individualised. His research is useful for thinking through the implications of the 
organisation of work, and the potential for exclusion that occurs in the 'guest list' 
mentality. As McRobbie has noted, work in the creative economy 'requires endurance 
and stamina', where networking, and attending the right parties, with no guarantee of 
financial return, is par for the course (2004: 195). However, a lack of empirical depth to 
Wittel's work, coupled with a lack of attention on a specific industry, means that one is 
left querying the overall applicability of his work to the generically defined 'cultural 
industries'. 
More grounded work confirms that networking is indeed a vital feature of 
seeking competitive advantage in the creative workplace. Under these new conditions, 
networking becomes central to finding work, as Ursell (1997) and Spence (1999) have 
examined in relation to the television industry. People are employed on the basis of 
'reputation and familiarity, conveyed in a mix of personal acquaintance, kinship, past 
working connections, and past achievements' (Ursell, 2000: 811). Indeed, as Ursell points 
out, in this creative environment 'networking as a considered effort of self-enterprise is 
the norm. Those who do not or cannot network are substantially disadvantaged' (ibid.: 
813). The ability to join the networks is seen as a decisive factor in ensuring optimum 
access to work opportunities in an uncertain industry; as Paterson writes, 'many 
producers use a limited pool of known colleagues for productions and entering one of 
these networks can be difficult' (2001: 515). Similarly McRobbie points to the pre-
eminence of networking as the dominant paradigm for finding work, which she suggests 
has a relationship to the 'club culture sociality' which is prevalent for contemporary 
young people (McRobbie 2002a: 521). But as she points out, this creates new forms of 
opacity and discrimination in cultural labour markets where one's ability to find work is 
predicated on one's ability to network after hours: 
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[I]he club culture question of 'are you on the guest list?' is extended to 
recruitment and personnel, so that getting an interview for contract creative work 
depends on informal knowledge and contacts, often friendships. (2002a: 523) 
2.4.2 Casualisation and precarious labour 
Another major issue that has been the subject of focus in much recent cultural 
production research is the growth of casualised, 'precarious' labour in the 'middle layers' 
of society, which is particularly noticeable in creative labour markets. In the cultural 
industries, these trends have been particularly pronounced, and have been examined by 
researchers. Recent studies have pointed out the impact of flexible accumulation on 
working lives in cultural industries in fashion (11cRobbie, 1998), flim (Blair and Rainnie, 
2000), television (Ursell, 2000; Paterson, 2001) music (Negus, 1992; Toynbee, 2000; 
Hesmondhalgh, 1998) and other areas of creative labour. Considering the impact of 
flexible accumulation on television specifically in the UK, Ursell argues that 'the size of 
permanent staffs with terrestrial producer-broadcasters has diminished, casualisation of 
the labour force has increased, entry to the industry is more difficult and less well 
rewarded or supported, average earnings have dropped, and working terms and 
conditions have deteriorated' (2000: 805). Paterson also points to the transformed labour 
market in British television: 'freelance employment on short-term contracts became 
normative in the early 1990s with inevitable consequences for career patterns and with a 
major effect on the creative environment within which television production work was 
carried out' (2001: 496). Born echoes this in her research on the BBC, arguing that 'One 
of the most striking developments in the broadcasting industry in the eighties and 
nineties was the casualisation of employment, evident in the drift away from permanent 
staff jobs and towards a reliance on short term contracts and freelancing' (2004: 180). 
Furthermore, Sparks (1994) shows how, in the face of massive pressures to cut costs, 
independent production companies in the 1990s operated by maintaining a skeleton 
staff, and contracting in freelancers when commissions were won. The longitudinal 
research project for the BFI (British Film Institute) on the working lives of people 
employed in television showed how workers were forced to cope with far greater levels 
of uncertainty, and increasingly needed to rely on networks of friends and colleagues to 
find work (BFI 1999). They were increasingly responsible for maintaining their own 
training, developing creative ideas on their own time, and sustaining good relationships 
with powerful figures such as commissioning editors. As Paterson argues, 'these 
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requirements had to be fulfilled with no certainty of work beyond the present 
commission or project as structures evolved and changed' (2001: 497). 
It is clear that the new modalities of work in the cultural industries, which are 
largely freelance, flexible and entrepreneurial, have been seen by some researchers as 
indicative of how we are all increasingly having to negotiate our working lives in a state 
that is 'permanently transitional' (McRobbie, 2004). If the early cultural production 
research took place in relatively stable environments where nearly all of the staff would 
have had permanent jobs (e.g. Schlesinger, 1987; Burns, 1977; Silverstone, 1985), then 
new research in this area has begun to examine the cultural impact of flexible 
accumulation and casualisation in cultural production (e.g. Ursell, 1997,2003; Paterson, 
2001). As McRobbie argues, 'There has ... been a neglect of the terrain of experience, 
that is to do with how, in this case, cultural workers make sense of what they do and 
with how they explain their own pathways through the insecure and volatile fields of 
creative labour' (2000: 256). 
Therefore, for some writers, creative labour acts as a template for new modes of 
working within late capitalism (e.g. McRobbie, 2004; Ross, 2004; Lazzarato, 1996). 
Certainly, the shift in creative labour echoes wider transformations in the nature of work 
in late capitalism. Flexible accumulation, coupled with the dismantling of unionised 
labour, has also caused a huge rise in far more precarious labour relations. This process 
has occurred partly as a result of the flexible employment structures created under 
conditions of flexible accumulation. This has led writers such as Handy to talk of 
'portfolio workers': 
Entering this zone of the world of work obliges us to rethink many fundamental 
assumptions of our lives. For one thing, we will have to abandon the metaphor 
of the line - always an upward-tending one, we'd like to think - as the organising 
design of our autobiographies ... .Instead, portfolio living forces us to think in 
terms of the circle, something like a pie chart with different segments marked off 
for different occupations, each coloured for kind and degree of hoped-for 
remuneration.(Handy, 1995: 26-7) 
While Handy's account is celebratory, in fact for many people 'portfolio work' has 
merely meant a series of insecure and low-status service jobs (cf. Thompson et ai, 2000) 
Moreover, the argument that creative workers are 'pioneers of the new economy' for 
over-privileging the figure of the artist, and ignoring the fact that precarious and unpaid 
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work has always been a feature of capitalism for those without power (such as migrant 
workers, domestic labour, 'grey economy' labour) (Vishmidt, 2005). Such critics argue 
that it is only because creative labour is more visible, as a result of the class of people 
undertaking it, that it has been noticed in this way. As Vishmidt contends: 
[W]hat may also be instructive in the uses of 'precariousness', especially those 
that try to critically appropriate the figure of the artist as the ideal pliant and 
omni-creative subject of capital, is the omission of the ordinary invisibility that 
always sustained the free movement of capital, Keynesian or networked: the 
flexible, informal, spontaneously value-adding sites of housework, personal care, 
seasonal and surreptitious labour - the disposable labour that was always at the 
core of the process if not the narrative of accumulation. (Vishmidt, 2005: 40) 
2.4.2.1 'Immateriallabor' and precarity 
Another strand of work which has assessed creative labour, but which comes 
from a rather different theoretical and political perspective, is analysis utilising 
Autonomist Marxist theory, in particular the work of Hardt and Negri (2000), Virno 
(2003) and Lazzarato (1996). This work seeks to explain changes to work through the 
concept of 'immaterial labor' and 'precarity' as a means of gaining a purchase on shifts 
within the mode of production in late capitalism. Immaterial labour describes the 
transformed nature of work, where labour is increasingly affective and knowledge based 
(Hardt, 1999; Lazzarato, 1996). Paradoxically echoing the management theorists of the 
'new economy' (Leadbeater, 1999; Knell, 2000), the three key aspects of this new 
production paradigm are described as: 'the communicative labour of industrial 
production that has newly become linked in informational networks, the interactive 
labour of symbolic analysis and problem solving, and the labour of the production and 
manipulation of effects' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 30). It is described as 'labor that 
produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or 
communication' (ibid.: 2000: 290). This concept, which places the production of 
knowledge, communication and culture at the centre of changes to capitalism, has acted 
as a theoretical catalyst for researchers attempting to mount a critical analysis of the 
nature of work in the cultural and creative industries (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 3) 
According to these theorists, immaterial labour has emerged under the 
conditions of flexible accumulation, as a direct result of capital's dynamic of constant 
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growth. Hardt and Negri's (2000) analysis of contemporary capitalism argues that work 
has been transformed by the widespread use of computers, and that it increasingly 
involves the manipulation of symbolic information. Yet, in opposition to the notion of 
the economy becoming more 'informational', they see labour practices as becoming 
more homogenised, as workers modify their actions through use, through a process of 
constant interactivity, 'along the model of computer operation' (Hardt, 1999). 
Furthermore, they contend that as labour becomes increasingly affective, and 
emotional, then contact and interaction also become more important. On the one hand, 
this has negative consequences in that late capitalism seeks to link knowledge, creativity, 
thought to management - imprisoning the capitalist worker through the workings of 
desire, emotion, knowledge and sociality (Seymour, 2005: 13). Yet on the other hand, as 
a result of these changes Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that labour has become more co-
operative, involving networks and new types of sociality. 
From this analysis, the Marxian leap is made which claims that 'immaterial labor 
thus seems to provide the potential for a kind of spontaneous and elementary 
communism' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 294). Immaterial labour, whilst ostensibly a key 
part of capital's dominance over the individual, holds within it the embryonic potential 
for a contestation of the capital's power. Foti has even announced that 'the precariat is to 
postindustrialism as the proletariat was to industrialism' (Foti, cited in Seymour, 2005: 8). 
Moreover, Neilson and Rossiter have argued that immaterial labour contains 
'potentialities that spring from workers' own refusal of labour and subjective demands 
for flexibility - demands that in many ways precipate capital's own accession to 
interminable restructuring and rescaling (2005: 1). 
As Hesmondhalgh has argued, 'It is this combination of rampantly optimistic 
Marxism, combined with a poststructuralist concern with questions of subjectivity and 
affect that has helped to make Hardt and Negri's work so popular amongst 
contemporary left intellectuals' (2007: 3). Certainly, there has been an explosion in the 
popularity of the concept of 'immaterial labour', particularly amongst those who have 
found it useful as a way of understanding the contemporary policy focus on creative 
industries, and the apparent injunction towards particular modes of working. Following 
on from this work, a number of writers have made use of the phrase 'precarity', to 
describe the new relation between work and capital which has occurred under the 
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conditions of immaterial labour (Neilson and Rossiter, 2005; Iles, 2005; Tsianos and 
Papadopolous, 2006). As Iles argues "'Precariousness" and "precarious work" have 
rapidly become terms for thinking through the collapse of the distinction between labour 
and non-labour and the expansion of capitalist forms of valorisation over all aspects of 
life' (Iles, 2005: 34). However, the term has become a rather 'catch-all' phrase, used to 
describe a wide variety of different forms of flexible labour, which are seen as 
exploitative and include temporary, seasonal, illegal work, as well as other 'precarious' 
aspects of life such as housing, debt, relationships and the decline of welfare provision, 
and as such has lost much of its explanatory or theoretical power. Moreover, little 
explanation has been given as to why the figure of the creative worker has been used as 
being totemic of transformations to the landscape of work, or as a 'model precarian' 
(Vishmidt, 2005: 39). Indeed, as Vishmidt has argued, such a theoretical leap fails to 
acknowledge the precarious sites of housework, personal care, and other forms of 
invisible labour, and as such 'risks embedding itself precisely in the terms that it is 
interrogating - the dogma of "creativity'" (ibid: 40). 
Useful as this work is in terms of drawing attention to these issues, and to the 
politics of 'precarity', the work that has been carried out in its name has been highly 
speculative and lacking in empirical evidence (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 4). It fails to ground 
its assumptions in research on the cultural industries, and moreover, the claim that 
immaterial labour holds within it the seeds for a radical transformation of capitalism 
seems rather fanciful in the current historical moment, to say the least. Indeed, the very 
concept of 'immaterial labor' has been roundly critiqued by commentators who argue 
that it represents a naive celebration of the power of labour against capital, and that it 
overlooks the fact that labour continues to be, for the majority of people in the world, all 
too 'material'. As Thompson argues: 
Labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity 
form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy. Its physicality 
or otherwise is wholly irrelevant. Knowledge and intangible assets, whether in 
services or any other form, can be calculated, rationalised, rule-governed and 
ultimately commodified. (Thompson, 2005) 
Indeed, knowledge workers who identify and solve problems and manipulate symbols 
and ideas, constitute only 10-15 per cent of the working population in both the UK and 
the UK (Thompson et al, 2000). Most actual growth has actually occurred in low-skill, 
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low wage jobs such as serving, waiting, guarding, cleaning and catering (Crouch et al, 
1999). 
Despite these crucial criticisms, this work has opened up an important debate 
around the political and social implications of the appropriation of culture by capital. For 
example, Neilson and Rossiter (2005), along with other writers, have shown how creative 
industries policy neglects the precarity of creative work in two key ways: firstly by 
refusing to acknowledge the insecure and precarious conditions facing cultural workers; 
and secondly by ignoring the fragile ecology of cultural production by reducing all 
analysis to the empirical determinism of mapping documents, feasibility studies and value 
chains.24 This work also opens up the possibility of a post-individualistic politics, where 
the idea is explored of individualisation giving way to 'new productive singularities' 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: 395). As McRobbie has argued, this allows us to consider how 
'Work (and here creative work) can become a site for re-socialisation at the heart of 
everyday life' (2004: 199). 
2.4.3 Understanding the 'cultural economy': subjectivity, affect and emotional 
labour 
Two issues can be seen to arise in particular strands of the work outlined above. 
The work emerging from human geography and management studies is rich in empirical 
detail, but arguably fails on occasion to analyse the sociological, political and cultural 
consequences of the new configuration of creative labour. Conversely, the 'precarity' 
work, which examines the rise of immaterial labour and focuses on creative labour as 
both a site of precarity, and also a utopian space for resistance, exhibits a failure to 
provide empirical evidence, thereby addressing the political question, but failing to 
address the sociological dynamics of production. However, it does draw our attention to 
the crucial issues of subjectivity and affect which are increasingly central to creative 
labour. 
In this final section of the literature review, I explore the work that examines 
these micro issues of subjectivity, autonomy and emotional labour, at a sociological level, 
24 Also see Hesmondhalgh for a more in-depth discussion on this issue (2007: 4) 
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through empirical research within a cultural industry. Usefully, much of this work is 
grounded in sociological analyses of specific cultural industries, and it moves the debate 
forward providing exciting new theoretical insights into creative labour as a whole. This 
work suggests that questions of identity, subjectivity and affect are vital in understanding 
the macro-structures of creative labour, moving us beyond a deterministic approach, but 
one that is still attentive to structural questions. Despite the clear differences within the 
fields of study, and the varied mode of analysis, a critical survey of this literature shows 
that there are also striking similarities within the creative labour markets that are studied 
by these authors. Here I shall examine the key themes that have emerged from this 
sociological analysis, and consider their implications for this study of creative labour. 
2.4.3.1 Pleasure at work: the affective demands of creative labour 
The issue that emerges consistently from this research is the pleasure which 
cultural workers derive from their work, and the enthusiasm with which they launch 
themselves into their chosen careers. This suggests that creative work is a clear site of 
'emotional labour', which Hochschild identifies as a key element of labour in an 
increasingly service economy (Hochschild, 1983). Emotional labour involves 'deep 
acting', where workers employ their emotional lives as part of the labour process. It is a 
process that signifies increasing management control over the personal, traditionally 
'non-work' elements of our lives, for as Hochschild contends, 'All companies, but 
especially paternalistic, non-union ones, try as a matter of policy to fuse a sense of 
personal satisfaction with a sense of company well-being and identity' (ibid: 132). Indeed, 
for emotional workers, 'emotion work, feeling rules, and social exchange have been 
removed from the private domain and placed in a public one, where they are processed, 
standardized, and subjected to hierarchical controL' (ibid: 153) 
Of course, creative labour has always been a 'labour of love', but this signifies 
something new. The available research shows that many people's experience of cultural 
production is one of (self) exploitation, inequality and exclusion. A striking feature of 
recent research is the re-emergence of gender, ethnic and class inequalities, particularly 
around issues of access and employment practices. Gill (2002) and McRobbie (2002b) 
have pointed to the exclusionary nature of network culture, where to find work you have 
to be part of the 'club culture', and hang out with contacts in trendy bars. Yet this mode 
of human capital is only available for those with the stamina and ability to let work into 
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all areas of their life. It precludes single parents, and those who have lost the stamina of 
youth (McRobbie, 2002b: 10). Moreover, (self) exploitation is rampant. McRobbie 
(1998) has shown how in the fashion industry, people will offer free labour in order to to 
gain credibility and to make contacts, which will hopefully lead to a paid commission. 
Ursell has also shown how many entrant level graduates will work for nothing in the 
television industry in the hope of securing paid work in the future (2000: 814). However, 
despite the difficulties of fmding work and making a living, ever greater numbers of 
people are attempting to find their way into the cultural and creative industries, seeking 
autonomy, self-fulfilment, and perhaps more than just a touch of glamour. As McRobbie 
points out, this issue of 'glamour' as a central incentive of working in creative labour has 
been mistakenly ignored, for in her analysis it forms a crucial legitimating function for 
the perceived cultural value of creative work (McRobbie, 2002b). 
This would seem to be a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, there are the 
many attendant pressures of insecurity, exploitation and low pay which mark the 
experiences of many cultural producers. Yet, on the other hand, these workers appear to 
be at pains to stress the pleasure that they derive from their labour. Work for these 
cultural producers has become a site of self-fulfilment, autonomy, independence and 
even of intense 'pleasure in work' (Donzelot, 1991). How can we understand this? 
Clearly, labour markets in the modern (post-)industrialised economy, particularly those in 
the 'creative industries', have come to be seen as being spaces for achieving these goals. 
For example, Florida describes how the 'no-collar workplace' 'replaces traditional 
hierarchical systems of control with new forms of self-management, peer-recognition 
and pressure and intrinsic forms of motivation, which I call sift contro! (2002: 13). Here, 
the search for self-actualisation and autonomy is central to the restructuring of labour: 
We trade job security for autonomy. In addition to being fairly compensated for 
the work we do and the skills we bring, we want the ability to learn and grow, 
shape the content of our work, control our own schedules and express our 
identities though work. (ibid.) 
Here, we can connect this mode of self-actualising work as part of the logic of 
individualisation. As Heelas argues, 'people have been thrown back on themselves as the 
key source if signijicance' (2002: 92). There is a clear power dynamic to this, in which 
workers are offered the 'reward' of autonomy as part of the package of benefits which a 
'creative' job provides. Here, the discourse of creativity, entrepreneuralism and the 'talent 
66 
led economy' works as a form of governmentaliry (Foucault, 1991), regulating creative 
workers' subjectivities so that they embrace the stringent demands of work in casualised, 
deregulated cultural labour markets. 
For Foucault government is a general technical form which encompasses 
everything from self-control to the control of populations. Governmentality in this sense 
is the process of regulation of individuals from the inside, and describes how social 
power is assured and reproduced through discourses and processes that encourage 
individuals to fashion themselves in ways that suit the demands of the dominant social 
group. The promotion of cultural values in the workplace works in the interest of 
neoliberallaissez-faire capitalism. As du Gay writes: 
'Culture' is accorded a privileged position ... because it is seen to structure the 
way people think, feel and act in organizations. The aim is to produce the sort of 
meanings that will enable people to make the right and necessary contribution to 
the success of the organization for which they work. (1996: 41) 
The discursive emphasis on entrepreneurialism and creative innovation in policy 
discourse masks the ruthless individualism of this new mode of work. As such the 
'freedom' of creative labour becomes a highly effective technology of the self. Indeed, as 
Miller and Rose show, creation of mearung at work is a regulatory practice: 
'Organizations are to get the most out of their employees ... by releasing the 
psychological strivings of individuals for autonomy and creativity and channelling them 
into the search of the firm for excellence and success' (1997: 330). So creative workers 
are encouraged to be entrepreneurial and endlessly flexible as the historic link between 
labour and capital is eroded, as a result of the restructuration of capitalism outlined 
earlier. Indeed, as McRobbie argues, reflecting on her own work on the cultural 
industries: 
Capital finds novel ways of offloading its responsibility for a workforce, but this 
relinquishing process is confronted no longer by traditional and organized 
'labour'. Instead, the new conditions of work are largely being experienced by 
'new labour'. By this I mean those sections of the working population for whom 
work has become an important source for self-actualization, even freedom and 
independence. (2002a: 518) 
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Creative workers embrace a deregulated working sphere because it is promoted in 
social discourse as a place for fashioning an identity, perhaps even attaining an aspect of 
celebrity. Work in this new creative environment becomes a site of intense personal 
satisfaction, of reflexive self-organising, of affective pleasure; yet it is simultaneously 
sometimes exploitative, certainly precarious and prone to ethnic, gender and class 
inequalities. Failure is individualised. What is particularly striking about the available 
research on work histories in cultural production is the high level of attrition as cultural 
workers get older and disillusioned. One is forced to question the brutal logic of the 
need for constant reinvention, when the mental and physical trials of such work begin to 
take their toll after a certain length of time. As McRobbie has asked: 'How many times 
can people re-invent themselves? In a winner-takes-all market, risk taking takes its toll' 
(2002b: 103). 
How these processes are experienced on the ground by television workers in the 
British independent television sector, and what the implications of this new mode of 
labour might be on the actual content of television are questions that I shall explore in 
the analysis of my research. 
2.4.3.2 Self-commodification and emotional labour 
Interestingly what has emerged in this research is that not only are these often 
young people accepting of the difficulties of making a living in these sectors, but that 
they are actively involved in the reproduction of that system of commodification and 
exploitation itself. As Ursell notes, following her work on television production, a 
phenomenon that needs careful investigation is 'that workers are, by and large, not 
merely volunteering to co-operate with the vampire but are actively constituting its life 
process' (2000: 816). Exploring these dynamics in the television industry, she uses a 
Foucauldian framework of understanding to see how self-enterprise works as a 
technology of the self in terms of how its values are inculcated and so reproduced (2000: 
818).25 As she argues, television workers are keen to stress the personal pleasure that 
working in this creative environment offers them: 
25 Technologies of the self are those practices which 'permit individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
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The willingness of individuals to work in television production is partly to be 
explained by the tantalizing possibilities thereby for securing social recognition 
and acclaim, that is self-affirmation and public esteem, and partly by the 
possibilities for self-actualization and creativity ... For the workers, television 
production is simultaneously a source of definite rewards, both material and 
existential, and a source of definite exploitation. (2000: 819) 
Developing this analysis further, Ursell shows how the subjects of her study are actively 
involved in self-commodification, being acutely aware of the need to sell themselves on 
the creative labour market. 
Approaching the issue of cultural production from a perspective that emphasises 
identity, subjectivity and affect as key features of creative labour, writers such as 
McRobbie (2002b), Ursell (2000), Ross (2004) and Gill (2002), amongst others, have 
done crucial work to explore this issue, by examining how creative labour places very 
particular demands on workers by utilising the self-realisation dynamic at the heart of 
individualisation. This research shows how creative labour is organised through 
particular practices and discourses which encourage the investment of emotion and 
affect as a central facet of the labour process. Their approach, which is concerned with 
creative labour as a site of affective labour, and which encourages particular 
'technologies of the self, allows us to understand why cultural workers not only put up 
with often highly precarious, poorly paid and exploitative working conditions, but indeed 
embrace them. This work also shows the new forms of discrimination, hierarchy and 
exploitation which emerge under the deregulated conditions of what Ross has called 'the 
humane workplace' (2004). 
For example, Ross, writing about his experience of observing new media workers 
in New York's 'Silicon Alley' during the dot.com crash in the late 1990s, describes the 
significance of 'the industrialization of bohemia' that has taken place since the 1960s, 
where capitalism absorbs a counterculture and then profits from it (Ross, 2004). He 
describes the emergence of what he calls 'the humane workplace' (ibid), where young 
new media workers are able to wear the clothes they want to, are encouraged to express 
themselves individually and creatively, and where work and play are interconnected. This 
thoughts, conduct and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality'. See Foucault (1998: 18). 
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clearly represents a shift away from previous expectations of workers under capitalism, 
where conformity was expected within the bureaucracy of the large organisation. As a 
result of this shift, workers are encouraged to, even expected to, make a significant 
emotional and personal investment in the company. On the surface, all would seem well 
- happy, seemingly autonomous workers, room for self-expression, and high levels of 
productivity and economic growth. Yet he also shows that despite this, these workers are 
also highly deunionised, working incredibly long hours, often with no health insurance 
and other social security benefits. As Ross argues: 
When work becomes sufficiently humane, we are likely to do far too much of it, 
and it usurps an unacceptable portion of our lives ... Not by any boss's coercive 
bidding, but through 'work you just couldn't help doing,' had the twelve-hour 
day made its furtive return. (2004: 255) 
Here, the hidden power function of the humane workplace emerges, which is 'to extract 
value from any waking moment of an employee's day' (ibid.: 146). Yet this is achieved 
through supposed autonomy, for as Ross argues, no-collar work is able to 'enlist 
employees' freest thoughts and impulses in the service of salaried time' (ibid: 19). 
Through the creation of the 'humane workplace', Ross shows how capital is able to shed 
its traditional responsibilities to workers, whilst at the same time, through the promotion 
of values which connect to the realisation of a culturally desirable self, actively engaging 
those very workers in the maintenance and reproduction of this disinvestment in human 
capital. 
Gill, exploring a similarly rich vem of critical analysis of the new media 
industries, has shown how new media work is able to present itself as 'cool, creative and 
egalitarian', therefore using cultural values to promote a very particular mode of flexible 
labour, with all the attendant pains described above. Yet, she shows that when you 
scratch at the surface, significant hierarchies and insecurities exist, and gender 
discrimination is rife. As she shows, paradoxically, it is the very features of new media 
work that are valorized (informality, autononomy and flexibility), which facilitate the 
emergence of what she calls 'new forms of gender inequality' (Gill, 2002: 71). The 'wired' 
portfolio workers that she studies, much beloved of future-gazers, politicians and policy-
writers, imbued with the values of entrepreneurial individualism and who are said to 
'prize freedom, autonomy and choice' (Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999: 15), in fact find 
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that the individualisation of risk which accompanies project-based careers provokes deep 
anxiety (Gill, 2002: 81). As Gill notes: 
On the one hand, individuals must become entirely self-governing and must bear 
the costs of all their training and professional development, of insurance, social 
security, sick pay, maternity leave, etc. They must also take responsibility for 
finding future work and for managing gaps between projects. (ibid) 
Gill's respondents were unequivocal in presenting an upbeat account of the pleasures of 
'working autonomously with no managerial control, flexible working hours, and the 
intrinsically challenging and fulfilling nature of the work' (ibid: 80). Yet, whilst presenting 
itself as egalitarian, the industry in fact paid woman less than men, they were more likely 
to be socially isolated because they worked from home, more likely to work part-time, 
and on fewer projects (ibid: 82). 
2.5 Conclusion 
What emerges clearly from this review of the literature is that there is a pressing 
need for grounded empirical sociological research that examines the new economic, 
structural and material reconfigurations of the cultural industries, yet also is alert to the 
processes that are particularly noticeable in creative labour markets, around subjectivity, 
identity, individualisation and affect. 
From a political point of view, the work of the 'precarity' writers offers up 
political openings, particularly in terms of how we might think through the long-term 
implications of a transformation in capital accumulation, new modes of working, and the 
valorization of 'creativity' within contemporary policy discourse. Yet, as argued earlier, 
much of this research is speculative, un empirical, generalising and unsubstantiated. The 
theoretical rush to detect new forms of collectivism within modes of immaterial labour 
looks rather hopeful in the present individualised context, particularly without 
sociological evidence to back up these claims. As Hesmondhalgh has argued, 'certain 
forms of empirical engagement can help qualify - and thereby ultimately strengthen -
arguments concerning the nature of creative labour in the cultural industries in modern 
societies' (2007: 7). 
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Therefore, my intervention in this thesis is to test out some of the insights from 
the new sociology of creative labour and from the other areas explored above, in order 
to examine the nature of creative labour within independent television. This approach 
will draw on the theoretical insights gained by theories of reflexive modernisation, and 
capital restructuration, but also be attuned to the modes of emotional and affective 
labour which operate within the cultural industries. Such an approach aims to avoid the 
pitfalls of over-determination through economy, politics and ideology, be alert to the 
contradictions that emerge from the fieldwork, and ultimately provide grounds for a 
critique of 'creative industries' policy, by providing empirical sociological evidence to 
demonstrate the fragility and complexity of the ecology of production on which cultural 
industries are based. 
72 
Chapter 3. The politics of independence: Contextualising 
independent television production in the UK 
Having provided a broad account linking global sociological transformation to 
creative work in the previous chapter, this chapter situates the research findings within a 
more industry-specific historical and political context, by exploring the evolution of the 
independent television industry from its origins to its present form. This evolution has 
taken place within particular ideological and social contexts, during a period of intense 
social transformation. In outlining this history, the chapter will cover a period of over 
fifty years, from the background to the formation of Independent Television (lTV) in 
1955, through to the Communications Act 2003, and the ensuing rapid consolidation 
and commercialisation of the independent sector. This will involve analysing a number 
of key historical and political moments in the evolution of the independent broadcasting 
sector, including: the formation of the independent broadcasting sector with the creation 
of lTV and the Independent Broadcasting Association (lBA); the creation of Channel 4 
and the emergence of the creative ecology of 'indies' that this produced; the significance 
of New Labour's current policy focus on the 'creative industries'; and the current process 
of rapid consolidation, commercialisation and concentration that is taking place in the 
sector, characterised in particular by regulatory changes to intellectual property rights for 
producers, and the emergence of the 'super-indies,.26 Throughout this period, issues 
around public sector broadcasting are continuous, and playa pivotal role. 
Independent broadcasting has developed in this country under two key 
competing ideological influences: the values of public service broadcasting and the values 
of commercialisation. When tracing this sector's history one can see clear evidence of the 
influence of democratic concerns about the public sphere, increased choice and diversity 
26 Although my focus in this research is primarily on the independent television sector, it would 
be impossible to attempt to understand the broadcasting sector without examining it in relation 
to the changing role and structure of the BBC. Therefore I shall also be referring throughout this 
chapter to changes within the BBC and policies that relate to those changes. As we shall see, the 
very history of the independent sector (and indeed the very composition of people who work in 
the industry) is intimately bound up with the BBC, therefore debates around public service 
broadcasting (PSB) are at the heart of policies which have led to the evolution of the 
independent television industry. 
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and a greater range of programming and quality; therefore the emergence of this sector is 
deeply imbricated in the wider political debate around public service broadcasting. 
However, at the same time the evolution of independent broadcasting (and the political 
decisions that paved the way for its existence) is inextricably connected to political and 
corporate strategies for commercial gain, competitive advantage and economic growth. 
Although of course these two positions are not necessarily incompatible, it is clear that 
the tension between them is still very much in evidence today within political and public 
discourse. 
U sing a mixture of policy documents, empirical data and historical research, a 
picture emerges of an industry in a state of constant flux from its inception. The 
independent television industry in the contemporary sense emerged with the launch of 
Channel 4 in 1982. At this point the cindie' sector was very much a cottage industry 
peopled by 'one-man bands'; a disparate group as Jeremy Isaacs (first Chief Executive of 
Channel 4) recalls: 
Some were individuals, natural freelances, touting a particular one-off idea that 
interested them to work on. Others were would-be entrepreneurs, looking to 
make substantial numbers of programmes, to build on that, to see their business 
grow. (Isaacs, 1989: 108) 
Today it is a far more professionalised affair, expenencmg rapid growth and 
commercialisation (Mediatique, 2005). It is a sector undergoing radical structural change 
as a result of consolidation, concentration and digitalisation, as convergence looks set to 
transform the consumption and the production of audio-visual material. 
In order to provide a coherent political economic narrative for the evolution of 
the ITPS, this chapter is structured in chronological order, with each section 
encompassing a particular ideological and political era that was central to the sector's 
formation. Following World War II, there was significant political and public demand for 
independent television, which took the form of lTV, and laid the ground for the creation 
of the ITPS. However, the sector we see today, made up of small to medium-sized 
companies operating on a commissioned project basis for the broadcasters, is one that 
only emerged in the 1980s with the launch of Channel 4. This chapter explores the 
political story behind the creation of Channel 4, and its catalytic effect on the 
broadcasting industry. Finally, it examines the implications of New Labour policies 
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towards broadcasting and the 'creative industries' since 1997, exploring how the media 
policies of the current government have impacted on the development of the sector as 
we enter the digital age. 
By contextualising the independent production sector this chapter provides a 
political and historical map for the reader that will both situate and illuminate the 
qualitative analysis of the later chapters, based on interviews with my research 
participants. The development of the ITPS has taken place against a backdrop of 
political, social, technological and economic change. Politically, we can see that the 
impact of neoliberal values in the 1980s, which placed an emphasis on free markets and 
the sovereignty of consumers to make choices on the open market were central to the 
creation of Channel 4 and the subsequent development of the ITPS. Socially, 
acknowledging the increasing importance of television in people's lives in the twentieth 
century is vital to understanding the growth of the sector. Technologically, we can see 
that the ongoing advances in both production and distribution of television content have 
had a huge impact on its development. Economically, the rise of flexible accumulation 
(Harvey, 1989) is key to understanding the organisational structure of the independent 
television industry; moreover, the increasing centrality of cultural production and 
consumption in the economies of advanced industrial nations is vital in terms of 
understanding the import of recent policies under New Labour that see the 'creative 
industries' as motors of economic growth. In short this chapter seeks to radically 
contextualise the research of this thesis by exploring the political, economic and social 
forces that have structured the independent television industry as it is today. 
3.1 From monopoly to duopoly: the BBC and the creation of lTV 
Difficult as it is to imagine today, for the first thirty years of broadcasting history 
in this country there was no independent broadcasting sector at all. Instead, the BBC, 
created in 1922 as the British Broadcasting Company, had an unchallenged monopoly 
over the airwaves. The BBC was created by order of the British government, which 
licensed a number of radio manufacturers to form a cartel. It was licensed to broadcast 
by the Post Office and was run as a monopoly funded by an annual licence fee paid by 
radio set owners. Public taxation was used to avoid commercialisation, and a monopoly 
was preferred to keep the broadcasting under strict regulatory control. This continued in 
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1927 when the company became an independent national organisation - the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, created by Royal Charter. The BBC was not directly 
controlled by the state, but its future lay in the hands of the government, which had the 
power to periodically review its licence to broadcast and determine the cost of its licence 
fee; a situation which continues to this day. 
As radio emerged as a key medium of communication after World War I, it became 
more closely regulated and controlled by government than any other mode of public 
communication. Politically it was felt that the state should maintain a close control over 
broadcasting, as such a powerful new medium of communication. The Sykes Committee 
of 1923 was clearly concerned about this, arguing that 'the control of such a potential 
power over public opinion and the life of the nation ought to remain with the state' 
(Sendall, 1982: 3). Indeed, the rise of broadcasting as a technological and social 
innovation was intimately bound up in a much larger project of national identity, and 
nation building, designed to address and construct a national public (Scannell and 
Cardiff, 1986; Hilmes, 1997). As Hilmes writes: 
In Great Britain and in the United States, as in most other countries, national 
governments assumed a greater degree of control over the establishment and 
development of broadcasting than they dared for any other medium of 
communication, in the interests of social order, political control and preservation 
of central cultural and economic hierarchies. (2003: 1) 
Certainly there was a climate of anxiety about the power of broadcasting on 
society, and it was into this situation that the notion of public service broadcasting 
emerged. This was spearheaded by John Reith (1889-1971), the BBC's first director 
general from 1927 to 1938, and before that Managing Director of the British 
Broadcasting Company. Reith took a very high-minded interpretation of broadcasting as 
a public service: it existed not only to entertain the population, but to inform and 
educate them as well. Reith was a Calvinist, son of a Scottish Free Church minister, with 
a missionary conception of broadcasting as a civilising tool to lift up the masses and 
therefore to avoid social chaos. In this vein, he famously asserted that 'Broadcasting is a 
servant of culture' (Reith, 1924: 217). For Reith, radio was a medium which should 
provide cultural 'uplift' for the masses (Scannell, 1990: 16) For Reith and many others, 
broadcasting became the tool of social inclusion. This patrician interpretation of public 
service broadcasting believed the masses would be improved by exposure to the culture 
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and values of the social elite. Indeed, for Reith, the question of whether this form of 
broadcasting might be what the public actually wanted was irrelevant, as they were seen 
as not having the aptitude to even know what they might want, or, more importantly 
need. As he wrote in Broadcast over Bntain, 'It is occasionally indicated to us that we are 
apparently setting out to give the public what we think they need - and not what they 
want - but few know what they want and very few know what they need' (cited by 
Briggs, 1961 b: 238). As such, the BBC broadcast content that was part of this 'civilising' 
project. As Hilmes writes: 'Reith saw a "top-down" approach to broadcasting as the 
most effective way of ensuring that programme output fitted his concept of public 
service, in which the standards and values of metropolitan culture were taken to be self-
evidently better than anything in the rest of the country' (2003: 6-7). 
Reith's notion of the public interest had political as well as cultural implications. 
Certainly in the early days of broadcasting, the BBC was at pains not to offend the 
government of the day. Reith earned the trust of government because his notion of the 
public interest largely seemed to coincide with that of the government, especially during 
the 1926 General Strike, during which the BBC allowed the Conservative government to 
use the airwaves while barring trade union leaders. Indeed, a memorandum circulated by 
Reith internally within the BBC after the strike shows the level of complicity between the 
BBC and government: 'Since the BBC was a national institution, and since the 
Government in this crisis were acting for the people... the BBC was for the 
Government in this crisis too' (cited by Scannell and Cardiff, 1991: 33). There were 
many critics of the BBC's approach to the strike, particularly amongst Labour politicians 
who saw the BBC as a propaganda tool of the government. As Tracey has argued, 'There 
is no doubt from reading through the various memos and numerous expressions of 
intent that the BBC's coverage was specifically aimed towards a particular end, which 
was the defeat of the strike' (2000: 42). Many disagreed with the BBC's handling of the 
strike, and the broader sense was born that allowing a broadcasting monopoly was not 
essentially anti-competitive, but that it was undemocratic. 
For critics, the BBC's handling of the strike was evidence of an organisation 
peopled by employees who were out of touch with the wider realities of social life for the 
majority of the country's population. This could be seen not just in the coverage of 
political issues but also in the very culture of the organisation, as Burns has suggested: 
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BBC culture, like BBC standard English, was not peculiar to itself but an 
intellectual ambience composed of the values, standards and beliefs of the 
professional middle-class, especially that part educated at Oxford and Cambridge. 
(1977: 42) 
Similarly, Creeber notes that Reith shaped the BBC 'in his image, an authoritarian, 
paternalistic and innately highbrow institution that tended to promote the interests and 
tastes of the English upper middle class' (2003: 24). 
These were all factors that led to a backlash against the BBC's monopoly hold 
over broadcasting. Following World War II concerns about the monopoly intensified. As 
Sendall writes, 'The very idea of a single public corporation, enjoying unchallenged 
monopoly control over a channel for the communication of information and ideas, 
seemed wrong to many thinking people.' (1982: 4). When, in January 1946, the Labour 
government declared that it would not be setting up another committee of enquiry before 
renewing the BBC's charter, there was criticism on both sides of the house. A number of 
heated debates followed in that year, which can be seen as the catalyst for the campaign 
that ended with the creation of Independent Televsion. By June 1946 a motion calling 
for the matter to be referred to a Joint Select Committee attracted 211 signatures 
(Wilson, 1961: 31). That committee was to be the Beveridge Committee, which would 
hold its first meeting in June 1949, by which time there had been a build-up of influential 
Conservative back-benchers who had the explicit aim of ending the BBC's monopoly 
through setting up a commercial service. After the general election in 1950 this included 
the influential 'One Nation Group' of Conservative politicians who were opposed to 
monopolies of any kind in principle, especially in broadcasting. a ohnson and Turnock, 
2005: 17). 
3.1.2 Beveridge 
William Beveridge was appointed by Clement Attlee in 1949 to lead a committee 
tasked to consider the 'constitution, control and future development of sound and 
television broadcasting services in the UK' (Hilmes, 2003: 32). The Beveridge Committee 
on Broadcasting was critical of the BBC, and described its ethos as 'beginning with 
Londonisation, going on to secretiveness and self-satisfaction, and ending up with a 
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dangerous sense of mission which became a sense of divine right' (cited in Curran and 
Seaton, 2003: 160). The Beveridge report was published in January 1951. Although it 
actually recommended that the BBC should retain its monopoly on broadcasting, enough 
momentum had now been created for introducing the BBC to competition. Following 
the report a campaign was launched for commercial television and the breaking of the 
BBC's monopoly. Moreover, an influential report by a minority report by one committee 
member, Selwyn Lloyd, argued that that BBC should no longer be granted 'the brute 
force of monopoly' (Briggs, 1961a: 217) in the provision of television services. When 
Labour was defeated in 1951, the Conservatives hastily pushed through a White Paper 
that promoted 'some element of competition' (Sendall, 1982: 13). A cabinet committee 
was set up under Lord Salisbury to examine a policy on the future direction of 
broadcasting. This took place within a political climate where there was a general feeling 
that the BBC was self-righteous and arrogant (ibid.: 10). 
While these political changes were taking place, television was evolving into an 
ever more popular cultural medium, which intensified the political demand for the end 
of the monopoly. Television services, which had started in 1936 and then been halted 
days before the outbreak of war, were resumed in June 1946. Take-up was slow at first -
by 1947 there were only 20,000 sets in the country capable of operating in the UK - and 
the new medium was beset by technical problems. However, as the 1950s progressed, 
television assumed an ever-greater cultural importance in people's lives until in 1953 the 
broadcast of the Coronation, watched by at least 20 million people, ushered in for many 
people the era of television. Whilst this was a great success for the BBC, ironically it 
heightened calls for the end of its monopoly, as demand grew for greater choice. 
Following the Conservative's White Paper on broadcasting policy in 1952, which 
advocated some form of competition to the BBC, the stage was set for radical change. 
The Television Act of 1954 gave the green light for the commercial television system, 
and the Act received Royal Assent in July 1954. The Independent Television Association 
(ITA) met soon after and began the planning for regional franchises. Invitations to 
interested parties to become programme contractors were published in the press on 25 
August 1954, and twenty-five applications were received. The ITA regulated commercial 
television through awarding franchises and controlling the nature and content of 
advertising; a strong public service remit was also imposed on contractors (Briggs, 1995: 
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879). Finally, commercial television began broadcasting on 22 September 1955. At first 
lTV could only be watched in the London area, but by 1956 it was available in the 
Midlands, and the main population areas were covered by the early 1960s. The new 
channel was highly popular and by the end of the 1950s lTV was winning the ratings 
battle with the BBC (Crisell, 1997: 139). 
Throughout this early period of lTV's history television became increasingly 
culturally important. As O'Sullivan writes, 'By the end of 1959, the British television 
landscape had been transformed. From the very shaky post-war technical restart in 1946, 
television had been reinvented as a national cultural institution with an established and 
expanding domestic viewing culture' (2003: 34). More and more people were watching 
television in their leisure time, so that in the 1950s people were spending more time 
watching television than visiting the cinema or listening to the radio. By the 1960s, the 
British population was spending more of its leisure time watching television than on any 
other activity (Williams, 2004: 1). 
The creation of lTV is crucial in that it led to the emergence of independent 
broadcasting and paved the way for the creation of an independent production sector in 
the future. However, although the government had succeeded in breaking the BBC's 
monopoly over broadcasting, it had established in its place a comfortable duopoly 
between the two broadcasters (O'Sullivan, 2003). The pressure grew from the 1960s 
onwards for a second commercial channel. This was not be realised until 1982, with the 
launch of Channel 4, and with it the contemporary ITPS. 
3.2 Channel 4 and the creation of the 'indie' system 
The watershed moment for the creation of the ITPS came at the beginning of 
the 1980s, under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, with the creation 
of a new commercial public service broadcaster. The Channel Four Company was 
incorporated in December 1980 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA). Channel 4 began broadcasting on 2 November 1982 after 
more than two decades of fierce political and public debate. The famous 'empty room' 
of broadcasting, referred to in 1977 in Lord Annan's report on the future of 
broadcasting, had finally been filled (Annan, 1977). But what was the political context 
under which Channel 4 emerged? Crucially, it was created on the threshold of a decade 
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that is generally associated with Thatcherism, with the econom1C, cultural and social 
policies of the New Right (Levitas, 1988). Forged under the contradictory forces of 
leftist radical experimentalism and neoliberal conservatism, Channel 4 has a uruque 
position in the history of broadcasting. Its existence also transformed the political 
economy of television production, largely due to its publisher/commissioning structure, 
which has had a fundamental impact on the ecology of independent production in this 
country. 
Harvey has shown how a key problem for the Conservatives in the 1980s was 
attempting to resolve the conflict between the values of the old and the new right, 
'between a paternalistic and often authoritarian cultural conservatism, and the demands 
of economic innovation, of letting the market "rip'" (2000: 93). On the one hand there 
was a demand for heritage, and for cultural continuity; whilst on the other hand, 
economic liberalism meant setting the market free, developing more efficient, flexible 
forms of production, providing greater choice, and prioritising the individual consumer's 
sovereignty to make choices in the marketplace. Channel 4 bears the hallmarks of these 
contradictory tensions within conservatism at the time. The commitment to public 
service with its long history in the BBC, and before that in the Victorian commitment to 
civil service, was evident in the 1980 public service requirement that Channel 4 should 
provide innovative new programming, serve the tastes and interests of a wide audience, 
and produce a suitable quota of educational programming. Leading up to the 1980 
Broadcasting Act, which acted as the political catalyst for Channel4's creation, there was 
a clear focus from both the Labour and Conservative Parties for choice in terms of 
content, not just of channels. With Channel 4, this was manifest in the focus on 
complementarity, and on serving the needs and interests of niche groups. Such a policy 
focus was not new, showing how 'public service' principles and a commitment to 
cultural heritage had historically superseded demands for a 'free market' in broadcasting, 
unlike the approach in the United States (Harvey, 2000: 93). 
At the same time a strong focus on entrepreneurialism and free-market economic 
liberalism was evident in the structure of Channel 4. This was designed to encourage 
greater efficiency in production, establishing Channel 4 as a broadcaster that would 
commission programmes externally, rather than produce them internally. Hitherto, 
programme production in the UK had been largely vertically integrated, with the 
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broadcasters also producing their own content in-house. Under the new system at 
Channel 4, the ITPS was created virtually overnight, consisting of small to medium-sized 
companies whose remit was to produce new and innovative content for the new 
broadcaster. As Harvey writes: 
The new independents, it was argued, would have more innovative attitudes to 
doing business, and lower overheads than the lumbering giants who were their 
parents: the BBC and lTV companies. The newcomers, motivated by an anxious 
desire to deliver programmes at competitive prices, would ultimately transform 
the industry as a whole, replacing permanent contracts with freelance 
employment, and doing away with 'over-manning', along with the company 
pension schemes, subsidized canteens, and childcare facilities, that had indirectly 
increased the costs of production. (Harvey, 2000: 94) 
Then as now (despite the emergence of the so-called 'superindies') it was an industry 
made up largely of micro-production companies, sustained precariously through insecure 
commissioning relationships with the broadcasters. We shall now turn to explore the 
political context of the creation of Channel 4, charged under an Act of Parliament to be 
experimental and innovative (Warnock, 2003: 199), and the implications of the radical 
new structure of this organisation on the independent production industry in the UK, 
3.2.1 Channel 4: breaking the duopoly 
[Channel 4] did not drop from the skies in response to a few lines in the British 
Parliament's Broadcasting Act of 1980. It was pushed into existence by many 
people, acting sometimes together, sometimes at cross-purposes, and under 
more-or-less favourable conditions ... It was probably the only television channel 
in the world to combine a legislative requirement to experiment, to innovate, and 
to complement the service offered by the existing commercial television channel, 
and all of this on an income guaranteed in advance by its parliamentary 
godparents, under the direction of a Conservative government. (Harvey, 2000: 
92) 
Essentially, Channel 4 was created to provide a new model of public servlce 
broadcasting in the UK, in the form of a channel that could provide greater choice and 
innovation. A comfortable duopoly had emerged between the BBC and lTV, which had 
led to a glut of populist television, particularly on lTV, that was squarely aimed at a mass 
audience. In some respects the duopoly between lTV and BBC had been a success, 
introducing a less elite tone, and providing some very welcome competition. However, it 
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was widely felt that there was a need for more experimental television in the commercial 
sector. After lTV's creation in 1955, there was a backlash against commercial 
broadcasting. The Pilkington Report in 1962 was critical of lTV's achievements for its 
perceived focus on ratings and commercialisation and made recommendations for a 
third channel which became known as BBC 2 in 1964. The creation of BBC 2 had 
shown government how successful a complementary programme schedule could be in 
public television. From that time onwards it was increasingly felt that commercial 
television should have a similar transformed structure. There was a feeling that the 
endless battle for ratings had made much television output bland and predictable, and 
that it failed to cater for diverse and niche audiences (Johnson and Turnock, 2005: 22). 
Channel 4 was designed to be a commercial channel that could take risks, innovate and 
experiment, without the commercial pressure of always having to aim for huge 
audiences. 
As well as greater diversity of programme content, it was also felt that there 
needed to be a new broadcasting commissioning structure which gave greater 
opportunities to independent producers. Following the establishment of lTV a number 
of influential programme makers had tried to set up IPCs outside of the BBC/ITV 
duopoly during the 1960s and 1970s. They included figures such as Jeremy Isaacs, 
Robert Kee, Ludovic Kennedy, Donald Baverstock and Alasdair Milne (Harvey, 2000: 
95). They quickly discovered that working outside of the duopoly was financially 
unrewarding and unsustainable. The first major attempt to work independently of the 
broadcasters came in 1962, when a number of Panorama presenters, fearing takeover by 
the BBC's lively magazine current affairs programme Tonight, left the BBC and formed 
Television Reporters International Ltd (TRI). As Lambert notes: 
It was the first major attempt by television programme-makers to work 
independently of the broadcasting institutions... Television Reporters 
International ... were convinced that with their impressive array of the BBC's 
most prominent presenters they could dominate the current affairs market and 
sell independently produced documentary features in Britain and worldwide. 
(1982: 36) 
The project was a failure: although Associated Television (A TV) made an 
agreement to buy their programmes, both Granada and Associated Rediffusion (AR) 
refused to take TRI's programmes. There were a number of reasons for this. As an 
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article at the time in Contrast suggested: 'AR said they would not participate In the 
networking of current affairs programmes not made by a company directly responsible 
to the government' (cited in Lambert, 1982: 36). Certainly internal staff tension within 
the lTV companies caused by TRI's entrepreneurialism was a major factor. The 
permanent workforces within ATV, Granada and AR perceived the threat to their 
security. Granada were worried that the deal would 'have a bad effect on their staff' 
(Lambert, 1982: 6). Moreover, the ITA was nervous about current affairs content 
produced outside of a directly regulated broadcasting company; and of course, the BBC 
was not going to support the breakaway group. 
In another doomed effort, a separate group of BBC producers also set up their own 
production company. In 1965, when Tonight came off the air, Antony Jay, Donald 
Baverstock, and Alasdair Milne formed JBM Limited. They actually managed to forge a 
working relationship with the BBC, and sold a small number of programmes to them; 
however, their financial lifeblood was industrial training mms. When Milne was offered 
the controllership of BBC Scotland, he accepted, and the venture fell apart. As Lambert 
writes, 'Once again, the lesson for others was that even the most respected programme-
makers found it hard to exist outside the duopoly' (1982: 37). 
These two high-profile examples had discouraged other programme-makers who 
might have been considering going independent at the time. Aspiring independent 
producers had to overcome great obstacles to make a success of it in the years of the 
duopoly. Both the BBC and lTV had established a form of cultural protectionism, 
unwilling to concede that good programmes could be made by independent producers. 
There were financial reasons of course: a healthy independent sector would challenge the 
BBC and lTV in terms of selling British television programmes abroad; but there was 
also a cultural reason. As the producer/director Christopher Nupen has suggested, there 
was a general feeling amongst the broadcasting elite that there was no real need to give 
greater control and opportunity to the independent sector: 
The absence of truly independent television producers in the United Kingdom, 
in spite of the availability of so many of the best technicians in the world, lies in 
the direct commercial conflict that inevitably exists between independent 
producers and the lTV companies, and the self-importance of the BBC 
administrators in their methods of using their absolute control over two of the 
three networks in this country. (cited in Lambert, 1982: 39) 
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Within this combative context the Pilkington Report in 1962 was highly critical 
of lTV's achievements and recommended the idea of a third channel which would 
eventually become BBC 2 in 1964. Politically, this is the moment when demand for a 
fourth channel began in earnest. Immediately, the ITA began calling for a new 
commercial channel known as 'ITV2'. Whilst the ITA at first envisaged this channel 
being independent from lTV, slowly over time, under pressure from the lTV companies, 
it changed its position to see the fourth channel being under the control of the existing 
lTV contractors. In 1970, when the Conservatives returned to power, the issue became 
more heated. In 1971 the ITA submitted evidence to the government which proposed 
that the lTV contractors should have scheduling control over a board consisting of the 
lTV programme controllers, with guaranteed rights to make programmes for lTV 
companies (ITA, 1971). It did suggest that an unspecified amount of airtime should be 
available for independent producers, but the ITA did not see their abilities in the most 
favourable light: 
There are dangers of amateurishness in production and difficulties in 
incorporating such programmes in a national television service without 
sacrificing impartiality and editorial control. (ibid.: 17-18) 
However, there were criticisms of the ITA's proposals from a number of quarters, most 
sharply focused in the TV4 group, a coalition of programme-makers, journalists, 
politicians, academics and advertisers, which attacked the ITA proposal in these terms: 'it 
represents an arrogant and bland ignorance of the needs of the public' (Lambert, 1982: 
46). Despite this, it seemed that the momentum for the fourth channel was lost when, in 
1972, Christopher Chataway, Conservative Minister for Posts and Telecommunications 
announced that the government did not intend to proceed with allocating a licence for a 
new channel. In fact the debate was just starting. 
3.2.2 'The National Television Foundation' 
Undoubtedly the single most important intellectual contribution to the future 
structure of Channel 4 came in April 1972 from Anthony Smith, a former BBC 
programme-maker, when he wrote to the Guardian and put forward his ideas for a 
National Television Foundation, which was subsequently worked up as a submission to 
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the Annan Committee (Smith, 1976). He argued that the Foundation would act as a 
publishing house, buying in and broadcasting programmes from a wide range of sources; 
open to independent programme-makers and individuals and organisations with a point 
to make. Smith contended that the duopoly had produced large self-protective 
bureaucratic organisations which had damaged creative work. As Harvey suggests, 'Smith 
argued that existing broadcasting institutions had become vast and bureaucratic centres 
of power, corrosive of creative work, inclined to over-careful self-policing, and absorbed 
in the project of their own institutional survival' (2000: 98). Against the duopoly, Smith 
made the case for a new kind of broadcaster: '%at has to be achieved is a form of 
institutional control wedded to a different doctrine from existing broadcasting 
authorities, to a doctrine of openness rather than to balance, to expression rather than to 
neutralisation' (Smith, 1976). 
Smith's thesis is pivotal to the eventual structure of Channel 4, and for the 
development of the independent production sector. He proposed that the current 
control of the airwaves by two broadcasters was unacceptable, and that there needed to 
be new independent voices that could bring new innovations and ideas into the 
television landscape. This envisaged that the open publishing system would provide a 
market for 'freelance' creatives who would not find outlets for their work within the 
existing broadcasters. As he suggested: 
It would supplement existing broadcasting by broadening the input, by allowing 
anyone to bring a project to it, whether an independent programme-maker with a 
finely worked-out plan, neatly costed, or a firm, organisation or individual with 
merely a well-argued complaint that some issue was failing to get across to the 
public. The Foundation would then playa kind of impresario role, merely by 
allocating resources to some, but fitting producers, writers, technicians to others 
who arrived with an idea, a grievance, a cause. (cited in Lambert, 1982: 47-8). 
Smith's critique of the duopoly, and his call for a new kind of broadcaster, was a 
intellectual focal point for those who argued against the extension of the duopoly 
through ITV2, and 'for many who had become disenchanted with the bland or 
censorious nature of the medium' (Harvey, 2000: 99). Key industry figures such as David 
Elstein, John Birt and Jeremy Isaacs argued for a new arrangement which allowed the 
independents to compete for airtime against the broadcasters. As Harvey writes: 
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What Isaacs, Birt, and Elstein shared with Anthony Smith was a desire to liberate 
the creative people in television from the often stifling effects of bureaucracy, 
and to find a way to ensure - systematically, not, as it were, by accident - that 
new things could be said in new ways' (2000: 99). 
The intellectual backlash against what was seen as a stifling duopoly system is perhaps 
best expressed by Michael Darlow, one of the key players at the time in the campaign for 
Channel 4: 
Increasingly we came to believe that the whole system of control and funding in 
film and broadcasting was inappropriate to the needs and aspirations of the new 
age; that the BBC and lTV networks, controlled and run respectively by narrow 
elites of predominantly middle-class Oxbridge men and a handful of show 
business agents and impresarios, no longer adequately met the range of needs 
and tastes of the viewing public or of society at large. As a result we began to 
search for ways of making the media in which we worked more accessible and 
participatory, open to a much wider range of possible ideas, films and 
programmes - drama, entertainment, documentary and current affairs, even to 
forms and content not so far seen or invented. In searching we sought to create a freer 
and more open arena in which to realise our own creative ideas. (2004: 3-4, my italics) 
3.2.3 The Annan Report 
The Annan Committee was set up in this climate in 1974 under a Labour 
government, although its recommendations were not available until 1977. It argued for a 
'third force' in broadcasting, to break the lTV IBBC duopoly. Although there was a 
widespread political desire for a fourth channel, there was a conflict between those who 
thought that there was a need for something completely different, and those who wanted 
the creation of 'ITV2', a channel that would be controlled by the ITA, provided for by 
the existing lTV companies which would essentially maintain the duopoly. The Annan 
Committee was wide-ranging, looking into all aspects of British broadcasting. Influenced 
by Anthony Smith's arguments (although he had been denied membership of the 
committee) and by Phillip Whitehead, a Labour MP who had been active in the TV 4 
Campaign, the committee put forward recommendations that British broadcasting 
should be: 
• accountable through Parliament to the public; 
• diverse in its services; 
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• flexible in structure; 
• editorially independent (Annan, 1977: 474). 
Lord Annan also saw the need for making space for minority audiences, contending 'we 
do not want more of the same. There are enough programmes for the majority ... What 
is needed now is programmes for the different minorities which add up to make the 
majority' (ibid.: 237). 
The Annan Committee proposed an Open Broadcasting Authority (OBA), which 
would act as a publisher offering an outlet to programmes from a diversity of sources 
that would not fit on existing channels. In key ways, the OBA was very similar to Smith's 
notion of the National Television Foundation. The OBA's programmes would come 
from three areas: education (including the Open University), the lTV contractors, and 
those from independent producers, the latter which it saw as a 'force for diversity and 
new ideas' (ibid.: 237). This new channel was seen as a space of experimentation for a 
new kind of broadcasting: 
We see the fourth channel not just as another outlet or even just as a means of 
giving a more varied service to the audience. It should be the test bed for 
experiment and symbolise all the vitality, the new initiatives, practices and 
liberties which could inspire broadcasters. (ibid.: 474) 
However, Annan's recommendations were not put into practice by the Labour party that 
set it up. It was unsure about the proposals, and although in 1978 it decided to support 
the OBA proposal, it did not move forward with enabling legislation. Then in 1979 
Labour lost the general election to the Conservative party. It looked as though the 
creation of the new channel had once become bogged down in political quagmire. 
In fact, the opposite proved to true: progress under the new government was to 
be swift. The incoming home secretary William Whitelaw had been interested in the 
fourth channel campaign, and in May 1979 the government announced the creation of a 
fourth channel in the Queen's Speech. Immediately, the campaigning increased to ensure 
cultural independence for the new institution, with many key figures in broadcasting and 
politics opposed to the idea that the lTV companies could control it. In the same year, 
the future Chief Executive of Channel 4, Jeremy Isaacs, gave the McTaggart Lecture, in 
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which he laid out his vision for the new channel and in which the imperative for it to 
'somehow be different' was again asserted: 
We want a fourth channel that will neither simply compete with ITV1 nor merely 
be complementary to it. We want a fourth channel that everyone will watch some 
of the time and no-one will watch all of the time. (cited in Lambert, 1982: 92) 
Meanwhile during the course of 1979 the campaigners for Channel 4 repeatedly 
emphasised the entrepreneurial benefits of independent production, most notably when 
a delegation of senior television figures including David Elstein, Christopher Nupen, 
Peter Graham Scott and Mark Shivas met the Conservatives' backbench Media 
Committee and argued that they had a greater desire to maximise overseas sales than the 
lTV companies.27 They warned the politicians that unless the new channel could provide 
a reliable domestic market to help create a potentially prosperous ITPS, then other 
countries might achieve a domination of this sector, which would make it harder for 
British producers to enter it in the future. Moreover they argued that an ITV2 run by the 
lTV companies would merely be a continuation of the wasteful industrial practices of 
over-manning, and overspending, which the lTV companies had become infamous for. 
The campaigners of the 'Channel Four Group' emphasised that as indie producers they 
would be entrepreneurial small businesses, in line with the enterprise ideology of the 
government, and the importance of small businesses to the economy. They borrowed 
Thatcher's free market language (with its focus on enterprise, small businesses and 'The 
Free Market of Ideas') to devastating effect (Darlow, 2004: 202). By aligning themselves 
to the Conservative's guiding ideology of free-market capitalism, the independent 
production lobby hugely increased the momentum for the creation of the new channel. 
In September 1979, Whitelaw ended speculation about the structure of the new 
channel when he gave a speech at the Royal Television Society Convention at Cambridge 
which assured observers that the government was committed to providing 'new 
opportunities to creative people', 'new ways of finding minority and specialist audiences' 
(Lambert, 1982: 93). The idea of the Open Broadcasting Authority was gone, and in its 
place Whitelaw proposed that the new channel should come under the control of the 
IBA. In the end the eventual regulatory structure was a compromise from some of the 
27 These figures were part of the Channel Four Group, the history of which is outlined in 
Darlow's account of the history of independent television (2004: chapter 6). 
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more radical suggestions that had been made over the years, with Whitelaw appealing to 
all factions to come together to make it work: 
The experience and ability of the IBA, if used to the full, the money, equipment 
and skills of the lTV companies, and the talents of independent producers, can 
be harnessed to provide a different and worthwhile service on the fourth 
channeL (cited in Lambert, 1982: 93) 
However, the independents had been successful in their lobbying to government, and 
the IBA was required to ensure that 'the largest practicable proportion of programmes' 
would be supplied from non-lTV companies. In return lTV would retain their 
monopoly on advertising sales. The control of this new institution had firmly moved 
away from lTV, and with it the creation of the independent sector had been guaranteed. 
3.3 Channel 4 and the new independents 
The creation of Channel 4 in 1980 meant a radical new structure for British 
broadcasting. The new channel was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (lBA). Although financed by advertising, it was set up on a 'not-
for-profit' basis, meaning that the return of profit for private investors would not be the 
main priority. As Harvey points out, this was a major structural innovation in 
commercial television: 
There would be no private investors whose primary interest would be in dividend 
returns and profit maximisation. This was seen as the most appropriate 
organisational form for the delivery of a public service remit, offering genuine 
programme (and not just channel) choice to audiences. (2003: 51) 
At the time, lTV was able to retain its monopoly on the sale of television airtime 
for commercials, which it had enjoyed for over twenty-five years. The creation of 
Channel 4 presented potentially new competition for television advertising revenue, 
which the lTV companies were implacably opposed to. However, through a complex 
deal struck by the regulatory body, the IBA, lTV held on to its advertising sales 
monopoly by being given the right to sell the airtime to Channel 4. The IBA acted as the 
middle-man, passing on the lTV subscription to meet the programme and running costs 
of Channel 4. The catch for the lTV companies was that in exchange for holding on to 
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their advertising sales monopoly they had to meet the running costs of the new channel, 
which were in excess of its advertising income for the first five years of its existence 
(Harvey, 2003: 52). However, the payments that the lTV made to the IBA, apart from 
the Channel 4 payments, were organised in such a way to cause minimum financial pain. 
In the end lTV was able to continue to set the price of airtime sales without a 
competitor. Essentially, this complex deal meant that it was in lTV's interests to 
peacefully co-exist with Channel 4, rather than aggressively compete with it through 
fierce scheduling competition. This served the public interest, in that Channel 4 was able 
to experiment and grow; whilst at the same time it was a way of subsidising this risky 
initiative in public service broadcasting. As Harvey notes, this arrangement of subsidy 
seemed to have slipped under the Conservative radar of the time: 
In practice the IBA made rather lower returns to the government Treasury 
during the first five years of this experiment and the Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, vigorously attached to the principles of the free market and deeply 
opposed to any extension of the public subsidy system, appeared unaware of the 
subversively uncompetitive nature of the new funding arrangement. (2003: 52) 
The lTV companies had been appeased with advertising revenue from the commercial 
breaks, but those who wanted the new channel to be experimental and innovative were 
satisfied that the channel was not forced to chase high viewing figures. 
3.3.1 Radical content 
Channel 4 had a parliamentary remit to provide programmes that were 
'innovative in form and content' and to 'encourage innovation and experiment in the 
form and content of programmes' (Bignell, 2004: 45). Certainly the content produced by 
the new channel under its first Chief Executive, Jeremy Isaacs (1982-7), achieved this 
prerequisite. Experimental and radical, Channel 4: 
Tapped the pent-up creativity of producers drawn from established broadcasters 
and radicals from the fUm industry and independent cinema. It also provided, 
under the banner of liberalism and innovation, a substantial platform for left-
wing ideas that were being squeezed out of the other media, especially the BBC, 
by the prevailing orthodoxies of Thatcherism. (Harvey, 2003: 96). 
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It was a period of bold innovation and defiance. The programmes that were 
commissioned challenged established views and positions, as Isaacs points out: 'I had 
never doubted, thinking too much television too unthinking, too bland, that Channel 4 
would broadcast programmes that put, as forcibly as possible, a forcible point of view' 
(ibid.: 53). In this context, Isaacs declared that the new channel should not aim for a 
mass audience but be different (ibid.: 19-20). 
Channel 4 set about fulfilling its parliamentary remit to experiment and innovate 
with vigour. A number of innovative examples stand out. Under Isaacs, an hour-long 
news programme was created for peak time, but that was ended by a three-minute 
Comment slot that featured an individual with a passionately argued point of view. Right to 
Repfy and a thirty-minute Opinions programme gave the viewers the right to get their 
views on television, working against what Isaacs perceived as 'a subtle centrist, 
conformist bias' in broadcasting (ibid.: 85). Other material such as that commissioned 
for strands like Eleventh Hotlr and People to People took risks both visually and in terms of 
subject matter. Moreover there were some hitherto unheard of experiments in 
broadcasting, such as the screening of Claude Lanzmann's nine-hour fUm about the 
holocaust, Shoah, over two nights without any television commercials. 
Looking back to early Channel 4, there was clearly an explosion of originality and 
ideas, as if a pressure valve of creative energy had been released. Ironically, Channel 4, 
developed under policies emanating from the free market doctrine of the current 
Conservative government, was often a radical, subversive broadcaster, giving a voice to 
the experiences, for the first time, of a wide range of minority groups. However, there 
was constant opposition to the perceived leftist bias of the new channel, as Jeremy Isaacs 
recalls when describing an encounter with the Conservative cabinet politician Norman 
Tebbit shortly after the channel's launch: 
After dinner at the German Embassy I spoke to one politician who was sure we 
were on the wrong lines, Norman Tebbit. 'You've got it all wrong, you know,' he 
said, 'doing all these programmes for homosexuals and such ... Parliament never 
meant that sort of thing. The different interests you are supposed to cater for are 
not like that at all. Golf and sailing and fishing. Hobbies. That's what we 
intended' (Isaacs, 1989: 65) 
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As Buscombe has written, this was one of the delicious ironies of early Channel 4: 'It is 
not the least amusing contradiction of capitalism that in the name of economic laissez-
faire it permits many flowers to grow which get right up the nose of its more socially 
conservative supporters' (2000: 13). 
3.3.2 The independents: a new paradigm for production 
As well as providing a home for experimental programtnlng, the creation of 
Channel 4 also acted as the catalyst for the rapid development of the independent 
television sector, which exploded in size in the years to come, and provided much of this 
innovative new content. As Lambert shows, there had been some growth in the 
independent production sector since the 1970s, with growth in the overseas and 
industrial training film market, and a growth in the number of production companies 
making television commercials (1982: 76). Meanwhile there were a number of freelance 
producers and directors who worked for the BBC and lTV. However, there was no 
'indie' sector then as it is conceived of today; a situation that was transformed by the 
creation of Channel 4. There were a number of key reasons for this. Firstly this was due 
to the commissioning structure of the channel. Crucially, the channel had retained 
Anthony Smith's original concept of the broadcaster as akin to publishing house; this 
made Channel 4 unique amongst the broadcasters of the period in that it was purely a 
broadcaster of content, it was not a producer. Second, there was a regulatory demand 
that the new channel should source a proportion of its original programming from 
independent sources.28 Both of these factors meant that Channel 4 needed to buy in new 
programmes from outside sources, many of which came from independent producers. 
After Channel 4 was set up in 1980, but before it started broadcasting in 1982, 
many industry figures transformed themselves from political agitators for the new 
channel to entrepreneurs. The new Chief Executive appointed his staff, and then began 
the process of commissioning programmes in earnest. There was a flood of offers from 
the few established and many more aspirant independent producers; this coupled with 
lTV's sluggishness in proposing programme ideas meant that by the beginning of 1982, 
Channel 4 had made over two hundred commissions, nearly all from independent 
28 Initially, the independents were expected to provide ten hours of programmes a week 
(approximately 20 per cent of Channel4's output) (Darlow, 2004: 281). 
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producers (Lambert, 1982: 122). The quality of the offerings from the new independents, 
their enthusiasm and speed in proposing programme ideas, and their competitiveness in 
relation to the much larger lTV companies, meant that about 50 per cent of newly 
originated material for the first year's output - a much higher share than Isaacs had 
predicted - came from the independent sector (ibid.). 
Therefore, while there were concerns from the IBA about whether the 
independent sector had the facilities to become major suppliers to Channel 4, the 
independents were quick to promote their competitiveness, their flexibility, and their 
leanness; juxtaposing the benefits of being small and flexible against what they argued 
was the cumbersome bureaucracy of the BBC and lTV companies. For example, 
Darlow, responding to contemporary concerns that the independent production sector 
wouldn't have enough quality production equipment to make the amount of 
programming necessary for the new channel, countered by arguing that in fact the BBC 
and lTV's post-production equipment was dated. 'On the whole, one can find better 
stuff around Wardour Street, and we would rather use it; it works quicker, it works better 
and it produces more the sort of pictures we want' (IBA, 1980: 7).Similarly, Mike 
Luckwell argued that there were more than enough studios, with forty in London alone 
(cited in Lambert, 1982: 123). 
Certainly in the ensuing competition between the independent producers and the 
lTV companies (both the network 'Big Five' (Thames, London Weekend Television, 
Associated Television, Granada and Yorkshire) and the smaller regional companies), the 
independent producers found themselves consistently in a stronger, more competitive 
position, because they did not have the high running cost overheads of the lTV 
companies. Whilst the lTV companies argued that Channel 4 should pay an indirect cost 
allowance to go towards permanent staff salaries, studios, equipment, ancillary resources) 
on top of the direct cost of a programme, Channel 4 disagreed. Indeed, Justin Dukes, the 
early Managing Director of Channel 4, speaking about this very issue, argued, 'no way 
am I interested, nor is there a case for, my paying their total costs, which are horrendous, 
but they are nothing to do with me' (cited in Lambert, 1982: 132). The advantage was to 
the independents, who did not have such overheads. Indeed, as Lambert argues: 
The extravagant industrial practices of the lTV companies, especially the Big 
Five, had been the subject of criticism over the years. The companies would have 
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to improve their working structure if they were to operate competitively with the 
leaner independent producers, who could afford to work with Channel Four's 
average £30,000 per hour budget. (ibid.) 
In contrast, the independents were able to make use of their flexible organisational 
structures to drive their costs down. 
3.3.3 The 'Indies' in the 1990s 
The economic and cultural success of the independent sector during the 1980s 
was compounded in the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which stipulated that the BBC and lTV 
commission at least 25 per cent of their originally produced content out of house. By 
1991 over half of its originally commissioned programmes were being made in the 
independent sector, produced by a total of 668 production companies, the majority being 
small businesses: only twenty-eight of those 668 companies received commissions 
amounting to more than £1 million for the year, with the majority of them (470) 
receiving commissions worth under £100,000 (Harvey, 2000: 112). 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act was crucial in the development of both Channel 4 
and the independent sector. The emphasis on experimentation and innovation was 
reinforced in the Act's requirement for the channel to encourage 'innovation and 
experiment in the form and content' of programmes, and to 'appeal to tastes and 
interests not generally catered for by Channel 3'. (ibid.: 115). The channel was no longer 
a wholly owned subsidiary of the regulatory body; the link to the lTV companies was 
broken, and the new corporation was able to sell its own advertising. As Harvey writes of 
this time: 
In avoiding both a private shareholding solution for Channel Four and the 
creation of head-on competition with lTV (for the same audiences at the same 
time) the long-established public policy principle that audiences should be 
offered programme choice, not just channel choice, continued to be upheld. 
(ibid.: 116-17) 
Choice had certainly been provided by the independent production sector in the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s, but during this time, independent production remained a deeply 
precarious sector. Building a sustainable business model was incredibly difficult for the 
95 
majority of IPCs, apart from a very few who were able to grow to a large enough size, 
with sufficiently good track records to guarantee commissions. However, although there 
was an explosion of production companies during this time, there were also many 
failures. As such, Channel 4's public service model was based on a free market model of 
flexible accumulation that left the majority of providers extremely vulnerable to failure. 
3.3.4 Independent but still dependent: insecurity as structural 
Certainly, many independent producers are experiencing almost intolerable living 
and working conditions, and yet this sector continues to be the preferred free-
market policy instrument for implementing the commitment to cultural diversity. 
There is a tense 'play-off' here between the values of 'heritage' and those of 
'enterprise'... For that variant of broadcasting heritage which involves a 
commitment to cultural pluralism is underwritten by the 'enterprising' methods 
of a dependent-independent production sector which may find it difficult to 
reproduce itself in the long term. (Harvey, 2000: 114) 
During the 1990s, building sustainable businesses was a remote possibility for the 
majority of IPCs who were utterly dependent on winning commissions from the new 
channel commissioners, but without any long-term guarantees of work. Commissions 
were largely one-off purchasing decisions, leading to a very high level of insecurity in the 
sector. Certainly, this insecurity was something that Jeremy Isaacs acknowledged in his 
first public address to independent producers in January 1981, when he cautioned 
producers that the independent route could be a difficult one: 'Do not leave steady jobs, 
mortgage the house and send the family out to work unless you've had your programme 
commissioned.' He warned those producers in the BBC and lTV that they should only 
consider the independent route, leaving the security of a permanent position, if they were 
especially talented (Lambert, 1982: 125). 
The insecurity of the independent sector is integral to the commlsslOrung 
structure of Channel 4, with both positive and negative consequences. On the positive 
side, because the commissioning/publishing structure worked in Channel 4's economic 
favour, they were able to create growth in the independent sector by providing a market 
for their ideas. However, as Harvey points out: 
While it is true that Channel Four provides some opportunities for first-time 
film-makers and for those who would otherwise have no access to television, the 
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problem for the small independents is 'how to survive' in the face of radical 
uncertainty about the renewal of production contracts. As the individuals who 
make up the sector get older, take on domestic commitments, and realize the 
benefits of secure employment, a predictable income, sick pay, paid holidays, and 
properly resourced pensions, their commitment to working in a radically insecure 
sector inevitably diminishes. It is appropriate, therefore, to ask whose cultural 
and economic interests are served by the maintenance of this sector and this 
'miniature' mode of production? And to what extent are freedom and diversity of 
expression safeguarded for the television audience by this system of production? 
(2000: 113-14). 
Essentially, the insecurity of this creative sector was created as a structural element of 
Channel 4's business model. Crucially, it is one that also suited the free-market ideology 
of Thatcher's Britain, in which entrepreneurial individuals were encouraged to sell their 
talent on the open market. The development of Channel 4 is critical to the evolution of 
the independent sector, which remains a precarious, freelance industry for so many 
individuals, as my analysis will show. 
3.4 Independent television production in the age of New Labour 
In the following section of this chapter, I explore how the independent sector 
has evolved from this position in recent years. I examine the key policy debates that have 
impacted on the growth and development of the sector in recent history, in particular 
under New Labour. There has been a rapid commercialisation of the sector during this 
period, partly as a result of regulatory change, creating an environment more conducive 
to growth for IPCs. However, while there have been a number of high-proftle 
commercial success stories in the independent sector amongst the 'super-indies', in fact 
the vulnerability faced by the majority of producers has intensified under the 
contemporary 'Creative Industries' policy. But first I will contextualise the new 
ideological environment that emerged under New Labour in the 1990s, which has had a 
significant impact on the broadcasting landscape since they swept to power in 1997. 
3.4.1 New Labour and the 'modernisation' agenda 
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After eighteen years in power (1979-97), the Conservative government were 
finally ousted from office in New Labour's landslide victory of May 1997.29 In the years 
following Thatcher's departure in 1990, the Tory government under John Major had 
become indelibly associated with sleaze, hypocrisy and incompetence (I<:.avanagh, 1997; 
Geddes and Tonge, 1997). Policies such as the 'back to basics' strategy, with its moral 
emphasis on recreating traditional 'family values', jarred disastrously with a party 
increasingly embroiled in personal scandal; at the same time the lingering negative impact 
of the poll tax, introduced under Thatcher, had a damaging long-term impact on the 
party's popularity. Labour, which had been out of office since 1979, had become 
increasingly desperate to regain power, and in 1992, with the election of John Smith as 
party leader, the shift to position the party in the 'centre' of British politics was 
consolidated. Determined to reform the structure of party politics within Labour, Smith 
quickly introduced the 'one member, one vote' rule for the selection of parliamentary 
candidates, in order to curb the power of the union block vote. However, for the 
'modernisers' within the party, the reform process was slow and overly consensual. With 
Smith's sudden death in May 1994, Tony Blair was made leader, and immediately set 
about a radical reform of the party. As Freedman argues: 
New Labour, as Blair's project came to be known at the end of 1994, could be 
characterised by its emphasis on three features: 'modernisation' of party policies, 
ideologies and structures; the professionalisation of the party's presentation and 
campaigning skills; and the neutralisation of the influence of a traditionally anti-
Labour mass media. (2003: 155) 
The transformation that occurred under New Labour was ideological, structural 
and aesthetic. Ideologically, the party made an accommodation with the values of market 
capitalism, as Tony Blair and his shadow chancellor toured the City convincing the 
financial community that they were friendly to business. They set out to dispel the old 
image of Labour as the party of high taxes; instead they offered low inflation and low 
levels of public spending. New Labour began to distance itself from fundamental 
socialist principles, in order to appeal not only to the City, but also to the psephological 
electoral heartland of 'Middle England'. This was epitomised in April 1995 when Clause 
IV of the constitution, which promised 'common ownership of the means of 
production', was replaced by one that promised wealth creation rather than distribution. 
29 Labour captured 43.2 per cent of the vote, compared to the Conservatives' 30.7 per cent. 
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Simultaneously, New Labour structurally metamorphosed into a tightly-
controlled centralist machine, as changes were instigated that concentrated power within 
the party executive, away from the rank and file members and the National Executive 
Committee (NEC). Candidate selection was centralised, with the national party given the 
ability to impose candidates on local branches. The annual conference was marginalised 
and the NEC's role was transformed to make it 'auxiliary to the parliamentary party, 
rather then the other way round' (panitch and Leys, 1997: 234). 
Aesthetically, the transformation was immediately evident in the rebranding of 
the party as 'New Labour'. Individuals skilled at media political communication, such as 
Philip Gould, Peter Mandelson and Alastair Campbell, were brought into Blair's private 
office, and a new unit was created at Millbank specifically for dealing with media and 
campaigning issues. Through a highly effective public relations strategy the party 
explicitly sought to court the media (especially the right-wing tabloid press, who were 
widely seen as responsible within the party for Labour's defeat in 1992). As Freedman 
argues, 'The effectiveness of Labour's communications and public relations strategy was 
seen as decisive, not simply in terms of electoral success, but in the actual creation and 
definition of New Labour' (2003: 157). Electorally, this strategy was wildly successful and 
in 1997 Labour succeeded in winning back the hegemonic political centre ground from 
the Conservatives and swept to power with a mandate to create a 'New Britain'. 
Most notably, a discourse of 'modernisation' swept through the party throughout 
the 1990s, and was utilised as a symbolic battleground in which the Labour right 
emerged victorious against the socialists in the party. This discourse, still very much in 
evidence today (Butler, 2003), has had the effect of drawing a metaphorical line in the 
sand between those on the side of Blair and the New Labour project, and the 'forces of 
conservatism' (Blair, cited in Fielding, 2002: 36) on both the left and right who oppose 
their policies. As Finlayson argues: 
The rhetoric of modernisation can be seen as a way of drawing antagonistic lines 
of exclusion and inclusion. On one side is that which is modernised or attuned to 
modernisation and this is always good (if sometimes requiring a 'hard choice'). 
The other side is always, by definition, out of touch and anti-modernisation. 
(2000: 60). 
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With the election of Tony Blair as party leader, the architects of New Labour 
increasingly aligned themselves with this project of modernisation, arguing that issues 
confronting the contemporary world transcended old political distinctions. Central to 
this process was New Labour's embrace of market capitalism and business; something 
made publicly apparent when Peter Mandelson declared that 'Profit was no longer a dirty 
word - profits are accepted as the motor of private enterprise' (1996: 22). As Freedman 
points out, this was a development of the Labour right's long-held belief in the idea of 
'markets as tools of egalitarian choice' but adapted to the context of the 1990s (2003: 
156). This was the context of rapid globalisation (Giddens, 1991) which was presented 
by New Labour as an inevitable force, and something that should be embraced as a 
source of opportunity for business and consumers globally. For Blair, globalisation was 
the 'driving force of economic change' resulting in a situation where: 
Technology and capital are mobile. Industry is becoming fiercely competitive 
across national boundaries. (Blair, 1996: 22) 
Free-market flows of capital and goods were seen as inevitable, and nation-states helpless 
in the face of such forces. Rather than resist this process, New Labour advocated 
measures and strategies to build international competitiveness so that 'UK. Plc.' could 
thrive in such a context. Blair was particularly keen to stress the role of culture and 
communications in this process: 
It is as if someone has pressed the fast-forward button on the video and there is 
no sign of it stopping. I also believe that the internationalisation of culture has 
played a significant part. In Tokyo and London, increasingly we are sharing the 
same rock music, the same designer clothes, the same films and surely, over time, 
the same attitude and tastes. (ibid.: 118-19) 
3.4.2 The 'third way' 
In these early days of New Labour, Blair drew heavily on the ideas of the British 
sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991, 1998), who proposed the much-maligned concept 
of the 'third way' for progressive politics, an attempt to steer a course between the naked 
individualism of Thatcherite neoliberalism and what was seen as an outmoded socialist 
politics of redistribution. The 'third way' posits the idea that state-based solutions to 
issues such as social exclusion have failed, and in fact it is through economic 
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competitiveness that a new progressive approach to social justice can be based. Global 
markets were no longer to be rejected on socialist grounds, but were seen by New 
Labour as instrumental in addressing central Labour aims, such as social inclusion and 
better public services. For Blair, the 'third way' meant an entirely different kind of 
politics: 
My vision for the 21st century is of a popular politics reconciling themes which 
in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic - patriotism and 
internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion of enterprise and the 
attack on poverty and discrimination. (1998: 1) 
Market mechanisms were no longer antagonistic to core social democratic principles, but 
were now seen as the route to delivering them. 
Crucially, the third way presents the key issues affecting societies and individuals 
m an increasingly globalised economy as transcending the traditional dichotomies 
between the left and the right. For Blair, globalisation (in particular an essentially 
neoliberal, capitalist mode of globalisation) is inevitable; in this new rapidly changing 
world, the 'old' questions posed both by socialism and 'the forces of conservatism' were 
increasingly irrelevant. New Labour has consistently presented its policies as the only 
logical response to inexorable global forces and the concomitant rapid social and 
technological change they bring; in this way globalisation is presented in a deterministic 
way, rather than as something contingent and shaped by social and political 
interventions. As Gilbert points out, the rhetorical use of language was a 'hegemonic 
gesture par excellence': by using the 'empty signifier' of 'modernisation', New Labour 
was able to assert the idea 'that its interests are conterminous with those of all or most 
members of that society' (Bewes and Gilbert, 2000: 59). Although the discourse of the 
'third way' has long been discarded by New Labour, the ideology that it represents can 
be seen to be alive and well within the broader 'modernisation' agenda of the 
government. 
3.4.3 Creative industries policy: the neoliberalisation of creativity 
At the heart of this New Labour modernisation manifesto was an explicit focus 
on promoting and embracing the 'knowledge economy' (DTI, 1999). A heavy emphasis 
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was placed on the value of knowledge-intensive industries to the UK economy. 
Technology-based sectors, science and the cultural industries were singled out as 
exemplary of the new 'weightless economy' that was seen as Britain's post-industrial 
future (Coyle, 1999). Tony Blair presented the 'new economy' as 'radically different' 
from what had gone before: 
Services, knowledge, skills and small enterprises are its cornerstones. Most of its 
output cannot be weighed, touched or measured. Its most valuable assets are 
knowledge and creativity. (1998: 8). 
Charles Leadbeater is the key policy thinker associated with these ideas in the UK.30 
Highly influenced by the heady atmosphere of Silicon Valley during the dot. com boom 
of the late 1990s, his book, Living on Thin Air, puts forward the argument that in the 'new 
economy' the most highly prized qualities will be creativity, innovation and knowledge. 
For Leadbeater, Britain must build a knowledge-based economy in order to prosper in 
an increasingly competitive global capitalist environment. With digitisation and 
globalisation leading to the far greater speed of knowledge distribution, the ability to 
convert 'tacit' knowledge to 'explicit' knowledge and then to disseminate it globally is the 
key to economic growth. As such Leadbeater argues that '[k]nowledge sharing and 
creation is at the heart of innovation in all fields - science, art and business - and 
innovation is the driving force for wealth creation' (1999: 29). 
Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Leadbeater suggests that knowledge, 
and the individual's ability to market, package and generate economic value from it, is 
key to success: 
At the end of the century, knowledge is not just one among many resources; it is 
becoming the critical factor in how modern economies compete and how they 
generate wealth and well-being. (ibid.: 36) 
In the 'knowledge economy' view, the proliferation of new digital technologies creates an 
intensification of globalisation which in turn heralds a new economic order where there 
30 Charles Leadbeater - a former contributor to Marxism Todqy - is the author of a number of 
books on the new economy, and retains a close link to the New Labour think tank Demos, 
where he worked in the mid-1990s. He has also acted as an adviser to government, most notably 
as the author of the DTI's report on the knowledge economy (DTI, 1999). 
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is a need for a 'learning society', in which workers need to be constantly updating their 
skills and reshaping themselves to be fit, lean and flexible for the 'new economy'. 
Culture has been accorded a privileged place within this vision of economic 
growth under New Labour. According to a number of definitive New Labour policy 
documents, without even realising it Britain had a great economic success story under its 
noses, one that had prospered despite years of under funding and cultural philistinism 
from the Conservative government (DCMS, 1998, 200la). This was comprised of a 
group of sectors that became known as the 'creative industries', essentially an attempt to 
find a new term for 'cultural industries' with less ideological baggage (Oakley, 2006). The 
creative industries were defined as 'those industries which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through 
the generation and exploitation of intellectual property' (DCMS, 1998: 3). Creativity and 
culture under New Labour was at once a source of individual fulfilment, economic 
growth, and a social policy tool for enhancing education and tackling social inclusion.31 
Indeed, Tony Blair has consistently made the clear link between creativity and national 
prosperity and success: 
For too long, arts and culture have stood outside the mainstream, their potential 
unrecognised by the government. That has to change, and under Labour it 
will .. .in the 21st century, we are going to see the world increasingly influenced 
by innovation and creative minds. Our future depends on our creativity. (2000) 
The 'creativity script' (peck, 2005: 749) involves an aggressive positioning of the 
cultural and 'content' industries at the heart of the new networked knowledge economies 
of post-industrial society, with 'creativity' (the definition of which is left deliberately 
vague) as a precondition for economic success. The policy shift to the concept of 
creative industries was radical in that it heralded a move from seeing culture and the arts 
as sectors to be supported through state subsidies, to seeing them as critical components 
within a globalised knowledge economy (O'Connor, 2007). According to the creative 
industries script as developed since 1997, and which has since spread globally (Wang, 
31 In the UK government Green Paper, 'Culture and Creativity', stress is laid on 'the key role that 
culture and creativity play in the government's educational and industrial policies'. 'Culture and 
Creativity' acknowledges the importance of the cultural sphere as a sector of the economy that 
continues to experience vigorous growth in Britain and throughout the globe. But it also 
recognises that cultural research and development constitutes an essential catalyst of future 
innovation: 'creative talent will be crucial to our individual and national economic success in the 
economy of the future' (DCMS, 200la). 
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2004), culture, creativity and the cultural industries have been reconfigured as engines of 
economic growth and social transformation, offering the hope of generating capital 
accumulation through the development of creative clusters, with the promise of making the 
UK the 'world's creative hub' (purnell, 2005, my italics). 
The creative industries agenda is evidence of the maSSIve economIc shift of 
cultural industries from the margins to the centre of economic and social life. 
Economically, the creative industries account for 8 per cent of Gross Value Added 
(GV A)32 - estimate at £56.5 billion - and according to the latest government figures, they 
are growing at 6 per cent per annum, compared to 3 per cent for the economy as a whole 
(DCMS, 2005). In 2004 there were an estimated 113,000 creative companies and 
employment exceeded 1.8 million (ibid).33 While there are serious questions about the 
validity of the creative industries evidence base and about the methodologies used to 
measure their economic impact (Oakley, 2004; Pratt, 2004a), it is clearly evident that as a 
collective group of sectors they have an increasing economic importance. Moreover, the 
creative industries development agenda within central and regional government has been 
used as an instrumental tool for a whole host of wider policy aims. For example, the 
creativity agenda has been mobilised to address social exclusion (DCMS, 1999); creative 
education (NACCCE, 1999); regional development (GLA, 2002), as well as economic 
development (DCMS, 2001b). 
Immediately, New Labour set about measuring this area of the economy. The 
Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) was set up in 1998 to measure each of the sectors 
within the creative industries. The CITF has produced two reports, one in 1998 and 
again in 2001. Details were amassed about each sector's size, number of employees, 
overall contribution to GDP, and growth. As a result, it was asserted in 1998 that the 
creative industries generated revenues of £60bn a year and employed over 1m people 
(DCMS, 1998). The message of the report was clear - the creative industries are big 
business. Moreover, New Labour asserted their centrality to wealth generation, arguing 
that 'creative industries have moved from the fringes to the heart of the UK economy; a 
key economic driver, providing the jobs of the future and maintaining our position in the 
world' (Smith, 1998a). 
32 GV A measures the contribution to the economy of each individual producer or sector. 
33 The employment figures for creative jobs apply to Great Britain only, i.e. they do not include 
Northern Ireland. 
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On the basis of this narrative of economic success, conclusions were drawn for 
appropriate growth strategies for the sector as a whole, and there was an analysis of the 
threats facing the different industries. Creativity and culture under New Labour was 
firmly conceived of within an economic frame of understanding, as a key part of the 
wider knowledge economy policy strategy. It was also seen as an essentially individualised 
process, as the rhetoric surrounding the creation of NESTA (the National Endowment 
for Science, Technology and the Arts) suggests, when Chris Smith (Culture Secretary 
1997 -2001) announced it would 'help talented individuals develop their full potential' 
(1998b: 30). The explicit link between an individualised creativity and profit is again 
clearly made by Smith in his manifesto for the arts, Creative Britain: 
The Creative Industries as a whole are big business. They are the fields in which 
jobs have been created and will be created, into the next century. And they all 
depend ultimately in the talent of an individual or the intellectual property that is 
created in order to succeed.(Smith, 1998b: 51) 
What is clear from New Labour's policies generally, and particularly towards the 
creative industries, is that there has been a significant political shift within the party 
towards an accommodation with neoliberalism, and the primacy of markets, whilst still 
holding on to core social democratic concerns around social inclusion, access and social 
justice. The attempt to find a 'third way' for progressive politics is echoed in New 
Labour's policies on the 'creative industries'. Since coming to office in 1997, New 
Labour has increasingly framed the importance of culture and creativity in 
instrumentalist terms, as the means to both bring about economic growth and tackle 
social policy agendas. This is also the context under which more specific policies around 
broadcasting have been developed. Within this wider political context, I shall now 
examine how broadcasting policy has developed under New Labour, and the impact of 
that policy on the independent production sector. 
3.4.4 Broadcasting policy 
Under New Labour there has been a constant emphasis at the policy level of 
commercialising the creative industries, and reducing barriers to growth. While earlier 
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Labour governments have expressed concerns about the dangers of media monopolies 
on democratic grounds, New Labour has steadily reduced the barriers to concentration 
and consolidation amongst media companies. Research papers published by central 
government, and also funded by government indirectly through organisations close to 
the New Labour project, have consistently argued that the UK's creative industries need 
to find ways to compete in the global market, find routes to market, and commercialise 
(e.g. Nesta, 2006). Indeed, this commercialisation of culture is one of the hallmarks of 
the New Labour government. In broadcasting policy, the commercialisation agenda has 
manifested itself most clearly in terms of deregulation, both in terms of content 
regulation, but most importantly in the relaxation of regulations around media 
ownership. This approach has had a significant impact on the structure of the 
broadcasting industry, and more specifically on the development of the independent 
production sector. 
In the period between 1992 and 1997 Labour's ideological conversion towards 
markets was echoed in its attitude to broadcasting regulation. This can be seen clearly 
when we examine Labour's changing conceptualisation of television audiences from 
citizens to consumers. For example, in 1992 Ann Clwyd, on the left of the party, was 
Labour's shadow heritage secretary. Working with Mike Jempson, whom she had 
brought in from the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, she was tasked with 
responding to the Green Paper on broadcasting in November 1992, which showed that 
the Conservative government had no intention of replacing the licence fee or of 
changing the funding structure of the BBe. As Freedman argues, 'the moderate tone of 
the Green paper provided Labour with an ideal opportunity to mount a stout defence of 
the principles of public service broadcasting and to attack the commercialisation of 
British broadcasting' (2003: 160). The submission that followed was anti-commercial and 
anti-deregulation, arguing that 'deregulation stems from a political decision to stimulate 
market forces, by commercialising every aspect of public life' (Labour Party, 1993). 
Crucially, the document saw the viewer as a citizen participating in a democracy, and not 
just a consumer with a commercial perspective. As Freedman argues, this report 
represented 'a clear indication of a mood inside Labour to resist further 
commercialisation and to halt the extension of the market to all areas of social life, 
indeed to treat people as "citizens" and not as "consumers"" (2003: 161). In 1993, Clwyd 
was also reported as hostile to Rupert Murdoch, who she was said to have declared 'must 
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and will be stopped', and to any relaxation on cross-media ownership rules (Culf, 1993). 
The following month she was ousted from the cabinet and replaced by Mo Mowlam. 
Under Mowlam, Labour's attitude towards media concentration of ownership 
became markedly more relaxed. The focus within the party shifted towards 'choice for 
the consumer' and deregulation of ownership and control measures (Culf, 1994). This 
position was given further credence in the following year with the creation of a research 
project into media regulation at the left-of-centre think tank the IPPR/4 backed by an 
array of big media interests including BT, the Cable Communication Association, LWT, 
Pearson, Mercury Communications and News International, which led to the publication 
of New Media, New Policies (Collins and Murroni, 1996). The report was highly critical of 
the left's hostility to the market, and sought a synthesis of neoliberal and left approaches. 
James Purnell was one of the IPPR researchers on the project and subsequently a special 
adviser on media policy in Downing Street.35 As he has since explained, the research was 
guided by two key beliefs: 
Firstly, that markets weren't necessarily bad things, that there were some things 
that they were the best tool to deliver. Secondly, we had to adapt to the fact that 
technology was changing incredibly fast and that, whereas policy was based on 
the idea that you would have a very small number of channels and newspapers, 
those assumptions were being overturned. (cited in Freedman, 2003: 163) 
In calling for modernisation, the report breaks ranks with the left on media 
concentration, arguing that it need not necessarily be curbed. The authors of the report 
assert that 'Large, concentrated media organisations are not intrinsically undesirable ... 
Large size tends to bring the resources required for comprehensive high quality reporting 
and the case of the BBC suggests that large organisations with a share of media markets 
can serve the public interest' (Collins and Murroni, 1996: 75). Intellectually, this research 
can be seen as a turning point in Labour's attitude to media regulation, becoming the de 
facto Labour position on media regulation. Indeed, when Jack Cunningham became 
shadow heritage secretary in 1996 his spokesperson Lewis Moonie went so far as to say 
that 'Cross-media ownership is a good thing. The whole point is to ensure the creation 
of bigger companies that can compete abroad' (prescott, 1996). 
34 The IPPR is an influential centre-left think tank close to New Labour. 
35 James Purnell has been central to the development of media policy under New Labour, 
involved in many of the key decisions including the creation of Of com and the 2003 
Communications Act. He is now a cabinet minister. 
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This approach was developed during the 1990s as the implications of digital 
technology for traditional analogue media forms became clear. Labour embraced the idea 
of the 'information superhighway' and in 1994 set up a policy forum on the subject, 
chaired by the new shadow heritage secretary, Chris Smith. The report that came out in 
1995 saw Britain's digital future in a technologically deterministic fashion: 
We stand on the threshold of a revolution as profound as that brought about by 
the invention of the printing press. New technologies, which enable rapid 
communication to take place in a myriad of different ways across the globe, and 
permit information to be provided, sought, and received on a scale so far 
unimaginable, will bring fundamental changes to all our lives. (Labour Party, 
1995: 3) 
Yet, despite its enthusiasm for the development of the 'information superhighway' 
within New Labour, its development was essentially left to the market to provide: 'so 
that government's role was essentially to create the appropriate competitive environment 
and to promote the use of the networks' (Freedman, 2003: 167). The impact on 
television policy was significant; firstly it showed that New Labour's vision of future 
foresaw the inevitability of convergence of all media, which meant the development of 
policies that fitted with that scenario. As such, there was less need for separate media 
policies, and the need for a 'communications policy' for a more competitive market, 
which led to the eventual creation of a new regulatory body, Ofcom.36 Secondly, it 
implied that Labour would now consider television policy more as a part of industrial 
policy, to do with infrastructure and building capacity for digital switchover (ibid.: 167-8). 
Free and fair competition was to be created using the competition authorities and 
economic regulators, not the broadcasting regulators who worked with cultural as well as 
economic objectives (ibid.: 168). 
36 Of com was established in the Office of Communications Act 2002, received its full authority 
from the Communications Act 2003, and began operating on December 29, 2003. Of com is 
widely seen as a new breed of 'super-regulator' and inherited the duties of five regulatory bodies: 
• The Broadcasting Standards Commission 
• The Independent Television Commission 
• The Office of Telecommunications (Of tel) 
• The Radio Authority 
• The Radiocommunications Agency 
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This industrial approach typifies New Labour's approach to media policy. The 
pre-election arts and media report Create the Future had a number of references to the 
'digital future' and promised 'universal access to a wide range of television services in the 
digital age', but failed to suggest how this would be publicly funded. In terms of 
television, the document emphasised the economic importance of UK television, but in a 
classically 'third-way' approach also emphasised the importance of 'creativity' and 
'independence', and key public service values (Labour Party, 1997). However, it is the 
emphasis on the commercialisation of television that is of most importance, as this is the 
agenda that can be seen clearly in Labour's subsequent policies on television. 
3.4.5 Deregulation and commercialisation 
Since reaching office in 1997, New Labour have enthusiastically embraced 
deregulation of the media sphere, beginning by pushing forward with their vision for a 
new 'super-regulator'. In May 1998 the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
argued that the current surplus of regulatory bodies in the media sphere was 'more 
reminiscent of a feudal State than a regulatory structure for the multi-media age' (Culture 
Media and Sport Select Committee, 1998). In July 1998, the DCMS and the DTI 
published their joint green paper, Regulating Communications. Viewers were seen as 
consumers, and market forces of supreme importance. Regulation should be minimal, 
and primarily undertaken in the interests of the market. As such, '[t]he government will 
seek to provide a structure that reflects market realities and will seek to distort them as 
little as possible' (DCMS /DTI, 1998: 10). Regulation, it was suggested, should now be 
'flexible' for a 'fast-changing environment' (ibid.: 24). 
This drive towards deregulation was accelerated in 2000 with the publication of 
the government's white paper, A New Future jor Communications (DCMS/DTI, 2000). The 
paper declared that the government would seek to 'make the UK home to the most 
dynamic and competitive communications and media market in the world' (ibid.: 10). 
The rule preventing one lTV company from reaching more than 15 per cent of the total 
TV audience was abolished. The market was seen as the best mechanism for delivering 
choice and quality. International competitiveness was seen as a key issue, indeed in 1998 
the government had argued the necessity for it: 
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Since markets are increasingly global - particularly if they are mediated 
electronically across global networks - domestic firms increasingly must compete 
with strong players from abroad. It is dearly central to the health of the UK 
economy that UK firms are fully competitive in world markets, not only to 
defend the domestic position but also to attract a share of global revenues and 
jobs to the UK. (DCMS/DTI, 1998: 14) 
In this way, the government has consistently made it easier for media companies 
to concentrate ownership, arguing that it makes them more globally competitive: '[s]ome 
concentration of ownership has been regarded as inevitable, and possibly desirable, since 
it confers advantage in terms of global competitiveness' (DCMS/DTI, 1998: 16). The 
government argued that existing competition law should be strong enough to stop any 
abuse of a dominant market position, but not the pursuit of dominance (ibid). In 1999 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was scrapped and the Competition 
Commission was introduced in its place, with 'tough new powers to rule on anti-
competitive behaviour without any political interference affecting key merger decisions' 
(Freedman, 2003: 176). The argument was that public interest was effectively served 
through competition in the market. However, the irony is that there is little to no 
competition in broadcasting in the UK, with Granada-Carlton dominating lTV, Telewest 
and NTL dominating cable and BSkyB dominating satellite. Broadcasting had come to 
be seen as an industrial sector to be exploited, rather than as an area of cultural life with 
its own rules and needs (ibid: 177-8). 
3.4.6 From 'cottage industry' to big business: the growth of the independent 
sector 
This shift towards deregulation and commercialisation is the broader context in 
which policies directed towards the independent television sector have been formed. The 
political will to build international competitiveness can be seen to have informed 
thinking within government towards the independent production sector, in particular the 
desire to provide regulatory changes which would allow growth in the sector, and allow 
those companies in a position to do so to commercialise and capitalise on their 
intellectual property. The overall picture has been one of economic growth. The statistics 
certainly tell a story of growth and economic success in the UK television industry. The 
UK television industry contributes around £12 billion to the UK economy, with exports 
approaching £500 million (Skillset, 2006b). Indeed of all the communications sectors, 
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television has had the fastest revenue growth (up 9 per cent from £9.3 billion in 2003 to 
£10.1 billion in 2004) (Of com, 2005a). This can be seen in context against annual GDP 
growth in the period 2003-4 of 3.1 per cent (Tyrell, 2005). A number of key changes 
have taken place within the independent sector which have contributed to this growth, 
which I shall explore below. However, there are growing concerns that this growth has 
occurred at the expense of a culture of innovation and creativity within the sector. 
In recent years technological innovation, commercial changes and regulatory 
intervention have created a climate of intense growth and investment interest in the 
ITPS. First, particularly as a result of digital television, the number of channels that 
commission programmes externally has dramatically increased. Over 370 channels are 
now available to UK audiences. Almost 2.5 million UK households acquired digital TV 
over the course of 2004, and by March 2005 62 per cent of UK homes were digital. All 
four main UK broadcasters have announced plans to diversify further, with new digital 
channels and movement into new delivery platforms such as broadband (Ofcom, 2005b). 
This has created a significant opportunity for British television production. 
Certainly the ITPS has been highly successful in recent years, and experienced 
consistent growth, largely as a result of regulatory changes. The introduction of the 
independent quota in the 1990 Broadcasting Act (HMSO, 1990) stated that 25 per cent 
of broadcast television must be sourced from independent companies. This provided a 
massive boost to the sector. More recently, changes to the Communications Act in 2003 
have been crucial in generating rapid investment growth in the sector. The Act outlined 
new terms of trade which mean that independent television companies are able to retain 
ancillary rights to the content that they produce, previously controlled by broadcasters. 
Once a programme is shown on terrestrial TV, the rights revert back to its maker, 
allowing companies to generate revenue by selling the show to foreign networks, 
licensing the format to other broadcasters, or selling the show on new platforms. This is 
vital in a transformed commercial environment where non-first-run revenue sources are 
providing increasing financial opportunities. However, there are concerns that these 
rights are not yet being sufficiently exploited - recent research found that 54 per cent of 
production companies were generating less than 1 per cent of their turnover from 
royalties (Skillset, 2005a). 
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Finally, the BBC has recently set up its Window of Creative Competition 
(Wocq, which means that the broadcaster will make up to 50 per cent of its original 
programming budget available to outside suppliers. All of this has ensured intense 
investment interest from the City in the independent television sector, which is currently 
experiencing a moment of dynamic commercialisation and growth, with turnover 
predicted to grow from £780m in 2004 to £1.5bn in 2014, not counting traditional 
programmes and format sales (Mediatique, 2005: 4). 
This has led to unprecedented interest in the independent sector since 2003, and 
a shift towards media consolidation and concentration. Most obviously there has been 
much talk of 'super-indies' within the media press, largely focussing on a small group of 
successful independents who have grown substantially in recent years to increasingly 
dominate the market (Martinson, 2005). These include companies such as RDF, 
Endemol, TVI, Shed and Shine.37 While each of these companies have quite different 
business models, between them they are representative of the rapid commercialisation 
and internationalisation that has taken place within the sector. Increasingly the 
commercial success of a production company lies in its ability to exploit its intellectual 
property globally across differentiated media platforms. For example, Endemol, as the 
producers of Big Brother, and other successful formats, extract commercial value across 
different territories, giving the company a stability beyond the traditional commissioner 
basis. Mobile phone ringtones, online rights, merchandise and book spin-offs are all 
ways for the successful modern IPC to capitalise on its intellectual property. 
37 For example, eight years ago, production company RDF was run out of an old church and 
employed 20 people. Today it has 350 employees and sales of £50m. RDF was voted Broadcast's 
best independent production company in 2004 and boasts offices in London and LA, having 
recently sold 20 episodes of its show Wije Swap to the US in a deal worth $7.5m. Much of RDF's 
success has come from pioneering one of the key trends in contemporary television: the 
development and exploitation of television formats for a global market. RDF has developed a 
number of highly successful formats, such as Wije Swap, Holidqy Showdown, and Faking It, which 
have been exported internationally. This strategy takes full advantage of the new legislative 
climate allowing indies to hold on to secondary rights. The move towards producing formats 
locally, as opposed to merely licensing product, represents a maturation of the market and the 
growing confidence of UK producers, who now lead the way in international format 
development and production. Recent research shows that the UK is the world leader in the 
creation and distribution of international TV formats, securing a dominant 45 per cent share of 
the international TV format market by hours and a 49 per cent share by the number of titles 
across the channels studied (UK Trade and Investment, 2005). Moreover, RDF is actively 
exploring multi-platform opportunities for its formats including web-based and mobile content, 
telephony income and sponsorship. 
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The success of the independent sector has created significant City interest, which 
means that those companies that have attracted investment have access to previously 
unimaginable levels of funding. The ability for independents to exploit their Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) is the underlying reason for this interest, viewed as they are as the 
key source of value in media markets. In the US, the equivalent sector has created many 
millionaires (Mediatique, 2005: 4). In the UK, increasing numbers of independents have 
floated on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and several have private equity 
backing (ibid). However, for all the hype around the so-called 'super-indies' it is easy to 
neglect just how fragile and exposed this dynamic creative sub-sector actually is. Often 
large production companies are in fact financially reliant on one or two high-prof1le hits, 
and so find themselves utterly exposed to the whims of television trends and of the 
commissioners. For example, one of the most successful and feted indies, Shed 
productions, floated on the AIM in 2005 for £44m, is in fact almost wholly reliant on the 
success of glossy dramas such as Bad Girls and Footballers' Wives. This is worth bearing in 
mind as large independents increasingly dominate the sector. However, the level of risk 
is even greater for the majority of independents, which are small to medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) or micro-businesses, and which often survive in a piecemeal fashion, 
lurching from commission to commission. 
As a result of these changes to the sector, the structure of independent 
production is currently undergoing a radical transition, from a largely 'cottage industry' 
sector, as it was from its formative days with the creation of Channel 4, peopled by 
SMEs and micro-businesses, relying on unpredictable commissions from a very small 
pool of broadcasters, to an industry that is largely dominated by a handful of large 
companies, selling their intellectual property to global markets. A recent report into the 
sector has predicted that the trend towards concentration will continue, leading to the 
existence of just five 'super-indies', which it suggests will be listed on the Stock 
Exchange; a smaller mid-market group of companies which may be externally financed, 
and a much smaller 'tail' of independent producers who will find it increasingly difficult 
to survive in this far more competitive environment (Mediatique, 2005: 4). This report 
depicts a highly commercialised, professionalised future: 
It is likely that these 'super indies' will be able to leverage their programming 
skills to ensure that they derive greater value from the broadcasters, to further 
develop their new media and international businesses, and to secure revenues 
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from an increasing variety of sources - all of which should lead to a more lasting 
love affair with the City (ibid.: 20). 
3.5 Creativity at risk? 
This situation raIses a number of key questions both for the broadcasting 
industry, and for the nature of the content produced. As external investors buy into the 
production sector, the primary concern of the company is to produce a return for 
investors and shareholders. Thus profit becomes the over-riding imperative in the 
independent sector, rather than the culturally independence and creativity which marked 
Channel 4's launch. While independents now have a much bigger market to sell their 
programmes to, arguably the commercialisation of the sector has a detrimental effect on 
innovation, as companies become under greater pressure to produce hits. 
What is increasingly clear both from my analysis and from the industry data is 
that this sector is undergoing a major structural change, which is squeezing out the small 
'lifestyle' producers. This is the term given to those small companies who make a living 
from a small number of productions each year, but do not have major plans for growth, 
and are quite content to carry on being creative without the need to grow. However, 
many of these 'lifestyle' producers are highly talented individuals who have produced 
some of the most memorable and creative television of the last thirty years. Analysis of 
the figures provided by the Mediatique report shows that whereas those lifestyle 
producers made up 61 per cent of turnover in the sector in 1993, by 2004 this had 
dropped to just 9 per cent. This is occurring as the number of independents is dropping 
(from around 1,000 in 1993 to the current level of 800) (Mediatique, 2005), as 
consolidation and concentration has an impact on the diversity of the independent 
production sector ecology. The larger companies will benefit, but the smaller ones will 
struggle. The following chart shows the change in the composition of the industry since 
1993: 
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Figure 1: The changing structure of the ITPS 
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There is a tripartite structure In place in the independent production sector, 
which is increasingly making it harder for these small 'long tail' companies to compete: 
Not all IPCs [independent production companies] are equal. The range of trends 
analysed in this report is likely to perpetuate a tripartite structure in the sector, 
with a handful of strong, well-funded and professionally managed IPCs, a long 
tail of small targeted and creative 'one-man bands' and a number of mid-market 
players, with little hope of creating critical mass despite ambitions to break into 
the top league. It is this last category that will be most at risk if the trends 
described here continue to develop but the long tail, too, is likely to see its shares 
of failures. (ibid.: 20) 
As in other sectors of the creative industries, there is a tension between size and 
creativity. Often the most innovative, risky and exciting cultural products come from 
outside the commercial mainstream, from people pushing boundaries. Commercial 
imperatives are often in conflict with creative innovation, so the question is who will be 
doing the risky, innovative television (except for the publicly funded BBC, which is of 
course facing its own huge structural changes). As Mediatique suggest, the picture may 
well be bleak: 
It will be the mid market and long tail where most innovation among 
independent production companies is likely to take place. It will also be these 
sub-sectors most at risk of failure. (ibid.: 20) 
This is likely to have an impact on the culture of innovation and creativity within 
programme making. As we have seen with the music industry, the existence of a 
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genuinely independent cultural production scene can have a significant cultural (and 
economic) effect. For example, the success of the 'Madchester' scene in Manchester in 
the late 1980s (and the subsequent wave of culturally led urban regeneration that it 
precipitated) was directly connected to the existence of a vibrant independent music 
production scene, which clearly acted as an incubator for a number of culturally 
significant acts (Halfacree and Kitchin, 1996; Haslam 1999). One has to ask how such a 
scene would have developed in today's highly commercialised music industry, where 
'independence' is often more rhetoric than reality.38 In the same way, will 'independence' 
in the commercial, global future of the television industry merely mean companies that 
are subsidiaries of huge, global media conglomerates? And if so, what does this mean for 
the cultural sphere? 
38 For example, the majority of 'independent' labels now are in fact subsidiary labels of the major 
labels, such as EMI, BMG and Universal. 
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Chapter 4. In the field: Researching cultural production 
using a situated, qualitative approach 
In this study, a primarily qualitative approach was taken, with 'ethnographic 
intent' (Gray, 1992; Morley, 1988). Empirical data for this thesis came from in-depth 
semi-structured qualitative interviews with twenty people working in the independent 
television sector, who were then studied longitudinally over a period of six months using 
bi-monthly email contact to develop an insight into the flux of their working lives over a 
period of time. To conclude the research, shorter follow-up interviews were conducted 
after this period. In addition, three in-depth interviews with more senior figures in the 
independent television sector were also conducted. This was done to build up a broader 
account of the organisational challenges and opportunities facing the industry in the 
coming years; also these interviews explored labour market issues from the perspective 
of individuals who were running their own companies, and making human resources 
decisions. Site visits were undertaken, as well as visits to industry conferences, in order to 
build up a deeper picture of the industry. Whilst the data generated from the fieldwork 
constitutes the bulk of material used for the analysis, the findings are also informed by 
the available empirical market and employment data on the television industry (e.g. 
Skillset, 2005b, 2006a, 2007; BFI, 1999; Of com, 2006; Mediatique, 2005). 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it outlines the significance of the 
epistemological debates that have occurred within social research, in particular in terms 
of how those debates have been played out within qualitative and ethnographic research. 
This is vital as a way of positioning my research approach; one that is qualitative, but 
informed by ethnographic concerns, and which seeks a 'critical realist' theoretical 
approach to conducting social research. Second, it assesses the methodological 
significance of qualitative and ethnographic accounts of cultural production for this 
study, exploring the difficulties of conducting production research, and the strategies and 
theoretical approaches that researchers in this field have used. Third, it outlines the 
research approach taken, detailing the time-frame of the research, the scale of the 
sample, the process of recruiting and tracking the participants, and of conducting final 
follow-up interviews at the end of the research period. This section will explore how a 
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qualitative approach connects to the research alms. Details are provided about the 
practicalities of conducting the research, dealing with recruitment of the sample, the 
issue of access, and the rationale for the selection of the key informants selected for 
study. Finally, the chapter outlines the mode of analysis taken, exploring the use of 
experience and of narrative inquiry as a means of conducting social research. It outlines 
the use made of the qualitative data analysis software NVivo, and also the use of 
discourse analysis. 
The methodological approach taken in this thesis is primarily qualitative, rather 
than ethnographic in the anthropological sense, which would involve full immersion in 
the field for an extensive period. However, I use the term 'ethnographic' here as an 
approach which signals the use of familiarity with the field, and the use of key tools of 
ethnography which are explored below, rather than in the 'strong sense of the term' 
(Goldbart and Hustler, 2005: 16). This draws from Sennett's mode of narrative sociology 
(1998), with interviews employing strategies of close listening, to understand the self-
reflexive narrative features of my participant's accounts, as well as ethnographic attention 
given to the sites of the research. Indeed, post-foundationalist methodological revisions 
(particularly feminist) which critique the concept of objective knowledge as power-laden 
and oppressive, and argue for a situated, grounded approach to knowledge generation 
(e.g. Haraway, 1991), have allowed a greater flexibility and openness in terms of what 
constitutes 'ethnography' and are highly significant for the methodological approach of 
this research. Such studies signal an openness which allows the researcher to use a 
number of different methods to produce an account of a social environment (e.g. 
Walkerdine et al, 2001; Budgeon, 2003; Skeggs, 1997). 
My methodological strategy has enabled me to 'develop a strong sense of the 
particular realities involved' within a given context (Goldbart and Hustler, 2005, 17). A 
range of research strategies are used which derive from ethnography, such as attention to 
the narrative features of my respondents' talk, reflexive engagement with the research 
process and engagement in the field for a length of time. Such an approach can be 
described as a 'quasi-ethnographic'methodology (Willis, 1981: 49, 75, 139, 138), used here 
as a strategy for gaining a greater understanding of the conditions of creative labour in 
the television industry. 
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4.1 Approaching social research: questions of epistemology 
In undertaking social research it is vital to attend to the epistemological questions 
that accompany such activity. What is the status of the knowledge that can be generated 
by such research? What are the epistemological and representational issues raised by 
doing social research, that are germane to this study? If conducting social research was 
once understood as a relatively umproblematic activity, based on an empirical, positivist 
understanding of the process of generating knowledge about the social world,39 then 
structuralism, poststructuralism, postmodernism and feminist post-foundational 
concerns have posed a series of radical epistemological challenges to this positivist 
model, by focusing on the constructed, partial, subjective nature of interpretation and 
representation. 
Social research undertaken in the wake of postmodern epistemological doubt 
must acknowledge these concerns. This does not mean that all attempts to describe and 
analyse the social world should be abandoned, but these epistemological concerns raise 
important questions about methodology which need to be addressed. In the following 
section I examine the implications of the 'crisis of representation' within social research 
(Geertz, 1975), and explore the benefits of a 'critical realist' methodological approach 
(Bhaskar, 1989), as a means of avoiding either an unreflexive positivism, or a potentially 
impotent postmodernism, paralysed into theoretical inertia. 
4.1.1 Positivism and the legacy of the Enlightenment 
Early social research was largely conducted with the View that scientific 
observation could achieve an objective, 'truthful' account of society. The social world 
was conceived of as an objective reality, which existed separately from human 
observation and modes of understanding it. This epistemological scientism emerged 
from the Enlightenment period in Europe in the 18th century and the dominant belief in 
39 Within sociology, positivism is evident, for example, in Durkheim's classic text The Rules 0/ 
Sociological Method (1964), and is exemplified in his assertion that 'a sociologist is a scientist, not a 
mystic' (ibid: 141). 
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sC1ence and objectivity as instruments of rational progress.40 In the empirical 
epistemology associated with positivism, the researcher is presented as a scientific, 
neutral observer who is able to provide an accurate representation of social life through 
scientific methods. Such an approach to social research puts forward a case for scientific 
knowledge gathered from 'the facts of experience acquired by observation and 
experiment' (Williams and May, 1996: 15). Such research is informed by this focus on 
'facts', which are presented as already-existing entities which can be measured and 
captured by the tools of the researcher. 
Qualitative research, with its focus on culture, identity and meaning, has always 
been a more subjective mode of research than quantitative research, with a greater 
emphasis placed on individual interpretation. However, early qualitative research ~argely 
ethnographic) was imbued with a highly positivistic framework of understanding. This 
positivist approach to social research can be seen clearly in some of the canonical early 
ethnographic texts which describe cultural formations in distant locations, often amongst 
communities far removed from the norms and beliefs of western civilisation (Bateson, 
1958; Mead, 1942; Evans-Pritchard, 1974; Malinowski, 1922). 
Such ethnographic research involved extensive field research, often over a year, with 
the researcher living alongside the group being studied. Its aim was to provide a realistic 
and objective analysis of social formation, discovered by an immersive and painstaking 
observational research. The ethnographer was the trusted and authoritative interpreter of 
'alien' societies, an impression reinforced by the fact that early ethnography rarely used 
direct quotations from respondents, which meant that the correct interpretation of 
events came from the 'expertise' of the anthropologist, as opposed to the research 
participants. Utmost faith was placed on the ability of the ethnographer to interpret the 
reality of the situation being studied. Four beliefs can be said to characterise social 
research of this kind in this period: (i) a commitment to objectivism; (ii) a complicity 
with imperialism; (iii) monumentalism (the belief that the report would contribute to a 
growing repository of knowledge); (iv) a belief in the timelessness of the culture being 
studied (Seale, 1997: 102). 
40 During the 18th century there was an intellectual shift towards understanding the world 
through scientific and technological progress and discovery. This led to the conceptualisation 
that the world could be controlled and understood through rational scientific understanding and 
progress, a mode of thinking associated with modernism. See Lyotard (1984) and Habermas 
(1971) for seminal accounts of Enlightenment and modernist thought. 
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Other forms of early qualitative research exhibit a positivist legacy. For example, the 
'Chicago School' researchers of the 1920s and 30s took a highly scientific approach, 
emphasising the deductive analysis of data. They focused on urban life, and believed a 
scientific approach would provide answers about the nature of society. Their approach is 
known as 'ecological', in that they perceived society as an ecological system, which could 
be studied in a dispassionate, detached way. This epistemology is epitomised in this 
quote: 
In these great cities, where all the passions, all the energies of mankind are 
released, we are in a position to investigate the process of civilisation, as it were, 
under a microscope. (park, 1928: 190) 
Such research was essentially 'realist', expressing faith in the concept of a world 'out 
there' that is independent from our perceptions of it, and that can be explained through 
rational, detached observation (Williams and May, 1996.: 36). It is 'the idea that there is 
a reality independent of the researcher whose nature can be known, and that the aim of 
research is to produce accounts that correspond to that reality' (Hammersley, 1991 b: 43). 
It is an approach 'which claims that knowledge and scientific theories of the world are 
derivable solely from empirical sense experience or observation' (Lazar, 2004: 9). 
4.1.2 Structuralism and the constructivist turn 
During the course of the twentieth century, these positivist assumptions were 
challenged, initially by structuralist theory and then by poststructuralism and postmodern 
epistemological deconstruction. Feminist standpoint and post-foundational concerns, 
and the growing concern with 'situated knowledge' (Haraway, 1991), were also vital to 
contributing to this epistemological break from positivism. The focus turned away from 
a belief in scientific objectivity, towards representation, partiality and the impossibility of 
an objective position 'outside' of cultural constructs, language and identity. Moreover, 
the scientific, empirical position of the positivists was seen by post-foundationalist social 
researchers and theorists as homogenising, de-differentiating, gendered and ethnocentric 
(e.g. Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1998) 
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This shift began gradually, as theorists and linguists increasingly focused on the 
constructed nature of representation. In social research, under the influence of 
structuralism, there was a growing concern with how social groups were constructed. In 
qualitative research this meant investigating societies as structural systems with their own 
codes of meaning-making, which occurred at the same time as the linguistic turn in 
literary theory. Structuralism emerged from Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of structural 
linguistics, which played a key role in the development of structuralism and semiotics 
(Saussure et ai, 1966). Saussure presented language as an arbitrary system of signs used to 
represent and construct an external meaning. For Saussure, language could be broken 
down into two key parts: the signifier (the mark, image, text, word or sign) and the 
signified (the meaning that the signifier was referring to). Words do not acquire their 
meaning from their equivalents outside the system of language, but rather through how 
they are differentiated from that which they are not within the internal linguistic system. 
As Strinati writes: 
Since the meanings of particular linguistic signs are not externally determined but 
derive from their place in the overall relational structure of language, it follows 
that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is a purely arbitrary 
one. There is no necessary reason as to why the notation 'dog' should refer to 
that specific animal, nor 'god' to a supernatural deity. (2004: 81) 
In social research, the influence of structuralism was most noticeable in the focus 
on the constructed nature of societies, and how those structures might be analysed. The 
realist agenda (Malinowski, 1922; Maybury-Lewis, 1965; Mead, 1942) gradually 
transformed into a concern with the structural conditions of meaning-making, such as 
language, myth and ideology (e.g. Levi-Strauss, 1961, 1977). Social constructionism 
became a dominant approach within the field of social research, described by Walsh as 
'the view that society is to be seen as socially constructed on the basis of how its 
members make sense of it and not as an object-like reality' (2004: 227). Essentially, social 
constructivists examine how individuals and groups participate in the creation of any 
given reality; analysing how social phenonena are created and given institutional form by 
people. For the constructivist, this is an ongoing, constantly evolving process, where 
social life is constantly reproduced by people's interpretations and knowledge of it. 
Constructivism aims to analyse and describe the process by which ideas and 
interpretations become social constructs, and are given material form, within a gIven 
culture. 
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4.1.3 The crisis of representation: 'anti-realism' in social research 
Structuralism's commitment to understanding belief systems and values did not 
pose a significant challenge to the realist agenda as long as it focused on the construction 
of the societies being studied. But when it turned to consider the construction of 
knowledge itself, it caused serious epistemological problems. Conceptual relativism 
posed a radical epistemological challenge to the positivist tradition, because it argued that 
any single interpretation was only one of many possibilities. The privileging of 'scientific', 
'objective' knowledge was dismantled. As Little argues: 
Different cultures employ radically different conceptual schemes defining what 
exists in the world, how things are organized in time and space, what sorts of 
relations obtain among things, and how some things influence others ... [from 
this standpoint] it is not possible to give rational grounds for concluding that one 
such scheme is more congruent to reality than another. (1991: 203, cited in Lazar, 
2004: 17) 
In this VIew, all knowledge is seen as socially constructed, with the researcher's 
interpretation being just one of many possible perspectives. 
Critical reflexivity towards the act of social research itself began in earnest in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, in what has been called the 'anti-realist' movement. 
Ethnography's 'crisis of representation' emerged with the publication of a number of 
formative critiques, which mounted a radical challenge to the hermeneutical framework 
of the dominant realist mode (Geertz, 1975; Marcus, 1982; Clifford and Marcus, 1986; 
Pratt, 1986; Clifford, 1988). These texts attack the ways in which ethnographers assert 
their objective authority and deny the subjective, power-laden nature of their relations 
with subjects. As Peas on argues, 'ethnography is a messy business [but] public accounts 
of fieldwork are invariably cleansed of the "private" goings-on between researcher and 
researched' (1993: vii). Within qualitative research more generally, there was a turn 
towards modes of interviewing which focused on issues of representation, with the 
boundaries between the interviewer and interviewee becoming blurred. Marginal voices 
were increasingly focused on, and the very purpose of doing social research became a 
focus of intense query (Gubrium, 2002: 163-3). 
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This re-evaluation of the method, theory and purpose of social research 
coincided with the wider poststructuralist movement which sought to expose the 
constructed, arbitrary nature of language and of systems of meaning. Poststructuralism 
claimed that 'meaning' was the product of unstable and endless chains of self-referential 
signifiers. If Saussure (1966) argued that all language was an interplay between the 
signifier and the signified, the text and the meaning implied, then poststructuralists took 
this one step further and argued that there was no meaning beyond the text; that all 
attempts to find any objective scientific, rational perspective from which to observe and 
judge reality were fruitless because any findings were merely the product of yet more 
signifiers. 
For example, Derrida emphasised the instability of language, in that the author can have 
no control over the arbitrary collection of signifiers in the text to forge meaning (Derrida 
and Spivak, 1976; Derrida and Bass, 1978); meanwhile Barthes showed that 'meaning' is 
created by the reader and the understanding that this reader brings to any text (Barthes, 
1967, 1976; Barthes and Balzac, 1975). Poststructuralism sees social life as composed not 
of identities, objects and subjects, but rather of difference, complex relations, and 
instability (Filmer 2004: 42). For the poststructuralist, 'meaning' and 'truth' are ultimately 
deferred, as signifiers only refer on endlessly to other signifiers. In other words there is 
no singular reality or meaning, only representation, which is arbitrary.41 For the 
poststructuralist, as Eagleton suggests: 
Meaning is the spin-off of a potentially endless play of signifiers, rather than a 
concept tied firmly to the tail of a particular signifier (1996: 127). 
Poststructuralism has been highly influential for theorists who claim that we are 
living in a postmodern society. Postmodernism signals a moment of radical critical re-
evaluation of the 'Enlightenment project', with its underlying narratives of progress. 
These meta-narratives of modernity were challenged by postmodernism, which Lyotard 
argues represents an incredulity towards overarching explanatory schemes (1984: xxiv). 
As Filmer et al argue, in the place of these meta-narratives, 'instability and uncertainty are 
introduced into knowledge claims and practices, and a more pragmatic and situated 
model of research is promoted' (2004: 43). 
41 For an excellent exposition of poststructuralism, see Eagleton (1996: 127-50). 
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Such ideas have had a powerful impact on social research methodology. For 
example, Geertz (1975) radically calls into question any claim made by ethnography of 
objective scientific inquiry. As Walsh suggests '[t]his position involves not simply seeing 
ethnography as a revelation of social construction but seeing ethnographic research as 
itse!f participating in the construction of the social world' (2004: 227) For Geertz, social 
research is only one interpretation among many. He has called for a more genuinely 
interpretive ethnography, which focuses on the 'search for meaning' rather than the one 
definitive meaning. As he writes: 
... man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun and I 
take culture to be those webs, and the analysis to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social expressions on their 
surface enigmatical. (1975: 5) 
In this View, ethnography should involve the generation of 'thick description' as its 
central knowledge-generating activity. This involves seeing the ethnographer as a kind of 
semiotician, examining a culture like a literary theorist would a text - as a system of signs 
which demand interpretation, even though any attempt at a definitive interpretation is 
frustrated by the fact that the researcher is caught up within that enclosed system of 
mearung. 
4.1.4 Towards a critical realism 
The postmodern rupture with totalising truth claims has been of crucial 
importance in advancing social research methodologies. The focus on reflexivity, and on 
marginalised voices, has shifted the terrain of social research, allowing for a recognition 
of the power imbalances inherent within the very act of much research. However, in 
recent years, there has been a growing backlash against the more extreme versions of 
postmodern social research. This is largely because the validity of such research has been 
questioned. If any attempt at ascertaining knowledge generates just one more 
interpretation amongst many, then what is the basis for the validity of any social 
research? If the social researcher becomes no more than a story-teller, then notions of 
truth must be forgotten. Given the radical shift towards partiality, situatedness and 
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reflexivity in postmodern social research, can there be any knowledge-producing role for 
social research in contemporary society? 
Devine and Heath (1999) have pointed to the specific challenge of doing social 
research in the wake of postmodernism. They question the possibility of producing 
reliable knowledge of the social world, when postmodernism, in its deconstruction of 
empmclsm, argues that there can be no final, conclusive and stable definition of 
knowledge. Williams and May have also pointed out the implications of 
postmodernism's radical deconstruction of epistemological understanding for the 
practice of social research: 
At an epistemological level, converts to postmodernism regard it as nothing less 
than pulling the rug from under the feet of traditional scientific foundations. 
Although there remains definitional ambiguity over the term ... postmodernism 
may be viewed as a critique of the values, goals, and bases of analyses that, from 
the Enlightenment onwards, have been assumed to be universally valid ... 
Methodologically, the alternative to the complacent foundationalism of 
modernism becomes the maxim that 'anything goes'. (1996: 158) 
For the postmodern relativist, there is no singular truth to be discovered 'out there' in 
the social world, but rather any number of co-existing 'truths' and interpretations, 
depending on the perspective of the respondent or researcher. As Seale has argued, 
'relativism rejects that notion of a common objective reality and counterposes to the idea 
of truth the notion of truths, there being (allegedly) no rational basis for choosing one 
version of truth as the truth' (1997: 19}. 
Yet surely there must be some basis for doing social research, without necessarily 
having to resort to a mode of essentialism? As Walsh argues, 'it seems wrong for social 
researchers to accept this postmodern discourse, to abandon all forms of realism as the 
basis for doing ethnography, and to accept that all is textuality and construction ... The 
social and cultural world must be the ground and reference for ethnographic writing, and 
reflexive ethnography should involve a keen awareness of the interpenetration of reality 
and representation' (2004: 228). 
This emphasis on reflexivity is vital for my research approach. By reflexive, I 
mean the process by which the social researcher incorporates into the study an 
acknowledgement of his/her own position within the research, and the causal 
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relationship between the research process and the findings generated. However, in 
conducting this research I wanted to avoid producing an entirely self-referential study 
that is only able to comment on the act of enquiry. Geertz has warned against an over-
reliance on self-inspection in the field and the 'curious interiorization of what is in fact 
an intensely public activity' (1995: 120). The problem is how to be reflexive and also 
generate empirical knowledge. Usefully, as Couldry argues, 'a commitment to 
reflexivity ... is perfectly compatible with a commitment to carrying out new empirical 
research' (2000: 13). 
While acknowledging the postmodernist position in social research, which rejects 
totalising truth claims, and argues that '[t]here can never be a final, accurate 
representation of what was meant or said - only different textual representations of 
different experiences (Denzin, 1997: 5), a number of researchers have argued that it is 
both possible and necessary to say something valid and useful about social life. This is an 
approach I have followed. Therefore while the research methodology of this thesis 
emphasises local, situated and partial accounts of the social world, it rejects the radical 
relativism of certain aspects of postmodern social research. Although one can agree with 
the postmodern notion that knowledge is socially produced, and that privileging one 
'reality' over another risks reproducing uneven power relations (Williams et al, 1996: 169), 
one can also argue for research that aims to produce knowledge of the social world, 
however partial or situated that knowledge might be. As Devine and Heath have argued, 
'the wholesale dismissal of conventional criteria for assessing social research can easily 
collapse into a rather hopeless relativism and, consequently, an inability to contribute to 
public debate' (1999: 209-10). 
As such, this research is positioned within what Deacon et al have called the 
'critical realist' tradition (1999). This approach, while indebted to the theoretical 
approach of standpoint feminism and poststructuralist methodology (Stanley, 1983, 
1993; Haraway, 1991), and influenced by a post-foundationalist, interpretivist perspective 
(Geertz, 1975; Marcus, 1982, 1998; Clifford, 1986, 1988), also emphasises the value of 
social research to attempt to critically answer difficult questions. This means rejecting the 
'excesses' of postmodern research, where the researcher can end up in a reflexive 'hall of 
mirrors' (Devine, 1999) - worried about the implications of making any truth claim at all. 
As Morley and Silverstone have written, with reference to ethnography, but in a view 
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that can equally be applied to all social research, 'if the traditional anthropological 
attitude to these questions ("Don't think about ethnography, just do it") is the problem, 
then equally, to fall into a paralysing (if vertiginously thrilling) trance of epistemological 
navel-gazing ("Don't do ethnography, just think about it") is no kind of answer to 
anyone with a commitment to empirical research' (1991: 162). 
Critical realism supports the interpretive posltlon that 'the social world is 
reproduced and transformed in daily life' (Bhaskar, 1989: 4). However, 'everyday action 
cannot be properly understood without taking account of the broader social and cultural 
formations that envelop and shape it' (Deacon et al, 1999: 10). This rests on the belief 
that structures are always enabling, and that the 'relations between situated actions and 
general formations, local choices and prevailing circumstances, are dynamic and two-
way' (ibid.). As Giddens has argued, 'structures are constituted through action' but 
simultaneously 'action is constituted structurally' (Giddens, 1976: 161). 
Such an approach rejects the extreme postmodern view that reality exists only in 
terms of how people choose to imagine and understand it. Rather it accepts that there 
are cultural and social structures that shape people's understanding of reality and their 
options for action, but that in turn those structures are constituted by active, creative 
agents. Positivism is unable to theorise structures in relation to creative agency and is 
therefore unable to explain how change occurs (Fiske, 1994: 195). But critical realism 
with its emphasis on structure 'insists that unlike the structures that organise the natural 
world, social and cultural structures have traceable historical careers' (Deacon, 1999: 10). 
It is by analysing the structures of contemporary social and cultural life that we can 
understand how they are changing, and it is through attentivity to the creative actions of 
agents within those structures that we can understand how that change is occurring. 
This position IS essential to the methodology of my research into television 
production. A critical realist approach demands attentiveness to the historical context of 
production, but also to the subjective desires, beliefs and cultural meanings for 
individuals within that production chain. It is an attempt to look for the macro within 
the micro, to theorise from the ground up rather than in a top-down manner. This 
means combining a method that is able to take the macro picture of the television 
industry (an empirical analysis), and connect this to the qualitative insights that come 
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from the local case study. Critical realism is an attempt to understand the 'generative 
mechanisms underlying and producing observable events' and the meaning systems 
attached to those events (Bhaskar, 1989: 2). This means the researcher must 'range from 
the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the 
human self, 'from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the 
national budgets of the world and see the relations between the two' (Mills, 1970: 14). 
4.2 Using qualitative methodologies to study cultural production 
Having outlined the key epistemological issues which arise in approaching social 
research, in the following section I specifically examine how other researchers have 
studied cultural production, in order to provide a critical account of methodological 
issues that are germane to this field, and to position my approach. In the last thirty years, 
cultural production research has shifted from a positivist approach to a more interpretive 
approach concerned with questions of subjectivity, identity and affect, echoing the wider 
turn within social research. From the sociological studies of large media organisations in 
the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Schlesinger, 1987; Burns, 1977), there has been a recent 
resurgent interest in smaller, 'micro-studies' of cultural production - qualitative and 
ethnographic accounts of creative labour markets which are attentive to new issues and 
use different methodological approaches to their subject matters. 
There is a long tradition of studying cultural production within media studies. 
Many of the key studies have been carried out by sociologists at a number of institutional 
sites, including the BBC, national newspapers, and television stations (Tunstall, 1971; 
Elliott, 1972; Alvarado, 1978; Feuer et ai., 1984; Silverstone, 1985; Schlesinger, 1987; 
Gitlin, 1994; Born, 2004). While the qualitative study of production in media and cultural 
studies has certainly been limited, it has, however, established a clear tradition in the 
field. However, it is fair to say that such research into cultural production is a niche area. 
This has now been acknowledged, as evidenced by Curran et al, who have criticised the 
lack of empirical research in this area: 
This has had two harmful consequences. It has encouraged a simplistic view of 
media representations as the expression or reflection of some aspect of society 
without reference to organizational mediation. It has also encouraged a 
Panglossian conception of the audience as autonomous and sovereign, without 
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regard to the ways in which audience responses can be constrained by the 
political economy of the media (1996: 169) 
Furthermore, McRobbie has argued that 'cultural studies has been concerned with 
representational forms and their meanings, leaving the terrain of lived experience 
completely to the side. Likewise social institutions and their practices have also been 
disregarded except in their discursive and regulative modes' (2000: 176). 
As a result of this, media research has tended to focus on three key areas: the 
political economy of the media (ownership, structure, distribution and access); textual 
analysis of media and cultural products themselves; and a focus on the audience (which 
is often ethnographic in approach). Participant-observation of media production remains 
a relatively small niche within the field. Deacon et a/have noted that: 
Studies of media production almost inevitably rely on some form of observation 
of the production process, and because of the practical difficulties this entails it is 
no surprise that the literature of such studies is the smallest branch of media 
research. (1999: 248-9) 
As the quote above suggests, there are a number of reasons for this lack of empirical 
research: 
1. Access is often difficult to obtain. This is partly due to the difficulties inherent 
in gaining access to the inner workings of any social group, but also because 
there is a fundamental lack of trust between social scientists and media 
production professionals. When Schudson writes, '[s]ocial scientists who study 
the news speak a language that journalists mistrust and misunderstand' (2000: 
176) he is highlighting an endemic issue for cultural production research. 
2. Participation in media production requires skills that many researchers do 
not have. As Deacon et a/ argue: 'few researchers have the skills or training to 
become a working member of a news team or production crew ... ' (1999: 251). 
3. The research process is time-consuming, and therefore more expensive 
than desk research. Often such research is carried out over an extensive period 
of time and involves participant-observation. The lack of extended research 
within the cultural industries is clearly related to the laborious process of 
gathering the empirical evidence in the field. Such work is 'production heavy', 
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and 'requires intense periods of immersion in the field of study' (McRobbie, 
2000: 257). 
4. Lack of theoretical interest. Until fairly recently, there has been more 
theoretical interest in the study of media products as textual artefacts, or the 
political-economic study of media organisations which examine their structural, 
political, and economic formations and the impact of these factors on the public 
sphere and democracy (for example Schiller, 1992; Herman, 2001). Such 
accounts tend to ignore the role of the individual cultural workers within such 
organisations. 
However, despite these difficulties, qualitative research methods have been used in a 
number of different contexts within media and organisational studies, because they offer 
a means of understanding the formation of production values from within the 
practitioner community. Cultural producers are affected by prevalent structural 
conditions (economic, ideological, cultural) which ultimately have an effect on the media 
products that surround us, and so on the wider public sphere. As Schlesinger has pointed 
out: 
While there is no doubt that external analyses of cultural products, whether by 
using the techniques of content, textual or discourse analysis, have much to tell 
us, such approaches do face the crucial limitations of only being able to make 
inferences about the actual processes of production inside cultural institutions. 
(1987: xxxii) 
As cultural production as a field of employment and labour becomes increasingly 
casualised, individualised and precarious, within a wider economic and political context 
of neo-liberalism, deregulation and of increased commercialisation, it is important to 
understand the transformations in the practitioner community from the perspective of 
those people working in these cultural sectors. 
4.2.1 Cultural production studies 
In terms of methodological contextualisation, early qualitative studies of cultural 
production are important as points of reference for this research. As described in the 
previous chapter, sociologists such as Silverstone (1985), Schlesinger (1987) and Tunstall 
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(1971) carried out groundbreaking ethnographic work into media production in the 
1970s and 1980s. These were deeply immersive studies. Schlesinger spent five years 
observing BBC journalists at work. In terms of methodology, Schlesinger used a classical 
immersive ethnographic mode of research that involved participant-observation over the 
course of five years. Similarly Silverstone's (1985) ethnographic study into the making of 
a BBC Han·zan programme also involved an immersion into the institutional setting of 
the BBC, this time in the science documentary department, to uncover how programme 
makers go about framing science within the populist format of television. 
The methodological approach that Schlesinger takes to his research is staunchly 
realist. Throughout this text Schlesinger gives the impression that he is an objective 
observer, unaffected by the situation, and similarly not affecting the situation by his 
presence. There is an empirical 'truth' to be uncovered - in this case the inner workings 
of a cultural institution, the BBC - and Schlesinger posits himself as the anthropologist-
as-detective, able to uncover the clues or signifiers and read the underlying reality of the 
situation. Silverstone's (1985) research is equally positivist in approach. It is presented in 
a diary format, and achieves a highly intimate account of the complexity of undertaking 
such research. As with Schlesinger's study of the BBC, this is research in the positivist 
mould of early ethnography - the detached, neutral observer who is able to go into 
strange exotic situations and environs and learn about the customs and beliefs of the 
'natives'. Questions that have emerged from postmodernism and poststructuralism, 
which undermine to tali sing truth claims, and show the difficulty of any 'neutral' realist 
reading of a situation, are not engaged with in this text. 
These studies used a more fully immersive approach than has been possible or 
desirable in this research. For example, both Silverstone (1985) and Dornfeld, in his 
study of public service broadcasting (1998), take on the double role of academic and 
production assistant/researcher in order to carry out the research. This was appropriate 
because their research focused on single productions. Such a degree of immersion was 
not something that this study set out to achieve, as it seeks to answer a wider range of 
research questions across a number of institutional settings. As my research is about 
working conditions within independent production, across a very large number of 
organisations, it has also been vital to interview and study a wide sample of individuals. 
However, the work of Silverstone and Dornfeld persuasively demonstrates that a 
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qualitative methodology is an appropriate approach for this kind of research into cultural 
production. Dornfeld's account of documentary production is very evocative 1n 
describing the culture of public service broadcasting, which he experiences as 'a 
constructive act of social communication and cultural production' (1998: 19). 
4.2.2 Contemporary accounts of cultural production 
Since the formative studies of production detailed above, a number of changes 
have occurred which have instigated a return to the study of cultural production, and 
which comprise a motivating force for this study. These changes can be seen as 
theoretical, material and methodological. From a methodological perspective, the early 
production studies are overly confident about their ability to produce an authoritative 
account from the field, and suffer from a lack of reflexivity. The pattern of research in 
these early studies involves the Oargely male) sociologist observing and interviewing the 
production community, after which it would appear to be a relatively unproblematic 
process for the researcher to turn his experiences into an authoritative text. 
Moreover, material changes in the nature of employment and production within 
the context of a flexible 'fast capitalism'42 have required new, equally flexible modes of 
research. The nature of cultural production has radically changed in the last fifteen years 
or so: now cultural production is a vastly expanded sphere of activity that employs many 
more people in a context of flexible accumulation. Today's cultural producer is likely to 
be a freelancer with a number of projects on the go, within a casualised and deregulated 
labour environment. The production studies undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s 
described a far more stable working environment for cultural producers, one that was 
also more spatially fixed (in terms of the working environment) and discursively 
bounded. As McRobbie argues, there needs to be a 'renewed commitment to production 
studies' because working practices in the media industries are 'almost unrecognisable 
compared to those that prevailed when sociologists talked convincingly about the 
42 According to Steer (1999): '[t]he term fast capitalism is an emerging description of the current 
social and economic environment workers fInd themselves in. Employers are demanding total 
commitment from their workers because they argue this is necessary to maintain their 
competitive edge. This has meant a declining quality of life for many people including increased 
levels of stress, reduced times spent with friends and families and overall disatisfaction with their 
lives.' 
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routines and daily practices of media professionals as they worked alongside each other 
in a relatively stable TV newsroom environment' (2000: 258). This has happened at the 
same time as there has been a discursive political emphasis placed on the 'creative 
industries' as drivers of innovation and global competitive advantage within an 
informational society, demanding research that examines the subjectivising impact of 
these contemporary discourses on individual attitudes towards creative labour. 
As a result, there have been a number of recent studies of cultural production 
that have explored these issues, in a range of production spheres, such as music (Negus, 
1992, 1998; Hesmondhalgh, 1996), fashion (McRobbie, 1998) and television (Ursell, 
1997, 2000), which take up the challenge of researching cultural production in the 
transformed economic and political climate of late modernity. These studies describe the 
turn to 'cultural individualization' (McRobbie, 2002a) for people working in creative 
sectors of the economy. Here, contemporary cultural production is seen to be peopled 
by atomised workers, who connect through networks but have lost a wider sense of 
workplace politics and labour solidarity. As such, employment fields for those working 
in the new economy become deeply individualistic: 
Thus the new work marks the end of loyalty to others in a shared workplace, the 
end of dependence, which is replaced with a more detached, self-reliant outlook. 
Here social interaction is more fleeting and the person protects him or herself by 
acting the part of co-operation and involvement, while in fact retaining a primary 
commitment to self-interest. (McRobbie,2002a: 103) 
The use of qualitative methodologies to study cultural producers in this new 
context can be seen as a strategy for grounding some of the theoretical concerns around 
production and consumption in a late capitalist society (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991; 
Lash and Urry, 1994) and also to question what might constitute creativity in this new 
economic and political climate. For example, Negus, in his research into music industry 
production cultures, shows how the 'creative' industries in fact often produce formulaic 
and repetitive work and that their structures of employment and their hierarchies are 
bound up in strict class divisions. To counter this, he argues that: 
We should develop an ability to untangle or dis aggregate the practices of cultural 
intermediaries: to work out when, how and under what conditions such aesthetic 
activity might be creative, innovative and providing any more than an impetus 
inclining towards the conservative and mundane. (2002: 510) 
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Qualitative methodologies have found a resurgence within this field because they 
offer a more grounded approach to studying the media that acknowledges the 
importance of attempting to understand those involved in the production of culture. 
That it is local, specific and situated research is central both to the theory and the 
method of such an approach. The local study within the qualitative or ethnographic 
tradition enables the researcher to affirm the agency of those who are involved in 
cultural production: not to assert that they are subsumed within structural constraints. As 
Dover argues, 'the practitioner community and the industry are only understandable 
through the experiences and relations of individuals involved' (2001: 59). 
4.3 Designing the research strategy 
With these issues in mind, I shall now turn to the specific methodological details of 
this research project. Clearly it was vital to develop a research strategy that was best able 
to address the key research questions of this thesis, namely: 
1. What is the nature of work and production within the ITPS? 
2. What is the impact of casualisation on the working lives of cultural producers 
within the ITPS? 
3. How do cultural producers in the ITPS find work and manage their careers 
within this casualised context? 
4. What is the impact of the transformations within the cultural economy of the 
ITPS on the production values and potential for creativity within the ITPS? 
5. What kind of subjectivities are emerging amongst creative workers under 
conditions of late capitalism? 
In order to address these questions, I have used an eclectic methodological approach, 
using a variety of qualitative research tools. Methodological textbooks can often give the 
impression that there is a 'correct' methodological approach to be found for a particular 
research project (e.g. a social survey, semi-structured interviews), and once it is found it 
is simply a case of sticking to it.43 However, social research is often a messy business 
which necessitates a mixed, inclusive approach, rather than a straightforward process of 
43 For further discussion of this tendency in methodological textbooks, see Devine and Heath 
(1999: 199-200). 
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choosing a method and then arriving at a conclusion (Deacon, 1999). There are often 
valid practical and theoretical reasons for taking an eclectic methodological approach to 
tackle the research questions of the study. One needs to be flexible in one's approach to 
social research, responsive to the changing dynamics and circumstances of the field being 
studied.44 Indeed some of the most productive contemporary social research has 
emerged from an eclectic approach (see Devine, 1999). Whilst the researcher must be 
aware of the specific epistemological challenges of a multiple approach, there are great 
benefits to be accrued if it is done thoughtfully and with intent: 
Despite the difficulties and challenges of mixing methods ... the combination of 
different methods within a single piece of research - if done well - can lead to a 
much more rounded and holistic view of the topic under investigation. (ibid.: 
201) 
Initially I believed that the best way to address the research questions of this 
thesis would be to undertake a 'full blown' and ethnographic study of a number of 
production companies. However, this initial assumption proved problematic. First, there 
was the theoretical and practical difficulty of studying individuals at work in an industry 
where there is no fixed workplace. This is a key issue: how to carry out a study of 
contemporary cultural production where there is often no single stable spatially bounded 
zone for such production, especially as the traditionally dichotomous zones of work 
(production) and leisure (consumption) increasingly elide within the creative economy 
(McRobbie, 1998; Kane, 2004)? Arguably, this dynamic works against the rationale for 
carrying out lengthy ethnographies within production companies. 
Second, although I initially hoped that gaining access to production companies 
would be relatively unproblematic, in fact it was far more difficult than I had imagined. 
The independent television industry is to a large extent a close-knit, closed-off 
community. Ironically for organisations that often make their living observing others, 
production companies have little desire to be observed themselves. This has been noted 
before by academics studying media organisations, who have written of the chasm of 
understanding and mutuality between media researchers and media practitioners. As 
Deacon et al have observed: 
44 For a full discussion of the need for flexibility in planning and carrying out social research, see 
Devine and Heath (ibid: 198-205). 
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National media - broadcasting organisations and networks, major newspapers -
are understandably cautious about approaches from researchers. Themselves in 
the business of publicity and information, they feel vulnerable to potentially 
critical or intrusive examination by people they consider ill-informed or even 
hostile. (1999: 367) 
As such it proved very difficult for me to gain access to production companies to carry 
out a full ethnographic study. 
Third, it also became clear that the research questions would be best answered through a 
more mobile methodology of qualitative interviewing, and by building up relationships 
with the participants over a period of time. This is partly because the research is 
concerned with the personal consequences of the conditions of creative labour. These 
are issues that were much easier to deal with in the more intimate, private setting of the 
interview. Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, the issues that are covered in this 
thesis are emergent and under-theorised. Creative labour in this new organisational and 
social context has yet to be fully understood, and there are many conflicting views on 
how to analyse it (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). In such an uncertain context, qualitative 
research is far better suited for exploratory, theory-generating research (Spicer, 2004: 
295). 
4.3.1 Using a qualitative methodology 
For these reasons, I decided that a qualitative research strategy was most 
appropriate to answer these questions, with a close focus on a relatively small group of 
research participants. A more statistical, quantitative approach could have covered a 
larger sample, and would have provided useful statistical information about employment 
within the ITPS. For example, the BFI (1999) research study of television workers makes 
use of questionnaires and quantitative methods to gauge details such as the levels of 
freelance workers in the industry, the lengths of contracts, the number of people leaving 
the industry. However, statistical methods are unable to delve deeper into the emotional, 
cultural and subjective aspects of work, which were key areas of concern for this 
research. Qualitative research is particularly useful in conducting research over an 
extended period of time where it is necessary to find out personal, intimate details of a 
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participant's life history. The in-depth, semi-structured interview, especially when 
accompanied by follow-up contact and interviews, allows the researcher to build a 
stronger relationship of trust with the participant, and gather data which is more 
personal and covers more sensitive issues. Qualitative interviewing allows the researcher 
to delve deeper into the interviewee's attitudes and values, which cannot easily be 
uncovered within a formal questionnaire interview (Byrne, 2004: 182). 
4.3.2 The case study approach 
Small-scale qualitative research does, however, raise questions about validity and 
representativeness. Clearly the use of a relatively small group of people is open to the 
charge of methodological relativism, and of being 'unscientific'. For example, given that 
this research involves only twenty people one might ask how it can make representative 
claims about an industry in which over 20,000 people work? Surely the sample would 
need to be far larger, the approach more scientific, and the data statistically examined for 
empirical evidence? These are charges that can be levelled against small-scale qualitative 
research. However, there is a strong theoretical argument for the case study approach. In 
terms of this thesis, the qualitative and ethnographic study of cultural producers offers 
the researcher an opportunity to understand a professional community undergoing 
intense structural transformations through the intensification of reflexive modernisation, 
in a way that is grounded in the lived experiences and belief structures of those 
experiencing those transformations. Such research also provides a way of grounding 
theoretical debates, particularly those around global transformations in late capitalism, in 
praxis, and seeks to discern specific and situated local knowledge which avoids abstract 
macroscopic accounts in favour of a lived reality. 
In this sense the micro-study approach is not a way of simply using the microcosm 
to make claims about the macrocosm, but is an embodied means by which to see how 
much larger trends within society are actually experienced at the local level. It is a 
question of translation. McRobbie has challenged those from within the political economy 
tradition in media studies who use case studies as a way of making much broader 
structural claims, claiming that such an approach has the danger inherent within it of 
reducing the local case study to the 'merely empirical' (1998: 176). Instead, discussing the 
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rationale for a localised approach when undertaking her research into the fashion 
industry, she argues: 
To those who query the value of local studies, and dispute the claims to political 
relevance, I argue that... the case study (in this case, geographically 'local') 
performs a knowledge-generating function. It allows us the opportunity to see 
how things actually work in practice and how more general social, and even 
global, trends like those described by social theorists including Beck, Giddens 
and Lash (1994) as well as Lash and Urry (also 1994) and also by cultural 
theorists like Jameson (1984) and Harvey (1989) are translated or modified when 
they become grounded. (McRobbie, 1998: 11) 
This is a crucial statement, one that provides an important methodological justification 
for carrying out local case studies on workers in the cultural industries, as a way of 
grounding the debates around 'reflexive modernisation' in practice. Furthermore, by 
studying creative workers, such research is able to focus on a particular group who are 
arguably at the accelerated end of the transformations that reflexive modernisation has 
brought to contemporary working life. 
4.3.3 Outlining the research design 
Following the decision to use a qualitative approach, it was important to devise a 
specific approach best suited to the research task. The fieldwork was carried out between 
October 2005 and July 2006. A small sample size of approximately twenty individuals 
was initially decided upon, with some flexibility in order to adapt to the necessities that 
would arise when doing the fieldwork. All of the core sample of workers were employed 
regularly within the independent television industry. The vast majority were freelancers, 
moving regularly from company to company, and sometimes working within the BBC as 
freelance staff. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, and so their names have 
been changed in writing up the analysis. This is because the freelance community within 
television is small and interconnected, and they did not want to jeopardise their future 
career prospects as a result of being open about the working culture that they described. 
This was understandable, given that their working conditions were often exploitative and 
nepotistic. 
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Three more interviews were then carried out with the owner/managers of three 
independent production companies. Two of these participants wanted anonymity so that 
they could speak freely about their industry. There was no need for follow-up interviews 
with this group, as they were not being studied longitudinally; therefore, the research 
with the 'owners' took the form of one in-depth semi-structured interview. These 
interviews were useful in a different way from the main worker interviews, as they 
provided information on the changing structure of the industry, a historical overview of 
how the industry had changed in the last twenty years since the formation of Channel 4, 
and an insight into the prioritisation of commercial success and the shift towards factual 
entertainment within UK broadcasting culture. 
The core group of 'workers' were interviewed in-depth initially, after contact was 
made and the interview arranged. The interviews themselves were semi-structured, and 
were conducted in person. A range of key areas were covered, with the flexibility to 
diverge to other areas if the conversation led that way, and the data being gathered was 
germane to the research (see appendix 3 for an outline of the key areas covered in each 
interview). They were then studied longitudinally over a six-month period. This took the 
form of regular email updates every two months. The email tracking survey was used to 
provide data on contract lengths, and changes in their employment status, summarised in 
table 1. 
Finally, attempts were made to re-interview all of the twenty workers at the end of the 
research, to ascertain their reflexive thoughts on the research process, and to find out if 
their views on the industry had changed at all during that period. This was possible with 
the vast majority of the participants, but due to time pressures and personal factors, a 
small minority of those interviewed were unable to be re-interviewed at the end of the 
study (see appendix 2 for full details). This process, known as 'sample attrition' and 
common in longitudinal studies, occurs for a variety of reasons, including: participants' 
unwillingness to continue with the research; difficulty in contacting participants due to 
change in address; and non-availability due to illness or death (Summer, 2006: 12). 
4.3.4 Recruitment 
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In terms of recruiting my respondents, a number of important issues needed to 
be considered. Having decided on a small sample, the immediate question was around 
who should be the focus of the research, and where would I find them? Television 
production is spread around the UK, with notable production hubs in regional cities 
such as Manchester, Cardiff, Glasgow and Bristol (Skillset, 2006b). However, despite 
ongoing attempts to shift production to the regions (through regulatory mechanisms 
such as the BBC and Channel 4's regional commissioning quotas, and the impending 
move of BBC production departments to Salford's MediaCity complex), the industry is 
still overwhelmingly based in London. For this reason, and also due to my own location 
during the period of the research, the majority of the respondents lived and worked in 
London. Only two of the respondents worked outside of the capital. I also wanted to 
speak to individuals across all levels of the production community. The sample reflects 
this, ranging in hierarchy from junior researcher to series producer (not including the 
'expert interviews' with company owners and executive producers). Appendix 2 
describes the sample of participants for this thesis. 
This range of respondents was crucial as I wanted to develop a sample which 
allowed me to examine the particular issues germane to the research. In conceptualising 
the sample, I use the idea of a theoreticallY purposive sample, where groups or environments 
that are chosen are seen as being illustrative of the phenomenon at the heart of the 
research problem (Silverman, 2000: 104, see also Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Mason, 
1996: 93-4). Here the sample is specific and partial as opposed to statistically 
representative. The rationale of theoretical sampling is to generate and develop theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In exploratory qualitative research of this kind, the sample is 
not meant to be statistically representative of a wider target population, but rather the 
emergent theories should be representative of the kinds of empirical phenomena one 
wishes to analyse (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 214). 
A focus here was not to make generalised findings (not a primary concern of 
theory-building research), but to focus on the 'explanatory power' of findings (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998: 267). As Alasuutari argues, 'If all readers of a study can recognise a 
phenomenon from the description presented, then generalis ability is not a problem; the 
only issue of interest is the relevance of the explanation offered for that phenomenon' 
(1995: 145). Yet it is still possible to relate the research findings back to the wider social 
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context in a process Alasuutari calls 'extrapolation' (ibid.: 155). In this study, my concern 
is to relate back the experiences of this small group in terms of their wider theoretical 
significance, as exemplars of new modes of work and experience within the cultural 
economy. Here I focus on individual narratives and experiences as emblematic of 
particular processes, following Sennett's approach in The Corrosion of Character, where he 
explores new modes of production through the exploration of individual sets of 
experiences. Here, Sennett discusses the 'universality' of his participants' individual work 
experiences (1998: 31). 
Initial contact was made with a number of gatekeepers who would prove vital to 
the progress of the research. In 2005 I posted details of my research on the website 
www.tvfreelancers.org(nowdefunct).advertisingforparticipants(seeappendixl).This 
website was aimed at freelancer workers in the television industry, and issues around 
working conditions were widely discussed on the site's forums. Two strands of research 
opened up from this initial advertisement. First, I established contact with one of the 
site's founders, Jack, a producer working in the independent sector, who proved a key 
informant. Jack helped put me in touch with other individuals working in the industry, 
and acted as a key gatekeeper for the research, posting further details of my work in an 
email newsletter. Second, the advert itself solicited several responses, leading to my first 
interviews. I had become aware of the site whilst working in the television industry 
before undertaking this research, and also through my earlier MA dissertation, which 
explored the working lives of a small group of individuals working in London's cultural 
industries - a project which effectively acted as a pilot study for this research (Lee, 2006). 
However, these initial efforts did not produce sufficient responses for the 
research, and other avenues were then explored. Here, a number of strategies were used. 
First, I snowballed my initial sample from the website respondees, leading to a small 
number of further participants (snowballing occurs when the initial research sample 
contact individuals that they know to provide the researcher with more potential 
participants). However, snowballing is not without its theoretical and methodological 
dangers. In terms of advantages, it allows researchers to identify potential particpants 
when it would otherwise be very difficult to do so (which is very much the case in this 
industry, for reasons mentioned earlier). However, its weakness is that it relies on the 
initial sample to understand the aims and objectives of the research in order to identify 
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suitable participants. Also the initial sample may have characterstics which are 
unrepresentative of the population as a whole, which can lead to problems of 
representativeness (Oliver, 2006: 282). Therefore, it is unadvisable to rely solely on such 
a technique. 
Second, in order to widen the scope of the research, and to gather together 
participants with a different perspective, I began to make use of my own personal 
contacts. Here, I was able to make contact with several respondents through my own 
network of television workers. I avoided interviewing direct friends and colleagues, and 
instead asked them to send details of the research to their contacts, allowing me to be 
more personally removed from the research. Again, there are problems associated with 
this approach, but such a route was unavoidable due to the difficulties of accessing the 
research population. I also made contact with key gatekeepers for this research through 
my association with the creative industries research consultancy Burns Owens 
Partnership, where two colleagues in particular were able to put me in touch with a wide 
range of industry professionals.45 
Once initial contact was made with my interviewees, it was important to establish 
a level of trust, in order to achieve the best possible research results. I always sought to 
meet my interviewees in their own preferred environment. Often, the interviews took 
place in cafes near to their places of work, although several interviews took place in 
locations such as editing suites, and production company offices. The fact that I had 
previously worked in the industry meant that I was able to understand the issues they 
were describing from a personal level, allowing a more immediate rapport. As Roseneil 
has argued, in relation to her sociological study of the Greenham Common protestors, 
having first-hand experience of the field being studied is a resource which can be utilised: 
Whilst 'insider research' is rarely discussed in texts on research methods, I am 
certainly not the first sociologist to use her personal experience and unique life 
history for research purposes. (Roseneil, 1995: 7-8) 
Indeed, it would be wrong to deny the importance of such prior involvement in the 
industry. As Devine and Heath have argued, 'sociological researchers cannot be divorced 
45 I have opted to keep the details of these gatekeepers anonymous, to protect the anonymity of 
my interviewees. 
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from their autobiographies, and will inevitably (whether consciously or otherwise) bring 
their values to bear on the types of research they choose to pursue, the ways in which 
they pursue that research and the ways in which they interpret and analyse their data' 
(1999: 27). 
4.3.5 Using the interview 
The semi-structured interview was used as the primary tool of data gathering. 
The interview provides the ability to go in-depth and to be flexible in terms of the 
subject matter covered. This was a key factor in the decision to make the qualitative 
interview the core of the research strategy. Describing the strength of this approach, 
Taylor and Bogdan note its 'flexible and dynamic' quality: 
By in-depth qualitative interviewing we mean repeated face-to-face encounters 
between the researcher and informants directed towards understanding 
informants' perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in 
their own words. (1984: 77) 
Qualitative interviews are loose and semi-structured, and can be seen as 'conversations 
with purpose' (Burgess, cited in Mason, 1996: 38). The questions are open, unlike the 
closed type which would typically be found in a questionnaire-based survey. The aim in 
qualitative interview research is data generation, and interpretation of the data which is a 
key part of the involved researcher. As Byrne notes, 'In qualitative interviews, the 
researcher is often regarded as a co-producer of the data, which are produced as a result 
of an interaction between researcher and interviewee(s), (2004: 181). 
U sing the interview has been vital in exatruwng and generating data on the 
experiential terrain of the creative economy, which is one of the main underlying 
purposes of this research. It is well suited for this purpose, for as Gray has argued, the 
interview is 'an absolutely central discursive technology in the generation of experience' 
(1997: 99). The use of the interview as a research tool has allowed me to interrogate the 
'lived experience' of my respondents, and to probe their reflexive self-knowledge about 
the conditions of their labour. As Gray writes, the qualitative techniques of 'participant 
observation and interviews' can work to 'produce rich and full accounts of ... lives and 
social worlds' (ibid.: 92). However, as Scott (1992) has warned, it is vital to avoid 
focusing on experience for its own sake. This is because sometimes the focus on 
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exploring experience is presented as a direct means of opening up 'hidden' lives and 
truths. Scott is highly critical of the metaphor of visibility in this context, 'implying as it 
does the possibility of a direct, unmediated apprehension of a world of transparent and 
knowable objects' (quoted in Gray, 1997: 93). 
Experience must not be fetishised, then, but should be seen as fitting into wider 
discursive regimes of meaning and knowledge, not used as a transparent truth. This is 
important in analysing my respondents' accounts, and is where a theoretical concern with 
the subjectivising effects of neoliberal discourses of the governmentalisation of creativity 
are useful when assessing their accounts of their experience. As Spivak has written, 
theories and methods should be challenged unless they enable us to '[u]nderstand the 
operations of the complex and changing discursive and material processes by which 
identities are ascribed, resisted or embraced, and which processes are themselves 
unremarked, indeed achieve their effect because they aren't noticed' (1987: 214). 
Using the interview as a means of generating knowledge raises other issues. For 
example, it is necessary to be constantly reflexive about the impact of the research 
process itself on the answers and data that is being generated. This is something that is 
vital for qualitative research, for as Hammersley and Atkinson argue, 'it is misleading to 
regard [this influence] simply as a source of bias that must be removed ... neither non-
directive interviewing nor even reliance on unsolicited accounts avoids the problem' 
(1995: 110). Moreover, as Byrne points out, 'in thinking about interviewing as a tool of 
social research, we need to be aware of the many different variables which will affect the 
outcome. These will include who is doing the interviewing, who is being interviewed, the 
location in which the interview takes place and the form of questioning' (2004: 180). 
However, with this in mind, the interview remains valid, for 'the fact that linguistic signs 
derive their meaning from relations with other signs ... does not strip them of their 
referential function' (Atkinson 1990: 176). 
My interviews with respondents followed a qualitative and a semi-structured 
approach, both in the initial and the final interviews. Semi-structured interviews mean 
that the interview has both a set of questions that are asked in a sequential manner, and 
also areas where the questions arise from the context of the interview and explore the 
views of the interviewee in more detail (Bloch, 2004). My interviews were conducted for 
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a duration of approximately one hour each, and I allowed myself the freedom to divert 
'off-script' in order to be responsive to the context of the interview and to what my 
respondents were actually telling me. As Byrne points out, '[q]ualitative interviewing is 
particularly useful as a research method for accessing individuals' attitudes and values -
things that cannot necessarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire. 
Open-ended and flexible questions are likely to get a more considered response than 
closed questions and therefore provide better access to interviewees' VIews, 
interpretations of events, understandings, experiences and opinions' (2004: 182). 
The interview has other strengths as a research tool. It enables participants, to a certain 
extent, to speak in their own voices - useful for researchers who want to uncover 
subjugated experience and knowledge, for example feminist scholars. It also allows for a 
complexity that is not available in a more survey-based approach to social research, and 
so when done well can achieve a depth not available in other approaches, as well as 
enabling the researcher to become attuned to subtle differences in participants' positions, 
both during the the interview and in the ensuing analysis (Byrne, 2004: 182) 
4.3.6 Multi-sitedness 
Sociology may be able to develop a new agenda, an agenda for a discipline that is 
losing its central concept of human 'society'. It is a discipline organised around 
networks, mobility and horizontal fluidities. CUrry, 2000: 3) 
As Urry has argued, our increasingly mobile age means that we need to develop a 
new mode of sociology that is able to deal with fluid, mobile individuals, who do not stay 
in one temporally, physically bounded location CUrry, 2000). The question is what kind 
of methodology is best suited to studying such mobility? In this study, the nature of the 
working lives of the research participants made the interview particularly efficacious. An 
approach based around interviewing informants is a highly effective method for 
researching cultural production in this new flexible environment. Interviewing offers a 
means of exploring the desocialised, individualised working lives of highfy mobile cultural 
workers. Therefore, on a practical level there is another reason that I have made use of 
the interview as perhaps my primary research tool, and that is the flexibility it gives to the 
researcher to be mobile. As McRobbie has pointed out, discussing her own experiences 
of interviewing cultural producers in the British fashion industry, there are serious 
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obstacles to overcome in order to carry out direct observation In the new working 
conditions of the cultural industries: 
I encountered first hand the difficulties participant observation posed, for the 
reason that the personnel doing this kind of work were highly mobile, most likely 
to be employed on a freelance or temporary contract, and consequently 
individualized in their outlook and rather isolated in their working practices. 
(2000: 260) 
Therefore, taking on board the difficulties of carrying out qualitative research on 
workers in this area of the economy, is there a sense in which the contemporary 
researcher of cultural production needs to be more adaptive and multi-sited than the 
cultural production ethnographers of the past were? I have found a methodology of 
mobility to be vital in my own research, as I am studying individuals whom it would be 
impossible to study at anyone fixed location. These are creative workers who, as my 
research will show, often have very short contracts and have no one fixed workplace. 
Indeed this raises deeper questions about qualitative methodology in a transformed 
economic era of production. In studying cultural production in the complexity of the 
network economy, where cultural products are created in a highly complex chain of 
action and interaction, there is a need for research to take on board this emergent post-
Fordist production environment. 
If multi-sitedness is the material reality of cultural production, how then can the 
ethnographer study loose networks of individuals, who work as freelancers under 
conditions of flexible specialisation, moving from project to project, in a number of sites, 
often juggling a number of jobs at anyone given time, and for whom the concepts of 
'work' and 'play' are eroded? Recent ethnographic research of the Internet is particularly 
suggestive in this context, where the focus has been on so-called 'virtual ethnography' 
(Hine, 2000). Under the conditions mentioned earlier, where ethnography is detached 
from reliance on a single field site, it becomes a more complex, ongoing project. As 
Hine (1998) has argued, '[t]he ethnography becomes focused around the tracing of 
complex connections and the mobility of the ethnographer is a tool which provides 
opportunities to reflect on the construction of place'. Moreover, as Marcus (1995) has 
pointed out, there is a growing trend for ethnographers to study multiple sites in order to 
follow objects (such as cultural products) through a series of cultural contexts. This 
means conducting 'ethnographies which are motivated by following people, things, 
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metaphors, stories and conflicts as examples of approaches which breach the 
dependence of ethnography on a particular bounded place' (Hine, 1998). Multi-sitedness 
that takes on board these insights is clearly a growing field within media studies (Radway, 
1988; Abu-Lughod, 1997) and science studies (Heath, 1997). 
4.3.7 Longitudinal research 
Another strategy I have used in my research is to track my respondents 
longitudinally for six months after the initial interview in order to build up a more 
complete picture of their movement within the labour markets of the television industry. 
This was achieved largely via email contact. Online technologies are increasingly being 
used in social research, and are very useful tools for qualitative research. The use of these 
technologies allowed me to overcome distance as a barrier to research, allowing my 
respondents greater flexibility in terms of communicating with me. As Markham points 
out, '[a]s well as collapsing distance, Internet technologies disrupt the traditional use of 
time in interaction ... Because Internet technologies accommodate both asynchronous 
and synchronous communication between individuals and groups, the use of time can be 
individually determined... Internet communication is persistent; conversations can 
extend over long periods of time, picking up where they left off with greater ease than in 
face-to-face settings' (2004: 103). 
Moreover, the use of longitudinal research allowed me to build up a deeper 
picture of my respondents than would have been possible from just one interview. This 
made it possible to interact more reflexively with my respondents and to extend the 
researcher/researched relationship over a greater period of time, building up a greater 
trust and hopefully leading to more genuine reflection. However, in using Internet 
communication as a tool for conducting social research, it is important to bear in mind 
the disembodied context of the Internet, which has implications for ethnography . As 
Hine (1998) suggests: 
The accessibility of the Internet attracts ethnographers to a field site which lives 
on the desk top, and a community which can apparently be joined without 
complex rituals and access negotiations. This very accessibility, however, tends to 
focus attention on the on-line community, to the exclusion of links with off-line 
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lives, identities and activities. It also tends to leave unquestioned the status of the 
Internet as a communication medium and as a technology. (Hine, quoted in 
Walsh, 2004: 232) 
This issue has been negotiated in this study by the fact that I was able to build up a 
relationship of trust through first-person contact before undertaking the email 
longitudinal research. 
4.4. Analysis 
The qualitative approach used in this study, by its intensive and longitudinal 
nature, generates large amounts of data which needs to be analysed. Moreover, 
television workers are by nature gregarious and talkative. As Gitlin notes, 'the television 
business is a talker's business ... So getting people to talk was not the problem I had 
anticipated: the problem was to evaluate millions of words' (1994: 14). This section will 
give an overview of how the data generated during the research was analysed. Data was 
generated in a number of ways, through in-depth interviews and email contact with my 
respondents. Ordering and structuring that material was a key task of the analysis. 
In analysing qualitative data, it is important to remember that such research is 
not a 'soft option', but should be systematic and rigourous. As Deacon has argued: 
Qualitative analysis should be as thorough and systematic In its way as any 
statistical analysis. Simply skimming through transcripts to gain a loose 
impression of the issues and to 'cherry-pick' juicy quotations for the final report 
does not constitute an adequate qualitative analysis. You need to immerse 
yourself in the detail available to you, to look for precisely the kind of subtle 
insights and qualifications that tend to escape most quantitative perspectives. 
(1999: 351-2) 
This is why it is vital to have a clear strategy for analysis, both practically and 
theoretically. 
4.4.1 Using computer aided qualitative data analysis software 
149 
Making use of the qualitative data analysis computer programme NVivo was vital 
for the task of ordering and analysing the vast amount of data that was generated in the 
course of the field-work. NVivo allows the researcher to decide on a hierarchical system 
of concepts (or 'nodes') which then allows one to code the data accordingly. Essentially 
this is a process of categorising the material conceptually to identify key themes and 
patterns from the data. NVivo allows for two centrally different nodes to be used. 'Trees' 
are essentially used for concepts, which are dealt with hierarchically. Therefore each tree 
node would have a 'parent' node (such as 'casualisation', or 'identity'), under which sub-
nodes or 'child' nodes are created which directly come under the umbrella of the key 
concept. For example, in figure 2, it is possible to see that 'creativity' is being used as a 
parent node, and that there are a number of developing child nodes underneath it. 
'Cases' are used for people, places and objects: they are specific instances of particular 
kind of thing. For example, each participant in the study was designated a case node. 
Figure 2: Screengrab from NVivo 
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NVivo allows the researcher to begin to conceptually order and categorise all of 
the data that is generated in a qualitative research project. Having transcribed all of the 
interviews, the raw data was put into NVivo where it could begin to be analysed. In 
developing the nodes themselves, this was a process of imposing analytical codes on the 
data (such as 'casualisation', 'identity', 'governmentality'), and also allowing concepts to 
arise from the data. It is important to avoid over-imposing conceptual frameworks of 
understanding on the data collected, as the researcher should be open and flexible to 
ideas and patterns which may not directly relate to her or his theoretical model of 
understanding. NVivo helps with this process, allowing for the flexible generation of new 
ideas, while helping the researcher to organise a vast amount of data into hierarchically 
arranged categories which can be built up and modified as the work of analysis is done. 
As Deacon suggests, '[a]lthough qualitative research is flexible and responsive - ideas 
and concerns are indttced as the research is conducted as much as they are imposed at the 
outset - you inevitably reach a stage when you have to impose some order on your data' 
(1999: 356). 
Once the data has been entered, and the coding is done, NVivo has powerful 
tools that allow one to search and analyse the data instantaneously. At a basic level, it can 
conduct administrative functions, such as retrieving all the text that relates to a particular 
node or set of nodes. This ensures a comprehensive record of what was written or said 
on that issue or theme, and so avoids a superficial impression of the data. However, 
NVivo also provides the capability for more sophisticated analyses than just that. For 
example, it allows one to produce statistical information about one's data. For instance, 
one can see the number of times that a particular node appears, and in how many 
documents. It also allows one to find the location and frequency of the appearance of 
individual words or phrases, which can help significantly with discourse analysis. 
Statistical summaries and tables can be produced that make it possible to identify 
patterns and thematic clusters. Age, gender, occupation of participants can be cross-
referenced against codings, which allows comments to be formally connected to their 
sources (ibid.: 362-3). 
4.4.2 Discourse analysis 
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Discourses. .. deeply permeate what is allowed as legitimate knowledge in 
particular domains of social life, and rigidly exclude other possibilities and other 
perspectives on those domains. (Deacon, 1999: 147). 
On a more theoretical level, extensive use has been made of 'discourse analysis' 
in this research project. Discourse analysis focuses on the use of language in social life, 
and on the relationship between language and social structure. Therefore discourse 
analysis is highly concerned with the context in which language is used, and how it is 
indicative of wider discursive formations within society. In this sense, discourse analysis 
connects directly to the historical and contextual sensitivity of critical realism, outlined 
earlier as the theoretical approach for this research project. Discourse can refer to a 
single fragment of a text, or a speech act, or to a 'systematic ordering of language 
involving certain rules, terminology and convention' (Seale, 1997: 373). Taken in this 
way, 'a discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about -
i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic' (Hall, 1992: 
290). This way of thinking about language and meaning systems is closely associated with 
the poststructural philosopher Michel Foucault. For Foucault, language is constitutive of 
social reality (Deacon, 1999: 147). As Deacon argues, 'The term discourse figures more 
in his earlier work, where it was taken to refer to broad domains of language use which 
both condition and mobilise historically specific "strategic possibilities" of meaning, 
understanding and practice ... Discourse in this sense, or what Foucault sometimes 
referred to as discursive formations, is at once singularly authoritative and deployed in 
the interests of existing structures of authority and power' (ibid.: 147). Discourse allows 
us to be attentive to the relations of power and knowledge which certain forms of 
discourse make possible. 
Therefore, taking one research question as an example, this research is concerned with 
the governmentalisation of 'creativity' as a key discourse that has emerged from a policy 
context over the last ten years, and is particularly associated with New Labour. Here the 
Foucauldian concept of subjectivisation is crucial - how certain discourses and practices 
work to shape human identities in certain directions. Such a process can be detected, 
arguably, through discourse analysis. In this sense, language is linked closely to ideology 
and to power. In this understanding of discourse, language is not a transparent medium 
through which we objectively and neutrally see the world. Rather we come to our 
understanding of social life, and our very sense of identity, through our engagement with 
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the signifying system of language, building up our sense of the social world through our 
language, which is largely cultural and historically determined (ibid.: 148). For the 
discourse analyst then, language is both text and practice; it is inherently a social act that 
relates to wider structures of power, meaning and culture. 
In this research, key discourses which emerged from the participants' talk about 
their working lives were investigated in order to explore how a practitioner community 
uses language in certain ways which work to organise fields of knowledge and practice in 
the field. For example, if creativity is taken to be a key discourse of government in the 
'knowledge economy' (as explored in chapter 3), then a discourse analysis would seek to 
understand how something that is naturalised through language can be understood as a 
social and political artefact shaped by a number of different discourses. Then it is 
instructive to see how my respondents engage and respond to the question of creativity 
as a key discourse shaping cultural and economic policy. Moreover, the research looks 
out for how television production workers have created a certain 'expert' language. As 
Seale argues, the development and use of expert languages has key effects, because 'it 
marks out a field of knowledge or expertise, it confers membership, and it bestows 
authority' (1997: 375). In analysing the documentary evidence that is relevant for this 
enquiry, such as policy documents, newspaper articles and so forth, discourse analysis in 
this sense is also central, allowing one to study the popular discourses associated with the 
'creative economy', for instance, in politicians' speeches. 
Discourse analysis is interpretive, and m terms of selecting and approaching 
material one's attention will be focused by the research questions. One needs a 
conceptual framework in place to start identifying the key themes and arguments that 
will emerge from the data. Also, in sorting, coding and analysing the data, one needs to 
be flexible. As Seale argues, 'At times it can be tempting to impose an interpretation on a 
sample of discourse, but if this is not supported by the data then it will not yield an 
adequate analysis' (1997: 377). One needs to be adaptive, reflexive, ready to reject a 
theoretical or conceptual framework if it is no longer appropriate: 'Discourse analysis 
involves a commitment to examining processes of meaning in social life, a certain 
modesty in analytic claims, and an approach to knowledge which sees this as open rather 
than closed' (ibid.: 380). For these reasons, discourse analysis is central to this research, 
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and it can be seen how it would be used with NVivo to generate particular forms of 
analysis. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodological framework of analysis 
and data-generation, as it relates to the research into independent television production, 
and the conditions of creative labour in this setting. As we have seen, there have been a 
number of studies within sociology, media and cultural studies that have examined 
cultural production from ethnographic or qualitative perspectives. However, it is also 
clear that there is a lack of research that has adapted to the realities of material 
conditions under the conditions of flexible accumulation, where the network is the key 
structure of production. These economic changes, as explored in chapter 2, are 
associated with a sharp decline in manufacturing and traditional industries, a nse In 
services and an emergence of an economy, characterised by networks of firms producing 
products and services on an increasingly global basis and on a contractual basis 
(Touraine, 1974; Harvey, 1989; Scott, 2000). Under conditions of flexible accumulation, 
a pattern has emerged of loose networks of small firms working together on a project 
basis, to produce short runs of new products at short notice Geffcut and Pratt, 2002). At 
the same time, commentators have noted the emergence of spatial clustering that has 
occurred, and the creation of new industrial districts (see Amin et ai, 1995 and Scott, 
2000). This process has been particularly marked in the creative industries. Recent 
research has shown that firms in cultural industries tend to agglomerate together in 
dense specialised clusters, yet their products circulate on a global market (see Power and 
Scott, 2004). Therefore, there is a pressing need for a new type of methodology to study 
workers in creative industries that find themselves under these new conditions of 
production and labour. Therefore, in this chapter I have argued for a qualitative, and 
essentially mobile methodological approach, which responds to these dynamics now 
inherent within contemporary cultural production. 
Furthermore, much research in the public domain into the creative industries is 
highly empirical, and 'evidence based'. The current research climate in the UK privileges 
particular types of 'factual' evidence and quantitative methods of researching society 
above qualitative methods of research. This is particularly pronounced within 
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government and public sector research on the cultural or 'creative' industries, with the 
emergence of any number of 'data-sets' that give statistical and 'hard' economic 
information about the shape and location of the various sub-sectors located under the 
broad umbrella of the 'creative industries' moniker (DCMS, 1998,2001 b, 2005). 
However, despite the growing body of factual evidence that has emerged from 
central government research, Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) , and 
consultancies, as to the shape, size, location and clustering dynamics of the creative 
industries, little attention has been given to the impact of a neoliberal, deregulatory 
political environment on the subjective experiences of individuals entering these new 
labour markets, and on the possibility for creative expression within such a context. As 
McRobbie has argued, it has become a politically pressing concern to research the 
working lives of individuals for whom 'self-reliance [is] more of a survival strategy than a 
political statement' (1998: 3). This points to a new understanding of the sociology of 
work and labour beyond the old dichotomy between left and right. Such an 
understanding allows for an understanding of workers' identities in the creative 
industries which can move beyond seeing workers as exploited subjects caught up in a 
ruthless free market, or as outright 'yuppie' individualists enthralled to the tune of 
Thatcherite enterprise culture, to a more sophisticated account of the realities of 
negotiating risk and insecurity which is attuned to the harsh conditions such workers 
face, yet understands that these sectors offer intense affective rewards at the same time. 
Research in this area demands an approach that is open to the experiences of 
social actors, one that is attuned to more subjective, qualitative concerns. In this sense, a 
qualitative approach has key strengths and offers depth and insights that a pure focus on 
statistics cannot provide. Policy research on creative industries has been largely silent on 
this issue (Knell and Oakley, 2007). However, a qualitative approach to analysing creative 
labour allows researchers to tackle pressing questions of identity, subjectivity and lived 
experience through a focus on individual narratives, areas which are missed by purely 
statistical, empirical analysis. Therefore, the decision to take a qualitative approach is 
crucial to this thesis's aim of attempting to generate a more critical body of evidence 
about creative work which is based on studying the subjective responses of the 
individuals involved in production, using a situated research methodology, where 
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'subjectivity, biography and commitment are a constitutive part of the research process' 
(Gray, 1997: 98). 
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Chapter 5: Risky business - making a living in the 
independent television production sector 
The working lives of most creative personnel in the television industry are 
marked now by uncertainty. (paterson, 2001: 498) 
With the slow demise of lifelong full-time employment, continuous searching for 
jobs, preparing for potential future jobs, as well as managing multiple careers 
more or less simultaneously have become core elements of the workstyle in 
everyday life for many. (Deuze, 2007: 20) 
Perhaps the most consistent theme that emerged from the research was the 
prevailing and often overwhelming sense of insecurity that the participants experienced 
in their working lives. This was a common feature, regardless of their occupation, from 
researcher to series producer, editor to producer/director. As other researchers have 
shown, both in media industries and more broadly within society, precarious labour is 
now a fundamental feature of working life, transforming traditional expectations about 
careers and the sustainability of creative work (Beck, 1992, 2000; McRobbie, 1998, 2004; 
Ross, 2004; U rsell, 1997, 2000). Moreover, creative labour markets are exemplary of 
patterns that emerge more broadly within the 'new capitalism', where class and gender 
re-emerge as significant factors determining success within opaque, networked modes of 
insecure, contingent employment (Sennett, 2006: 80). This is important not only as a 
matter of sociological interest, but also because there is growing evidence that such an 
employment landscape has a detrimental impact on the creative ecology in itself, with 
implications for the public sphere (paterson, 2001; Ursell, 2000). As a result of the 
negative associations of insecurity increasing numbers of people leave television once 
they reach an age where flexibility is no longer an attractive option (BPI, 1999); this skills 
exit connects to growing evidence that creativity itself needs secure conditions in which 
to flourish. 
The broader empirical and theoretical context of labour uncertainty, which I 
outline below, resonates with my interviewees' experiences of work. Work in the 
independent television sector is highly precarious and contract based, involving the 
individual in the constant search for sustainable work. The traditional benefits of secure 
labour, such as paid holidays, pensions and employment rights have largely vanished. In 
157 
this chapter I examme the striking uncertainty of creative labour m the freelance 
production environment within television, and its implications. 
5.1 The context of risk 
It is clear that my findings in this area are part of a wider picture. Numerous 
sociological investigations into the nature of work in the post-Fordist environment, 
particularly within media and new media environments, have pointed to a transformation 
of working structures, with freelance encounters within networks of companies 
increasingly becoming the standard model (Gill, 2002; Ross, 2004; Pratt, 2000, 2002). 
Some have argued that the freelance mode of work, with its contract based and insecure 
nature, is now the new norm, indicative of a shift within capitalism away from the job 
security associated with professional careers in the mid 20th century (Allen and Henry, 
1996; Beck, 1992, 2000). Increasing numbers of men and women, especially in the 
service sector, occupy 'non-standard' jobs. Standing (1986) has referred to this trend as 
the 'contractualisation' of employment, where employers erode the terms and conditions 
of labour, so that short-term contracts and a lack of benefits such as holiday pay and a 
pension become increasingly normaL The rhetoric of 'flexibility' as something to be 
embraced by the individual belies rather less attractive conditions for many workers. 
Peck has pointed to how these 'flexible' arrangements in the workplace operate in the 
interest of increasingly centralised capitalist markets, for the purpose of control and 
profit: 
Disintegration and fragmentation on the surface often reflect underlying 
processes of integration and centralization. This is certainly true in the labour 
market context, where many of the so-called flexibility strategies -
'individualised' employment relations, plant-level pay bargaining, incentives-
based contracts - are established means of deepening control over the labour 
process in ways of which Frederick Taylor might have been proud. (1992: 329) 
As chapter 2 explored, the global economic crisis in the 1970s and the rise of flexible 
accumulation means that job security has decreased in many areas of the economy. 
Sennett notes how temporary labour is the fastest growing sector of the labour force in 
the United States and Britain, accounting for 8 per cent of the U.S. labour force today 
(2006: 49). Beck has argued that we are witnessing a major transition in the very nature 
of employment within post-industrial societies in the West, with 'the spread of 
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temporary and insecure employment, discontinuity and loose informality into Western 
societies that have hitherto been the bastions of full employment' (Beck, 2000: 1). 
Certainly there is growing evidence of employment casualisation, as more people 
in industrialised countries such as America and Britain have become free-lancers, 'e-
lancer's', or so called 'Free Agents' (Malone & Laubacher, 1998; Pink, 2001). These 
individuals are often presented as the feted mobile elite of the new capitalism with no 
permanent employment, who move from contract to contract, a group for whom the 
notion of a 'job for life' has vanished. For writers such as Pink (2001), this group is the 
subject of breathless speculation. They are portrayed as the avatars of the new economy 
of uncertainty, using their skills, know-how and knowledge for their own and society's 
economic and social advantage. However, as Ross points out, in fact the majority of 
these 'free-lance' individuals in the US are involuntarily contract and part-time workers, 
often women, working in low-wage jobs such as temping, and are predominantly black 
and Hispanic (Ross, 2004: 157-8). 
Despite such contradictions between hype and reality, there is broad evidence of 
a shift towards less secure forms of employment within post-industrial societies. In the 
UK the picture is similar, with the Office for National Statistics showing that the self-
employed now account for over 13 per cent of the workforce, with almost 4 million 
people having set up their own business, the highest number since records began in 1992 
(Freelance UK, 2006). In the UK there are now more than 3.7 million people working as 
freelancers (ibid). In the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 1990s, nearly 40 per 
cent of work was destandardised (much of it part-time) O'vkLaughlin, 1994; Millar et al, 
1989). W'hile it is important not to overstate the statistical importance of freelance modes 
of work in the new capitalism, we must recognise the cultural importance that such 
models of working hold, in that they 'exert a profound moral and normative force as a 
cutting-edge standard for how the larger economy should evolve' (Sennett, 2006: 10). 
5.1.1 Theorising uncertainty 
Beck (1992, 2000) has suggested that we are witnessing the end of the era of full 
employment, and that this is part of a much larger trend towards an economy of 
personal insecurity and risk. Risk and social responsibility for working lives is offloaded 
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from capital onto the individual. For Beck (1992), this process can be seen as the 
'reflexive modernisation of the employment society', one where underemployment 
becomes the new aim so that employers are able to extract more value from workers for 
less cost. This is work as 'permanently transitional', where temporary jobs become not a 
pathway to greater security but a permanent phenomenon. 
A number of writers have examined the personal and cultural consequences of 
precarious labour markets in the flexible economy. Sennett (1998) has described the loss 
of character and a coherent life narrative that occurs under conditions where workers are 
constantly having to move from job to job and from place to place. This is a game of 
chance, a gamble where life-chances are the stake and where 'new market conditions 
oblige large numbers of people to take quite demanding risks even though the gamblers 
know the possibilities of reward are slight' (ibid.: 88). These individuals are forced to 
endlessly reinvent themselves, and Sennett asks what the human cost is of such 
permanent impermanence. For Sennett, work in the new capitalism has a deleterious 
impact on self, as these individuals are assailed by economic forces beyond their control. 
Forced to live in a constant state of flux, individuals are unable to construct a stable 
linear narrative account of their lives, weakening the social bonds between people and 
producing a more individualistic, self-reliant perspective on life. He asks: 
How can long-term purposes be pursued in a short-term society? How can 
durable social relationships be sustained? How can a human being develop a 
narrative of identity and life history in a society composed of episodes and 
fragments? (1998: 26-7) 
The emotional impact of an uncertain life narrative is clearly in evidence in my research 
findings. 
These are the personal consequences of labour restructuring. In The Organisation 
Man, Whyte (1963) famously described a bureaucratic world of work in 1950s America, 
depicting a nation of employees where the new middle class were creatively stifled and 
conformist, but essentially employed within permanent and secure jobs. The bureaucratic 
organisation created a rationalised form of time, predictable, linear and long-term 
(connected to a culture of delayed gratification which operated for individuals working in 
such organisations). As Sennett has argued, 'Rationalized time enabled people to think 
about their lives as narratives - narratives not so much of what necessarily will happen as 
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of how things should happen' (ibid.: 23). The bureaucratic organisation, described as an 
'iron cage' by Weber (1992: 123), did, however, offer the security of life-long 
employment, fostered social inclusion (and social capital) by providing wide-spread 
employment within society, and provided individuals with a clear sense of a life narrative 
through work (Sennett, 2006: 15:82). Such a narrative has now largely vanished, for those 
at the 'cutting edge' of capitalism, such as creative workers. 
Such uncertainty clearly works in favour of capital accumulation, at the expense of the 
individual. Yet it has been achieved not by domination, but through a process whereby 
precarious models of work are aligned to a cultural desire for individual freedom. For 
Ross (2004) the shift towards a more 'humane', 'no-collar' workplace, where self-
management and flexible patterns of employment are common, also provides the 
grounds for exploitation, and a long-hours culture. He exposes how the employees of 
the digital creative economy have 'brought their experience in sacrificial labour and 
therefore a willingness to work in low-grade office environments, solving creative 
problems for long and often unsocial hours in return for deferred rewards' (Ross, 2004: 
10). Ross's research exposes the dark side of the 'new economy': 
Features that appeared to be healthy advances in corporate democracy could turn 
into trap-doors that opened on to a bottomless seventy-hour-plus workweek. 
Employee self-management could result in the abdication of accountability on 
the part of real managers and an unfair shouldering of risk and responsibilities on 
the part of individuals. Flattened organizations could mean that the opportunities 
for promotion dried up, along with layers of protection to shield employees from 
market exposure. A strong company culture was an emotional salve in good 
times but could turn into a trauma zone in times of crisis and layoffs. Partial 
ownership, or stakeholding, in the form of stock options could give employees 
an illusory sense of power sharing, rudely shattered when they encountered the 
unilateralism of executive decision-making in layoffs and office closures. (ibid.: 
18-19) 
For Ross flexible creative labour blurs the boundaries between work and leisure, 
so 'that it can enlist employees' freest thoughts and impulses in the service of salaried 
time': 
In knowledge companies that trade in creative ideas, services, and solutions, 
everything that employees do, think, or say in their waking moments is potential 
grist for the industrial mill. Where elements of play in the office or at 
home/offsite are factored into creative output, then the work tempo is being 
recalibrated to incorporate activities, feelings, and ideas that are normally pursued 
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during employees' free time. For employees who consolidate office and home, 
who work and play in the same clothes, and whose social life draws heavily on 
their immediate colleagues, there are no longer any boundaries between work 
and leisure. (ibid: 19) 
Here the 'new capitalism' demands particular forms of 'emotional labour' 
(Hochschild, 1983). Cultural norms, based around individual self-actualisation, exert a 
powerful mode of governmentality at work, shaping individuals' innermost desires and 
feelings towards the firm's mission for profit (du Gay, 1996; McRobbie, 2002b; Ursell, 
2000). My research shows how the discourse of being creative in fact provides 
individuals with a narrative of work which fails to address exploitation, insecurity and 
long-term sustainability. 
5.2 The research fmdings 
My research shows that the labour market in television has become a desocialised 
and individualised environment, a site of intensive self-reflexivity and constant updating 
of skills in order to remain employable. Yet despite these rigours, it is also a site of 
intense personal pleasure. My interviewees expressed a deep ambivalence about their 
working lives. On the one hand, they were open about their concerns at the insecurities 
and the stresses of individualisation, of living and working in a 'winner-takes-all' culture 
(Frank, 1995). Yet, on the other, they emphasised their great personal satisfaction in 
being creative, and in the pleasure they derive from their work. In central ways, 
'creativity' acted as a panacea for the structural pains of making a living under such 
pressures. 
What is immediately clear from the analysis is the casualised nature of their 
employment. Table 1 below provides detail of number of contracts that each of my 
participants had during the research period. 
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Table 1: Details of participants' contract lengths 
Name Occupation Number of contracts in Average length 
research research of contract in 
period research period 
Abigail Assistant Producer 5 6 weeks 
Andrew Assistant Producer 3 2 months 
Anita Producer/Director Has own company n/a 
Colin Editor 5 6 weeks 
Dave Managing Director Has own company n/a 
Deborah Editor 1 Rolling contract 
with one 
employer 
Eleanor Assistant Producer 3 2 months 
Emma Producer/Director 2 4 months 
Jack Producer/Director 3 2 months 
James Producer/Director 3 2 months 
lennI Assistant Producer 3 2 months 
Jonathan Assistant Producer 2 4 months 
Louise Series Producer 2 3 months 
Paul Assistant Producer 1 Rolling contract 
with one 
employer 
Rachel Researcher 3 2 months 
Richard Producer/Director 3 9 weeks 
Robert Editor 4 6 weeks 
Sara Production Manager 2 2 months 
Sarah Producer /Director 2 3 months 
Simon Producer/Director 2 3 months 
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5.3 The material realities of insecurity in the ITPS 
My data shows that insecurity and casualisation have very real consequences on 
the day-to-day working lives of production workers in the ITPS. Individuals are involved 
in a constant search for future employment. There is a restless mobility to their lives, as 
they endlessly move from contract to contract. Re-skilling becomes a vital way of 
maintaining an advantage in this situation. As a result of this working culture, the social 
contract between worker and company erodes, leading to a lack of loyalty to the 
company. Capital reneges on its responsibilities to the worker, meaning that production 
workers must take responsibility for their own pensions, holiday pay, and health care 
costs. Exploitation is rife, bad working practices emerge such as taking on eager young 
recruits on an endless cycle of 'work experience'. 
5.3.1 'Liquid' workers 
In the casualised world of television production, the production culture is one of 
constant mobility, where contracts vary from weeks to months: 
Emma: I've got a long one at the moment, 8 months, but ... I've had a weekly 
contract at [ .... ], see where we are at the end of the week. That's about as bad as 
it gets! 3 months is very common for a documentary ... I've never had anything 
longer than 8 months which is the longest ever. 
Therefore, work within a small 'indie'is experienced as highly unpredictable: 
Jenny: Well I'm still living on the edge ... Baby ... You know. So, I've spoken to [x] 
[the production manager] and he said February, which is when my contract ends, 
so it's really difficult. We're hoping to extend that for another three months but 
he's like, you know we are just examining our finances at the production 
company. 
James also told me that 'the longest contract I've ever had is 5 months, 6 months, to 
make a big BBC 1 film, you know'. 
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An analysis of the tracking data confirms this picture of mobility. For the 
freelance workers I interviewed, their average contract lengths ranged from six weeks to 
four months (see table 1). This precarious existence echoes Bauman's description of 
'liquid modernity' as: 'a society in which the conditions under which its members act 
change faster than it takes the ways of acting to consolidate into habits and routines. 
Liquidity of life and that of society feed and reinvigorate each other. Liquid life, just like 
liquid modern society, cannot keep its shape or stay on course for long' (Bauman, 2005: 
1). Modern life exhibits characteristics of permanent flux and uncertainty; in such 
conditions workers are required to adopt certain strategies. 
5.3.2 The constant job search 
Unsurprisingly, gIVen this short-term contract context, all of the freelancers I 
studied were involved in a constant search for future employment. Indeed, this process 
was an over-riding concern, dominating 'leisure' time and involving effort outside of 
contracted hours, and involving emails, phone-calls and meetings, often during the 
production period of the current job that they were employed on. The structural 
uncertainty about future employment means that freelance workers in television must 
constantly be thinking about their next job, even while they are working on their current 
one, as this quote of Emma's suggests: 
It's difficult, it's insecure because it's very hard to manage ... most people as they 
play it, the last few weeks of their contract they start looking around for work, 
because when people want to hire you as a researcher or AP they want you the 
next Monday, so it's really difficult to say, unless you're incredibly lucky with a 
really good relationship with someone in a company who is able to plan 8 
months ahead, say you're on a one 8 month contract and you know mostly that 
it's quite rare that one contract is going to dovetail nicely with another because 
there's all this cyclical commissioning stuff that is going on behind the scenes ... 
Equally, Jenny described the need to 'bash the phones, and fire off emails all the time' in 
order to find the next job. And this process is hard work in itself, as Emma notes: 
I would say I have met 10 or 15 contacts before I actually work for them. Either 
they called me and I go in and have a chat about something specific or emailing 
them or them ringing me, so it's a long process. 
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This process is stressful, particularly as there is no down-time on productions, so 
this job-hunting has to take place within one's own time: 
Emma: [Y]ou're full on the whole time and then sort of two weeks before you 
realise 'shit, I haven't sent any emails out', so you do a horrible excruciating day 
at work, then you go home and do a job application ... Or you bung out a few 
emails.Soit.seither at the weekend when you're meant to be resting or in the 
everung. 
Indeed, managing the whole process is fraught with problems, particularly in terms of 
fitting interviews around the requirements of the current job: 
Andrew: Going for interviews is problematic in terms of trying to get time off 
during a short term contract because they obviously won't give you time off, so 
its like well how can you go on holiday then. But it makes it difficult to go for 
job interviews. 
This echoes the research of Paterson, who notes the 'constant necessity of finding new 
work, the next contract' in the television industry (2001: 497). 
5.3.3 Exploitation 
Insecurity breeds (self-) exploitation. My research was indicative of a work 
culture which included features such as extremely long hours, low pay, bullying, the 
exploitative use of work experience free labour, and other highly dubious working 
practices, exacerbated by a pervasive fear of standing up to exploitation for fear of being 
labelled a trouble-maker. The network culture of employment militates against workers 
giving public voice to their discontents, for in doing so they run the danger of not being 
employed again (Saundry, Stuart and Antcliff, 2007: 185). Such widespread exploitation, 
particularly of junior production staff, has been called 'television's dirty little secret' 
(Silver, 2005); indeed many of these issues have become areas of public concern since a 
high-profile media campaign in 2005 called Television Workers Rights Advocacy 
Petition (TVWRAP), which collected stories about exploitation in the industry, making 
use of a web forum for freelancer television workers.46 The petition was signed by 2,800 
46 See www.tvfreelancers.org.ukforfulldetailsofthecampaign.This was the first Internet 
campaign in British broadcasting history for better working conditions for television production 
staff, and it received significant coverage in The Guardian and Broadcast. Notably, the campaign 
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freelancers and was backed by senior figures in the industry such as the documentary-
maker Paul Watson. They collected evidence of how many independent production 
companies were failing to pay junior staff the minimum wage, and to meet freelancers' 
entitlement to paid holiday. However, despite the coverage, my research suggests that 
many of these issues remain. 
The long-hours culture in television means that it has become standard practice 
for employees to sign out of the European Working Time Directive, which limits 
working hours to 48 hours per week. In fact all of my freelance interviewees had signed 
an opt-out clause in their contract. This long hours culture is widely accepted: 
Paul: I think there is a tendency to keep wages relatively low and maintain long 
working hours and so on, that perhaps might be viewed slightly differently, but I 
think that at the entry level, I think that unfortunately everyone just accepts that 
that's the way it is. It's not always fair but ... 
Production schedules were often squeezed, making antisocial hours an inevitability. One 
interviewee described the situation he experienced at a major indie: 
James: This is an example of modern TV, the last job I've done, they're current 
affairs so they tend to have short turnarounds on things anyway. A) It was a 
shorter schedule; b) it was a big ruthless company ... ; c) and I think they take the 
piss because they push ... It didn't need to be fast turnaround, there was no real 
time sensitivity on it, but they pushed the production schedule ... 
Another interviewee experienced the same issue: 
Simon: I think a lot of the exploitation comes about in a sense by saying 'we'll 
make this documentary in 4 weeks'. The company doing that is actually saving 
money, but it's to the detriment of the social life, or life, of the person making 
the f11m. 
This inevitably impacts on life outside of work. For example, this way of working 
impacts on the ability to have a social life: 
was conducted outside of union involvement (the main union in the industry for television 
workers is BECTU), and shows the potential for networks as a means of campaigning. See 
Saundry et al (2007) for a full discussion of this campaign, and the implications for trade unions 
in the audio-visual industries. 
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Andrew: I was going to join a karate club and ended up not doing it because I 
could never commit to a regular appointment every week. I've never done that 
since. I mean I think the only thing I've done outside of work is the gym and 
even that I don't go to because I don't have time. 
Equally, Abigail said '[y]ou basically have to realise that if you do one of these very full 
on jobs then you're not going to have a personal life for three months'. 
Insecurity was closely linked to self-exploitation, particularly at the more junior 
editorial levels of the industry, such as researcher and assistant producer. For example, 
Jenny, a junior assistant producer, described how the competition and insecurity created 
a culture where you felt that you just couldn't say no to unreasonable working demands: 
I'd say it has more of an impact on your social life than anything. Because if you 
are in there, and you've been picked, you've either probably got a good track 
record or you are a hard worker and they've recognised that. And you kind of 
work. You want to do the best, you want them to choose you again, so you kind 
of swallow things that you really shouldn't ... You probably kind of say oh I'll put 
up with that. Long hours. Sometimes that's the nature of the beast. Sometimes 
for example, pre-production and you've done like 8 hours and you go home. 
Other times you work 16 hour days and that's just the way it is. 
There was a sense of frustration about this situation, yet also resignation. As Abigail 
noted, there was no option not to sign out of the working time directive, but that 'once 
you sign a contract that says that your hours are unregulated then what can you do?' The 
competitive nature of the industry is used as a means of coercing individuals into 
accepting such conditions: 
Jonathan: It's so competitive, that if you get asked to work the weekend, you're 
like 'oh right is it going to be paid', they're like 'oh no it's not paid', and you 
cannot say no to working that weekend. Because if you do you'll be replaced just 
like that. They don't care. There's a hundred people queuing up to do your job 
and can do it as well as you can. 
Bullying also appeared as an issue for a number of interviewees. Andrew told me 
about an experience he'd had on a well-known factual strand; 
I mean I've worked on [x] with a boss who literally threw furniture at people, and 
he got away with it because it was a 6 month contract and Channel 4 were like 
'Oh by the time they've all complained ... ' ... Because it's all short-term contracts 
everyone just puts up with it. 
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The research uncovered a picture of a bullying culture within television, accepted as 
normal by pliant young workers: 
Eleanor: I think it's a bullying atmosphere. If I've just come out of university and 
I'm desperate to work in telly and I manage to claw my way through the doors 
because perhaps I know someone who knows someone, I'll do anything to stay 
there even if it's really unethical or I'm killing myself. 
On one job Eleanor described how her boss 'used to scream at me, and I always 
remember he used to eat cake and scream at me at the same time so I could see the cake 
in the inside of his mouth'. 
Working for nothing also emerged as a major issue in the industry, particularly 
with the use of long-term unpaid work experience, an illegal practice, but clearly one that 
many of my interviewees had either experienced themselves or witnessed. This is 
consistent with the findings of the TVWRAP campaign, which found this to be a 
widespread practice. Sarah told me, 'Yeah of course I've seen it happen'. Rachel, a 
researcher, said 'I just don't think you've got a hope in hell of getting a job in television 
without doing free work'. Paul, having acknowledged that its something that 'almost 
everybody has to do', speculated on the implications for diversity, noting that it's only 
possible 'if your parents can bankroll you', and that 'the industry loses out on a lot of 
talent because people just can't afford to work for free'. 
In short, exploitation figured as a major theme in my interviewees, with 
casualisation and the decline of union power cited as the key reason for these trends. 
Paul Watson, an experienced [11m-maker, has argued that the situation is getting worse: 'I 
think exploitation is far more widespread than it's ever been ... I've been in the business 
40 years and have heard most of the plaintive cries over those years, possibly even 
uttered a few myself ... but it is now a clamour' (quoted in Silver, 2005). Furthermore, 
Darlow has also spoken out about the situation publicly: 
The TV industry is rife with stories of exploitative and bullying employment 
practices, Indies appearing to be among the worst offenders ... Young, fully-
trained people forced to work unpaid, and more experienced people, in order to 
work at all, increasingly having to work on rates below those agreed between the 
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industry's unions and employers, and for hours far in excess of the working time 
directive. (quoted in Silver, 2005) 
Yet, despite this, only two of my interviewees belonged to the broadcasting 
union BECTU, which has directly campaigned on this issue. In one sense, this is as a 
direct result of the deunionisation of the industry, discussed in chapter 3. Belonging to a 
union is no longer seen as a 'normal' thing to do in this industry: 
Sarah: I don't know anything about BECTU. I've barely ever met anyone who 
said they were a member and I just don't know anything about it. I don't know 
what it would do for me, no ... 
Furthermore, fear of being marked as 'difficult' prevailed. This echoes Saundry's 
research, which specifically looked at union organisation in the industry. As one of their 
interviewees noted, '[T]here's this unspoken thing that if you were to get BECTU 
involved then they wouldn't employ you again so you just agree a fair rate with them. 
You don't say I'm calling BECTU to get my rate. (Wildlife f1lmmaker), (Saundry et al, 
2007: 185). 
Indeed, the fact that all of my interviewees stipulated the need for anonymity 
suggests that this fear of speaking out is a key issue. This echoes the situation with the 
TVWRAP campaign, and the subsequent media stories, where all of those complaining 
about the exploitation did so only under the guarantee of anonymity. Considering this 
situation, Martin Spence, assistant secretary general of BECTU has argued: 
Working long hours and for free is widespread in the independent sector because 
crudely-speaking it's a buyers' market. Some employers do take full advantage of 
that, there's no question about it. The catch 22 is that the young people who are 
being worst treated hope that this is their way into proper employment in the 
industry and so the last thing they want to do is kick up a fuss or come and speak 
to the union as they'll be seen as trouble-makers. So there are real incentives for 
them to grin and bear it (quoted in Silver, 2005). 
5.4 Responding to uncertainty 
Unsurprisingly, this precarious and often exploitative situation was a cause of 
anxiety and stress for some of my participants. However, others accepted and even 
embraced the risk. Unsurprisingly, all developed strategies for dealing with it. In such a 
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context, it is evident that the response to uncertainty is varied. As I shall show, insecurity 
has a clear emotional impact, producing feelings of anxiety, stress and fear. Yet this does 
not represent the full picture. Generational differences in attitudes towards risk emerged 
from the data. Some embraced the flexibility of their employment situation, while others 
had come to find it unsustainable. The individualisation of risk means that responsibility 
is devolved to the self; this leads to particular strategies for dealing with the situation, 
including developing entrepreneurial attitudes towards the self and an embrace of 
mobility and fluidity as a means of moving up in the industry. 
5.4.1 The emotional impact of uncertainty 
'In a WInner takes all market, risk-taking takes its toll'. (McRobbie, 2002a: 
103)http://docs.google.com/View?docID=dgvjghgp 21 hnsx5h&revision= latest 
ftn3 
The culture of risk-taking, and endless uncertainty, appeared to take a significant 
emotional toll on some of my respondents. Anxiety and stress were marked responses to 
this way of working; significantly, insecurity was the key factor that seemed to cause this. 
Arguably, underlying this 'structure of feeling' lies an emotional shift, away from the 
terror of permanent unemployment, to the anxiety produced by the constant spectre of 
underemployment, and individualised risk. As Sennett has argued, 'Failure in the old 
pyramid was grounded in dread; failure in the new institution is shaped by anxiety' 
(Sennett, 2006: 53). Furthermore, he contends how in the new flexible capitalism, 
affluent and highly educated young professionals are 'on the edge of losing control over 
their lives. This fear is built into their work histories' (1998: 19). 
Expressing just this fear, Emma described the emotional rigours of a freelance 
casualised working environment: 
At times I feel incredibly insecure ... the positive way of trying to look at the 
career is always looking for new skills and new challenges and just keeping 
moving taking the work that came my way, but the actual feeling, what that is 
actually like to work really really hard and be off to Africa one week talking your 
way into a jail cell and then fly back and the project is over and you're 
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unemployed again and all your contacts say that there is no work about, can be 
very harsh really ... 
Jenny also described working in the industry as a frustrating, combative experience; 'It's 
just really hard. There is just so much insecurity. I think you've just got to be a 
fighter ... you just feel like you are banging your head against a brick wall more times than 
not'. Describing the emotional impact of the insecurity, she said: 'It makes me feel really 
low self-esteem, scared, worried'. James said he found 'the feeling of not belonging' to be 
'isolating'. Andrew described being 'scared' by the experience of being out of work. 
Louise experienced the difficulties of being able to plan for the future because of 
the insecurity; 'Well the key feature for me as a freelancer is the utter lack of stability in 
your life and you know it's difficult to forward plan for things because you always feel 
that you are only as good as your next contract'. She clearly resented the lack of job 
security, particularly when compared to the experience of her parents: 
I mean both my parents ... one was in the Navy and the other one was a teacher 
so they both very much were from that kind of you know job for life kind of 
existence where you have a nice job and the government pays your wages and 
you work hard but you get a pension at the end of it, and you get your holidays 
and that works well. And so I found the whole idea of being utterly dependent 
on myself without any security beyond the next six weeks really freaky. 
Eleanor even told me that she thought the stress of working in the industry had caused a 
'nervous breakdown' in at least one of her friends: 
The stress of it is a lot of people bottle up all their tension, resentment and fury 
and suddenly it all comes out. And I'm talking about quite mild-mannered people 
just going completely furious at someone because they just can't take it anymore. 
5.4.2 Generational differences 
Despite these negative feelings, clear generational attitudinal differences emerged 
towards insecurity and the 'liquid life' of media work (Deuze, 2007). For example, the 
younger respondents (below 30), who had entered the industry following the 
restructuring of the early 1990s, tended to be more accepting of the situation that they 
were in. While they may have complained about the hours, or expressed anxiety and 
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stress at insecurity, the vagaries of a casualised industry were normalised for them. For 
example, for Rachel, a researcher aged 25, the idea of a 'job-for-life' was anathema: 
To tell you the truth, I personally wouldn't want a job for life. I think we've all 
grown up in such a consumer society, and we do want the best all the time, and 
be able to take the best option all the time. No, I don't think jobs for life really 
do exist, and I don't think we want them either. 
For these younger workers, insecurity was also seen as something that could and 
indeed should be successfully negotiated if one was to have a successful career in the 
industry. These interviewees were keen to tell me about the positive elements of the 
flexible labour market of television, and of how they embraced insecurity and risk almost 
as a marker of success. For example, Sarah (producer/ director), Simon 
(producer/ director) and Jonathan (assistant producer) asserted that although they were 
aware of the insecurity of their industry, it was not something that bothered them, as 
they felt they were successfully navigating this terrain: 
Sarah: It [the insecurity] doesn't bother me at all. It never has bothered me, I 
don't know why. It may be that I've never been out of work for more than about 
10 days without knowing what I'm doing next. I mean I've taken more time off 
than 10 days but that's about the longest I've been out of work not knowing 
what's coming next or needed to know what's coming next. 
Jonathan is equally relaxed about it. Age is a key factor. He is 24, no mortgage and family 
commitments, and so for his lifestyle the freelance way of work suits him very well. 
However, he is able to see that such a way of life may not be sustainable as he gets older: 
I think there will come an age where maybe the freelance isn't so attractive 
anymore. They've [BBe employees facing redundancy] probably got kids, wives 
families mortgages. I've got none of those worries. But at the end of this job I'm 
out of work. I'm out of work [ ... ] I'm still at the point where I'm trying to travel 
and work and it's perfect for that. I can do a job, three or four jobs, and you can 
just go off and travel come back and there's none of that mess, you can just get 
straight back into it. The last trip I did was half a year and I was able to sort 
myself out a job while I was still away so when I came back I just went straight 
back into work. If you can do it it's great. But there will come an age in a few 
years' time when that will have stopped, and all of a sudden I might want to be 
settling down. When all that comes into it, then you're going to be looking for 
more security. 
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Yet for some of the slightly older workers, the pressures of uncertainty clearly 
begin to have a much more marked impact. For the majority of those above 30 years old 
there was a strong recurrent theme of leaving television. This was framed within the 
context of insecurity. For example, Louise, a series producer aged 38, told me: 'One day 
I would like to have a family and at the moment I can't really see how I could reconcile 
the two well because I don't want to have that stressful life all the time ... 1 can't see 
myself doing it when I'm 50'. Similarly, Jack (who has now left the industry to work in 
higher education), speculated on leaving the industry: 'I wouldn't hesitate to switch to 
something else if it gave me a stable income and allowed me to have more of a home 
life'. James also talked to me about the exhausting nature of his creative labour, and his 
desire to leave the industry as a result: 
Despite having had a fair amount of success and all the rest of it, I've just ... I 
don't know I can't imagine doing this at 50 you know? The energy levels required 
and the insecurity and all the rest of it. I think you want to be able to take your 
foot off the gas at some stage you know? Not being lazy, but not always be 
watching your back and working in ... I mean obviously the longest contract I've 
ever had is 5 months, 6 months, to make a big BBC 1 film ... 
While clearly this research would need to be replicated across a far wider sample in order 
to stand up statistically, my findings do call into question the sustainability of such 
precarious creative labour. This is illustrated in these workers' feelings towards the work. 
Although they find the work rewarding, there is a sense in which it is increasingly an 
unsustainable model of employment for middle age and beyond. 
5.4.3 Individualisation of risk 
My research findings show that this insecurity and risk is not dealt with 
collectively, but is individualised, so the structural issue of casualisation is interpreted at 
the individual level. 1ndividualisation means that these knowledge workers must 'seek 
personal solutions to systemic contradictions' (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxii); they 
must live with the ever-present possibility of 'the breakdown biography' (ibid: 3). With 
the individualisation of work, where '[t]he normal work situation - normal both for 
individual lives and for company policy - has begun to break down, and a political 
economy of insecurity and differentiation has developed in place of an economy of state-
guaranteed social security' (Beck, 2000: 53). This new situation provides a freedom to 
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shape one's life, but that 'new trapdoors can lead to exclusion, and the risks are shifted 
from the state and the economy on to the shoulders of individuals. Both aspects are 
based on the new precariousness of work; the opportunities come with risks attached' 
(2000: 53-4). Individualisation provides new freedoms, but also much greater risk, 
uncertainty and anxiety, requiring constant self-monitoring and improvement in order 
for the individual to negotiate this new economic and cultural terrain. 
Work therefore for my participants becomes a critical site for the process of 
creating one's desired identity. For some, as we have seen, it is also a source of stress and 
insecurity, for as Bauman suggests, the processes of disembedding that are set in motion 
by individualisation are 'forcing men and women to be constantly on the move and 
promising no rest and no satisfaction on "arrival", no comfort on reaching the 
destination where one can disarm, relax and stop worrying' (2002: xvi). However, for 
others, there is a clear sense in which insecurity also equals freedom, a discourse that 
appears with regularity in their talk about work. Freedom is very much part of the 
individualisation process, where the wish to 'live a life of one's own' has taken on a 
historical and cultural significance under conditions of late modernity. If paid work is 
'chopped up' (Beck, 2000: 53), then what remains is the freedom for individualistic self-
determination, as the traditional certainties of work dissolve. 
For example, Emma is also acutely aware of the way that the risk inherent in her 
employment situation means that responsibility is devolved from the company level to 
the personal level: 
I think my viewpoint now is that yes, I know I have to accept total financial 
responsibility for myself, no-one is going to do it for me, no-one is going to put 
money into a pension scheme for me ... I've got used to the fact that no-one's 
going to look out for me financially and I've got used to it. 
James told me about the isolation that the insecurity and constant job-searching brings to 
his life, describing his existence as 'fairly nomadic' and 'pretty isolating in a way'. He also 
expressed an awareness of another more bureaucratic mode of working life, one with 
attractions, despite the pleasure of being an independent freelancer: 
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· .. you've never got that sense that you would in an organisation of somebody 
looking out for you, you know... or thinking 'what would be best for James 
next'. 
Paul, as a staff employee within an independent production company, has more 
security than the majority of my interviewees, but he is also acutely aware of a constant 
sense of individualised insecurity, telling me that 'there isn't that sense of unity in a union 
sense ... we're all freelancers and we're all on our own as far as, you know, you have to 
look after yourself as far as your next job ... you don't have that kind of healthcare 
pension scheme, long term employment prospects that you might have had years ago'. 
This is very much a world where loyalty and a sense of solidarity has all but 
disappeared. In its place comes the imperative to make it on one's own, as all other 
allegiances are fleeting, transitory and weak. Simon describes the individualistic culture of 
the independent production company, where any sense of loyalty has vanished: 
There's no safety net ... And because of that there is very little loyalty. Because of 
the lack of loyalty it creates an inherent kind of instability anyway ... Nobody 
pulls together to get something done. If they want to fire somebody it's easy to 
fire somebody. A company goes under the wall, there's very very little chance 
that people are going to come in and help that company because it's not an 
industry that has been built on a sub, and in a sense it means that it's built out of 
sand to a certain degree because it's so movable that the moment the water 
comes it just washes it away and there's almost nothing there. 
This clearly connects to Sennett's assertion that the low social capital generated within 
companies that adhere to the values of highly flexible capitalism engenders a lack of 
loyalty to the company, and low levels of personal trust between colleagues (Sennett, 
2006). This is in opposition to the high levels of loyalty that sociologists observed within 
the bureaucratic forms of labour in the twentieth century: 
Cutting-edge institutions in civil society lie at the opposite extreme. They elicit 
extremely low levels of loyalty. The reason is not far to seek. If an employer tells 
you that you are on your own, that the institution will not help you out when you 
are in need, why should you feel much loyalty to it? (ibid.: 64) 
This lack of loyalty only serves to exacerbate the anxiety and stress within such firms, 
because employees feel a lack of purpose to their work, where '[t]he stretched-out, 
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intense workday can seem without purpose; pressure becomes depressing rather than 
stimulating' (ibid.: 65-6). 
5.4.4 Entrepreneurs of the self 
Under these conditions of individualised risk, my respondents are compelled to 
become highly enterprising as a strategy for survival in a precarious working 
environment; indeed they become 'entrepreneurs of the self' (du Gay, 1996). As Beck 
has noted: 
For a majority of people, even in the apparently prosperous middle layers, their 
basic existence and lifeworld will be marked by endemic insecurity. More and 
more individuals are encouraged to perform as a 'Me & Co.' selling themselves 
on the marketplace. (2000: 3) 
Moreover, as Reich has argued, 'Increasingly in the new economy, the only way up is to 
promote yourself' (2001: 128). 
Again, we see the ambivalent response to insecurity for these production workers, where 
stress and anxiety are translated into feverish enterprise. For example, Jenny describes 
the need to push oneself and be endlessly self-promoting: 
You've just got to rise to every occasion, you've got to seize those opportunities, 
you've got to take those opportunities, you've got to find opportunities. You've 
got to really push yourself and always ... Like ... Just ... You know that thing 
when you are younger and you pat your head and rub your tummy, it's like that, 
it really is like that and you've got to keep all the balls in the air you've got to ... 
But ... It's exciting when you get it right it's brilliant. When you are where you 
want to be, it's good, it's good. 
Sarah also pointed to the importance of being entrepreneurial in television: 
I do know that you have to be able to sell yourself with flair quite a lot, so in the 
sense of an entrepreneur being able to sell anything, this is my product, it's me 
really, in order to get me in the door somewhere. So yeah ... But I think that the 
skills that you need to make a good programme many of those are also those that 
you need to get the job in the first place. 
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For Simon, his response to insecurity was entrepreneurialism, with an explicit focus on 
how he could develop his career successfully to the point where insecurity was no longer 
an Issue: 
[Insecurity] makes me feel two things. One, that I need to get on with creating 
security and by creating security you have to find a way of earning a lot of money 
in this industry. And two, it makes me think kind of think beyond, think further. 
What else can you do? Where are you in terms of your own abilities? It makes 
you think that as well as being personable, being versatile and being able to 
bullshit and a lot of that stuff. 
5.4.5 Mobility as strategy for success 
While stress and anxiety were major features of television work for many of my 
respondents, a number of them actively embraced the risk of a flexible, mobile labour 
environment, asserting the need to move around different companies within the 
industry. Interestingly, in this context, moving around emerges as a key strategy for 
success. Staying still was perceived by a number of my respondents as a mistake, while 
being mobile a means of moving up within the field. Paul describes this situation: 
I'd like to stay at [x] for a little while longer, because they've been very good at 
giving me experience, and giving me a lot more hands on experience than I 
would have got at a lot of bigger companies. But you know ultimately you know 
I think if you don't move around a little bit, people are very suspicious in the 
work place, you need to be able to show that you can adapt to different 
situations ... The bigger the company, the easier it is for them to keep you at a 
certain level and pay you at a certain level, because they can offer more security, 
they can offer more training, but you often don't get as much experience. And 
also by moving around, in reference to your earlier question, you know one of 
the ways in the industry that you manage to negotiate more money is to move. 
Every time you move you look to secure a little bit more on your salary or on 
your weekly or monthly wage ... You know as part of the process of moving. 
Moreover, Sarah, when reviewing her own work narrative in television, clearly perceives 
a period of relative stability and security that she experienced when working for a large 
independent company as a time of stasis, and damaging to her career. She described to 
me the need to leave this secure situation in order to get herself better known in the 
industry: 
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Sarah: ... so in a way even though I was technically freelancer the whole time I 
had this very sort of comfortable I mean I knew that my contract would just 
keep rolling on and it wasn't very good for me actually. I mean it was good for 
the first ... I think if I'd stayed for three years that would have been ideal because 
it is actually a freelance industry, so if you opt out of that it can actually do your 
career harm. 
DL: People expect you to be moving around? 
Sarah: No-one outside of [x] knew who I was at all, and you do need to develop 
a reputation. 
This echoes Bauman's notion of 'liquid modernity', where the pnmary 
experience of individuals caught up in late modernity'S ceaseless change is one of 
movement, transition, and flux. Here the existential modality of individuals in the 
postmodern period is one of 'insufficient determination, inconclusiveness, mobility and 
rootlessness' (Bauman, 1996: 51). Individuals working in the television industry must 
become more mobile in order to succeed, they must enact fluidity. They move within the 
network of production in much the same way as Urry has described the movement of 
'global fluids', as a means of categorising the increased but unpredictable flow of people, 
information, money, objects and risks: 
Fluids move in particular directions at certain speeds but with no necessary end-
state or purpose ... They move according to certain temporalities, over each 
minute, day, week, year and so on ... Different fluids spatially intersect in the 
'empty meeting grounds' of the non-places of modernity, such as motels, 
airports, service stations, the internet, international hotels, cable television, 
expense account restaurants and so on (2000: 194) 
Yet it is vital to see that there are power relations at work within this dynamic of 
fluid mobility. Clearly, some are more able to be mobile than others. Sarah and Paul's 
sentiments about rejecting security for the flux of mobility relate to Sennett's 
understanding of the culture of the new capitalism, where the new values of flexibility 
and enterprise mean that 'dependency' is perceived as a weakness; the 'idealized person 
eschews dependency; he or she does not cling to others' (2006: 46). In turn this creates 
anxiety, as 'the fear of dependence names rather a worry about loss of self-control and, 
more psychologically, a feeling of shame in deferring to others' (ibid: 47). In the new 
capitalism, the key to success is the ability to let go of one's past, to constantly go with 
the flow of ceaseless change, and to accept impermanence. As Sarah told me: 
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I think I actually quite thrive on the flexibility of it, I don't know what I'd feel 
like doing a job which was just 4 weeks holiday a year. I get a kick out of moving 
from company to company. I never feel nervous starting at a new company, 
never have done. 
The ability to be mobile, both physically and psychologically, is a key factor in 
determining success, not only within television production, but more broadly within 
contemporary capitalism. As Boltanski and Chiapello have shown, those who are 
immobile are seen within contemporary capitalist discourse as 'rigid', 'local', the 'little 
people' who suffer from 'attachment' to a single project or place (200S: 19); whereas 
those who are mobile are celebrated within this discourse as flexible, enthusiastic, 
constantly prepared for change, and able to take risks (ibid: 12). As they argue, those 
who are immobile and fail to move around are fundamentally disadvantaged within 
today's flexible capitalism. Indeed, 'some people's immobility is necessary for other 
people's mobility' (ibid: 362) 
The paradox of 'liquid work' is that everything points towards instability, and 'a rapid 
destabilization of social bonds', yet successful workers caught up in this global shift 
'express a sense of mastery over their lives, interpreting their professional identity in this 
context in terms of individual-level control and empowering agency' (Deuze, 2007: 24). 
But what kind of 'mastery' is this, where my respondents have no choice except to find 
individualised gratification at how successfully they have commodified themselves? This 
is not an expression of pleasure in mastering one's creative craft, for example. What is 
being expressed here is a sense of pleasure over how 'successfully' my respondents have 
mastered fluidity and insecurity, rather than a sense of deep gratification in the creative 
role itself. 
5.5 Mfective labour 
Television production emerges as a emotionally charged labour market. Yet as 
the previous analysis shows, the response of workers is paradoxical, where they respond 
to uncertainty and de stabilisation with both fear and a sense of mastery; both positive 
and negative emotions are evident in their views on their working lives. Anxiety, fear and 
stress marked the emotional response to insecurity. Lack of loyalty, and low social capital 
within organisations, are endemic, as individualisation shifts the focus of security from 
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the company, and the state, to the self. Yet they also experienced great pleasure and 
satisfaction. Thus the sphere of television production becomes marked out as a zone of 
affective labour, marked by extreme highs and lows, often closely associated with each 
other. Of course, television workers have always cared about their creative efforts 
(Deuze, 2007: 65). Yet, arguably, the particular tone of emotional investment that we see 
in creative fields of labour today, where workers willingly embrace their own exploitation 
and casualisation, is something new. This shift is significant, suggesting a new mode of 
work that is associated with late capitalism. Affective labour is understood as a condition 
of labour that appears more prominently in the new capitalism, as work demands more 
of the workers 'soul' (Hoschschild, 1983; Rose, 1989, 1999; du Gay, 1996). 
5.5.1 Subjectivisation and disciplinary control 
It is possible to understand this ambivalence towards insecurity and exploitation 
if we recognise the subjectivising power of the meritocratic discourse that has evolved 
around creative work. Subjectivisation, following Foucault, means 'those forms of 
understanding which the subject creates about himself' (1999: 161). Here the very 
concept of self is inextricably connected to historical and material circumstances, so that 
'self' is seen to be caught up in processes of social reproduction. The 'creative' self is one 
that is encouraged through the contemporary discourse of 'creativity' as explored in 
chapter 2. For Foucault, the very way that we understand our 'self' relates to these 
broader political-economic values within society. Therefore, in the creative economy, a 
particular mode of selfhood emerges, which encourages and embraces flexibility, 
freedom and creative autonomy. 
The 'creativity' discourse functions to individualise the experience of work, and 
to encourage certain types of subjective responses to such conditions, which are in line 
with the values of particular discursive regimes. My respondents seem particularly 
attuned to the need to be entrepreneurial, to network, and to make it on one's own, as I 
shall explore in the following chapter. The language of risk is highly evident in their talk 
about work, but it is largely understood in personal, individual terms. In this process we 
can see how the casualised and freelance dynamics of television production are in turn 
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understood and translated at the level of self-identity by television workers, so that the 
values of entrepreneurialism, freedom, creativity and flexibility (which are of course 
closely aligned to the economic values of neoliberallate capitalism, with its emphasis on 
flexible markets and outsourcing) are embodied at the level of subjectivity. 
Creativity, glamour, freedom from the perceived banality of the office 
environment: these are all recurring themes which show that for my respondents, their 
jobs provide high levels of meaning and self-actualisation. The regularity with which 
these themes come up in my own research, and in other research that has explored 
similar areas of the economy, suggests that there is now a powerful discourse in play 
around the experience of work in this creative area of the economy, to the extent that 
being creative has almost become a moral edict. Indeed as Osborne argues, 'in 
psychological vocabularies, in economic life, in education and beyond, the values of 
creativity have taken on the force of a moral agenda' (2003: 507). This raises the 
question: what purpose do these powerful discourses about work have in contemporary 
society, and how are they manifest for television production workers? In addressing this, 
I have turned to the post-Foucauldian theoretical framework employed by writers such 
as du Gay (1996), Ursell (2000) and Donzelot (1991). These authors, although examining 
very different fields, have a shared attentiveness to discourse and to the micro-politics 
of power within the workplace as they are played out through working life. 
Du Gay's (1996) research on the discursive power of culture within the labour 
processes in the service economy is useful here. Du Gay has concentrated on the role of 
identity within contemporary labour markets, alerting us to the ways that work-based 
identities are formed through governmentality and discourse, so that workers come to 
identity with beliefs that closely echo the needs and normative demands imposed on 
them by capitalism and by the companies that they work for. Concentrating on the 
work-based discourse of 'excellence' that became so prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s as 
a result of Thatcherite neo-liberal strategies in the workplace, du Gay demonstrates how 
language plays a vital role in the creation of new subjectivities at work, which function 
on behalf of contemporary organisations to make the individuals working there more 
competitive, autonomous and adaptive. Examining the role that discourse plays in 
creating identity at work, du Gay argues, 'The fact that the self is constituted in discourse 
means that certain aspects of a person's sense of who he or she is are bound to mirror 
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and incorporate the general morals or values of the wider group contained within 
discourse' (1996: 30). In this way, concepts that have been naturalised within managerial 
discourse for hegemonic reasons are demystified: 
Notions such as 'job satisfaction' and 'motivation' are not phenomena that exist 
in some timeless universal realm waiting to be discovered by, and deployed 
within, managerial discourse. Both the basic concepts and the practices that 
bestow upon them a material reality are products of changes in the imagination 
and organization of work. (ibid.: 51) 
This research exposes the centrality of culture as it is employed as discourse 
within the contemporary workplace. Du Gay's insights are essential for understanding 
the discursive power of 'creativity' for those employed within the cultural industries, as a 
way of creating 'better' contemporary workers. Indeed he suggests that there is a clear 
reason for this turn to culture in the workplace - profit: 
'Culture' is accorded a privileged position ... because it is seen to structure the 
way people think, feel and act in organizations. The aim is to produce the sort of 
meanings that will enable people to make the right and necessary contribution to 
the success of the organization for which they work. (1996: 41) 
As such, particular cultural values about working life, and about contemporary 
capitalism, emanate and are embodied within particular discursive formations within the 
workplace, which are crystallised in particular forms of selfhood. This is indicative of a 
wider self-reflexive individualising shift within contemporary capitalist society, as 
responsibility for the self is politically devolved from society to the individual. Therefore 
this is a process by which self-management, and self-regulation, are seen as key, and 
indeed part of the way in which capital devolves its responsibility for a work-force to the 
individual worker.47 As Ursell writes, it is in this process that we can see 'how late 
capitalism associates with a very particular technology of the self' (2000: 806). 
5.5.2 Pleasure at work 
A key factor therefore in understanding the response to the insecurity is the 
professed pleasure with which cultural workers embrace this kind of work, despite the 
insecurity, the long hours, and the various inequities which clearly exist within it. 
47 For more on this process, see McRobbie (2002a: 109). 
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Pleasure at work becomes a key part of the disciplinary power of late capitalism, so that 
these structural pains are actually offset by the passion that they have for the work. As 
Ursell suggests, 'in television production you can pursue your sensual pleasures'; 
moreover, for creative workers 'pleasure derives from the scope they are finding for 
aesthetic self-expression' (2000: 819). This self-actualising sense of pleasure in such work 
accords with McRobbie's observations on cultural labour, where she notes, 'the pleasure 
with which individuals enter into this kind of work, notwithstanding low pay (sometimes 
no pay), extraordinarily long working hours ... and volatile and unpredictable patterns of 
work' (2002a: 109). 
Indeed many of my interviewees were keen to stress the pleasure that they got 
from working in television, despite the insecurity: 
David: I feel very lucky, and I feel that I'm one of a small group of my peers and 
friends who has a job that really interests him and he really likes. I mean there 
aren't sometimes Monday mornings when you wouldn't rather stay in bed, but I 
find it creative and I find the people that I work with appreciative. So I find my 
job very rewarding in that sense. 
Crucially for David, a big attraction of creative work is about escaping the routine of the 
'9-5', and in finding himself doing a job that is seen as interesting. This also emerged in 
Richard's feelings about his job; he told me: 
Broadly I feel quite lucky that I do it. I enjoy my job. I look around at a lot of my 
friends and think maybe I enjoy it more than they do their jobs. I mean I like 
coming into work in the morning mostly. So I like that, I like the variety. 
Jenny also colourfully described her love of television work, as set against more 'boring' 
work. 
Yeah this job is finally where I want to be, where I can grow. And [the series 
producer] says, 'Right you want to be a producer how are we going to get you 
there?' It's like yeah baby, yeah baby. That's what I want to hear. .. I want to be 
the best I want to do the best I can. I really ... I've tried all those ... I've worked at 
[x], and secretary things like that, it's not who I want to be, it's not where I want 
to be. 
Sarah expressed similar feelings about her job as a producer/director, one in which the 
sense of doing something 'different' from the norm was a key attraction of her role: 
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I think the upsides are that you do get access to the most amazing people and 
places and stories. The other day I was coming back from the first day of my 
shoot on this project and I was just suddenly struck. .. 1 looked around the tube 
compartment, it sounds really ridiculous, but I thought I bet no-one else in this 
carriage has had as interesting day as I have, because I'd interviewed Douglas 
Hird, Pete Waterman and Jazzie B and you know it was such a weird 
combination ... You know ... to sit and interview for 3 and a half hours Bob 
Geldof and then the next day go and do an interview with Richard Curtis, and 
then go to LA to interview Bono, and all these people who are culturally 
significant people, and you know I've spent significant chunks of time 
interviewing them and getting them to reveal all, and it's very rewarding that sort 
of thing. So what it gives you access to is amazing. 
Equally, James told me that for 'all the frustrations of working in it I've never had 
another job, I mean there must be a lot of jobs, for all the problems of TV it sure beats 
working in most office environments you know?' 
Emotional involvement with the subject matter, and with the process of work, 
also came across as vitally important. As Dave T told me, 'I think one of the reasons that 
we make films is that we are passionate and we are consumed by what we make'. 
Similarly, Jenny told me that 'Where I am working now, I love it so much, and I feel 
really happy, and really really blessed, and it has taken me a really long while to get here'. 
This connects to Hochschild's (1983, 2003) analysis of contemporary work, in which she 
argues that contemporary capitalism is demanding ever greater emotional involvement of 
the worker, with the shift towards service work and a more intense involvement of the 
whole se!fin work. 
Rachel's response to her feelings about her job was telling, in the strong 
ambivalence coming through, between 'enjoying' it, and yet constantly feeling the 
pressure of the insecurity: 
I really really enjoy it. I don't see myself being in it forever, I don't think I could 
face the short contracts, the worry about the next job, forever. I just think I don't 
want that in probably 5 years time. But I do, I like the change, I like meeting new 
people. I can just see that the novelty of meeting new people will wear off, when 
you've done it for the 30th time, and obviously this constant need to prove 
yourself, because it is extremely competitive. I mean I've not worked with 
somebody who's bad at their job yet. I think everybody is brilliant, and how on 
earth people choose between people I don't know. And I think that endless 
competition and change I think will lose its appeal for me. 
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Here, the perceived glamour of media work is key to understanding its appeal, but also in 
understanding why television workers express such ambiguity about working in the 
industry; here work becomes more like consumption, more about lifestyle self-
actualisation, than a traditional career. Jack discussed his reasons for enjoying television 
work in these terms: 
The upsides are ... It's very varied, it's very creative, um you know generally you 
find yourself sharing ... You are very privileged actually to be able to share the 
lives and events that people let you into. Um, you know always meeting new 
people and you know there is, I don't care what people say, there is a certain 
amount of glamour working in television, which is easy to forget when it's what 
you do all the time, but a lot of the time it is fun and you do get a buzz off it. 
Consistently this sense of doing something that is more interesting than other 
jobs is intransigent throughout the data I gathered. The glamorous, autonomous world 
of media work is seen as a space where one can express oneself. As Emma told me, 'I 
am allowed to be me in my work, I can bring my personality to work and it's accepted'. 
Equally, Jenny's comments capture the importance of emotional involvement in creative 
work, despite the challenges: 
DL: How important for your sense of identity is what you do? 
F: Really important. I'm not a media luvvie at all, but I love it when people say 
'Oh what do you do', and I say 'Oh I work in TV, I love it'. And they are like 
'Oh wow!', and you're like 'The hours are shit, the money's rubbish, get out!' 
Yeah iI love it, it's great! I love it. 
5.6 Conclusion 
A picture emerges from this analysis of an industry that is precanous, often 
exploitative, and fuelled by injections of emotional labour, where intense and reflexive 
associations are made between creative media work and freedom, autonomy, glamour 
and self-actualisation. The theoretical framework of individualisation enables us to 
understand the fluidity, or 'liquid' nature of this working environment (Deuze, 2007). 
Yet, a Foucauldian analysis of identity allows us to see how particular forms of selfhood 
are encouraged within this individualised context, which contain both an embrace and a 
rejection of uncertainty. 
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By examining the way that they deal with the insecurity, but use 'creativity' and 
'freedom' as key self-actualising values to negotiate or avoid the tensions of such a 
stressful situation, it is evident that sociologically something unusual is going on here. 
Understanding the subjectivising power of such contemporary discourses is one way of 
making sense of how my interviewees describe their working lives. The 'creativity script' 
(peck, 2005: 749), which cherishes the values of entrepreneurialism, freedom and 
flexibility, has become a pervasive discourse within working life, particularly in the 
cultural industries. This discourse functions to legitimate the workings of neo-liberal 
markets at the level of self-identity. As Peck has argued, 'Discourses of urban creativity 
seek to normalize flexible labour-market conditions, lionizing a class of workers that can 
not only cope with, but positively revel in, this environment of persistent insecurity and 
intense, atomized competition' (2005: 764-5). It is at this level of individualisation that 
the power of the contemporary discourse of meritocracy can be most evidently seen, and 
one can see how such a discourse of 'talent' and 'creativity' becomes a technology of the 
self, engendering an individualised response to structural insecurity. The climate of 
casualisation and freelancing can be seen to operate within a broader cultural milieu 
where these discourses function in a disciplinary sense, so that workers are encouraged 
to embrace this working climate, despite its insecurity and risk, and attendant pains. 
U sing the theoretical framework of subjectivisation and of emotional labour is not to 
suggest that these workers are all ideological dupes, suffering from some form of 'false 
consciousness'. Rather it is to explore how individualisation connects with a particular 
technology of the self, which crystallises in media work, allowing particular forms of 
selfhood to evolve. The emergent subjectivity in television labour is of sociological 
interest in its own right. But when we consider the cultural power of television, then the 
analysis takes on a new urgency; here subjectivity connects to political economy in the 
structuring of the industry, and in the forms and modes of creativity that are allowed 
within it. 
In the next chapter, I shall explore how my respondents negotiate this precarious 
and insecure world that I have described above. As we shall see, they do so through 
networking, and through cultural capital. This has serious implications for diversity, 
inclusion and ultimately for creativity within the industry. 
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Chapter 6. Networks, cultural capital and creative labour in 
the television industry 
In a connexionist world, a natural preoccupation of human beings is the desire to 
connect with others, to make contact, to make connections, so as not to remain isolated. 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 111-12) 
Work in the cultural industries is widely claimed to differ from earlier Fordist 
arrangements. Cultural firms are widely understood as information rich, relatively un-
hierarchical, flexible, with a tendency to cluster, and dependent on networks as sources 
of industry gossip, employment and talent (Lash and Urry, 1994; Pratt, 1998; Scott, 
2005). More specifically, research into working practices in television, and more broadly 
the audio-visual industries, has emphasised the importance of informal networks as a 
means of recruitment (Antcliff et al, 200Sa, 200Sc; Blair and Rainnie, 2000; Ursell, 1997; 
Willis and Dex, 2003). In this way, networks function to overcome information 
asymmetries within the project-based political economy of media production, where the 
absence of familiarity built up over time leads to a reliance on personal 
recommendations through networks. 
There is growing evidence that under the combined pressures of deregulation, 
flexible accumulation and technological transformation, the cultural industries are at the 
forefront of a labour market transformation, characterised by casualisation, risk, 
outsourcing and flexibility. Labour market trends in the British television industry have 
accelerated the shift towards networking practices, as the sector has become highly 
casualised. Here, networking emerges as a key mode of finding work, and sustaining 
one's career (paterson, 200la). Employment has moved decisively away from the more 
regulated framework of public sector employment (predominantly the BBC); what public 
sector employment remains has become increasingly casualised, whilst simultaneously 
there has been a rapid growth in the size of the freelance independent sector workforce 
(Mediatique, 2005). Therefore questions about labour transformations within this 
industry have become more urgent, with the rise of networking as a key phenomenon to 
be studied. 
188 
The culture of networking takes place broadly under conditions of the 'network 
society' (Castells, 1996), as described in the literature review. However, Castell does not 
set out to explore the impact of this shift towards networks on individuals managing 
their careers. A key feature of the transformation that Castells describes is a shift towards 
network structures of employment and recruitment. But how is this interpreted and 
negotiated on the ground? This chapter will explore the hypothesis that a new mode of 
'network sociality' (Wittel, 2001) is at work in the culture industries, drawing on empirical 
data, existing research and analysis. It then examines this claim more specifically in the 
television industry, by drawing on an analysis of the research data. It investigates the role 
that social networks play in the working lives of the research participants, and the 
implications of a network culture upon this sphere of employment, exploring how the 
reliance on networks of contacts 'frees up' the labour market, allowing a greater mobility 
and flexibility for the lucky few, but also creates new forms of exclusion, hierarchy and 
discrimination. 
A significant body of work has been done that has examined the relationship 
between social capital and the extent of one's personal and professional networks 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1996). Within networked, 
flexible firms, high levels of social capital have been seen as key sources of competitive 
advantage (Marti, 2004). Yet, little research has been done on the implications of the turn 
towards networking in terms of opportunity, equality and exclusion, particularly in the 
cultural industries. In a broader economic context, however, research has shown that 
networking operates as a means of closure, reducing competition within informal and 
flexible labour markets (Fevre, 1989). More recently, important questions have been 
raised about the lack of equality in gaining access to audiovisual labour markets, partly as 
a result of networking practices (Holgate and McKay, 2007). Holgate and McKay's 
(2007) work has pointed to exclusion from the industry on the basis of race; meanwhile 
Willis and Dex (2003) have explored the challenges facing mothers returning to 
television production work in the new casualised environment. These findings raise 
important political and cultural questions. While social capital theory has largely been 
discussed in an enthusiastic manner by policy commentators (e.g. Khan and Muir, 2006; 
Leadbeater and Miller, 2004), this chapter will critically evaluate how social capital, when 
utilised through networking practices as a dominant mode of finding work and seeking 
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advancement within the television industry, becomes a mechanism of power, excluding 
actors on the basis of class, race and social status. 
A strong pattern emerges from the data which shows that 'getting on' in the 
television industry as a freelancer is inextricably linked to creating and maintaining a large 
network of contacts, a process which involves a significant amount of work, in terms of 
presenting the self as flexible, enthusiastic and mobile. While networked labour markets 
undoubtedly facilitate greater economic and managerial flexibility in the cultural 
industries (a process that is of course echoed across the economy as a whole, with the 
rise of 'flexible accumulation'), there is, however, a high social cost to pay, as this process 
negates a workplace politics based on equal opportunity, diversity and fairness. 
Moreover, it is evident that because network sociality (as a means of access, recruitment 
and furthering one's career) is by its very nature opaque, with access depending on 
contacts and informal processes, there is a necessity for cultural workers to possess high 
levels of cultural capital in order to enter and succeed in this industry (Bourdieu, 1984, 
1986). 
In this context, the concept of risk (Beck, 1992, 2000) is a useful theoretical tool, 
as networking becomes a vital means of negotiating the precarious nature of cultural 
employment. As Banks et al argue, 'It is suggested that senses of risk are constitutive and 
often pivotal to the whole economic and social basis of cultural entrepreneurship - risk 
being central to choices made not only in business but in the lifeworld more generally' 
(2000: 453). Therefore networking becomes a mandatory practice for subjects who are 
constantly struggling to navigate the 'tightrope' of contemporary labour markets (Beck, 
2000). As Pratt argues, 'The challenge of getting the next job, and for employers to hire, 
relies upon networks' (2005: 4). However, as with their feelings towards insecurity, the 
interviewees present ambivalent feelings towards network sociality. Whilst all concede 
the necessity of networking, some positively embrace it, whereas others begrudgingly 
accept it as a normative practice. For some it is all part of the 'fun' of creative work, 
where business and leisure elide; others see it much more instrumentally as a source of 
potential economic or professional reward. Again, there is a generational gap here, with 
older workers far more likely to view networking as an instrumental practice, than to 
associate affectively with it. Moreover, those that reject it then feel that they are 
somehow 'missing out'. Therefore, this research raises important questions about how 
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network culture is both structural, determining the field of relations within the industry, 
and translated at the subjective, individual level where its meaning alters. 
In contemporary capitalism, networking is a mechanism of power. Behind the 
discourse associated with networking, such as 'flexibility', 'freedom', and 'access', lies a 
process which often excludes social actors on the basis of social capital, which in turn is 
largely determined by social status. Yet networking is not just a structural reality, it is also 
a dominant discourse within the new capitalism, particularly within the cultural 
industries, which functions to legitimate and regulate particular practices and modes of 
thinking about labour market processes. Therefore, a particular set of discursive values 
about networking culture have become internalised by my respondents; networking is a 
potent technology of the self. Here we can see how contemporary capitalism, with its 
focus on flexibility, adaptiveness and networks, needs 'justificatory regimes' to become 
attractive to individual workers (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). 
6.1 Network modalities at work 
According to Castells (1996), we are now living in the 'network society'. While 
his work offers little or no insights into how the transformations he describes might be 
experienced by individuals in the contemporary workplace, his understanding of the macro 
shifts within society provide a crucial context for the changes that I argue have occurred 
in the television industry. The key features of Castells' theory are that the information 
technology revolution coupled with a radical restructuring of capitalism on a global basis 
has brought about a network society which is characterised by a number of key features. 
They are the globalisation of strategic economic activities, the rise of the networked 
organisation, by flexible, unstable and individualised labour, by a new virtual and 
interconnected media culture, and by a material transformation of space and time, 
through the constitution of what Castells' calls 'the space of flows' and 'timeless time' 
which are expressions of the activities of controlling elites (1996: 1). Network society 
theory argues that the topology of the network is the most useful way of understanding 
these transformations, both at the macro global level, and also at the micro level of 
individual identity. Most clearly these transformations can be registered in the following 
areas: communication and information technological advance; the restructuring and 
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globalisation of capitalism; political change; and the emergence of personal identity as a 
key force in a globalised society, with the rise of new forms of identity politics. 
This research is most interested in the changes to labour that Castells argues has 
occurred. Castells asserts that labour has become decentralised, more flexible and 
networked (internally and on a firm-to-firm basis); leading to an empowerment of capital 
over labour, greater global competition, and increased individualisation of working 
relationships (1996: 1-2). The key factor that has facilitated such changes is the rise of a 
new 'networked' form of capitalism, which has seen the extensive use of advances in 
information communication technology (lCT) in order to connect up firms and markets 
globally. This has led to the creation of global financial markets, which operate in real-
time, connected by I CT. 
The worldwide integration of capital has made labour fundamentally 
unpredictable, as local production becomes contingent on the global network 
fluctuations. If the new creed of contemporary capitalism is 'workforce flexibility' 
(experienced by the majority as casualisation, downsizing, and permanent flux) then for 
many it is synonymous with job insecurity (real or perceived). In this context, Castells 
characterises workers as 'nodes' in the network, who are either switched on or switched 
off, depending on how their labour serves the interest of the network. The 
inclusion/ exclusion logic of the network "switches off ... people and territories dubbed 
as irrelevant from the perspective of dominant interests" (Nyiri, 2004: 7). This enforces 
domination: '[dJomination depends ... on the simultaneous capacity of ... elites to 
articulate themselves and disarticulate the masses' (Waterman, 2004: 49). 
Castells' theory is key to the analysis of the participants' working lives, for as he 
argues, 'one of the key features of informational society is the networking logic of its 
basic structure' (Castells, 1996: 21). Thus network effects can be felt at the level of global 
restructuration of capital, and at the individual level of daily labour. Networking is crucial 
to my respondents, who enter insecure labour markets through networks; use networks 
as a vital means of communication (for finding work, promoting themselves via online 
employment websites); and for whom social 'after-hours' networking is central to 
success. Therefore, through networking, demarcations between work and leisure time 
erode. With the ongoing demise of lifelong full-time employment, coupled with a 
192 
process of continuous job seeking, and the management of multiple careers as a reality 
for increasing numbers of people, it is clear that we need a more inclusive understanding 
of work as taking place in a variety of socio-economic circumstances, often connected 
with non-work relationships (parry et ai, 2005: 541). In this context, networking becomes 
the means of navigating risk, for as Deuze writes: 
Working increasingly includes (re-) schooling and training, unlearning 'old' skills 
while adapting to changing technologies and management demands, moving 
from project to project, and navigating one's career through an at times 
bewildering sea of loose affiliations, temporary arrangements, and informal 
networks (Deuze, 2007: 542). 
6.1.1 Networking in the cultural industries 
As vital as Castells' meta-theory of the network society is, it tells us little about 
the specific network culture of the cultural industries. Castells provides us with a guide to 
this new terrain, but more specific evidence is needed to begin to understand the 
network environment within the television industry. Research into the culture industries 
(as well as other knowledge intensive environments) has shown that networking is a 
central mode of interaction in these sectors. It functions as a means of sharing tacit 
knowledge, fostering relationships within flexible working environments, which tend to 
be geographically clustered, and building competitive advantage (cf. Comunian, 2006; 
Grabher, 2004). Cultural industries, particularly those at the high end of the value chain 
in the audio-visual sector, have a strong tendency to be geographically clustered, based in 
urban environments, and are characterised by being made up of dense networks of 
formal and informal economic and social relationships (pratt, 2004a; Scott, 2005). 
Indeed, often cultural industries (particularly new media sectors) are based in the same 
building or block of a town or city (Indergaard, 2004; Pratt, 2002). 
Much of the econorruc literature related to cultural industries and regional 
economic development stresses the importance of networks and co-location in order to 
build a vibrant economy (Coe, 2000, 2001; Gibson, 2003; Kong, 2005; Lange, 2005; 
Scott, 2004; Turok, 2003). Networks therefore play an important economic function, 
providing cultural producers with vital routes to market. For example, in his 
investigation of the new media sector in San Francisco with its dense network of social 
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and economic interactions, Pratt (2002) has shown the importance of material networks 
of collaboration and competition. Similarly, Scott (2005) has demonstrated the centrality 
of networks to the development of Hollywood as a global fIlm production hub. Both 
demonstrate the importance of the network as a means of understanding the human 
geography of culture industries. 
Networks are not only economically important but they also serve a vital social 
function in cultural industries. The network structure in the cultural industries supports 
the exchange of ideas and social interaction that is essential to the development of their 
work. In this sense, networks and networking can be seen as vital to innovation, for as 
Lange says, cultural entrepreneurs 'act in order to build up networks, to arrange 
meetings, and to establish urban laboratories where new products can be tested and 
where experience and knowledge may be shared' (Lange, 2005: 82). They also act as an 
important support infrastructure for freelance, sometimes isolated cultural producers 
(Comunian, 2006). 
6.1.2 Television networks 
Turning to the television industry, research shows a highly dense network culture 
in operation. This can be seen at the macro and the micro level. On a structural level, the 
independent television industry exhibits a network structure, comprising of a large 
number of fIrms which are arranged in dense geographical clusters (in urban locales) 
providing content for a small number of broadcasters. Research suggests that there are 
high levels of movement by individuals between these companies, as work is largely 
contract based and freelance (Antcliff et al, 2005a). Therefore, at the micro level, 
informal and formal networking between individuals emerges as a key mode of 
interaction, providing individuals with the means to fInd work, and companies with a 
method of bringing in flexible, freelance talent and 'know-how' on a project basis. 
Drawing on available industry data, it is possible to see that television production 
takes place in urban clusters (see fIgure 3 below). The industry is still overwhelmingly 
London-based, with the BBC and lTV and the majority of independent production 
companies based there; however, important but small clusters of activity exist in 
Manchester, Cardiff, Leeds, Glasgow, Belfast, Southampton, Birmingham, Bristol and 
194 
Newcastle (Skillset, 2006b). Recent research for Of com shows the concentration of 
economic activity in this sector as being within London (Of com, 200Sa). 
Estimated distribution of all production across the UK 
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Figure 3: Independent television production map. Source: Of com (2005a) 
The research sample echoed this general picture: all but two of the participants 
are based in London, except for one who is based in Manchester, and one who runs a 
company in Wakefield, West Yorkshire. The analysis shows that unless they actually own 
their own company, my respondents all move fluidly from one company to another. As 
the data on their contract lengths in table 1 shows (chapter 5) it is clear that there is a 
high degree of movement between jobs for my participants. In such a highly casualised 
environment, making and maintaining contacts with people in the industry emerged as a 
crucial determinant of success, echoing research conducted by the BFI which showed 
that, in a much larger sample than mine, 72 per cent of respondents had 'maintained 
work contacts' due to uncertainty, and 63 per cent had attempted to work with people 
that they knew (BFI, 1999: 31). Indeed, the BFI data shows that personal contacts are 
the most important way of finding work (ibid.). 
195 
6.2 Fieldwork analysis 
My respondents are deeply immersed in a network culture in their working lives. 
This structural shift is individualised - they make use of the Internet, email, mobile 
phones to keep in touch, they go to clubs, bars and actively network as a means of 
maintaining their careers. In the following analysis, I interpret their mode of social 
interaction as evidence of the turn towards 'network sociality' (Wittel, 2001). Building a 
broad range of contacts in the industry is central to moving up, as opportunities come 
about through a multitude of 'weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973). 
6.2.1 Network sociality in the television industry 
How do I network? Just pop an email, make a call, be charming. Emma 
The concept of network sociality (Wittel, 2001) is useful for this research because it 
IS a form of sociality particularly visible in the cultural industries. Indeed, as Wittel 
argues, 'the rise of a network sociality is especially visible in urban (postJindustrial spaces and 
milieus. It is most visible among the new middle class of culturally educated and media and 
computer-literate people' (ibid.: 53). 'Network sociality' is the term developed by Wittel 
after undertaking ethnographic research in the new media environment in London in the 
late 1990s (the period of the 'dot. com boom') and refers to an emergent mode of social 
interaction under the larger structure of the network society. It draws on the work of 
Lash and Urry (1994), who have analysed patterns of interaction in the cultural 
industries, and is described as the social expression of 'liquid modernity' (Bauman, 2000). 
In network sociality, 'networking' is understood as a key component of economic, 
social and cultural relations, in contrast to the declining traditional sociality of 
community. For if community sociality exhibits characteristics of embeddedness, 
continuity, depth, stability, coherence and belonging, then network sociality is 'lifted out' 
(Giddens, 1984), disembedded, fleeting, non-linear, often superficial, and ephemeral. 
Equally, if community provides individuals a coherent narrative, of the kind that Sennett 
(1998, 2006) argues is disappearing in contemporary working lives, then network sociality 
is informational and intermittent in character: 
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Network sociality consists of fleeting and transient, yet iterative social relations; 
of ephemeral but intense encounters. Narrative sociality often took place in 
bureaucratic organizations. In network sociality the social bond at work is not 
bureaucratic but informational; it is created on a project-by-project basis, by the 
movement of ideas, the establishment of only ever temporary standards and 
protocols, and the creation and protection of proprietary information. Network 
sociality is not characterized by a separation but by a combination of both work 
and play. (Wittel, 2001: 51) 
This ephemeral and instrumental nature to network sociality has also been observed by 
Grabher, who writes, 'in sociality, social relations are less "narrational", that is they are 
less based on mutual experience or a common history but primarily on an exchange of 
knowledge and "catching up'" (Grabher, 2004: 26). 
While network sociality is not a new phenomenon, having been noted by writers 
such as Simmel (1950) in the early twentieth century, what has changed is the way that 
network sociality is now an increasingly dominant mode of interaction in the 'new 
economy', and how the structural changes associated with the rise of the network society 
have led to a massive spread of this new mode of social interaction. As Wittel notes, 'the 
rise of network sociality is not only a far broader and more visible phenomenon than it 
was a few generations ago, it is also new in terms of its formalization and 
institutionalization, and in terms of a commodification of social relationships' (2001: 52-
3). However, it is important to note that network sociality is not universal, but rather is 
highly dependent on factors such as geography, class, education and socio-economic 
status (ibid: 52). Therefore one's ability to network relates to symbolic forms of capital; 
here cultural capital is used in order to improve one's social capital through networking 
practices. 
My respondents are all highly reliant on this mode of interaction as a means of 
operating within their industry, particularly in terms of finding and maintaining work. 
When asked about the importance of networking for their professional practice, they all 
agreed that it was vital. There is a deeply restless quality to these accounts of finding 
work, suggesting the need to constantly be on the move, and be contacting people in the 
network who might be helpful. 
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Jack, a producer/director, described contacts as 'absolutely crucial' when it comes to 
finding work in the industry. He explained that when you finish a job as a television 
freelancer, the 'first thing' you do 'is just start ringing around, emailing people': 
I think literally just keeping up with contacts whether you are working or not 
working is the best way of being thought of when something does come up. 
Equally, Sarah, a successful series producers in her early 30s, described to me her 
experiences of entering and moving up in the industry, where networking and 
confidence were key: 
I was this strangely mature creature at 23 and then as I said in my late 20s I went into 
a bit of a dip, once I started directing and stuff, but at the beginning I was like 
dynamic, very employable, so a lot of it was through force of personality I think ... 1 
was quite good at catalysing on contacts that I'd made because by then I was 
generating my own contacts, but ... I was a good little networker. 
She describes the frantic round of networking that goes into moving up within this 
industry, demonstrating the need to be flexible and fast-paced in order to negotiate 
precarity: 
And I went to see this guy but again I seem to remember that the connection 
was via some friend of my parents ... The company I went to see was [x] and I 
went in for a chat for advice but there was no job. But a couple of months later I 
was getting a bit fed up with this job I was doing ... so I thought I know I'll go 
off to Hong Kong for the hand over in 6 months time, I'll stay with my uncle and 
aunt and I'll see if I can get some sort of work ... So I called up this guy at 
[company x] to say do you know anyone who's doing anything in Hong Kong in 
the next few months and he said 'No but I need a researcher to start next 
Wednesday are you free?' So I just dropped everything because it was a Channel 
4 job ... and again that was only through being in the right place at the right time. 
Jenny also emphasised the importance of networking in her narrative of finding 
work. Contacts and persistence are key, and a sense that each meeting becomes an 
opportunity to network, that help can come from unexpected places: 
DL: How do you go about finding work, what's the process? 
F: Kick bollock scramble. Really, truly. As I said to you previously, it's just a 
case of trial and error, of like trying to speak to people and saying you 
know 'can I have 5 minutes of your time?' 
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In such an environment, great emphasis IS placed on having the 'right' kind of 
personality, and being persistent: 
DL: You just phoned people up? 
F: Literally phoned people up. Some of them were like yeah, yeah, yeah 
whatever. And other ones were like, sort of interested ... But at the same 
time I was making new contacts. So I emailed the producer, and he 
emailed me back and in the end it led to a job. All experience is good 
expenence. 
Rachel, just starting out in the industry at the age of 25, also explained the role that 
networking played in finding work, echoing the BFI's research that shows how the 
majority of work in television comes about through contacts and informal recruitment 
procedures: 
DL: Just thinking about that, how do you tend to find work? 
EW: Well it has been through word of mouth, it's been through different 
directors I've worked with, they've all actually said you know I know so 
and so needs a researcher, and they put you in touch with them. But it is 
such an ad hoc way of doing it, and you think god if what next time they 
don't have anything for anyone, but so far that's how it's worked for me. 
DL: So in terms of the process, it's word of mouth. Is networking quite 
important? 
EW: Well it's essential. It really is. None of the jobs I've got have ever been 
advertised. 
6.2.2 The 'strength of weak ties' 
Clearly, then, networking is a vital way for my interviewees to find work within 
the television industry. But why does networking function as such a persistent mode of 
interaction within this sphere? If the jobs are precarious, then the networks are much 
more durable. Granovetter's (1973) theory about the strength of 'weak ties' is useful in 
exploring this paradox. His theory came about from a puzzling anomaly that he noticed, 
where the overwhelming majority of people he was studying found out about work 
opportunities through loose acquaintances, rather than close friends or family as might 
be expected. Granovetter's argument is that close relationships such as those between 
family members and close friends ('strong ties') do not provide the same diversity of 
knowledge capital as the relationships between acquaintances and business 'contacts' 
(seen as 'weak ties'). Therefore, a person or an organisation is more likely to maintain 
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and build on their position in the field by actively creating contacts with 'weak ties'. As 
Granovetter argues, there is a mathematical logic to this, in that 'whatever is to be 
diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance (i.e., 
path length), when passed through weak ties rather than strong' (1973: 1366). 
Strong ties are based on bonds, forged around community, family, and 
geography, which are close, intersecting, multi-functional ties. Trust is also seen as a key 
distinguishing feature of strong ties (Leonard and Onyx, 2003). Strong ties involve 
'bonding' social capital, as opposed to 'bridging' social capital (putnam, 2000; Woolcock 
and Narayan, 2000). Conversely, weak ties are based on the thin, impersonal trust of 
acquaintances. These are loose networks, which mean a shift from the 'getting by' 
dynamic of 'bonding' social capital to the 'getting ahead' culture that comes out of 
'bridging' social capital. Strong ties occur with friends and family, built up over time, 
with a clear narrative to them. Loose ties are ephemeral and impersonal, and emerge for 
mutually beneficial reasons. 
While one might assume that an individual would find out about a job through a 
strong personal tie (on the basis that such a person would be more motivated to help 
someone with whom they shared a close tie), in fact Granovetter discovered that 
individuals were far more likely to find out about a job through someone with whom 
they share a weak tie. The reason for this is because those to whom we are weakly tied 
are likely to move in different social circles and therefore have access to a greater 
diversity of information (Granovetter, 1973: 1371). Indeed in Granovetter's study, 
people sometimes even received job information from people who they had actually 
forgotten existed (ibid.: 1372). From this research, Granovetter shows how weak ties 
provide individuals with informational advantages within job markets; this is because 
they connect distant 'nodes' in the network, and are thus highly efficient as a means of 
overcoming information asymmetries that occur within networks (Burt, 1995). 
How can we relate this to the television industry? As previously argued, 
broadcasting is now a highly fluid and transient industry, therefore making it difficult for 
people to build up lasting, strong ties. As Anita puts it, television is made up of atomised 
individuals, so that although it 'seems like a social industry, [it is] ... actually quite isolated 
and isolating'. Her perception of the industry is that 'people are separated off into their 
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cliques. People move in and out of jobs so regularly there is very little sense of sort of 
team, or kind of continuity'. Therefore, in the factual television industry, weak ties 
function as a way for participants in a particular labour market to keep each other 
informed of what is going on, and act as a durable mechanism for individuals to 
negotiate a casualised labour market. For example, Louise, a series producer who has 
worked for a number of 'super-indies', emphasised how important networking is for her: 
Networking is hugely important. The one thing that has made a difference to my life 
in the last couple of years is just having spent more time as a freelancer and worked 
in more places I now have more contacts. 
Equally, Anita pointed to the significance of having a wide number of contacts in terms 
of finding work. Here we can see how it is vital to have access to a wide network of 
acquaintances, and the number of contacts that one has is instrumental in one's ability to 
find sustainable work: 
I think it helps if you've got friends who are in good positions, and I think it helps if 
you know a certain number of people, and I think that there are a lot of deals that are 
done that are to do with socialising ... And to do with knowing people I think. A lot 
of work comes through that way. 
6.2.3 Networking and exclusion 
Current pathways are opaque and there is an over-reliance on graduate entry in some 
sectors. What I term the 'work experience, work for nothing' model also militates 
against those from more diverse backgrounds. All this, at a time when employers in 
these industries are crying out for a broader talent pool from which to recruit. 
(Creative and Cultural Skills, 2006) 
The position from which one enters into networking, and one's access to 'weak 
ties' within the industry, is, however, far from equaL This is a highly opaque industry to 
enter, where recruitment is largely done via word-of-mouth, and through personal 
recommendations. This is similar to trends that have been noted within the flim industry, 
where 'the majority of those working in the flim industry, as well as those attempting to 
gain access to it, hear of and secure work through a variety of types of personal contact 
who perform functions such as providing recommendations' (Blair, 2001:152). In the 
film industry, advertising for positions is rare (Skillset, 1996: 45) and curriculum vitae are 
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very rarely used (Langham, 1996). This is a relatively unexplored, yet pertinent issue 
within the cultural industries, for as Oakley points out: 
In many years of interviewing creative industry workers, the notion that these sectors 
remain the preserve of a well-educated elite is always greeted with protestations of 
horror and evident discomfort. But it is perhaps the very unconscious nature of these 
barriers which makes them most difficult to surmount. (2006: 265) 
My analysis shows that access to television industry networks emerges as crucial 
for finding work. Simon explains how 'word of mouth is very important and who you 
know is very important'. As such he told me, 'that's really how I've always found my 
work, through who I've known and my name's been passed on to other people'. 
This means that access to these networks and informal routes of recruitment is 
vital in order to get on. However, this access is often restricted, and often based on levels 
of 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu and Johnson, 1993). The networking culture, whilst 
seemingly open and accessible, actually negates diversity, by privileging those with good 
contacts and social status. Moreover, the fact that entry to the industry is often unpaid 
means that individuals from less privileged socio-economic backgrounds find it very 
difficult to survive. The industry was seen as highly middle-class by my interviewees: 
Emma: For god's sake, it's middle class people ... It's people who can afford to get 
into telly, who can afford to support themselves while they are doing work 
experience to get the experience you need to get a paid job ... So unless you've got 
the economic wherewithal, a credit card you don't mind maxing out, blind faith in 
yourself to actually the point of ridiculousness, then going through that process of 
being a runner a researcher and an AP, getting on the ladder, you have to have a 
confidence in your ability to survive on not very much money. 
Social position (and race) was also linked to success in television: 
Simon: Yes if I think about it everyone does talk the Queen's English. You don't get 
many 'geezers', you don't get many black people. And I think it's maybe a socio-
economic thing. 
This echoes research done by Skillset (2005b) which shows that 38 per cent of audio-
visual workers had done unpaid work during their careers; and 70 per cent got their first 
job informal routes such as via contacts. Moreover, research by Blair on a specific fllm 
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industry production shows that 56 per cent of the crew entered the industry through 
either friends or family (2001: 159). 
6.2.4 Translating cultural capital into social capital 
If networking is the new paradigm for finding work and maintaining a career in the 
new cultural economy, then a critical question arises: who has the skills to get on in this 
'club culture' and who does not? Here we need to understand how 'cultural capital', by 
dint of education, class, geography, can be translated into social capital in terms of 
helping individuals enter the industry and move on up the career ladder. Identified by 
Bourdieu (1986), cultural capital relates to modes of knowledge, taste and education 
which provide social advantages to an individual giving them a higher status in society. 
Such forms of capital enable society to reproduce itself along class lines; for example 
parents will provide children with cultural capital, the knowledge that makes the 
educational and social system a place in which they can easily succeed. These cultural 
attributes can then be translated into social capital, which can be seen as resources based 
on group membership, relationships, networks of influence and support. Bourdieu 
defines social capital as 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition' (ibid: 248). While social capital is the vital 
ingredient in terms of negotiating the precarious nature of freelance labour market in the 
independent television industry, cultural capital acts as the means by which an individual 
amasses this social capital, and gains the resources of the network. 
Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital is closely linked to the concept of field. A field 
can be any structure of social relations (King, 2005: 223). It is a site of struggle for 
positions within a field and is constituted by conflict which is created when individuals 
or groups attempt to establish what defines legitimate and valued capital within it. For 
Bourdieu, fields are determined by conflict, and by a desire to get to the top of any given 
field (to dominate it, and thus determine the rules which govern the field). Cultural 
capital is a vital tool used as a mode of symbolic domination. Therefore, following 
Bourdieu, we could argue that individuals within the television industry make use of 
cultural and social capital to rise up within the field. Because of the lack of transparency 
in recruitment procedures and in terms of entering the labour market, modes of capital 
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that are largely determined by class and status within society playa powerful role, as their 
influence is largely unregulated. 
Therefore, a defIning factor for success in the network society is a high degree of 
cultural capital to facilitate access to the network and to provide an individual with the 
communicative and cognitive skills to succeed in this environment. Cultural capital 
encompasses such seemingly 'natural' things as taste, style and confIdence. Bourdieu 
(1984) shows us that such traits are not 'natural' at all, but are socially constructed, the 
product of education, class and social position. They are the symbolic means by which 
society reproduces itself. As Bourdieu argues, 'art and cultural consumption are 
predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfIl a social function of legitimating 
social difference' (ibid.: 7). Cultural capital plays a vital role in determining the economic 
and social success of the cultural producer, for the acquisition of forms of cultural capital 
is often undertaken in the expectation of the improvement of status or life chances 
(McRobbie, 2005: 145). 
Thus social class, and forms of cultural capital (which are unmeasurable through 
equal opportunity criteria such as qualifIcations) thus re-enter the frame of cultural 
production. Although small, my sample suggests that cultural capital plays an important 
role in regulating access to television industry networks. Cultural capital is notoriously 
diffIcult to assess. However, I have focused on key factors which are well-established 
indicators: education, self-perception of social class background, and access to television 
industry networks through family or friends at the start of a career. For the purposes of 
this research, I have not looked at their cultural tastes, as Bourdieu does in Distinction 
(1984). However, I was interested in levels of confidence to access networks, which I 
believe to be key to success in this environment. This draws on research done by Oakley 
and Erskine (2004) which showed that the 'right' personality attributes such as 
confIdence were key to entering cultural industry networks. 
The qualitative data from the interviews provides useful insights into personal 
predispositions towards networking which can be seen as part of the cultural capital 
which an individual brings to this job market. This analysis shows that out of my sample, 
all but two considered themselves to be 'middle-class', and all but one had been educated 
to degree level. Of those degree educated individuals, all of those under thirty at the time 
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of the interview had entered the industry through work experience, often gained through 
family contacts. Commenting on his experience of not having a degree within the 
industry, Jonathan told me: 
DL: Is it quite unusual to get in without a university degree? 
I<J3: I think it is. I never like to say it is, because it always makes me feel like 
I'm going 'Hey I'm the only one in here without a degree guys!' But it is. 
Especially at the Beeb. At the Beeb everyone's been to university, lots to 
Oxbridge ... 
What emerges strongly from my sample, is that class, cultural capital, and social position 
appears to matters as a means of accessing the networks of television. The result of this 
is a marked inequality of access. 
Cultural capital provides my respondents with opportunities to enter the television 
labour market. It also provides them with the innate confidence and social skills to 
navigate this precarious world. My research indicates that exclusion is also stratified 
along the lines of personal attributes, where the ability to network (and therefore get on 
within the industry) is based on specific social skills. The research shows that certain 
social attributes (associated to high levels of cultural capital) were seen as important to 
have in order to get on. For example, a number of my respondents pointed to the 
centrality of 'getting on' with people in this industry. Jack emphasised the personal 
attributes he thought were important to succeed in the field 
DL: Are there skills that you need ... Not necessarily to be good at working in 
TV, but to find work and to be able to network? 
NP: I think the most important thing is to be able to get on with people, and 
for people to you know, you can't afford to have any kind of attitude, you 
need to be amenable, you know, flexible, willing, enthusiastic... So in 
terms of getting repeat work, if people find you easy to work with and 
enjoy working with you they will work with you again. 
Simon pointed to the importance of softer, personal skills as a prerequisite for getting 
on: 
You've got to be nice, you've got to easy to work with. Nobody wants to work 
with an arsehole. Although you can be an arsehole if you are higher up the scale. 
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Paul also noted the need to 'have the right tone' as an important attribute in the industry, 
raising questions about who makes the judgement about what the 'right' tone might be: 
I think the one that I always hear discussed the most is you know really the ability to 
be a good communicator. You know it is a communicator's industry, it is a media 
industry, you know if someone comes in to work for us, especially at a junior level, if 
they can't pick up the phone and make phone calis, and compose letters and emails, 
and really communicate and express themselves with decorum effectively, with the 
tone required, that can be a real problem, and vice versa if they are very able and very 
eloquent, and able to express themselves, that can be really helpful. 
Such communicative abilities, and intangible assets such as having the 'right tone' are 
increasingly culturally embedded. They are not only acquired indirectly through academic 
qualifications, as traditional cultural capital theory would have it, but 'also as a direct 
consequence of patterns of middle-class socialization and life-styles, where the 
cultivation of interests and investments in leisure, hobby pursuits, and patterns of 
personal interaction serve to embellish a "privileged" education' (Brown and Scase, 1994: 
29). 
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on a particular type of communicative ability 
predicated on successfully operating within networks (and extending networks), is 
connected to Boltanski and Chiapello's ideal type 'networker' or 'network-extender' who 
forges profitable network links in late capitalism (2005: 355). Such an individual is 
'mobile, streamlined, possessed of the art of establishing and maintaining numerous, 
diverse, enriching connections, and of the ability to extend networks' (ibid). Successful 
networkers are autonomous and entrepreneurial. Above ali, they must be confident, for 
'They regard everyone as contactable, and any contact as possible and natural' (ibid.: 
113). 
These communicative skills are vital for success in the networked cultural industries. 
Self-presentation, the ability to read situations are vital. Such skills emerge from one's 
cultural capital, which being largely socially determined means there is a narrowing of 
who can participate. Describing her research with a group of 'cultural entrepreneurs' at 
the Institute for Contemporary Art (lCA) in central London, Oakley notes that for these 
successful networkers: 
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The notion that having the confidence to go to the lCA and introduce yourself to 
strangers, albeit ones who are open to such introductions and having to do the same 
themselves, is not a characteristic that is equally distributed in the population, was seen 
largelY as a personal failing, if it was seen at all. (2006: 266, my italics) 
This connects with Sarah's baffled reaction to the success of some older established 
individuals in the television industry with perceived 'social failings': 
Yeah you do meet [television producers], fewer now, but slightly more in the older 
generation ... who you think are so diffident and sort of odd, and how on earth could 
they ever do the researcher/ AP jobs? 
This is the neglected downside of the 'network society'. Networked labour markets 
have a tendency to be opaque. The networked economy becomes increasingly 
discriminatory in terms of who has access and who doesn't, while hard-fought battles 
over workers' rights and anti-discrimination laws are sidelined. Social reproduction on 
the basis of cultural capital is accentuated in contemporary media production as a result 
of the connexionist economy, where mobility acts as a form of competitive advantage. 
This mobility, and the ability to network, appears to emerge from high levels of cultural 
capital. 
6.2.5 Class and diversity 
This focus on cultural capital raises some uncomfortable questions about the social 
make-up of the labour market in the television industry. If there is a high value placed on 
cultural capital, then what issues does this raise for diversity? The research shows that 
class and socio-economic position are major employment barriers in the broadcasting 
industry (and broader cultural industries). Whilst there is no evidence from my research 
that blatant discrimination on the grounds of class, gender or race operates within the 
industry, there is certainly evidence of closed networks which are often nepotistic and 
exclude outsiders. Obviously, this impacts on those from less powerful social positions. 
Also the fact that it is largely an imperative to work for nothing in order to enter the 
industry means that individuals who come from poorer, working-class backgrounds 
often just cannot afford to get into the industry. Finally there is a cultural expectation 
factor at play - often working in 'the media' is perceived as a middle-class white pursuit. 
Whilst this is something that I have not been able to follow up in this research, certainly 
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this was something that came up on occasion in the interviews, and has been explored in 
more detail elsewhere (Holgate and McKay, 2007). 
My research concurs that there are significant barriers to entry to these highly closed-
off labour markets. A key factor is that there is a strong reliance on a network of 
contacts and friends in terms of finding out about work in the first place. Sarah describes 
the vital role that familial contacts can offer to those in the industry, describing how 
being at a family party helped launch her career: 
And the reason I was at this party, again it was one of those things where my 
mum who as I said had no connection with anyone in TV industry said I'm going 
to this party that a colleague's having and his boyfriend works at Planet 24 and 
you better come ... Sure enough I go to this party begrudgingly with my mum 
and dad and there was this guy there who you know we didn't talk about TV 
particularly but somehow that was enough to mean that when my mum bumped 
into someone at work a couple of days later he said 'Oh that guy's looking for 
researchers' ... My experience, even though I didn't have parents who were in the 
media, was that just having that sort of middle-class network works as a huge 
advantage because if you're a kid in Wolverhampton from a council estate you 
just don't have access to those sort of connections, so there's no doubt that that 
is very significant. 
Moreover, as Andrew's comments show, often the television industry networks are 
small, and difficult to gain access to: 
DL: Do you fmd that the word of mouth side of finding work, does that 
make it problematic for some people to find work? 
Andrew: I think for new people definitely. I know when I started I got my 
first job through a friend of a friend ... but then after that someone from 
[programme x] suggested me for a job, and then they suggested me for 
another job and then the commissioning editor for Channel 4 who I'd 
met suggested me for another job. Do you know what I mean? It kept on 
happening like that. So it kind of became self-fulfilling. 
Equally, Rachel, at an early stage in her career, described the lack of transparency in 
television recruitment, where jobs are never advertised, and word of mouth rules: 
DL: What's the recruitment process like in television? 
EW: Well it's a joke really. I mean you just never see jobs advertised, which 
again is very, very daunting, you just think God if I haven't got a list of 
contacts, which of course you don't have when you are starting out, how 
on earth will you get follow-on jobs? Because they are just not advertised. 
And that is difficult. And coming up the end of a contract you know that 
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it's that way, because you can't do a standard application process, it's a 
matter of talking to people. But also in a way it's not cliquey in that jobs 
are only going to friends, it's just that jobs aren't advertised, and people 
do everything through word of mouth. 
Lindsey also reflected on the exclusionary nature of networking, pointing out that 
you need to do it more when you are at the start of your career, but that at this stage you 
lack the necessary contacts: 
It's [networking] one of these things that you need to do more when you're 
further down the career ladder, but it's more difficult to do then, because you're 
younger and you don't have as much in common with the people that you're 
trying to network with and you don't get invited to the same industry bashes as 
you do when you're a bit more experienced and all that kind of thing. 
Other research has indicated that the broadcasting industry is still highly 
homogenous in terms of being largely white and middle-class. Recent research on 
diversity in the audio-visual industries has shown a lack of diversity in the labour market 
(Ursell, 1997; Campion, 2005; Holgate and McKay, 2007). For example, Holgate and 
McKay (2007) have explored the barriers to the black and minority ethnic (BME) 
population in entering these highly competitive industries. Their research shows that the 
closed incestuous world of recruitment practices in this sector of the economy act as 
significant barriers to entry for BME audio-visual workers, and for them to move up the 
career ladder. 
The findings of these much larger studies are reflected in the personal testimony 
within my findings. For example, Holgate and McKay's (2007) study shows that a lack of 
aspiration amongst ethnic minorities to work in the media industries is a key issue. 
Simon, a black producer/director, has personally experienced the impact of these 
cultural expections very keenly: 
Simon: As far as race, I don't know many black producer/directors. I don't know 
if that's an issue of racism, but it's certainly true that this is a very white 
industry ... there just aren't many black people in the industry. 
DL: Is that partly a cultural factor within BME communities - television isn't 
something that is aspired to? 
EO: Yes. Or they wouldn't think about going into it. Especially they wouldn't 
even know about it ... Unless you are brought up in a very middle-class family you 
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wouldn't know about current affairs television or something like that. It's just not 
something that you'd do. I've seen a couple of other black producers, there is a 
black reporter, but he tends to do things on adoption ... There was another black 
producer who sadly tended to be employed on things to do with race and started 
off on Black Britain ... It's interesting, it is a very white industry. 
Class also emerged as a barrier to entry for those at a lower socio-economic position, 
particularly because of the 'working for nothing' culture. Anita felt that the prerequisite 
for capital to enter the industry means that 'unless you come from a background where 
you can have a certain amount of support, it's almost impossible'. For Jack, equally, the 
cost of entering television as an unpaid intern discriminates against people from poorer 
backgrounds, it discriminates probably against ethnic minorities as well, especially if you 
are trying to get into the industry in London'. As he says, 'you cannot live in London on 
£250 a week on a basic minimum wage, or work for nothing'. Louise also pointed to the 
lack of diversity in the industry, which she put down to the exclusions caused by class, 
nepotism, lack of capital and transparency: 
The way that it [recruitment] seems to happen at the moment is oftentimes just 
through nepotism. And I know that some people will build little empires and just 
surround themselves with their mates. It's not necessarily good for the 
programmes and it's not necessarily very good for the industry. And it prevents 
other people who might be better at that job from getting ahead. 
6.2.6 Mobility and stasis 
A picture emerges from the research of an industry that is difficult to gain access 
to, where access is often predicated on social and cultural capital, where opaque 
networks function as the dominant means of finding work and progressing within the 
industry. However, as suggested earlier, some ambiguities also emerged from the 
interview data. A number of my participants denied the importance of the networks, and 
indeed denied that it was an industry structured by anything less than sheer merit and 
talent. Anita said she thought there was 'a big difference between getting work through 
contacts, because they've noticed your work and they think you are good, and going and 
hanging around at parties and harassing people ... ' She dismissed the idea of networking 
creating inequality, saying, 'I don't know I think the whole thing about networking and 
is it leaving single mothers out and things like that ... I don't think that's really relevant, 
because I think that if you do good work, and you make a bit of an effort to try to get it 
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seen as well, I think you'll be fine'. Similarly, Simon, whilst acknowledging the 
importance of networking, still argued that 'you have to be good'. 
Nevertheless, both also told me that class and race was an issue. Of course, one 
could interpret their inability to see such inequities as evidence of 'false consciousness' 
(Engels, 1893), and undoubtably the powerful ideology of meritocracy in operation in 
the industry would provide a justification for such beliefs. Obviously, it is true that you 
do have to be talented to make it within the industry, for as Emma told me, you 
wouldn't get far in such an exposed industry if you were purely reliant on nepotism: 
I mean the job I'm working on at the moment I had to give 3 references, and 
also somebody on the team already knew me and I had 2 interviews, that's to get 
this job, so ultimately unless you're the sort of person who has got a job because 
you're somebody's nephew, and you stay at that one company and you don't 
mind not being promoted, if you're going to move around ultimately peope will 
talk about you. 
However, despite this, it appears that another dynamic is in evidence here, which relates 
to the issue of mobility, and its converse state, fixity. The participants who seemed most 
oblivious to the potential inequities of the network culture were also those who were 
doing best out of it. Anita has made it to Executive Producer at the young age of 32; 
Sarah is a series producer; Simon is highly successful as a current affairs 
producer/ director. These are examples of success. They are also highly mobile, able to 
easily move from company to company, in demand, with strong networks. Moreover, 
they were able to identify important nodes within the network, who would give them 
access to knowledge and contacts. For example, Sarah told me how she had established a 
'mentor' figure senior to her in the industry. As Boltanski and Chiapello suggest, 
successful networkers such as Sarah 'know how to locate sources of information' (2005: 
113). 
This mobility is of course in stark opposition to other less mobile figures in the 
industry (not to mention the immobile state of much of the population's socially 
excluded). In some ways, indeed, the rhetoric of the independent television industry is 
founded on such a distinction between entrepreneurial mobility versus bureaucratic 
fixity. This can be seen in Jonathan's rather dismissive attitude towards BBC staff 
workers: 
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There is such a weird difference between people who are staff at the BBC. In 
production a staff AP had to serve as an AP... When I was in DMCF 
[Documentaries and Contemporary Factualt8 they were going through lots of 
redundancies and everybody was going, and the feeling of the place was so 
depressed ... I'm like 'hang on a minute, I've been brought in for 6 months, that's 
my job, at the end of that I'm off and I'll go somewhere else'. I love that. I love 
the freedom to go where you want. They don't owe me anything, and I don't owe 
them anything. But they have got some way indebted to the BBC and feel that 
the BBC owes them. They don't understand the whole freelance world. I mean 
we're looking for jobs all the time. They're sitting there in master classes on how 
to cope in the outside world ... Things like how to do an interview and stuff. You 
can't believe it, they're so miserable about it ... They don't want to have to 
compete with people like me, and why would you? 
Here, having a mobile adaptable self is key to success, for as Boltanski argues, 'to adjust 
to a connexionist world, people must prove sufficiently malleable to pass through 
different universes while changing properties' (2005: 461). 
Yet it is also true that in the flexible, reticular, project-based environment of the 
independent television labour market, those who do not make it are, of course, invisible 
to the successful. Thus the excluded disappear. As Boltanski and Chiapello note: 'in a 
world so constructed as to be entirely subject to a network logic, there is no reason to 
pose the question of justice, because those of low status... tend to disappear without 
trace.' (2005: 106). For example, Sarah told me: 
DL: Do some people get left out and if so who? 
Sarah: Well I don't know if I would ever come into contact with them because 
they probably have already fallen by the wayside ... Yeah I think that they are 
probably the people who end up dropping out and I never hear ... 
In such a way, the network culture obscures social injustice and inequality is reduced to a 
mere abstraction. 
6.2.7 The obligation to be free: networking as a discursive regime 
48 DCMF was part of Specialist Factual at the BBC, which was part of the broader Factual and 
Learning department. This has since been rearranged. 
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Discourses. .. deeply permeate what is allowed as legitimate knowledge in 
particular domains of social life, and rigidly exclude other possibilities and other 
perspectives on those domains. (Deacon, 1999: 147) 
In order to understand the ambiguities of this networking culture, where networking 
plays a crucial role in the careers of my participants, yet is downplayed in significance -
indeed where the very notion of networking appears to discomfort some of them - it is 
important to understand the discursive power of networking at the subjective level. 
Throughout the findings of my research, a strong sense emerges from the data that the 
culture of networking is an activity that you cannot opt out of. As illustrated in the last 
chapter, Sarah embraced the risk of entrepreneurial networking after several years of job 
security at one company as a staff producer. For her, fixity was interpreted as personal 
failure: 
Eventually I had to leave to give myself a bit of a kick up the arse and I did and 
then improved things enormously. 
Similarly, Louise deliberately made a choice to embrace the insecurity and risk of the 
freelance world, leaving in the process a secure job at the BBe. Discussing this, she said: 
L: That's the other thing, it's really difficult to get promotion across by staying in 
the same company. It's usually by moving outside and moving sideways into 
another job that you get it ... 
D: So is there a sense that you've got to be quite risk-taking to move up? 
L: You've got to leave and at some point you've got to decide that you're not 
going to take any more researcher jobs because you really want to be an AP. 
Emma also told me that 'networking becomes a way of life, something that you have to 
do in order to survive in this industry'. 
Yet for Emma the pressure to network jarred with the practical difficulties of actually 
doing so. First the pressures of her job made it difficult: 
You get to this stage at the end of every job where you're facing unemployment 
again. So you bang out emails to people you know, fix up interviews for jobs. 
This inevitably happens at the end of a job, when you're flat out in the edit, 
working all hours. It's a nightmare. 
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Secondly, there are the competing demands of work and home-life that she faces as a 
young mother: 
I really struggle to be a director and a mother. We have child-care, and luckily my 
husband's hours are less crazy than mine. But it gets me down, I feel I'm missing 
a lot. Then I'm supposed to be out there schmoozing at parties on top of all of 
that? 
Here we can see how successful networking places demands on individuals outside 
of the formal contracted time of the workplace. Whilst crucial to success, it entails a 
lifestyle that is only compatible with youth and health (McRobbie, 2002a). When asked 
what might happen to someone who opted out of the after-work networking culture in 
the pub or bar, Jonathan's response was telling: 
She then has to make up for it in the office. The people who don't come for the 
drinks after work and stuff. Like jobs I've been on we've had 'beer 0 clock 
Friday', five 0 clock, everyone knocks off and goes for a drink with work, and 
there will always be people who can't, maybe someone who has always got plans 
on Friday, maybe they have got a family to get back to, but then they have to be 
a massive character in the office to claw some of that back, what they're missing 
out on. And if ... you're not coming to those after-work drinks and you're quiet 
in the office you'll get left behind definitely. 
Louise also raised an crucial point about the cost of the networked labour market. Whilst 
she feels that she is now in a position where she would like to have children, she worries 
about the potential cost to her career and economic wellbeing: 
[T]he one big thing for me is that I think it's really difficult as a woman to see 
how you could reconcile having a family with working in TV because the hours 
are long and as a freelancer especially you are expected to be utterly dedicated to 
your job, so you get taken on for a 2 month contract and they expect 110 per 
cent every single day of those 2 months. 
How can we understand this process, where my respondents readily acknowledge the 
negative aspects of this networking culture, yet still feel compelled to be a part of it, even 
rejecting job security in the process? It seems that my respondents are 'obliged to be 
free' (Rose, 1999: 87), even when they might be fearful of the precarious nature of the 
'freedom' that awaits them. For example, as Louise says, when asked about how she feels 
about the insecurity, and whether she had got used to it: 
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No absolutely not, it still can be a source of huge stress and fear to me, and I 
sometimes think what am I doing with my life and why don't I just try to get a 
nice job in a company somewhere where life will be less stressful, and I just don't 
know. 
An understanding of the importance of the governmentalising power of the discourse of 
networking is crucial to understanding this contradictory process, whereby individuals 
embrace a particular entrepreneurial risk culture, which involves endless networking, 
whilst simultaneously being terrified by it. 
In examining the discourse of the 'network' it is possible to see how it fulflls a 
regulatory role in society. With the rise of the 'network society', a powerful discourse 
around the idea of networking and networks has emerged. The discourse of the network 
is now ubiquitous, as commentators on issues as diverse as social interaction (\Xlittel, 
2001), the 'new economy' (Kelly, 1998; Reich, 2001), and politics (McCarthy et al, 2004), 
amongst others, point to the network as the emergent key topology for understanding 
new forms of organising and communicating within society. Individuals, business 
managers, and even states, are encouraged to 'surf the wave of the networked future, or 
risk falling behind and failing (Leadbeater and Oakley, 2001; Mulgan, 2004). The concept 
of the 'network' and networking is highly prevalent within management theory, most 
closely associated with 'new managerialism' gurus such as Kanter (1995, 2000, 2001). 
Here, networking is valorized as part of the heady rhetoric of the 'new economy', 
presented as exciting, creative, chaotic and as representing multiple opportunities for 
economic and social success. 
In their analysis of the role that managerial discourse plays within contemporary 
capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) argue that capitalism necessarily embraces 
values outside of itself, in order to produce 'justificatory regimes' that appeal to society, 
even appropriating elements of capitalist critique in this process. When considering how 
networking has been valorized within new managerialism literature, one can see how 
certain counter-cultural values that rejected the conformist homogeneity of Fordist mass 
production (and labour) are embedded within the ideas being presented, such as the 
focus on creativity, collaboration, constant change and self-actualisation. 
Considering the rise of networking as a powerful discourse within contemporary 
capitalism, it is evident that networking is promoted as a form of 'inspirational' 
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organisation, a 'project-oriented' regime whose, 'state of greatness includes adaptability, 
flexibility, sincerity in face-to-face interaction, capacity to generate enthusiasm, its format 
of investment is readiness to sacrifice one's private life and longterm plans for the 
company, its paradigmatic test is ability to move from project to project' (Fairclough, 
unpublished paper). This represents an ideal archetype for my respondents, who have to 
juggle numerous projects, be endlessly flexible, and for whom the right form of self-
presentation is vital. Therefore networking (and its associated activity of 
entrepreneurialism) is not only a structural necessity within the television labour market, 
but also a cultural value, something to be aspired to. 
This discourse, when considered at the level of the individual, is part of a wider 
discourse of 'freedom' within contemporary society (in this case the freedom to embrace 
risk), in which we see the valorisation of a particular type of idealised entrepreneurial 
self, the self-choosing, self-actualising, autonomous individual. As Rose argues, we now 
live in a 'regime of the self where competent personhood is thought to depend upon the 
continual exercise of freedom, and where one is encouraged to understand one's life, 
actually or potentially, not in terms of fate or social status, but in terms of one's success 
or failure acquiring the skills and making the choices to actualise oneself' (1999: 87). As 
such, the choice made by my respondents to embrace the precarity of the network can 
be seen as a means by which particular choices are closely aligned to the interests of 
wider power structures, politically and economically. 
6.3 Conclusion 
The research above shows that the rise of a network culture, on a macro global 
level, has intense ramifications at the local micro level. Whilst much of the management 
and policy discourse around networks is often technologically deterministic and 
celebratory, in fact network culture translated on the ground in this specific culture 
industry has a number of sociological consequences, some of which are deeply worrying. 
We need to be attentive to the power dynamics inherent within networks, in a world that 
remains hierarchical and divided. 
The rise of network forms of organising social life is bound up with new forms 
of inequality and controL Flexibility and mobility for the few means fixity and inequality 
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for the majority. The configuration of the network as a means of organising social and 
economic life is deeply linked to the wider shift in neoliberal capitalism towards jlexibilz!J. 
As Castells points out: 
[T]he information technology paradigm is based onjlexibiliry. Not only processes 
are reversible, but organizations and institutions can be modified, and even 
fundamentally altered, by rearranging their components. What is distinctive to 
the configuration of the new technological paradigm is its ability to reconfigure, a 
decisive feature in a society characterized by constant change and organizational 
fluidity. (1996: 71) 
Therefore the wider shift towards flexible specialisation in firms is accelerated through 
the move towards networks. Flexibility at the level of the organisation is closely 
associated with economic advantage and the need for adaptivity in a highly competitive 
global market. Indeed, managerial discourse celebrates 'Change as a condition of 
existence' within a transformed mode of accelerated capitalism (K.anter, 2001: 255). 
Meanwhile, at the level of the individual, flexibility is part of a wider discourse 
that emphasises creativity, self-actualisation, freedom and personal responsibility. 
However, flexible specialisation is also synonymous with mechanisms of control and 
power, allowing as it does particularly ruthless forms of cost-cutting, downsizing, job 
insecurity and the rise of non-typical employment arrangements such as part-time 
working and contract work. 
It is this potential for social control that has been largely ignored by the first wave of 
network theorists and cyber-libertarians (e.g. Rheingold, 2000) . Yet, increasingly there is 
evidence that networks have a number of negative social attributes, as well as positive. 
For example, it is widely assumed that networks are open, democratic and transparent, 
but in fact networks are by their very nature exclusionary, for in order to have a network, 
you have to leave people out. Indeed, Mulgan has noted the power dynamics inherent in 
networks: 'Networks are created not just to communicate, but also to gain position, to 
outcommunicate' (1991: 21). 
In this chapter we see how networking as a practice has a number of consequences 
for the independent television industry. Firstly, we can see how networking potentially 
negates cultural diversity. In order to be able to network successfully an individual has to 
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have particular personal attributes, which one could argue are related to high levels of 
cultural capital. Thus, a network culture within this industry works to reinforce lack of 
diversity at a structural level, because as Bourdieu has shown, cultural capital is the 
means by which society reproduces itself along hierarchical lines. This finding is crucial, 
because it would suggest that networking practices mitigate against cultural diversity. The 
question of diversity is crucial within the cultural industries because the culture industries 
are the means by which a society communicates to itself. Lack of diversity at the level of 
production means that inevitably certain views, positions and values fail to be 
represented. The network culture would appear to reinforce a lack of diversity through 
its potentially exclusionary mechanisms. 
Secondly, it is clear that network society at the macro-level (Castells, 1996; Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005) produces a new mode of network sociality within this industry. This 
produces intense yet ephemeral social interactions, and breaks down the distinction 
between the business sphere and the personal. As Grabher writes: 
Networking, in fact, signifies the emblematic mantra of project ecologies ... 
Personal networks symptomatically efface the distinction between private and 
business ... , between the communicative logic in the 'life world' and the strategic 
rationality in the 'systems world'. (2004: 6) 
Network culture in fact intensifies work, and produces a lack of loyalty to the firm, as 
individuals must first and foremost think of their own career within this insecure 
environment. 
Thirdly, the constant focus from my respondents on networking as a practice also 
emphasises how it has become a powerful regulatory discourse within this industry. And 
it often emerges as a discourse in connection to obligation, as something that one 
'should' be doing. Thus, arguably, networking has become a regulatory discourse of 
subjective control within this industry, something that has become hegemonic, and 
normative. 
Many of my findings raise worrying questions about the implications of a network 
culture within the television industry. On the one hand, the research raises questions 
about how networking has been appropriated in the pursuit of capital. On the other, it 
raises questions about the social structure of the industry, which as the following chapter 
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will explore, has worrymg implications for creativity itself. The underlying issue 
governing the networking dynamic within the television industry is one of power. For 
example, one's attitude towards networking and entrepreneurialism is to a certain extent 
determined by personal attributes, class, cultural capital and social position. One's ability 
to move through the dense networks of opportunity that make up this particular cultural 
labour market is dependent on such supposedly outmoded 'depth' variables as social 
class.49 Networking works for elites in positions of authority and prestige, but presents 
new challenges and obstacles for those seeking to enter and progress within the industry. 
Indeed, it excludes many before they even have the chance to prove themselves. 
Earlier studies of television showed strong evidence of an 'old boys' club' 
(funs tall, 1993). This research shows that social class and cultural capital playa strong 
role in access to the independent television industry. However, what is clear is that a new 
networking dynamic, one naturalised by advances in communication technology, has 
become embedded within the labour market. Ironically, despite being deeply 
exclusionary for less privileged individuals, this networking dynamic is intensified by the 
fact that it justifies itself through the prevailing discourse of meritocracy within 
contemporary society (Finlayson, 2000). However, my research suggests that successful 
networking now supplants talent as a means of advancement within the industry; success 
in television is now oriented around success at networking. Futhermore, the new 
networks of power in independent television (geared around super-indies and which 
priorities commercial values) have arguably instilled a culture of creative stagnation, 
where new ideas are arguably unable to find space in the dominant commercial landscape 
of factual entertainment witin the factual television sphere (Silverman, 200S). In such a 
context, what becomes of craft, and of talent? 
In the following chapter I shall examine this pressing issue of creativity and craft, 
which I argue is under increasing threat in the contemporary commercialised television 
landscape. This will involve examining the transformed political economy within this 
sphere as a way of understanding the changing production values of television has 
focused on the external political economy. As I argued in chapter 3, the independent 
television industry has undergone a rapid commercialisation in recent years. In the 
49 The idea that 'class' is an ineffective way of analysing social groups can be seen in a particular 
strand of contemporary social and political thought. See, for example, Kingston (2000). 
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following chapter, I shall explore how my research indicates that this transformed 
political economy is having dramatic consequences on the production culture within the 
industry (while recognising that this study does not extend to an actual textual analysis of 
the content itself). I also investigate how the production values of my respondents 
appear to be changing as a result of sociological changes in the nature of work and 
identity, as well as because of external market forces. For my respondents, the creative 
energy that was once spent on learning the craft of programme-making is increasingly 
spent on networking and entrepreneurialism. Moreover, this insecure, 'liquid' 
environment presents significant challenges for learning and developing skills, a process 
which would have traditionally taken place within the more secure environment of the 
major commercial and public service broadcasters. I shall explore the paradox of why my 
respondents feel that production values within independent television production are 
declining, and why the 'craft' of programme-making is under threat, whilst 
simultaneously the discourse of 'creativity' within contemporary society, and within 
television in particular, has become so prominent. 
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Chapter 7. Precarious creativity: The transformation of 
television production values? 
The emerging social order mitigates against the ideal of craftsmanship, that is, 
learning to do just one thing really well; such commitment can often prove 
economically destructive. In place of craftsmanship, modern culture advances an 
idea of meritocracy which celebrates potential ability rather than past 
achievement. (Sennett, 2006: 4) 
'There is relative silence on the issue of what happens to media production 
arrangements under different regulatory regimes. In particular, there seems to be 
a failure to consider that the changes in conditions of work and employment 
have consequences for the extent to which television workers fmd themselves 
able to meet professional goals and standards, or perhaps begin redefining their 
notions of professionalism' (Ursell, 2003: 34) 
As the previous chapters have shown, due to the insecure, freelance nature of 
television work, workers are forced to invest high levels of time and energy maintaining a 
steady flow of work, through networking and work socialising. Furthermore, under the 
current deregulated and highly commercialised conditions of production in the freelance 
independent sector, (self) exploitation is rife for a large number of workers, with research 
showing high levels of stress, insecurity, overwork, lack of pension and holiday pay 
(Ursell, 2000; BFI, 1999; Sparks, 1994). Despite the celebratory policy rhetoric of the 
'creative industries', in fact my research shows that this transformed production 
environment has had a detrimental effect on skills and on the potential for creativity 
within the industry. 
As a result of a labour market that requires high levels of investment of time and 
abilities in terms of networking, as well as an institutional lack of investment in skills 
training for freelancers, there is less opportunity for today's television workers to 
develop production and craft skills. The casualisation of the industry has also produced 
an ideological shift from vocation to contract for these workers. The constant spectre of 
unemployment and 'uselessness' (Sennett, 2006) haunts my interviewees, forcing them 
into developing a number of time-consuming strategies to cope. Indeed, many of them 
have turned this process of navigating risk into a skilled practice in itself, one which 
demands abilities of communication and enterprise which take time and effort to 
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develop. These skills of networking and maintaining a career have become a primary part 
of the talents of a successful television professional. 
As the last chapter argued, strong interpersonal skills are necessary to navigate 
network sociality in this industry, where the ability to network and present yourself well 
is a key skill needed to get on in the industry, and find work. Indeed, these skills were 
often mentioned over creative skills such as imagination, talent, and craft, as prerequisites 
to being successful. However, a significant generational difference emerged in my 
research, with the older, more established interviewees stressing the need for creative 
skills as opposed to networking, social skills, as key to their success, whereas only a 
minority of the younger (below 30 years old) interviewees did. 
Here I shall investigate a number of vital questions that flow from this analysis. 
What happens to craft and creativity in this 'creative industry', under such precarious 
labour conditions? Have the skills of networking in some way replaced, or detracted 
from, the skills of production? How do individuals become skilled professionals, in the 
absence of job security and institutional training provision? What can be meant by 
creativity and craft in such a context? Can we begin to approach the vexed question of 
qualiry in television, through an understanding of the production values and labour 
market conditions that are prevalent in the industry?50 
The chapter presents an analysis of discourses around production values, 
creativity and entrepreneurialism within the independent television industry. To put 
these views in a historical perspective I shall explore how factual television, and its 
production values and genres, have changed in recent years. Production values have 
been transformed under the forces of deregulation, commercialisation, multi-channel 
programming, casualisation and the rise of independent production. From a political 
economic perspective, these values have altered partly because of policy interventions 
designed to commercialise the television marketplace, and stimulate competition. I argue 
50 The vexed question of quality in television has a long and controversial history within media 
studies. In my view, it is important to remember the vital questions of class and power that lurk 
beneath debates around 'dumbing down' and lowering standards on television. As Brunsdon has 
argued, such debates around cultural value easily become embedded in suspicions of their 
ideological foundations - Quality for whom? Judgement by whom? On whose behalf? 
(Bruns don, 1990: 73). These cultural value judgements are often 'shaped by legacies of social 
class hierarchy' (Richardson and Meinhof, 1999: 117). 
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that the dominant production values held by contemporary television professionals are 
radically removed from those that were held in the past. 
This chapter explores the contested nature of 'production values' within the 
television industry. To focus on the concept of 'production values' implies that there are 
a set of hegemonic and institutionalised norms which govern the field of production, 
impacting on individuals as they move through the industry. However, as a result of 
regulatory and commercial shifts, the prevailing orthodoxy of production values has 
changed in recent years. The chapter examines the altered professional status of 
television workers, particularly under the pressures of a changing occupational ethos and 
the impact of deskilling in the industry. This involves assessing the impact of 
'multi skilling' , and of commercialisation, on the professional norms of these creative 
workers. As Sennett (2006) has argued, the logic of work in the new economy operates 
to negate values of 'craftsmanship', and against the steady development of skills and 
abilities which are accumulated through the course of a lifetime. Rather, today's 'new 
economy' logics demand constant evolution, adaptivity, and the ability to retrain 
throughout one's working life. These broader issues have a great relevance to the 
production of factual television. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of this 
changing production environment on the nature of creativity within factual television 
production, exploring the decline of craft within the industry, and the impact of 
commercial and temporal pressures which my interviewees experience. 
What emerges most strongly from the fieldwork is a discourse in terms of 
attitudes towards creative labour in the field of independent television production that is 
neoliberal, favouring enterprise, commercialism, competition, flexibility and 
individualism. Yet, evidence exists of another competing discourse, one that promotes 
the values of craft, talent, co-operation and public service. This tension is generational, 
with older participants more likely to espouse the values of the latter discourse. Yet that 
alone is too simplistic an analysis, for often these competing discourses are evident 
within the same individuaL Crucially, the tension between these two discourses is 
ideological, between two competing visions of factual television, its purpose and its 
future. Therefore this research shows that television production has become a discursive 
battleground for two radically opposed visions of cultural production. 
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7.1 Changing production values: from Grierson to the 1990s 
Over an extended period there has been a significant shift in production values 
1n factual television. Previous generations of programme-makers underwent a long 
apprenticeship, learning their skills on the job and over many years of accumulated 
experience. Television in this sense was very much a field where the notion of the 
'apprenticeship' was both culturally central and institutionalised (Tunstall, 1993). In 
today's cost-cutting and commercially driven climate, television professionals, 
particularly those in the freelance independent sector, have experienced a transformation 
in their professional environment, particularly in terms of the ethos of production values 
and in terms of training. Individuals are often obliged to pay for their own training, a 
difficult and expensive task in a fast-changing digital environment (Skillset, 2001). The 
Skillset (2001) survey shows that 69 per cent of freelancers have training needs. 
However, only 15 per cent of freelancers received training funding from their employers 
(Skills et, 2001: 16). They are encouraged to multi-skill, often fUming, directing and 
editing entire programmes single-handedly. They are also forced to be highly flexible 
about the nature of the content that they work on in order to stay in employment. This 
shift has occurred concomitantly to a wider change in factual content, with the growth in 
popularity of reality formats and factual entertainment, as well as regulatory changes 
which mean that independent producers are able to profit from secondary markets for 
their intellectual property (DTI, 2003). As a result of these changes, and at the broadest 
level, the 'traditional' value and skills of television production are being steadily replaced 
by those of the commercially astute entrepreneur who sees the market opportunity for 
successful global formats. 
So, what kind of production values existed in the past, and what kind of 
production values can be detected today? To answer this question is to revisit the history 
of factual television as it evolved from documentary television to more contemporary 
genres. Documentary television emerged in the UK in the 1920s as a result of the 
creative efforts of John Grierson and a collective of filmmakers and technicians who 
surrounded him. They made up what has become know as the British Documentary 
Movement, and included names such as Paul Rotha, Humphrey Jennings, Harry Watt, 
and Alberto Cavalcanti. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s these self-consciously 'artistic' 
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film-makers produced a number of classic early documentary films, such as Night Mail 
(dir. Basil Wright and Harry Watt, 1936), London Can Take It (dir. Humphrey Jennings, 
1940), Coa!face (dir. Alberto Calvalcanti, 1936) and Fires Were Started (dir. Humphrey 
Jennings, 1943). These middle- to upper-class male filmmakers, largely Oxbridge 
educated, believed in the power of film to change society for the better and were driven 
by a sense of social purpose. Grierson described the moral values driving early 
documentary production: 
This sense of social responsibility makes our realist documentary a troubled and 
difficult art, and particularly in a time like ours... realist documentary, with its 
streets and cities and slums and markets and exchanges and factories, has given 
itself the job of making poetry where no poet has gone before it, and where no 
ends, sufficient for the purposes of art, are easily observed. (Grierson, quoted in 
Hardy, 1979: 25) 
Many of these films were shot during the worsening social conditions of the 
1930s and then during World War II, and had a clear propaganda objective, designed to 
raise national morale, and to inform viewers of the war efforts. They dealt with social 
issues, but have been criticised for failing to ask questions that might have challenged the 
social structure that produced such social conditions (Winston, 1995). It is argued that 
these films, while on the surface concerned with the social, evade social meaning through 
an aestheticisation and romanticisation of poverty. As Winston argues: 'This meant a 
tendency to seek the picturesque topic, but the search for the picturesque is to be found 
in even the least 'aesthetic' subjects' (1995: 38). 
Two key ideologies can be seen to guide early documentary: the aesthetic 
ideology of realism, and the prevailing ideology of culture as an educational tool which 
should provide 'uplift' for the 'masses' (Swann, 1989: 176). Realism as an artistic 
movement emerged in the 19th century, and was concerned with the scientific, rational 
depiction of society, in contrast to the then prevalent forms of romanticism in art, 
literature and theatre.51 It was a form that had its roots in a radical socialist vision, with a 
desire for progressive change (Winston, 1995: 30). This gave early documentary in the 
UK its social and educational agenda. Indeed, in Grierson's view, documentary was first 
51 Classic realist texts include George Eliot's Middlemarch, the plays of Anton Chekhov, and 
Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary, and focus on depicting everyday life and events 'as they are' 
rather than being overtly artistically constructed. For an in-depth study of realism in the 
nineteenth century, see Byerly (1997). 
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and foremost a medium of social engagement - an exalted calling. His was an elitist 
stance, where 'the elect have their duty'. Indeed, he declared 'I look on cmema as a 
pulpit, and use it as a propagandist' (Rotha, 1966: 42). 
7.1.1 Onto the small screen: documentary on television 
Following World War II, things changed swiftly. First, the emergence of 
television moved mainstream documentary from the cinema onto television. Second, 
technological advances in filming allowed directors to experiment with smaller hand-held 
cameras and sound recording equipment, allowing them access to shoot material that 
would previously have been impossible. This shift was vital to the emergence of the 
cinema verite movement in the 1950s, which evolved from the French New Wave, and 
allowed flimmakers to shoot action as it happened.52 Third, with the rise of public service 
broadcasting following World War II, and the subsequent creation of lTV, the model of 
state funding for factual content that was utilised by the British Documentary Movement 
of the 1930s and 1940s altered dramatically. 
Most obviously, mainstream documentary and factual content moved from the 
cinema to television. This had significant ramifications for the nature of the content. 
While the work of the British Documentary Movement was self-consciously 'poetic' and 
artistic, the form changed as the values of television journalism entered documentary 
practice. If fllmic documentary (and so factual television more generally) began as a form 
of cinematic essqy ('impressionism put to promotional ends; an exploration of the modern 
through evocative, metonymic use of images and sounds' (Corner, 1996: 2), then the 
form shifted under the medium of television and much documentary became more 
journalistic, a form of extended reportage (ibid). 
The shift away from commercial and state funding also had a dramatic effect on 
the production values of documentary makers working within television (Ellis and 
McLane, 2006: Chapter 12). Whilst the Griersonians were able to make films that 
52 Cinema vhiti was in many ways a reaction against studio film restraints, allowing film-makers 
such as John Cassavetes, Richard Leacock and Barbara Kopple to flim events on location as they 
happened. There were often no sit-down interviews, the film would show events unfolding, and 
the large amassed amount of material would be carefully edited down into a coherent whole by 
the editor. 
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depicted an aesthetic view of poverty, without asking more critical questions about the 
causes and effects of social inequality, ftlm-makers working in television, although still 
constricted by regulatory and ideological pressures, were able to take a more critical view 
of social issues. That is not to say that the factual television being made in the early days 
of the medium was radical in content, but rather that it was produced using journalistic 
principles of examination, critique and analysis, rather than being essentially propaganda 
for the war effort. This change from film to television also meant new strictures for 
documentary makers, as powerful but implicit norms regarding 'public interest' and 'due 
impartiality' come into play, moving documentary into the same climate as news 
production. As Winston suggests, documentary in this period began 'encountering 
problems of non-cooperation from official sources, anxious monitoring from interested 
parties and potential self-censorship from nervous production executives' (1995: 23). 
7.1.2 The 'golden age' of television? 
The period from the 1960s to the 1970s is often perceived as a halcyon era for television 
production where budgets were large, schedules were flexible and generous, and there 
was plenty of scope for directors to make highly personal, single-subject programmes 
with scope for artistic freedom. Dennis Potter described the period from the late 1960s 
into the 1970s as television's 'golden age' (Wattis, 1994), whereas others have been less 
specific about the time-frame, but are clear that this 'golden age' existed before the 
deregulated, multi-channel environment of today (Hutton, 2006). 
Whilst the constant evocation of the 'golden age' is in my view overly nostalgic 
and ignores the innovations and creativity of more recent content, it is instructive to 
examine the reasons why this is felt to be the case, and to explore what has changed. 
Most clearly, this was a period of professionalism and high status for factual television 
production staff. The broadcasting climate was favourable: for example, this was a 'time 
of plenty' in television, where an lTV franchise was once famously called 'a licence to 
print money' by Scottish Television's Roy Thomson (cited in Crisell, 1997: 108). This 
was also a period before the highly competitive multi-channel environment of today. Job 
security was high, pay was higher relatively than now and highly regulated, with specified 
minimum rates of pay and common terms of employment agreed between broadcasters 
and unions (Saundry, 2001). Moreover, there was a different kind of cultural attraction to 
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working in factual television, as it was a career path that was highly attractive to idealistic 
progressive graduates with creative aspirations. 
Exploring this, Garnham, writing about his early career in television production, 
describes the attraction of working in the industry in the 1960s: 
I joined the BBC in the immediate aftermath of the Pilkington Report and at the 
birth of BBC2. It was the precise moment at which a whole generation of the 
British creative intelligentsia moved into television because they saw it as a 
progressive medium of popular education and enlightenment against the 
background of an increasing radicalization of British politics. (2005: 472) 
Similarly, Paul Woolwich, a senior editor within BBC current affairs, notes: 
Twenty five years ago, young Turks embarking on a TV career wanted to work in 
the BBC's current affairs department with the aim of changing the world. Today 
they would rather be working on Changing Rooms. (Woolwich, 2000) 
An ideological sea change can be seen to have occurred in factual television 
production, where new entrants to the industry are no longer lured by such idealistic 
aspirations. This represents a significant cultural shift within television production, where 
the values that inspired a previous generation are no longer the norm. 
7.1.3 The 1990s: deregulation, 'reality TV' and the rise of factual entertainment 
In the mid-1990s the nature of factual television began radically to shift. Many of 
the more traditional forms of content were still being made, but new forms rapidly 
became dominant. These forms were so-called 'reality television' formats: including 
emergency formats, 'docu-drama', factual entertainment and 'gamedoc' shows which 
meshed factual formats with traditional game-show features (Corner, 2000: 687). The 
reasons for this shift are culturally complex and contested. Some have argued that the 
turn to 'reality' reflects a democratisation of television (Bazalgette, 2001: 20); others that 
it is indicative of a 'dumbing down' of factual television output (Dunkley, 2001). Indeed, 
as Holmes and Jermyn have argued: 
The discussion concerning definitions of Reality TV has indicated the extent to 
which issues of cultural value have been on the agenda - enmeshed within the 
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wider maelstrom of what can be described as the high-profile discursive 
circulation of the form. (Holmes and Jermyn, 2004: 8) 
The rise of reality television represents a significant shift for factual television, 
one that is bound up with a seismic shift in production techniques and production 
values, undermining traditional documentary's status within the industry. As Barnett and 
Seymour (1999) have argued, the traditional analytic documentary suffered a long decline 
in popularity over the course of the 1990s, with BBC 2 becoming the main home of 
serious political, economic and social analysis. Analysing this change, Corner has 
suggested that we now live in a 'post-documentary' culture: 
There has, then, been a decisive shift towards diversion. This has not had the 
effect of completely displacing 'serious' output but it has certainly had the effect 
of reworking the identity of this output both within television's generic system 
and within the pattern of viewing habits and expectations. (Corner, 2002: 149) 
Corner's argument is that there has been a shift in purpose towards 'documentary as 
diversion' coupled with the 'radical dispersal' of a 'documentary' look across programme 
forms and schedules. Here, significant financial reductions in the cost of making 
documentary-style television have driven its ubiquity across television output. As Ellis 
and McLane note: 
The cost of small-format video is a fraction of older technologies. In the twenty-
first century one or two people shoot major television documentary projects that 
once required lavish funding and at least four-plus crew members [ ... ] This .. has 
considerably lowered the bar as to what television audiences accept as 
documentary. The speed of this kind of flimmaking, its low cost, and the fact 
that a person with almost no technical skill can perform it, has opened the field 
of documentary making to the entire industrialized world. (2006: 294) 
As such there is a vastly extended space for 'factual' programming across the schedules, 
which problematises documentary's status (Roscoe and Hight, 2001: 7). Winston has also 
argued that 'there are increasing signs of documentary being put under pressure to win 
larger audiences by becoming "lighter". Moreover, some of the most significant hybrids 
in recent programme development have had a marked "infotainment" character' (1995: 
24). 
229 
Fundamentally, the shift to factual entertainment has some key political 
economic drivers. They involve global factors such as the expansion of satellite 
broadcasting, and national factors such as the 1992 Broadcasting Act requirement that 
twenty-five per cent of programmes should be produced by independents (Brunsdon et 
al, 2001: 31). As Brundson et alhave argued, '[b]oth, in different ways, increase pressure 
on programme-makers to provide more and cheaper programming, in a context where a 
substantial proportion of the national audience is opting out of terrestrial broadcasting 
for, in particular, sport and fum viewing on satellite and cable' (2001: 31). 
7.2 New times, new values 
In this transformed context, production values have undergone a radical shift. In 
the qualitative analysis that follows I shall explore the nature of that change, and the 
implications of it for creativity and innovation within television production. The key 
changes to the production environment that have impacted on production values can be 
described as: commercialisation, deprofessionalisation and multiskilling. These changes 
have occurred under general conditions of casualisation, as discussed in chapter 5. 
Alongside these changes, there has been the rise of a new discourse around creativity, 
which is highly neoliberal, geared towards economic growth, and encourages the values 
of enterprise, entrepreneurialism, and self-actualisation through creative individualism. 
7.2.1 Commercialising creativity 
As explained in chapter 3, neoliberal governmental policies towards media 
regulation allowed the introduction of satellite and multi-channel television systems 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-1990s multi-channel became a reality, 
leading to the introduction of much greater choice and competition in the industry. As 
Sparks argues, during this period 'neoliberal ideology increasingly favoured competition 
and markets as against the combination of political and cultural paternalism that had 
dominated the main national broadcasting organisations' (Sparks, 2007). In this context, 
audience share for the major terrestrial broadcasters has been steadily falling since the 
1980s (ibid). 
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This has had a major impact on factual television, putting far greater pressure on 
broadcasters to maintain high ratings, in the face of this growing competition. 
Mainstream broadcasters have had to develop programmes that are able to attract as 
large an audience as possible and also hold on to hard to reach demographic groups such 
as young people (ibid.). This has led to the creation of new forms of popular factual 
television, such as emergency formats and reality television, which attract high audiences. 
As Dovey has argued: 
The explanation [for the rise of reality television]... is to be found in the 
increased commercial pressure on all TV producers which follows from varying 
degrees of deregulation and increased competition for audience share with new 
channels. This, it is argued, has driven down the costs of production throughout 
the early years of the 1990s, as well as increasing the necessity to produce more 
and more ratings-friendly programme forms. (2000: 83-4). 
At the same time, broadcasters have responded to the economic threat to their business 
model by forcing through a series of measures aimed at their employees, which have had 
the effect of casualising the industry. This has involved moving from predominantly in-
house production to subcontracting production to independent companies, which for 
many workers involved a shift from permanent, full-time, organised employment to a 
succession of short-term contracts under precarious and harsh conditions (Sparks, 1994). 
During the 1990s, casualisation combined with the cutting of programme 
budgets, particularly in factual television, which has continued unabated to this day.53 As 
factual based programming has dramatically expanded to fill the schedules, budgets have 
been slashed, and production times significantly reduced (Ellis and McLane, 2006: 294-
5). The commissioning focus now is on commercial return, and popular formats, rather 
than on one-off documentaries, which are expensive to make. 
In my research, all but one of the freelancers studied believed that their industry 
has become far more commercialised, with a large proportion believing that this has had 
negative consequences on the content produced. The commercial imperatives that now 
53 This has hit the BBC's documentary department very hard, with department staff reduced 
from 120 to 70 in the last two years (Silver, 2006). In 2006 Mark Thompson, the Director 
General of the BBC, introduced a series of budget cuts for indies and in-house production alike 
and announced 50 per cent cuts in the BBC documentary department. 
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dominate within the independent television sector have created an obsession within 
indies to capitalise on intellectual property rights. As Paul commented: 
I think the industry is heading that way more and more: returning series, series 
that you can make money on beyond the screen, you know, a book, merchandise 
and follow ups. And every company knows that it is a potential business 
changing commission if you get a returnable format series, so every company I 
think really is prioritising that. 
My interviewees contended that the new commercialised climate has impacted negatively 
on production values. Sarah told me that she thinks 'that the content has changed mainly 
because television, factual television has become so much more entertainment-driven'. 
Because entertainment programmes now have much bigger budgets, she said that she 
thought 'that documentaries have suffered from the falling away of high production 
values'. 
It also appeared that the impact of this squeeze on budgets was significant. For 
example, Sarah described the impact of a compressed production schedule on the 
making of a programme about Obsessive Compulsive Disorder: 
I was expected to start shooting after about 2 weeks. I managed to get it up to 3 
weeks. But 3 weeks to find contributors for a film, and bear in mind that people 
with OCD are so ashamed of their condition ... That programme was a nightmare 
to work on from start to finish ... because constantly we were being squeezed 
and squeezed and squeezed, and the anxiety levels that I experienced on that 
were really high. 
A number of my interviewees also felt that commercialisation impacted negatively on the 
quality of individuals working in the industry: 
Eleanor: I've been away [from the industry] for 4 years and in those 4 years 
you've seen the rise of certain mega indies and they're making a lot of money and 
the moment you're looking at people making a lot of money you're looking at a 
horrible drop in standards ... the quality of the people that work in the industry 
has declined. That's happened because you pay peanuts. If you pay peanuts what 
you tend to do is you get runners, and push them into positions of power, where 
they'll do anything because they are so happy to be elevated, they'll do anything 
to get someone on a morning talk show. 
Other interviewees described how the high production values held in the past 
were increasingly being put under pressure with the shift towards factual entertainment. 
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This was linked to the fact that more factual programmes are being commissioned and 
produced by industry figures with a background in entertainment programming, where a 
different emphasis would be placed on core documentary and current affairs skills such 
as fact-checking: 
Louise: One thing that I do think is that when I was at the BBC one thing that 
was hammered into me was production values and if you were doing a factual 
programme you bloody well checked every last damn fact and checked it and 
checked it and not a thing would go into the script that wasn't absolute. And 
what I've find in the Indies is that I've had to fight for that, and there's an awful 
lot of hand waving and people going 'does it really matter, will anyone ever really 
bother' and I think 'yes it does matter'. 
Commercialisation was felt to be eroding the barriers between the programme content 
and the advertising, as the boundaries were becoming more blurred: 
Emma: it's a business, and there are people whose job it is to get people in 
CDUK wearing their clothes, and television does sell things. I mean the barrier 
between adverts and programmes has eroded. 
Ultimately, a sense emerged that commercialisation impacted negatively on 
creativity and innovation. One of the most senior interviewees, who has worked in the 
industry since the 1950s, argued that the structural changes happening within the 
industry, with the rise of the 'super-indies', were having this effect: 
Ivan: If you finish up with seven super-indies, and you get what I've called in that 
speech an OPEC of super-indies, very soon they will start determining what is 
economically viable for them, and that's all the broadcaster will get to look at, 
and they will have killed off all the little furry mammals which are busy beavering 
away making all kinds of different programmes, and creating and maintaining the 
diversity, they will all get killed off. And if the big beasts do rule the jungle and all 
the little furry mammals are being chased away, well I think that jungle could 
very quickly turn into a desert ... 
7.2.2 Entrepreneurialism 
During the course of the 1980's, the idea of an enterprise culture has emerged as 
a central motif in the political thought and practice of the conservative 
government in Britain. Its radical programme of economic and institutional 
reform has earlier been couched primarily in the rediscovered language of 
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economic liberalism, with is appeals to the efficiency of the markets, the liberty 
of individuals and the non- interventionist state. But this programme has 
increasingly also come to be represented in 'cultural' terms, as concerned with 
the attitudes, values and forms of self understanding embedded in both 
individual and institutional activities. (K.eat and Abercrombie, 1991: 1) 
In the place of established television production values oriented around craft, 
quality and public service, a new set of values have become dominant amongst television 
workers, which are connected to entrepreneurialism, individualisation and self-
promotion in the free market of ideas and opportunities. Here, we see how a new 
discourse around creative labour emerges which promotes self-enterprise and self-
commodification, and sits uneasily alongside older values associated with talent, skill and 
craft. This new discourse, closely associated with neoliberalism, can be seen most clearly 
amongst the younger interviewees, while it is most contested by the older workers 
(although it appears in both groups, and sometimes is contested within a specific 
individual). For example, the majority of the younger freelancers expressed the 
importance of marketing oneself as a commodity in the television labour market, as this 
exchange with Rachel indicates: 
DL: Entrepreneurialism. How important is it to be entrepreneurial in 
television? 
R: I mean I think it's essential to be able to think ahead and market yourself, 
and plan your next move. 
DL: So self-promotion is important? 
R: I don't think you can do it without it. 
DL: What does it mean to you being entrepreneurial? 
R: I think to me it means constantly talking to people about the way the 
industry is going, about what companies are doing what, constantly 
making sure I'm abreast of what's going on ... making sure I know what's 
out there, knowing what the options are for me and kind of making 
myself more marketable so that I'm more employable. 
Jack, 36, also expressed the importance of being 'proactive', and entrepreneurial, telling 
me that in order 'to get on in the business you do need a certain amount of innovation, 
enthusiasm, developing your own stuff, just being proactive basically'. 
Here, we can see how the discourse of enterprise, so favoured by New Labour, 
can be seen in the values and language of my respondents. The very language used to 
describe their careers, particularly amongst the younger freelancers, is full of words and 
expressions such as 'opportunity', 'being proactive', 'entrepreneurial', 'making it', and 
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'drive'. The values of competitive individualism are internalised, and form a key part of a 
enterprising discourse which shapes these individuals' working identities. The promise 
held out by this discourse is that of self-actualisation through enterprise, adaptivity and 
flexibility. This can be seen in the hope amongst the younger interviewees that despite 
the rigours of the competitive, individualistic labour market, everything could be 
transformed by that one big opportunity. For example, Jenny described the challenges 
she had faced in her career, having to move from short-term contract to short-term 
contract, interspersed with episodes of temping work, and parental pressure to 'get a 
proper job', with a pension and security. However, despite this, she is holding on in 
there, because of the prospect of career transformation, in which the phrase 
'opportunity' is repeated like a mantra: 
You've just got to rise to every occasion, you've got to seize those opportunities, 
you've got to take those opportunities, you've got to find opportunities. 
Often these entrepreneurial sentiments were highly individualised, stressing an 
association with enterprise and self-reliance, self-motivation and self-promotion. Indeed, 
a strong theme emerges from the interviews showing the commodification of the self 
that occurs in the cultural economy of television production. As described in chapter 2, 
social transformations associated with reflexive modernisation mean that particular 
discourses have emerged which orient the self around self-enterprise and self-
commodification in keeping with the values of neoliberal society. As Rose argues 
'Contemporary individuals are incited to live as if making a project of themselves: they 
are to ... develop a "style" of living that will maximise the worth of their existence to 
themselves ... [and] transfer ourselves in the direction of happiness and fulfilment' (1996: 
157). The emergence of an individuating discourse of choice and self-enterprise in 
society means that the neo-liberal subject is positioned as a 'stand-alone' individual, able 
to thrive in a new socio-economic environment (Walkerdine et af2001, 2), one that was 
highly evident amongst my participants. 
In the television labour market freelances have organised their own labour 
market in such a way as to produce 'an intensification of the self-commodification 
processes by which each individual seeks to improve his/her chances of attracting 
gainful employment' (Ursell, 2000: 807). Jack told me how important it was to be 
enterprising within the industry: 
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I think to get much higher in the business you really have to be developing your 
own ideas and projects really. 'Cause otherwise if someone else comes up with 
the cracking perfect idea they're not going to go to someone else to make it for 
them, they're going to make it themselves. 
Similarly, Sarah, described how '[yJou have to be able to sell yourself with flair quite a 
lot ... in order to get .. .in the door somewhere'. 
But while the values of enterprise (and networking) are powerfully expressed by 
my interviewees, this is by no means the consensus view. Again a discursive schism 
appears to open up, raising important questions. For example, Simon, whilst 
acknowledging the importance of enterprise, argues that talent is still the key factor in 
success: 
I think entrepreneurialism to me is coming up with new ideas and creating new 
opportunities ... I think that for the producer/director that's not what really gets 
you... I don't think that's what gets you on. I think it's being creative and 
knowing your job. 
Equally, Colin stressed the values of co-operation and a mutually supportive network 
above a ruthless individualism: 
I've never found any of my fellow editors to be competitive... As a bunch, 
certainly the ones I know, and I know a few, we are always very keen and 
enthusiastic for our fellow editors to be picking up work. And there is certainly 
an informal network of you know 'do you know anyone else', 'yes well I do', and 
passing names and numbers on. 
From this point of view, a clear tension emerges in the discourse of my interviewees 
between the naked individualism engendered by the casualised, precarious labour 
market on the one hand, and the need to be supportive and co-operative in order to 
find work on the other. 
7.2.3 Deskilling and altering professional identity 
In the commercialised, self-enterprising context of contemporary television 
production, a new set of values appears to have come into place in the television 
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industry. These can be largely attributed to changes in the regulatory environment, and in 
the conditions of work and employment. For example, in the commercial sector of 
broadcasting, but also with close parallels at the BBC, Ursell has noted how 'the valued 
media professional and creative individual is in train to becoming either de-
professionalised and/or subordinated by cost-driven production criteria' (2003: 45). The 
current change in production values can be traced back to a political change in the way 
broadcasting was perceived by free-market ideologues during the 1980s. Before the 
Peacock Report, the deleterious effects of competition were always traditionally 
recognised in broadcasting, with the BBC being seen by government as a patron for 
creative workers (see Briggs, 1961 b, Chapter 5). This was based on an early belief that 
for the BBC, the task of educating, informing and entertaining the public would be at 
risk if workers were explosed to a working environment driven purely by market forces. 
Television production was understood as a craft, and creativity as fragile, needing a 
secure environment to flourish within. This was affirmed in 1977 by the Annan 
Committee which reported British broadcast products as being 'hand-made by 
craftsmen' (Annan, 1977: 28). However, this can be seen as the last time that 'Parliament 
reasserted PSB values with regard to the perceived crucial contribution of broadcast 
workers seen as "professionals'" (Ursell, 2003: 35). 
This all changed in the 1980s under the free market ideology of the New Right, 
as described in chapter 3. The protected environment for broadcast workers became a 
target of these ideologues, as evidenced in the words of Sir Alan Peacock, the man 
charged with leading a review into public service broadcasting in the 1980s: 
[W]e received evidence... that the broadcasting industry was wasteful of 
resources through over-manning and self-indulgent working practices. In 
particular the cost for productions by the BBC and lTV have been compared 
with those for independent production which ... are cheaper but just as good. 
(peacock, 1986: 532) 
In 1987 Thatcher challenged the lTV comparues as 'the last bastion of restrictive 
practices' (Crisell, 1997: 235) - and in so doing the Reithian idea of the broadcaster as 
craftsman and valued media professional, which had been reasserted by Annan 
Committee, came to be associated with trade unionism, which the free marketers wanted 
to stamp out (Ursell, 2003: 36). 
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The effect on television production has been dramatic. For example, in her study 
of journalism, Ursell has noted that: 
In such conditions, there is a question mark about the ability of television 
workers to produce 'quality' output. Quality is measured as consisting of 
accuracy, factualness, completeness and impartiality, yet they are seen as being 
achieved against the odds, with lack of time, too few people, and not enough 
training. (2003: 40) 
Learning from colleagues on the job diminishes or disappears, as older media 
professionals are either forced out of the industry, or have no time to informally train 
younger colleagues. For Ursell, '[t]he loss of colleagues, particularly the older and more 
experienced ones, in the context of more pressurised production schedules, constitutes 
the erosion of relational structures and temporal space allowing journalists to think and 
to reflect on their practice' (2003: 41). 
My research suggests a similar trend, indicating that in this highly commercialised 
climate, the professional status of programme-makers has altered, along with the desired 
skills base required by broadcasters and production companies. Before the deregulation 
of the industry, programme-makers, editors and camera operators had the security of a 
'job-for-life', and were able to spend their career steadily accumulating expertise in 
specific areas of programme-making. As Jack told me: 
It was different back then [in the 1970s -1980s ]. You spent five years as a 
researcher, another five as an assistant producer, and then you were a director. 
You spent years learning your craft. There was a career path, there was security 
and the pay was much better. 
This training ensured a professionalism within television production of a particular type, 
one that existed within large bureaucratic organisations such as the BBC, and came with 
a particular public service ethos. The status of the documentary film-maker in this period 
can be seen as one with high professional status, echoing the wider culture of 
professionalism at the time, especially within large bureaucratic organisations (parker, 
1977). In factual television, the shared ethos, inherited from a long-standing public 
service broadcasting tradition, was one that placed an emphasis on television's educative, 
social purpose. However, Richard noted that this focus on skills and craft was vanishing. 
Instead he said that '[t]oday, it seems to happen far more by chance and luck, and 
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without the same learning process. Directors today seem to wing it far more; they don't 
have the same knowledge of the medium and how to make bloody good television'. 
Again, a generational difference emerged in attitudes towards production, with 
my data persistently showing that amongst both the younger freelancers and the older 
owner-managers, there was a feeling that the past was associated with 'quality' television, 
whereas the future was highly uncertain, with high production values under threat. Again 
this finding was biased generationally, with a greater proportion of the more established, 
older participants expressing this feeling. Generational differences are key here, as older 
television workers have an earlier reference point to previous production values and 
conditions, whereas the younger ones are more completely immersed in the 
contemporary, more commercial values. Although my sample is relatively small, it is 
interesting that only one of the under-30s expressed any awareness of different 
production values in the past, whereas all but one of those over 3S years old did. 
For James, there was 'far more freedom to try ideas out' in the '1970s or 1980s'. 
Colin talked about the length of time that was spent training individuals in the past, and 
said that 'the Beeb expected people who were going to be cameramen or editors to train 
for five, six or seven years. Far longer than you ever did in the freelance sector'. For him, 
that was part of the BBC's 'commitment to quality' which 'appears to be going out of the 
window now'. In its place, '[t]here is the belief that anyone can flim, anybody can edit, 
and I just don't believe it to be true'. 
In this context, the past appears to have become talismanic for my participants, 
evocative of a lost 'golden age'. Sarah described how new commercial values had become 
a priority for her, yet the spectre of the 'glory days' clearly hangs over her response: 
Sarah: Yeah I think it's you know I'm just a little bit too young to remember the 
glory days of documentary making in British television but the sort of emphasis 
on branding for programmes that you make and I mean ratings have always been 
a preoccupation but I think more than ever and I think the sort of 'is it a 
returner?' that sort of question. 
Paul, at 26 also part of the younger generation of production staff, also exhibited a clear 
awareness of older values in programme-making: 
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· .. the time frame has telescoped in so much as the kind of landmark 
programming that people were making in the 70s ... and the 80s, you know, 
things like Disappearing World you know, that kind of programming is almost 
impossible to get commissioned these days ... You've really got to be able to 
squeeze the pennies to offer something for the best possible value. 
Therefore, in a discursive sense, the values and production climate of the past haunt the 
present, showing how the new values of commercialism are far from readily accepted 
and internalised, but instead are being constantly contested by my interviewees. 
For my respondents it would seem that the professional ethos and the 
production values of factual television have altered significantly from the past. 
Furthermore, new technology, and the prerequisite for 'multi-skilling', are pushing down 
the barriers to entry to this profession. Training and skills provision is in decline, as there 
is less investment by companies on the professional development of their staff (Ursell, 
2000). The apprenticeship that was traditionally undertaken to enter the industry, as a 
film-editor, cameraman and director, is now vanishing, as digital technology makes it 
commercially viable for broadcasters and production companies to employ people to 
make programmes with far less skills than previously. The short-termist profit-oriented 
culture described earlier that typifies the flexible organisations of the independent 
television industry mitigates against a long-term craftsmanship which stems from a 
particular professionalism. 
Within television, my research would suggest a process of deskilling has taken 
place in the industry, which has led to an altered professional status. Much as Braverman 
shows how contemporary capitalism leads to the deskilling of 'craftsmen' in a number of 
areas, as there is an increase in the interchangeability of labour and a decline in the levels 
of training (Braverman, 1974), so too can this process can be witnessed in television 
production as craft skills embedded over time are increasingly eroded, and carried out by 
interchangeable production staff. In factual television production this means that editing 
is increasingly done by producers, filming is done by assistant producers, and the skilled 
technical production staff become marginalised, and too expensive. 
Alongside this process of deskilling, there has been a cultural and economic shift 
away from the values of what Sennett (2006) calls 'craftsmanship'. For Sennett, 'Getting 
something right, even though it may get you nothing, is the spirit of true craftmanship' 
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(2006: 195). In what he calls 'the new culture's idealized worker', the commitment of the 
craftsperson is missing, the belief in 'doing something well for its own sake' (2006: 195, 
105). As he notes, 'Understood this way, craftsmanship sits uneasily in the institutions of 
flexible capitalism... Institutions based on short-term transactions and constantly 
shifting tasks, however, do not breed that depth' (Sennett, 2006: 105). Here, we see how 
the erosion of craftsmanship in new capitalism takes place at the same time as the 
erosion of the traditional moral anchor of lifetime workplace identities (Sennett, 1998). 
Like other professionals, programme-makers are less likely to work in a clearly 
defined role throughout their working life, and are increasingly likely to work in complex 
flexible and fluid organisations with the expectation of numerous changes in location 
and role specification over a career a ohnson, 1995). This trend is undermining 
traditional certainties about what a career in television involves, as Rachel noted: 
To tell you the truth, I personally wouldn't want a job for life. I think we've all 
grown up in such a consumer society, and we do want the best all the time, and 
be able to take the best option all the time. No I don't think jobs for life really do 
exist, and I don't think we want them to either. Most people I know are planning 
to do lots of different things in their life. So in a way I just see it as part of the 
society that we are creating around us. 
Indeed, this sense that television is a temporary 'job', rather than a vocation, was 
particularly evident when the freelance group were asked if working in the industry could 
be a job for life, with the majority expressing that they did not believe working in 
television was a permanent occupation for them. This was perhaps typified m an 
exchange with Jack, who has since left the industry to work in higher education: 
DL: Do you think that television is going to be your job for life? 
Jack: I don't know. I'd like to think that it might be. I'd like to find a way where I 
could combine it with having a life outside of work. So because this is where my 
skills are, this is the industry that I can actually make a decent living in. So the 
straightforward answer is I don't know. But I wouldn't hesitate to switch to 
something else if it gave me a stable income and allowed me to have more of a 
home life. 
7.2.4 Multiskilling 
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The trend towards multi-skilling in the industry has exacerbated the increasing 
ambiguity my respondents feel towards their professional identity. Multi-skilling in 
factual television production refers to the trend for creative staff to increasingly have 
knowledge of a range of different skills. So, for example, the vast majority of camera 
operators working in factual television must now also have the ability to record sound. 
Previously, these were seen as radically different disciplines, with their own clear 
professional demarcations. Similarly, in the same field, producer/directors (the title itself 
indicative of the blurring of two previously distinct occupational identities) will often be 
expected to be able to fllm their own material using lightweight digital cameras, and 
increasingly to edit it themselves. My findings clearly show the impact of this trend on 
creative practice, and echo research done in other areas of audio-visual production. For 
example, in his study of BBC news production, Cottle noted the deleterious effects of 
multi-skilling on news journalists, making them computer-bound and more pressurised 
(1999). Similarly, studying the rise of multi-skilling in television news production in Spain 
and the UK, Aviles et af note the risks that it poses for accuracy and depth, and suggest 
that 'multi-skilling leaves journalists less time to fulfill traditional journalistic practices, 
such as double-checking of sources and finding contextual information' (Aviles et al, 
2004: 99). However, despite this they write that 'multi-skilling seems to be a trend that 
will increase in the near future mainly because of economic reasons' (ibid.). 
My field research demonstrates this shift towards multi-skilling, which came 
across as a major issue, particularly for the freelancers, with all of the group discussing 
the necessity to be able to multiskill these days. As Jack told me: 
In terms of how it's made, um, I think that the multi-skilling thing is going to 
continue even further and I think it will be standard that people like me will be 
expected to shoot, direct and cut in fact. 
Indeed, according to Jack, clearly many fllm-makers are increasingly expected to manage 
all aspects of production, from 'directing', 'shooting', to 'getting access, researching the 
storylines, negotiating access with people, building relationships, [and] planning what the 
storyline is going to be'. Andrew also told me how as an assistant producer he was now 
expected to multi-skill to previously unprecedented levels: 
Well yeah I went for a job recently where they said they wanted an AP to be able 
to edit with final cut pro and avid, to fllm on Zl and VX9000 ... I was like you've 
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got to be kidding. And because it's an AP they wanted to pay cheaply. And I was 
like you want someone who's a cameraman, a producer/ director and an editor all 
in one and pay £700 a week for it. But I am aware that maybe I should get more 
skills. 
These interviewees told me how their craft suffered as a result of these new 
demands, with the majority of the freelance group expressing their concerns in this 
regard. Some suggested that there will be a 'two-tier' television industry in terms of 
production values now, where there will be expensive, big-budget programming, and 
cheaper material made by people with less experience who are carrying out multiple 
aspects of the production process: 
James: I mean I see TV going this way - on the one hand there are a lot more 
international 'co-pros',54 there's a lot more big budget stuff than there used to 
be ... But then there's a whole other tier of programming that is obviously filling 
the gaps and channels. That's where they are going to start getting people to 
shoot, direct, edit... there is going to be this move to let the AP do the whole 
thing on their salary of £600 a week. Can't wait to see the result. 
Indeed, when I pressed James about the impact of multi-skilling on the industry, his 
prognosis was gloomy: 
That is going to be the biggest disaster ever to hit television. I'll tell you what 
happens now. People are expected to go out and expected to shoot. So they go 
out and they shoot hours of totally shit rushes, I mean appalling rushes ... Then 
they get an experienced editor who pulls his hair out rescuing their appalling 
rushes, but really using all his skill to cut around the worst examples of their 
camera work and salvage something resembling a story with their appalling 
rushes yeah? As soon as you get these people a) shooting b) researching and c) 
editing you know they are too stretched ... So they're really going to stretch 
themselves too thin. You've just about got away with it up until now because it 
feels rough and ready, but there's somebody skilful putting it together anyway. 
This is just going to be, quality-wise, the straw that broke the camel's back. 
Therefore it was clear that the trend towards multi-skilling is something that 
worried my interviewees significantly, in terms of how they felt it undermined the quality 
of the programme that they were working on. It was felt that a key issue was that the 
actual 'skills' being produced by this new economic demand for multi-taskers were 
inferior to those that were available before. For example, when describing the shift 
54 'Co-pros' are co-productions, projects which are jointly funded by a number of media 
company partners. 
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towards employing assistant producers or researchers who can also film, Simon was 
troubled by a widespread lack of skill in using the camera: 
They are detailed skills that you have to learn, and the problem with say for 
example the camera is that you can switch on these cameras and see a picture, 
but it doesn't mean that you can film. There are a lot of people going out there 
filming who really don't know how to film. They really don't understand how to 
film. And you cannot replace a good cameraman easily. 
Throughout, the research findings suggest a sense of loss of craft, which was associated 
with a previous time, where people were trained over an extensive period of time. 
A strong sense emerged from the research that the multi-skilling environment meant 
experience and knowledge was being lost from factual television production which was 
impacting on the quality of the programme: 
C: If we go back to this cameraman/ producer/ editor being one person, how, for 
the majority of people, are they going to turn out films that have a quality the 
conventional production route would produce? You know normally of course 
you'd have the producer who came up with the idea for the film would be given 
a commission to make the film ... A cameraman would shoot it, an editor would 
cut it. And that has a consistency, you have experience from the cameraman, 
experience from the editor, and they combine together to make the film. How 
can one person ever hope to replicate the work of three people and maintain the 
quality? I think as I said before that it's a very rare person who is able to do that. 
And yet they will be held up as the example to everyone else. 
7.2.5 Reframing professional identity 
What emerges strongly from my research is that the discourse and practice of 
entrepreneurialism and commercialisation within broadcasting has led to a rejection of 
some core values of traditional television professionalism and a re-framing of others. A 
clear trend emerges from the fieldwork showing that in stark contrast to the Griersonian 
approach to documentary as public duty, which persisted as a legacy through public 
service broadcasting, there has been a de-coupling of public service vocationalism in 
factual programme-making from professionalism for my respondents. This echoes other 
research done on professionalism. For example, within the medical sector Jones et af 
have examined a radical shift within medical primary care, noting that 'vocation is no 
longer a normative trait of positive professional identity, and has been devalued as 
characterising old-fashioned, over-burdened and dysfunctional approaches to primary 
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care' (2006: 948). In my v1ew, a similar shift from vocation to contract is true for my 
interviewees. Many of my interviewees exhibited largely ambivalent feelings about 
television as a vocation; rather, as explored in chapter 5, it was seen as a way of getting 
'nice work', interesting and sometimes glamorous work that was somehow perceived as 
more interesting than a 'nine-to-five' job. 
When the freelance group was asked what it was that particularly attracted them 
to working in television, the idea of it being somehow different from the norm was 
clearly evident, with the majority of them maintaining that it was attractive because it was 
so interesting. Here we see the the pleasure that is expressed in being involved in a 
creative profession. The younger interviewees in particular consistently expressed the 
pleasure that they derive from working in this industry. As Colin told me: 
DL: What does it mean to you personally to be doing a creative job? 
C: Well it means everything. I've always had a creative bent if you like. Always, 
from childhood. And so to be working in an industry like this, I feel privileged, 
and very lucky to be able to do it, and I still get a silly kick out of telling people 
what I do, and get the reaction 'wow, that must be interesting' and I have to say 
'well yes it is'. 
Equally, Jenny told me that she 'loved' 'being in an environment which is not 9-5'. This 
was the pleasure of 'being around people who interest you, doing something that you 
feel involved in and that you can contribute to, and that you can make it your own, and 
your creative juices are flowing, and you are meeting really interesting people ... And I 
just want to do it, I just can't explain ... It's madness, you just want to do it.' 
Therefore, excitement, and the self-actualisation associated with creative labour, 
are powerful motivating factors for working in television. However, despite claims that 
creative labour such as television is largely dominated by discourses around celebrity and 
glamour (McRobbie, 2002b; Ursell, 2000), my findings show that a public serv1ce 
discourse remains a powerful factor in motivating individuals to work in factual 
television production. In both the freelance cohort (younger, and more shaped by the 
discourse of creativity and glamour), and in the employers' group, a sense of public 
service endures, although it may well be under threat. For example, when asked why he 
wanted to work in television, Simon described his motivations: 
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[It's] interesting. Get to delve into the lives of other people, and it's diverse as 
well. And there's always a hope of giving a message and have a vision of a world 
that you want to be in. I suppose its success for yourself and also to do good in 
the world. 
Abigail also felt the 'need to kind of do work that feels like it matters'. David T. 
described how he had formed a production with an 'ethical approach', because of a deep 
'belief that films can be used ... to create change'. Richard had a strong public service 
ethos, and told me that: 
[O]ne of the reasons I wanted to make television programmes is to actually tell 
the viewer something new about something. I don't want to make television for 
the sake of television if you like. And I think there's a lot of television that's 
made for the sake of it. 
Yet, on the evidence of my research, it would appear that the public service ethos is 
increasingly being culturally eroded from within the industry, as it becomes seen as 
something old-fashioned, worthy but dull. As Abigail suggested, particular types of 
content are increasingly marginalised within industry circles: 
One of my friends, myoId series producer, who's now deputy commissioner for 
Channel 5, he's like 'why do you want to do these worthy programmes? Do I 
want to slit my wrist?' 
7.2.6 Competing visions of creativity 
A powerful tension emerged between individualism and collaboration in this 
research, which was identifiable in the discourse of my respondents, and which played 
out in regard to understandings about the nature of creativity itself within television 
production. The creative process in television, as in many other cultural industries, is a 
collective endeavour, involving numerous personnel For example, in their work on 
creativity, Negus and Pickering note that 'creativity arises not from a cultural context 
which exists in monolithic isolation, but from cultural borrowings and transactions' 
(2004: 40). Yet the new subjectivity engendered by the values of individualism, and self-
enterprise, acts against co-operation, making all social exchanges acts of competition. 
This creates a tension between the values of individualism and of collectivity in the 
creative act itself. As Born has noted, in the context of the BBC, but with clear 
246 
implications for the independent sector, the casualisation of the broadcasting industry, 
by attuning workers always to be looking for the next job, has inhibited collaboration 
and led to the privatisation of ideas and intellectual property: 
The public qualities of the workplace are weakened. Ideas are effectively 
privatised; they become a currency by which future employment may be 
transacted. Intellectual property issues become pervasive in workplace politics; 
legalistic concerns can prevail over substantive creative ones. (2004: 191) 
As argued earlier, the instrumental discourse around creativity associated with 
New Labour has created a very particular vision of creativity, one that is individualised, 
autonomous, self-reliant and associated with economic growth. Yet many different 
concepts of creativity exist, which form competing discourses (Banaji et al, 2006). The 
tensions which are evident in my interviewees' understanding of creativity reflect wider 
uncertainties, and a broader discursive struggle over what constitutes the purpose and 
meaning of creativity. 
Some have expressed a belief in the primacy of individual talent, showing that 
the Romantic understanding of creativity, which promotes the idea of the individual, 
creative genius remains powerful and attractive for creative workers. This view of 
creativity is highly prevalent and often portrays creativity as constantly constrained by 
'institutional, bureaucratic and economic monoliths' (Negus and Pickering: 58). Yet this 
view is simplistic, because it fails to acknowledge the sociological nature of creativity, in 
short the 'asymmetries of power and resources' (ibid.) between different actors working 
in cultural production, which work to reproduce particular tastes and definitions of what 
is socially constituted as 'creative'. Others, as described earlier in this chapter, hold on to 
a particularly public service neo-Reithian understanding of creative work and television's 
purpose. 
However, a powerful feeling was found amongst my interviewees that creativity 
was under threat within the new production climate. Simon argued that the 
commercialisation of television production content has had a detrimental effect on the 
creative ability to take risks, and to innovate, as it has led to a heightened form of 
standardisation: 
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I think what's really happened more as time has gone by, that commercialism has 
driven people not to take as many risks... and what they tend to do now is if 
something works everyone else will chase that similar format and repeat it to 
death, I suppose to keep their jobs for as long as possible, and until it's 
completely dead then they're looking for the next trend. So commercialism has 
led to a kind of standardisation rather than in most industries where you expect 
commercialism to provide people with a wide range of products, but in TV it 
seems to be the opposite, and create a homogenous kind of [product]. 
Other interviewees actually questioned the creative nature of television per se, expressing 
a sense that television has become just another consumer commodity marketed to the 
widest possible audience: 
Rachel: I don't know if television is that creative really. I don't really know. There 
is a creative process, but I don't think it's creative like a modern artist is. There's 
just not that space for it, because you are constantly trying to market to wider 
and wider audiences, and I think that means that creativity probably has to go 
down because it's got to have mass appeal, so if anything I feel that television is 
probably getting less creative. 
J ames, when asked what impact the insecure environment, both for freelancers and for 
independent companies, has on the content, argued that: 
The content becomes much safer. You have companies like October who are 
doing one-offs, doing the difficult documentaries, making the challenging 
thought-provoking films who are now finding themselves having to go for the 
format market in order to be able to survive. Um and there's nothing wrong with 
the format industry, but what's wrong is that people are now refusing to risk 
something because they think something is not going to work, and because thry need 
to fit in with what the broadcasters want. 
Perhaps most powerfully, however, comes an understanding of creativity which 
1S essentially neoliberal in flavour: individualistic, enterprising and geared towards the 
marketplace. In this view, particular modes of creative endeavour are legitimated, while 
others are dismissed as irrelevant. In the neoliberal vision of creativity, creativity is 
eviscerated, ensuring that the only legitimated forms of creativity are those that produce 
commodifiable, profitable outcomes and products. Alternative creativities associated 
with collectivisation, 'culture jamming', or even skateboarding do not figure in this 
creative economy script 'in part because they are perceived as socially disruptive, but also 
because they are less easily transformed into (capitalist) accumulation strategies' (Gibson 
and I(locker, 2005: 100). 
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Such an attitude was clear at times In the discourse of my respondents. In 
particular, this comment from Anita, a highly successful company owner and series 
producer, typified this attitude, where she argued that in the current creative climate in 
television, 'innovative' content was seen as outmoded by the broadcasters: 
Even though they [the superindies] might not be doing that much more 
innovative programming, I think that they will still be able to do programming 
that will fit the bill because most of the channels aren't looking for innovative 
programming. Innovative programming is sort of seen as a bit studenty. It's not 
where money gets made and it's not what people are that interested in. 
In the new networked, commercialised, entrepreneurial context of independent 
television production, making connections, and having the right 'people skills' becomes 
more important than the creative process: 
Sarah: I'm never going to be someone who comes up with some enormously 
original idea about how to shoot something. That's just not where my talents lie. 
But being able to get access to people and to build their trust enough so that they 
tell me something that they've never told anyone before on camera, get them to 
open up, that's what I can do really well. I don't think I've ever had a contributor 
who's been upset about the way that they've been portrayed but equally I don't 
hold back from telling the truth and all of that. So that happens to be a very 
good thing if you're like that for working your way through the industry. It's 
exactly the same set of skills. 
7.3 Conclusion: insecure production values 
As chapter 3 described, the television industry has become far more 
commercialised, as a result of multi-channel growth and deregulation. In the 
independent sector this has been marked by a process of consolidation, the 
marketisation of 'super-indies' in financial markets, and regulatory changes which allow 
independents to hold on to certain secondary rights. My research suggests that this is 
having a significant impact on production values across diverse levels and professional 
groups within the industry, from younger researchers to established managing directors 
of production companies. 
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Clearly, multichannel television environment has created a major cultliral shift 
within factual television. As Brundson et al (2001) have showed, key parts of the schedule 
became dominated by factual entertainment and lifestyle formats during the 1990s, 
typified by programmes such as Ground Force, Changing Rooms, Animal Hospita~ and a 
plethora of programmes on fashion, home improvement and cookery. Since then, reality 
and celebrity based formats have continued to rise in popularity, particularly shows with 
an element of gameshow competition to them, that employ reality television techniques 
(for example, Pop Ido~ Celebrity Big Brother, I'm a Celebrity Get Me Out Of Here.). Moreover, 
such formats are now highly lucrative intellectual properties, as independent production 
companies are able to exploit the rights in hitherto untapped areas. As one interviewee 
argues, television has become increasingly about 'returning series, series that you can 
make money beyond the screen, you know, a book, merchandise and follow ups', with a 
pressure on finding successful formats that can deliver these alternative revenue streams. 
In this context, 'traditional' analytical one-off documentary has continued to be 
marginalised in the schedules, largely now being shown on 'specialist' digital channels 
such as BBC 4. 
Contemporary factual television production is now being produced within a far 
more commercialised environment than in the past. My interviews explored the impact 
of this commercialisation on production values, and the implications of this changing 
landscape in terms of the type of content being produced. All of my interviewees agreed 
that factual television had indeed become more commercialised, and reflected on how 
this had affected their careers, and the industry more broadly. Traditional values, 
associated with 'quality' television, were seen as being under threat from commercial 
concerns, with my research showing a feeling amongst television workers that there has 
been a subsequent decline in standards. 
A number of my participants have argued that factual television has become far 
more homogenised, and formatted. In this highly commercial environment, broadcasters 
have become risk-averse, often reflexively adapting each other's successful formats. This 
echoes the environment that Gitlin (1994) described in his study of commercial 
television production in Hollywood, where producers nervously reversion successful 
formats, as a means of mitigating the risk inherent in cultural industries. Today, the 
independent television industry is producing increasingly standardised products, 
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accommodating the logic of the market's demand for successful formats and 'returnable' 
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senes. 
In the commercialised world of 'mega-indies,56 and global competition, 
increasingly it seems that there is less space for the innovative independent production 
company: 
Dave T: When was the last time that a small indie came up with an innovation 
that you can remember? They don't really get a look in. And innovation to a 
certain degree is not encouraged. Urn, so much so that very often commissioning 
editors will say 'we're looking for this, these are the sort of filins we want'. 
Anything that falls outside that tends to be urn just shoved away because there's 
no room for the slot. It's all done by slots which does kind of ... Especially for 
small indies ... You can't innovate if you don't have money coming in, you know? 
Innovation is a luxury in this industry so I don't know. 
The trend towards consolidation and commercialisation would appear to 
challenge the very principles of public service broadcasting that have been established in 
this country, creating a situation where, as one interviewee put it 'And ultimately what's 
going to happen is that the strongest will survive. The strongest aren't necessarily those 
who are the most creatively interesting'. This is partly the logic of digitalisation, as the 
new regulatory structures attempt to negotiate the challenges of ensuring the 
continuation of public service broadcasting in an age of video-on-demand, and niche 
programming (Of com, 2004b). As Hutton has argued: 
Broadcasters ... are much less confident about building schedules in which the 
populist and market-driven is mingled with giving audiences television they 
should be watching because it is good, challenging and important. Everything has 
to be popularised or given a personal hook; whether the news, a feature film 
about fatness or documentary about violence in schools, and which reaches its 
nadir in reality TV. They are responding to 'the market. (Hutton, 2006) 
As my research demonstrates, the wider cultural tension about production values 
and quality are also felt extremely keenly at the individual level for production staff. The 
55 Returnable series are those that are regularly recommissioned by the broadcasters, and run 
over a number of years. 
56 This is the latest trend in the restructuring of the independent sector, as greater consolidation 
is leading to the creation of new so-called 'mega-indies', amalgamations of a number of 'super-
indies'. See 
http://www.broadcastfreelancer.com/broadcast/content/ViewEditoriaIContentStory.do?conten 
tId=4512. 
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two conflicting discourses of public servIce values versus commercialisation can be 
clearly seen at the political, macro level. This conflict is played out in debates about 
'quality' and 'dumbing down' within the industry. However, the political dominance of 
the logic of commercialisation is evident in recent cultural policies which are oriented 
towards greater commercialisation, such as the Communications Act 2003, or a recent 
policy report which called for the television industry to become even more 
commercialised, seeking global markets (Nesta, 2006). Yet the tension between these two 
discourses does not just exist in a media policy vacuum, but rather is played out at the 
microcosmic level of individual subjectivity within the industry, as the competing values 
and demands of neoliberal commercialisation, and what Born has called a 'neo-Reithian' 
attitude in British broadcasting (Born, 2004), can be detected in the language and 
attitudes of production staff. 
Ultimately, the prevailing consensus is with the neoliberalisation of culture, as the 
'creative industries' are exemplars of casualisation, and flexible specialisation. The impact 
on creativity, risk-taking and innovation is beginning to become clearer after more than a 
decade of this structural shift in the broadcasting industry. Just as independent 
companies are dependent on broadcasters for the next commission, so too are workers 
dependent on the independents for their next job. As Born has noted, this has had a 
detrimental impact on creativity: 
Given the chronic insecurity, the individual freelancer's relations with the current 
employer became a microcosm of the relations between the insecure 
independents and the broadcasters: the need to secure another contract militated 
against risk-taking or originality and towards the need to flow with prevailing 
trends. (2004: 186) 
Here lies the true impact of the values of entrepreneurialism, commercialisation 
and neoliberalism on the television industry, in the threat it poses to creativity and 
innovation within the industry. When Channel 4 was created, and with it the 
independent production sector in this country, the indies produced some highly 
innovative content, because the demand was there from the broadcaster, and because of 
the regulatory context in which those companies were operating (Harvey, 2000, 2003). 
Now, as public service broadcasting values find themselves increasingly under threat, we 
also find an independent sector that is increasingly consolidated, commercial, and in fact 
further and further from being 'independent', as ever more companies are being bought 
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into by commercial investors, who are looking for a return for their investment. In this 
new context, the very values that inspired the creation of the independent sector, from 
the Channel Four Group campaign onwards, are under massive structural pressures. As 
Darlow, one of the founders of the campaign for Channel 4, and a pivotal figure in the 
evolution of the independent television sector, has argued, this raises serious issues for 
the ability of those working in the independent sector to take risks, to innovate, in short 
to be creative: 
Dare they speak out or take creative risks in a climate of all-pervading 
commercialism, working on short-term contracts for the broadcast institutions or 
separated from each other in a myriad of independent production companies 
which are themselves terrified of doing anything that might lose them favour 
with the broadcasters? Dare they repudiate the morality of the market and the 
attitude that says broadcasting should be valued only according to the sum of 
those things that can be counted or measured? (2004: 617-8) 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion. From independent production to 
capital accumulation: Creative labour and public service 
broadcasting 
Television devours ideas which stem either from individuals or from teams 
which have worked together over a long period, whose members spark ideas 
from each other. The nature of the teamwork is immensely important, not only 
in the sense that it is a team - writer, director, designer, cameraman, sound 
engineer, lighting engineer and others - that finally puts the programme on the 
air, but in the sense that the television organizations consist of creative nuclei 
from which ideas spring by contact, argument, collaboration. (Hood, 1970: 71) 
Broadcasting, like other cultural industries, is innovative or it is nothing. It must 
continually generate new ideas. [The goal should be] to create a community of 
employees, one that chatters, invents and criticizes. Excessive marketisation 
limits the collective innovation that comes from a free flow of information. In 
the market paradigm it is assumed that competition will fuel innovation. Now we 
know that it is much harder to create an innovative environment and much easier 
to destroy it than anyone imagined. (Mulgan, 1993: 76-80) 
This thesis provides a detailed qualitative account of the nature of creative work 
1n independent television production within a broadcasting industry that has been 
transformed in the last two decades as a result of political-economic, technological and 
sociological change. By focusing on the working lives of a relatively small group of 
individuals working within factual television production in the independent production 
sector, it depicts an industry through the testimony of casualised workers who have 
experienced the force of this transition within the industry. As the preceding chapters 
have shown, they experience a working life marked by uncertainty, networking, short-
term contracts which has been accompanied by a dramatic shift in production values. 
They are working in an industry that has experienced the full force of deregulation and 
market liberalisation. 
This aim of this thesis has been to assess the implications of these shifts in the 
structure and organisation of creative labour in the ITPS, and to consider these changes 
alongside wider social, political and economic change. This concluding chapter will 
summarise the research findings, and will then consider the overall central contributions 
provided by this study. It will also provide a wider context for this study, considering the 
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implications of my flndings for the production of television in the digital age, for public 
service broadcasting, and for assessing the social and cultural signiflcance of the 
emergence of new modes of creative labour. 
8.1 Television production: continuity and change 
The primary research for this thesis, backed up by secondary literature, suggests 
that the production culture of the television industry is in a context of rapid and deep 
transformation. However, it is important to recognise that these changes coexist 
alongside various forms of continuity. My research indicates the continued presence of 
modes of work and production values which have existed within the industry for many 
decades. However, such forms of continuity that exist are constantly being challenged by 
a highly commercialised logic of labour and production. For example, as chapter 7 
argues, public service broadcasting values persist within factual television production, but 
they appear to be are increasingly under threat from a number of directions, in particular 
a new aggressive logic of commercialisation, consolidation and commodiflcation in the 
industry. Similarly, the networking culture described in chapter 6 is to a degree an 
extension of the 'old-boy' club culture that has always existed within creative professions 
such as television; however, casualisation, technological and social change, and new 
modes of networked workplace sociality have precipated a sea change in the organisation 
of this labour market from previous periods. My research shows that for my interviewees 
the values of craft and skill persist, yet as chapter 7 shows, they face an acute challenge 
because of accelerating commercialisation, shorter production schedules, and an erosion 
of skills training. This echoes wider transformations within late capitalism itself, where 
mobility and potential are valued over deeply embedded skills accrued over time 
(Sennett, 2006). 
The broader political economic history of the sector, as described in chapter 3, 
shows that despite the continuity of certain established modes of working within the 
television industry, the sector has undergone a signiflcant transformation in terms of 
how creative work is organised. At the political-economic level, this is most clearly 
evident in the structural reconflguration of the industry, away from the duopoly of the 
BBC and lTV, and a labour market which offered stable, protected, unionised 
employment (but often operated as a 'closed shop', open only to those already within the 
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industry), to the multi-channel production context, with a multitude of independent and 
quasi-independent production companies producing content on a commission basis for 
broadcasters. As Chapter 5 indicates, the result of this has been the creation of a labour 
market defined by extreme insecurity, short-term contracts and exploitation (particularly 
of junior production staff). Chapter 6 suggests it is a labour market where recruitment 
and access is organised largely through the dynamics of network sociality. As the 
sociological literature in this area shows, social networks offer fortunate individuals an 
efficient means of overcoming information asymmetries within a flexible labour market 
(Friedland and Robertson, 1990; Granovetter, 1990). However, my research suggests that 
this also creates an opaque recruitment dynamic where individuals can be unfairly 
excluded on grounds such as cultural capital, class and race. As chapter 7 argues, 
production values and skills are another area where continuity and change co-exist 
uneasily. In the past, the BBC and lTV companies acted as a skills incubator for the 
industry, investing in training for many of those who now hold senior positions within 
broadcasting. Today, skills training that was offered through permanent employment 
within the public broadcasters has been devolved to the individual. Taken together, these 
factors denote a shift in the organisation of labour in the industry that works 
predominantly in the interest of companies and capital accumulation, rather than 
individual creativity. 
The reconfiguration of the television labour market which has occurred 
alongside the growth of the independent production sector means that many of the 
features of work which are described in this research have existed since the early 1990s. 
However, the rapid growth and commercialisation of the independent sector in recent 
years, coupled with an increased policy emphasis on labour flexibility and encouraging a 
more competitive economic environment, means that far more people are now 
experiencing these working conditions. These changes are largely the result of policy 
decisions taken with the aim of liberalising and deregulating the television industry and 
which have radically altered the structure of the broadcasting landscape in Britain, and 
the nature of work within it. Television production has been transformed under the 
wider economic and ideological context of free-market, neoliberal policies towards 
broadcasting, which have sought to open up the market to greater competition, to 
liberalise labour laws and to 'let the market rip'. A series of policy interventions since the 
creation of Channel 4 have favoured the growth of the independent sector, such as the 
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establishment of minimum quotas for commissions from independent companies, and 
the legal changes which have been introduced which allow independents to exploit their 
intellectual property through being allowed to hold on to the ancillary rights for their 
ideas. These developments lie behind the current financial interest in the independent 
production sector, driving the process of consolidation and the emergence of the 'super-
indies'. 
The 'super-indies' are currently in the process of buying up many of the smaller 
indies, who often find it impossible to compete against the financial and production 
strength of the larger companies. This trend is compounded because commissioners, 
desperate for ratings and populist factual formats in a competitive multichannel 
environment where audience share is declining, increasingly procure the majority of their 
factual content from a smaller number of larger companies who they trust will deliver 
commercially viable programming. Thus the formative structure of the ITPS, which 
emerged with the creation of Channel 4 and consisted of a large number of small 
production companies and 'one man bands' which specialised in particular areas and 
produced a diverse range of creative content, is vanishing in favour of a highly 
consolidated sector, with a handful of large, powerful companies dominating, and whose 
main obligation is to reward their shareholders with a strong commercial return on their 
investments.57 In this context, the search for the 'big hit' format arguably now occludes 
cultural concerns about the cultural, democratic purpose of television, with a decline in 
creative public service broadcasting (Hutton et al, 2005). As new priorities begin to 
dominate the industry, these companies inevitably produce more formulaic and populist 
formatted content which can be capitalised on through merchandising deals, exports and 
other ancillary rights. 
8.1.1 The commercialisation of television content 
These structural changes go some way towards helping us understand the turn to 
factual entertainment within the industry. In the past factual television was 
predominantly delivered in the forms of 'traditional' documentary and current affairs. 
57 Indeed, some of these companies (such as Talkback Thames) are no longer 'independents' in 
the strict sense of the word, as they are increasingly owned by larger multinational 
conglomerates. 
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The entrance of entertainment style devices (such as are found in reality television, 
make-over shows and so forth), and their immense popularity, has transformed the 
factual production landscape. This transformation has occurred at the same time as the 
independent television production sector has been increasingly commercialised and 
marketised. Factual entertainment genres, which are delivered as formats which can be 
duplicated across a number of media platforms, with the potential for book spin-off 
deals, merchandising deals and international export sales, have become the focus of the 
independents' efforts. As Moran and Malbon argue, 'the formatted TV programme is a 
global commodity (2006: 16). The holy grail of the 'returnable series', where a series is 
recommissioned, ideally creating a strong brand which can lead to secondary rights 
exploitation deals, is where development teams focus their efforts. 
Simultaneously, other factors are also driving the shift towards less innovative 
content. The shift towards more generic, 'safe' content is backed up by statistical 
research, and is part of a wider shift within broadcasting towards more populist content 
within the multichannel environment, where the battle for viewers is far more fierce. For 
example, in his study of the delivery of public service broadcasting in the digital era, 
Bergg (2002) argues that broadcasters have become less innovative in recent years, a 
claim he illustrates with several key statistics. He shows how the number of unique 
programme titles on BBC 2 and Channel 4 (which he uses as examples because they 
have held on to their share of audience far more successfully than BBC 1 or lTV1) has 
experienced a dramatic decline. 
Table 2: unique programme titles on BBC 2 and Channel 4 
Unique programme titles on BBC2 and Channel 4 
1993 1997 2002 
BBC2 699 570 439 
Channel 4 577 522 463 
Source: Be,!% (2002: 11) 
Equally, examining figures across all the terrestrial channels, Bergg also shows the 
decline in traditional forms of public service broadcasting, with current affairs 
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programming experiencing a 35 per cent drop between 1992 and 2002, and arts 
programming a 52 per cent decrease (ibid.: 12). 
Therefore, in a multichannel context of vastly expanded choice, the ability of 
audiences to choose freely what they watch is a key catalyst for the shift in the types of 
public service programmes being made. Key studies suggest that what they want to 
watch are entertainment based programmes, not 'worthy but dull' traditional public 
service genres. For example, examining data from Germany and the UK, Tambini (2002) 
has shown how viewing figures for the traditional public service genres decline 
dramatically when viewers are offered greater choice through multichannel television. As 
he argues: 
Where there is increased choice and control, however, entertainment will win. 
Education and culture are, almost by definition, cultural phenomena that require 
external discipline. Public service broadcasting has provided some of that 
discipline, but as channel choice has increased, it is no longer able to make 
viewers' choices for them. (2002: 56) 
These trends in viewing behaviour are also being accelerated as a result of the increased 
popularity of devices such as Personal Video Recorders (PVRs), which allow audiences 
to record only the programmes that they are interested in, and avoid content that they 
are not interested in. These shifts, which all work to marginalise public service 
broadcasting, are then intensified by the global context, and the rapid globalisation of the 
media industries within a free-market ideological context, which as Barnett has argued is 
seen most acutely in countries such as the UK 'with deeply embedded social democratic 
traditions which privilege public interest values and those institutions which exist 
primarily to make a positive contribution to civil society and the quality of public life' 
(2002: 35). 
Here then we can see how technological change, leading to increased choice, a 
neo-liberal ideological climate advocating free-market globalisation, and the 
transformation of an industry through consolidation and the valorisation of commercial 
imperatives have converged to weaken public service broadcasting on all sides. However, 
if these changes are fundamentally macroscopic, impacting on the production of 
television from above, so too have internal sociological and cultural changes within the 
production environment had a radical effect on television production. My research 
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suggests that changes in creative labour pose an equally serious threat to the traditional 
values of public service broadcasting. 
8.2 Creative labour 
The new modalities of creative labour in the ITPS raise important questions for 
the public sphere, and for the nature of creative work more generally. This thesis is 
illustrative of an industry where working conditions for the majority are risky, where 
exploitation is commonplace, where access to work is based on exclusionary networks 
which require high levels of cultural and social capital, where traditional production skills 
are under threat due to heightened temporal production pressures and lack of funding, 
and where new production values that place commercial success over formal innovation 
have become dominant. These negative features are important to note, in a political 
context where creative labour is being feted by government and policy-makers. The 
reality of creative labour for many is far removed from the celebratory image of Florida's 
'creative class' (2002), or any number of images of 'creative entrepreneurs'; mobile 
avatars of the 'creative economy'. Rather they are often atomised, anxious and 
individualised workers, working in industries that favour individuals with economic, 
social and cultural capital. All of these trends undermine the fragile creative ecology of 
television production. 
In the context of industry transformation, a focus on production adds a 
necessary qualitative analysis to the traditionally top-down political-economic oriented 
debate about public service broadcasting. By examining the structural transformation of 
the industry alongside the organisation of creative labour within it, it is possible to see 
how debates about public service broadcasting are intimately connected to shifts within 
the working environment of broadcasting. On one level, the transformation of the 
industry is being driven by economic and technological imperatives, which in turn are 
altering viewer behaviour. Yet my research suggests that these changes are also 
internalised at the subjective psychological level for production staff. The restructuration 
of the factual television industry driven by commercial imperatives would appear to be 
having a major impact on the working lives of production staff. The values and actions 
of the creative workers in the sector are not solely determined by economic or 
technological forces. Yet, how they reconcile the demands of the industry with their 
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creative abilities within this changed context is an area of vital interest for the public 
sphere. This thesis suggests that there is an ongoing discursive battle occurring within 
the production community itself between the values of commodification and those of 
PSB, echoing the wider political-economic battle between those who argue that PSB is 
more vital then ever in this age of digital multichannel convergence (Miller, 2003), and 
those who argue that these very factors render the traditional justifications for PSB 
irrelevant (e.g Cox, 2004; Elstein, 2004). 
My analysis suggests that the ideology of commodification is winning out over a 
public service ethos within the production community. As such, for my respondents, the 
values of entrepreneurialism and accumulation often supplant creative imperatives. They 
operate within a sphere where individualised and competitive networking used as a 
means of negotiating the risk of a precarious working culture acts against cooperation 
and collective learning. Just as research has pointed to the fragility of the cultural 
economy (McRobbie, 1998; Neilson and Rossiter, 2005), so too is creativity within 
cultural industries a fragile entity. For example, whilst there has been little study of the 
impact of insecurity on creativity within creative organisations, research from the field of 
education is suggestive (Shallcross, 1981), demonstrating that creativity needs careful 
nurturing within a secure environment where risk-taking is encouraged. Despite the 
constant policy focus on creativity and innovation (Bakhsi et al, 2008), my research 
suggests that the flexible accumulation imperatives of late capitalism eviscerate creative 
innovation through the constant anxiety of unemployment and individual 
competitiveness. As Paterson (2001a) has shown, the creative ecology within television 
production is a fragile entity which has been damaged by the deregulatory changes that 
have taken place in the last twenty years. 
For my respondents, casualisation has also eroded their skills base. The erosion 
of stable employment within the public service broadcasters, traditionally the incubators 
of creative talent within the industry, means that skills provision is now devolved to 
individuals and to companies who are not motivated to invest in the skills provision of 
the future generation of cultural producers. Indeed, ongoing research for Skillset 
suggests that the casualisation of the industry in the UK has severely damaged regional 
skills in the flim and television industries, as production companies are reporting a virtual 
absence of a skilled local production community in northwest England (Skillset and 
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Burns Owens Partnership, 2007). Such findings suggest that government rhetoric 
celebrating Britain's cultural and creative achievements and strengths mask the fact that 
neo-liberal policies towards broadcasting serve to undermine the creative ecology of the 
industry, not strengthen it. 
8.2.1 The casualisation of creativity 
The casualisation of creative labour that has occurred within independent 
television production is not a new phenomenon, indeed it has existed since the 
formation of Channel 4, and the emergence of the sector. However, what is new is the 
scale of casualisation within the sector. It is estimated that 57 per cent of all independent 
television production staff are now freelance (Skills et, 2007). Many of the remaining 43 
per cent do not show up on the official figures, but of those a sizeable percentage could 
hardly said to be 'secure', working as they often do on recurring fixed-term contracts 
inside the BBC or on a similar basis within indies. This means that creativity is now 
fundamentally organised within the sector through the structure of a casualised 
workforce. 
This insecurity impacts on all aspects of the production process, and is deeply 
connected to the structural changes within the industry. Casualisation raises important 
questions about the lived reality of creative work, showing it to be far removed from the 
glamorous image traditionally associated with such work, where constant insecurity fuels 
anxiety, exploitation and frenetic, exhausting networking. But what impact does such an 
environment potentially have on content? Whilst such a question is impossible to answer 
objectively, given so many factors enter into this issue, it is vital to reflect on this crucial 
question. In terms of creativity, my research suggests that insecurity inhibits risk-taking. 
It is far more difficult to take creative risks when one's livelihood is so precarious. This 
indicates that the lack of security and the heightened commercial pressures of the 
industry potentially limit opportunities for creative risk-taking, because of the emphasis 
that is put on producing successful formats, which leads to imitation and risk-avoidance. 
As Gitlin (1994) has shown in his study of the Hollywood television industry, executives 
seek to negotiate the risks inherent in television production by employing such tactics, 
yet the downside is a lack of creative innovation within the industry. Although this study 
can only speak to the experiences of a small sample, their experiences, backed up with 
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research such as Bergg's (2002) would suggest that a similar process has intensified in 
British television production, under commercial pressures. 
This would suggest that casualisation acts as the catalyst for a more conservative 
production culture. This dynamic for my respondents is intensified by the atomised 
nature of a casualised labour force, where there is no opportunity for them to form 
strong bonds within the production community. As chapter 6 suggests, weak ties 
provides them with competitive advantage through a dense social network, rather than 
deep ties forged over time. This process of moving around constantly, often on 
contracts of a few weeks or months, means that for my respondents there is a marked 
lack of a collective identity, a collective work-place politics, and a common consensus 
about the cultural importance of television as cultural form. Despite their intense efforts 
to make a living in this industry, they appear to be missing a clearly articulated sense of 
the purpose of factual television production. Therefore it is easy for values of capital 
accumulation and individualism to step into that vacuum. 
8.2.2 Networking and diversity 
In turn, casualisation drives the networking culture that is described in chapter 6. 
The long-term shift towards opaque forms of recruitment and access to the industry 
raises difficult questions about the demographic composition of the industry. In recent 
years, the lack of diversity within the media industries has been recognised, and there 
have been a large number of initiatives to address the problem. Greg Dyke famously 
announced that the BBC was 'hideously white' and set about attempting to boost BME 
employment within the organisation (BBC, 2001). At the policy level, interested parties 
such as Skillset and Bectu have sought to increase the diversity of the media industries. 
However, despite these efforts, the media industries are overwhelmingly populated by 
people from wealthy middle- to upper-class backgrounds and are predominantly white 
(Holgate and McKay, 2007). Holgate and McKay's (2007) research finds that while over 
a third of the London workforce are from ethnic minority communities, just 8 per cent 
of workers in the audio-visual sector in London are black or Asian. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that entry to the media industries is poorly paid, if paid at all, and 
so many from less well-off backgrounds are unable to sustain the financial penury that 
entry to the creative industries entails. 
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My focus on labour market processes for a small group of individuals helps to 
explain why this might be the case. The lack of transparency caused by networked labour 
markets generates opacity and exclusion for my respondents. For them, jobs and entry to 
the profession is largely governed by personal contacts. This raises the question: how 
does someone from outside of an established middle-class network make the necessary 
contacts to enter the industry? To the outsider, these industries often appear hopelessly 
remote, with no clear way in. For my respondents, routes into television often come 
about through personal contacts (often family networks), and through working for 
nothing to gain 'work experience'. Again this is a major factor working against diversity: 
clearly it is very difficult for someone who does not have the economic backing of their 
parents to survive entering an industry that is predominantly London based (and 
therefore costs of living are very high) where you are expected to subsidise yourself for 
lengthy periods of time in order to gain the experience to get paid work. Therefore 
diversity in the industry rests on access to forms of capital which marginal groups do not 
enJoy. 
Clearly this lack of diversity matters on a political level, and on a creative level. 
Politically it is important because, following Anderson (1991), television, as part of our 
common culture, plays a fundamental role in the imagining of community (see also 
Gillespie, 1995). If the role of representation is only available to those from comfortable 
backgrounds, then it fails to represent the nation adequately. Marginal groups are further 
excluded from the public sphere because of their inability to access jobs in the media 
industries, with obviously negative consequences for social inclusion and democracy. 
Secondly, from a creative level, it is vital that all parts of society are able to express and 
develop their creative abilities. Surely, if the industry is peopled predominantly by middle 
to upper class individuals then many creative people are excluded, and the industry risks 
stagnation. Difference is vital to creativity. Research has shown that creativity thrives in 
conditions of diversity (Amabile, 1996), suggesting that a creative labour market that is 
closed off to many potentially talented entrants through lack of resources, be they 
cultural or financial, is prone to stagnation and timidity. The closed network culture 
stifles creativity. As Fukuyama (1997) has shown, tight-knit networks can be slow to 
adapt and unaware of new ideas. Coleman (1988) has also argued that the importance of 
social norms within networks, and the threat of sanction for contravening such norms 
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can stifle creativity and innovation. As Antcliff et al have argued, 'networks can be 
associated... with nepotism, favouritism, patronage, a lack of transparency and 
opposition to change' (2005b: 6). 
I would argue that for my respondents the network dynamics of the creative 
labour market in television erode creative diversity. While this is not to criticise networks 
per se, it is to recognise that the current dynamics of closed networks that function within 
the ITPS make entry difficult to outsiders, and allow for nepotism, favouritism, and an 
erosion of the social democratic culture of equal opportunities which was created 
through political struggle in the twentieth century. As McRobbie has argued, in relation 
to the emergence of 'network sociality' in the cultural economy, '[t]here is hardly any 
need to deal with bureaucracy, and without any of the anti-discrimination legislation in 
place what happens is that old and more elite and socially exclusive patterns re-emerge 
and come to distinguish the world of the ... small scale creative economies' (2007: 4). 
8.2.3 Production values and the erosion of creativity 
For my respondents, within the casualised, networked, individualised context of 
their working landscape, a new set of production values have emerged. As chapter 7 
shows, highly commercial and entrepreneurial values are commonplace amongst my 
respondents. If their experiences were replicated more widely across the industry then 
this would denote a widespread change in production values. This of course is work for 
a much larger study, but what do the experiences of my interviewees suggest in this 
respect? I would argue that they indicate that structural change in the industry Oeading to 
an increasingly commercial environment) combined with a political and social cultural of 
neoliberal individualisation, compounded by the shift away from a culture of public 
service towards personalised consumption (echoed in the wider shift from citizen to 
consumer (Marquand, 2004)), have all contributed to a transformation of the traditional 
public service values within factual television production. In their place a new set of 
values become evident in the testimony of my repondents, that emphasise commercial 
success and individual self-actualisation. The 'artist-as-networker' archetype that 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) describe can be seen in vivid colours in the attitudes of 
many of my respondents where a public ethos appears to be being displaced by 
individual motivation towards success. 
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As chapter 3 argued, the political-economic transformation of the broadcasting 
industry had a radical structural impact. Yet, as chapters 5-7 show, the transformation of 
factual television production can also be detected through my respondents testimonies at 
the more intimate discursive level, through the emergence of particular working 
identities within this new, more commercialised context, and in the subtle but forceful 
shift in production values that was evident in the interviews and field-work conducted. 
As chapter 7 indicates, the new production values that my respondents display are very 
different from the craft based values of an earlier generation of producers and 
programme-makers, indicating that a new generation of television professionals is 
adapting to the transformed commercial realities of the broadcasting industry. The PSB 
tradition emphasises the importance of broadcasting in terms of its public and civic role, 
focusing on the vital role of the media in terms of education, the public sphere and the 
role of the media in terms of creating a healthy democracy. But in the commercialised 
context, these values appear to be under threat. Just as there are growing political 
tensions about the continued relevance of public service broadcasting, so too is the 
validity of public service broadcasting ethos under threat within the production values of 
the production staff themselves, and within the working community. Thus, at the very 
localised level which this study is based, there is evidence that echoes Ley's assertion that 
'public service broadcasting is giving way to market-driven broadcasting' (2001: 110). 
By focusing on the reality of the production environment in this thesis, my 
research would suggest that for my respondents at least there is a clear gap between the 
rhetoric of creativity employed by New Labour, and the reality of media policy decisions 
on the capacity for creativity within the ITPS. Britain is world-renowned for excellence 
in broadcasting (Nesta, 2006). Yet much of this reputation rests on the infrastructure 
that existed to support creative endeavour in this field, which largely existed within the 
protected and subsidised field of public service broadcasting. This protection is currently 
being eroded, as witnessed for example in new funding arrangements force the BBC to 
make huge cuts in their programming provisions in order to make up the £2Bn shortfall 
in the licence fee settlement (Conlan, 2007). Political and economic forces, sharpened by 
debates about digitisation, are gathering to threaten the future of public service 
broadcasting in Britain. But these changes are also occurring internally at a discursive 
level. This research is indicative of the impact of a sea change in attitudes towards 
television production on the internal cultural of production within the industry. Much as 
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Born (2004) argues in relation to the BBC, the independent television sector has also 
seen a dramatic commercialisation of creativity in recent years. The new values that 
emerge within this context threaten the values of public service broadcasting from within 
the industry. 
8.3 Creative labour and public service broadcasting 
Debates about PSB must be connected to a broader discussion about the 
organisation of creative work in this industry. This research takes place within the 
context of a heated debate about the future of public service broadcasting in the UK, 
which is being fuelled as digitisation becomes a reality for ever more viewers. The future 
of public service broadcasting is at a crossroads, with the critics of public funding for 
PSB growing ever more vociferous. They argue that as digital television brings vast 
choice to the viewer, the key justification for public subsidy, market failure, is no longer 
viable. With near unlimited spectrum, they argue that the market is more efficient at 
meeting consumer needs, and should in theory be able to provide consumers with all the 
areas of niche programming that they need. Furthermore, they argue that as a 
multichannel, converged media environment produces far greater competition for 
viewers, that this leads broadcasters such as the BBC away from their original charter, of 
educating and informing, and far more down the line of entertainment in order to 
compete for audience. For these reasons, they argue that the licence fee should be 
abolished, and that the market should be left to its own devices. In this vein, influential 
authors such as Cox (2004) and Elstein (2004) have argued that public service 
broadcasting should now be funded by subscription. 
Economic pressures are also threatening public servIce broadcasting in the 
commercial sector, as advertising revenues for airtime have fallen dramatically (Cowling, 
2002). This has been highly damaging for the commercial public service broadcasters 
such as lTV and Channel 4, and raises questions about how future television content will 
be funded. Trends that have evolved as a result of this include sponsored television and 
product placement, where advertisers pay a premium to have their brand associated with 
a particular programme. 
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At stake within this transformation of an industry is the future of factual 
television production in Britain. Traditional PSB genres such as current affairs, arts 
programming and one-off documentaries have suffered a precipitous decline, simply 
because they fail to attract the levels of audience that the broadcasters want, particularly 
at peak times. While developments such as BBe 4 have provided a home for this kind of 
programming, the danger is that such content has become permanently marginalised 
within the schedules. Yet, as this research has shown, this marginalisation has occurred 
not only at the macro-economic level, but also within the production community itself. 
In this context, the debate about the future of PSB can not only be seen to exist 
in external policy debates about market failure and digitisation but must also take into 
account the transformed production culture of television production. Just as at the policy 
level there is a heated discussion about PSB, with the very idea of PSB itself coming 
under attack, so too is there a discursive battle within the television production 
community as to the future and purpose of television. It is clear that much of the 
research that has examined the future of public service broadcasting approaches the 
subject from a policy perspective, focusing on abstract issues such as market failure, 
supply and demand, spectrum scarcity and convergence. However, the issue of 
production is rarely discussed. Here, I have approached the issue of PSB from a more 
unusual perspective, by focusing on the changes that neo-liberal media policies and 
market transformations have brought to the production community. 
While government policy has consistently recognised the econorruc value of 
creativity to the UK economy, there has been a radical neglect of the fragility of the 
creative ecology in terms of the working environment that creatives are operating within. 
As all creative endeavour becomes framed within the 'big hit' meritocratic economic 
context of globalisation and free markets, this key issue has become lost. This research 
shows the importance of refocusing cultural policy towards the issue of labour. There are 
welcome signs that this is happening at a tentative level. Recent reports on the creative 
industries for policymakers have stressed the fragility of creative economies, and the 
challenges facing creative workers as a result of trends such as flexible accumulation 
(Oakley and Knell, 2007). Furthermore, there has been an explosion of academic interest 
in the area of media and cultural labour in the last couple of years (Deuze, 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007). However, there is still much more research to be done - in 
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particular, in my View, empirical evidence that exanunes the detrimental effect 
unmitigated free-market policies have on the creative ecology. 
In the case of broadcasting, this thesis suggests that over twenty years of 
deregulation and neo-liberal media policies towards broadcasting have resulted in a 
working community in which creative innovation is now secondary to profit. In this 
context, for my respondents, skills and craft have been eroded from within and without. 
There is a sense in which the industry may be starting to feel the effects of such a shift, 
as a result of the recent crisis of trust at the BBC and within the ITPS as a result of 
various 'faking' scandals (Wray and Holmwood, 2007). Concerns have been raised about 
how to restore faith in broadcasting standards, and how to ensure particular values and 
standards, within a climate where these have been steadily deconstructed from within 
(Hewlett, 2007). Furthermore, there are increasing concerns about how to maintain 
innovation and creative experimentation within a broadcasting culture that has become 
antagonistic towards such values (Hutton et ai, 200S). In this respect, the findings of this 
research suggest an intensification of trends which Barnett and Seymour (1999) found in 
their research on television in the late 1990s, which 'found a depressing consensus 
amongst those at the creative coal-face that as competition and commercial imperatives 
had increased, there was far more emphasis on re-commissioning existing success stories 
or sticking to standard formulae' (Barnett, 2002: 40). This thesis indicates that there is 
still a great deal of creative energy amongst television production staff. However, the 
wider context suggests that it needs political will to protect and enhance it. 
8.4 Creative work, new subjectivities: towards a progressive agenda? 
To conclude, I want to consider the implications of my research findings from a 
broader sociological perspective by speculating on the social, political and cultural 
significance of the micro-conditions of the labour dynamics apparent in the ITPS. 
Clearly, the conditions of labour experienced by many television workers that this thesis 
has uncovered raise important questions about the challenges facing knowledge workers 
under conditions of late capitalism. Here we see the consequences for the individual of 
extreme forms of post-Fordist labour, which while superficially providing 'freedom', 
'glamour' and 'self-fulfllment' for creative workers, finds new modes of oppressing and 
exploiting individuals for the purpose of capital accumulation. Here we see how 
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capitalism associates with a particular technology of the self that subjectivises individuals 
so that they embrace this exploitation and oppression in the name of creativity. 
The rhetoric of creativity has become a core script of governments around the 
world, illustrating that culture cleaves ever more closely to the skin of capitalism, just as 
Jameson perceived over twenty years ago a arneson, 1991). Creativity in this context is 
seen by government as an instrumental device, capable of generating economic growth, 
whilst in the UK context it has also been aligned to traditional leftist values of tackling 
social exclusion. However, within the creative industries themselves, there is ample 
evidence that suggests that the modes of working that are associated with a creative life 
are far from idyllic, and indeed allow for the possibility of heightened exclusion and 
exploitation within society. Therefore, policy needs to look afresh at the impact of 
deregulation and neo-liberal policies designed to encourage flexibility and growth on the 
lives of growing numbers of individuals who are living out their lives in the context of 
precarious creative work. 
However, despite the many negative aspects of such work, it is important to 
recognise that the shift towards creative labour within late capitalist societies offers the 
potential for a more hopeful politics of affect. The fact that my interviewees, along with 
so many other individuals today, seek 'pleasure at work' is more than just evidence of 
their ideological subjectivisation to the demands of capital. In short, they are more than 
just passive dupes of an illegible capitalism. Rather, they are often indeed happy in their 
work, and more than that, thry expect happiness. Caught between the enterprise culture and 
the new governmentality of adaptivity, they seek to find ways to find self-actualisation 
through work. This is a significant shift to a situation where increasing numbers of 
young people expect pleasure in work. 
Here lies hope for a new politics of resistance to the inexorable demands of 
unleashed capitalism. For in its very immateriality, creative labour expresses a utopian 
longing, for work that is beyond the mundane alienation of capitalist logic. That is not to 
say that these workers are not alienated, atomised or exploited. Clearly they are all of 
these things at times. But in the turn to creative labour we can see the potential for a new 
progressive agenda. In their refusal of mundane, repetitive, tedious work, a new 
generation expect self-fulfilment through their working lives. However compromised 
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those expectations may be, we can see that capitalism is forced to accommodate those 
expectations, even if new forms of exploitation emerge through the rubric of creative 
work. This romantic idealisation of work is more than false consciousness, but reflects a 
sociological shift, and a space for a more collective progressive politics to emerge from. 
Therefore, while the creative economy bears all the hallmarks of the 'winner 
takes all' culture, where creatives are endlessly searching for a way out of exhausting 
networking and anxious precarity through the elusive 'big hit', we can also see that the 
normalisation of the artistic project-based mode of life is also making apparent the new 
precarity of social and economic relations within neo-liberal freemarket capitalism. As 
McRobbie has argued recently, 'what remains of class struggle is now deflected onto this 
field of precariousness' (2007: 7) The bigger political question, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, is whether these new modes of creative labour and its massively expanded sphere 
of activity will lead to a reflexive critique of capital hegemony on a broader cultural basis, 
with creative labour at its heart. This would demand a turn to a collective culture to re-
energise such a critique, arguably one which would be most likely to emerge from the 
cultural industries, as the primary conduit of political communication. How, and if, this 
might emerge from the individualised, competitive, precanous landscape of 
contemporary cultural production is a pressing political question for our time. 
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Appendix 1: Email to television production website58 
Please help - academic research into the television industry 
Hello, 
My name is David Lee, and I'm researching a PhD at Goldsmiths College, in the Media 
and Communications department. This PhD is funded by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC). My research is looking at working lives in the independent 
television industry, at a time of radical change within the production environment. 
Before doing this PhD I worked in television production myself for about five years, as a 
researcher and assistant producer, mostly on current affairs programmes, and 
documentaries, in the independent sector and for the BBC. 
I would like to interview users of this forum for my field research. Amongst other 
things, I'd want to ask you about your experiences of working in the television industry, 
how you manage your careers in a deregulated working environment, how creative 
decision making takes place within an organisational setting. All interviews will of course 
remain confidential, and I would be happy to provide an official signed letter confirming 
both this anonymity and my identity from my supervisor at Goldsmiths College. 
I hope that my research will provide an important source of information about the 
experiences of people working in such an important cultural industry in the UK, with 
implications for wider debates on media policy. 
If you would like to know more about taking part in my research, please contact me on 
david.lee@gold.ac.uk, or if you'd prefer you can call me on 07708 83xxxx 
Thanks very much for your time, 
David Lee 
58 The email was sent to the website http://www.tvfreelancers.org.uk. 
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Name 
Sarah 
Anthony 
Emma 
DaveT 
Paul 
Colin 
Simon 
Rachel 
lenny_ 
Andrew 
Ivan 
Eleanor 
James 
Abigail 
Deborah 
Jonathan 
Robert 
Louise 
Anita 
Jack 
Sara 
Richard 
Appendix 2: Details of participants 
(all names have been changed) 
Date Date of Position Age Gender 
initially final 
Interv'd interview 
Jan 2006 July 2006 Producer/ 31 Female 
Director 
(PD) 
Oct 2005 N/A Chief n/a Male 
Executive 
Nov 2005 May 2006 PD 38 Female 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Executive 41 Male 
Producer 
Jan 2006 July 2006 Assistant 26 Male 
Producer 
(AP) 
Oct 2005 April Film Editor 43 Male 
2006 
Nov 2005 May 2006 PD 34 Male 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Researcher 25 Female 
Nov 2005 May 2006 AP 30 Female 
Oct 2005 April PD 31 Male 
2006 
Dec 2005 n/a Managing n/a Male 
Director 
Jan 2006 July 2006 AP 37 Female 
Nov 2005 May 2006 PD 34 Male 
Oct 2005 April AP 32 Female 
2006 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Film Editor 34 Female 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 AP 24 Male 
Oct 2005 Not Film Editor 33 Male 
possible 
Jan 2006 July 2006 Series 32 Female 
Producer 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Series 32 Female 
Producer 
Nov 2005 May 2006 PD (now 36 Male 
left the 
industry) 
Oct 2005 Not Production 30 Female 
possible Assistant 
Dec 2005 Jun 2006 PD 30 Male 
Location 
London 
London 
London 
West 
Yorkshire 
Manchester 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London and 
Newcastle 
London 
London 
273 
Appendix 3: Interview guide 
Interviews were semi-structured, and used to guide discussions. As such in every 
interview that took place there was variation in the order of topics, and the length of 
time spent discussing them. The following questions should be seen as a guide, rather 
than a comprehensive catalogue of questions asked and areas covered 
General 
What is your name/age? 
Can you describe what you do for a living? 
What have you worked on in the last year? 
Have you worked for a number of companies, if so how many? 
Indies 
What are the main features of working in independent television? 
Tell me about the trend towards multi-skilling. How does that make you feel? 
Are there practical issues about the pace of change [probe for issues around skills] 
Production process 
Describe the production process in your area of work. 
How is new technology and innovation generally changing the television industry? 
Market conditions/structure of industry 
Has the independent televison sector changed in the time that you have been working in 
it? [probe for commercialisation, the rise of formats] 
Do these changes this have any implications in terms of doing your job? [probe for the 
impact on working in the industry; generating ideas for programmes] 
Making a living. 
What is it like working in television? 
Describe your feelings about working in television 
Is it a secure environment to work in? 
If not, how does the lack of job security make you feel? 
Does it have any impact on the process of production? 
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Do you expect that TV will be your job for life? 
What hours do you tend to work? 
What are the pleasures of your job, the upsides? 
What are the downsides? 
Do you ever think about leaving the industry? 
If so why? 
Competition and flexibility 
How competitive is your industry? 
Do people work for nothing to get experience, to get in? 
Do people move around from job to job, and have 'mini-careers' or portfolio careers, 
doing a range of different things? 
Entrepreneurialism 
Do you think you are entrepreneurial? Why? How? 
How important is that trait in the industry that you work in, do you think? 
What does being entrepreneurial mean to you? 
Education and Skills: 
Can you describe your education? 
What education do you need for the job? 
What skills are important? [probe for 'softer' people skills, etc.] 
Networking and Finding work: 
How do you tend to find work in the industry? 
What is most important in terms of finding work? 
Is networking important? 
How important are contacts and how do you go about maintaining and creating 
contacts? 
Do you think that some people get left out of the network culture of your area of work? 
Why is that? Who gets left out? 
Is there a 'club' mentality in terms of how networks operate in your field, in terms of 
who gets to be part of the club and who doesn't? 
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How would you describe the demographic mix in your industry? [If participant feels that 
it is not diverse, probe for why they think that is the case] 
Unions: 
Is there any kind of union for communication workers? Do you belong to it? Is it 
helpful? 
What does workers rights mean to you? 
Is there a sense of community in television? 
Have you come across the online forums for freelancers, like tvfreelancers.org? What do 
you think of them? 
Creativity: 
How would you define creativity? 
What does it mean to be creative in television? Do you consider it a creative job? 
Do you have any thoughts about the process of being creative within a commercial 
environment such as television? 
How important on a personal level is it for you to be working in a creative field? 
If you could be doing anything within television, and market conditions were no 
obstacle, what would you be doing? 
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Appendix 4: Sample interview 
"Rachel" / First Interview / Date: December 2005 
DL: If you could just tell me first of all what you do for a living and describe your job. 
R: I'm a researcher, I work for [xxxx]. At the moment I'm working on a programme 
about British summers, which is a series of programmes, and I'm the researcher 
across all four of those. 
DL: Just generally what kind of things does your job involve? 
R: Um well this series is slightly different from other ones I've worked on, because 
they are also assistant producers. So normally my job would involve finding 
contributors for the programme. I mean I suppose the first step is you find out an 
awful lot about what the programme's about and what the main themes are. And 
then finding people who can talk about them, because you know I work in 
documentaries. This series is slightly different because the producers have done 
more of that, so I tend to be given sort of research tasks, like you know we want to 
find out about abortion in the '50s, so I'll go off to libraries to find out things 
about individual research topics. 
DL: So generally you are doing factual research across a range of documentaries which 
could involve finding contributors, or doing more general background research? 
R: I suppose I'm doing a lot more background research on this programme, which 
has been interesting, it's taken the pressure off actually because that's the bit I 
enjoy the most ... .It's lovely, they are so nice. They really do value thorough 
research and they don't mind you going off and being very independent about the 
way that you do that. And a lot of production companies I find like to keep you 
chained to your desk because they are a bit worried about something coming up. 
[Company x] is a lot more ... They trust you basically. 
DL: Can you just tell me about your previous experience of working in the industry, 
and the average length of the contract 
R: Well, I have been working in television on and off for a year and a half, and they're 
not that long really. I mean contracts are always short and that is always a worry to 
tell the truth. And of course there is all this stuff, you know you work very very 
long hours. I did the whole ... I started off as a runner and worked my way up, so 
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did an awful lot of overtime in order to prove yourself and get up the ladder, but I 
mean I was quite lucky and I did get up the ladder quite quickly ... 
DL: Yeah I'm quite interested in the length of contracts and the experience of the 
researcher/runner; can you give me any examples of the hours that you have had 
to work? 
R: It was hard because I had a really good first class history degree from Edinburgh 
university which I would have thought would stand me in quite good stead going 
into history documentaries, but I rapidly realised that it didn't count for anything at 
all and that if I was going to get anywhere I would have to make tea for quite a 
long time. And that's fine I'm not snobby about my work, but I was quite shocked 
by that at first. and trying to get that first runner's job is really really hard, and I 
sent off about 50 applications, and two people got back to me, and I went to 
interviews and in the end I got my first ... actually I didn't I got a job transcribing 
for a documentary about porn, which was really funny. So I spent this ridiculously 
long week again being paid an absolute pittance I would sort of arrive at 9 am and 
work until 9 o'clock at night trying to type in these porn tapes. And actually at the 
end of a couple of weeks of doing that a runner job came up and I got my first 
runner job. And again it paid a tiny amount of money, and you know I worked 
extremely long hours, but really luckily because they were on such a tight budget 
for that programme they hadn't employed a researcher, and really quickly I became 
a researcher on that programme. 
DL: So is being flexible is an important attribute in order to move up.'? 
R: Definitely, and just realising what's needed, like just being able to spot where 
people need to be helped, and need some ideas, or whatever that might be. I just 
think that having an eye for that was definitely what enabled me to move on quite 
quickly. 
DL: Just in terms of your feelings about why you wanted to work in television, what 
was it about television that particularly attracted you? 
R: Well I knew ... I love history. I studied history at university and I loved history, but 
I didn't want to go into academia, I just found that really stale, and I thought if I 
could work in history programmes that would be the best way of using my 
knowledge and love of history. But also working with dynamic people, and also 
just sort of being something that it is in touch with everyday life, not something 
that is set apart, and you know television seemed like the best way of doing that. 
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And amazingly actually I've been really lucky, and I have worked in history 
programmes, and actually all those hopes have been fulfilled by my work so far. 
DL: Was there something about it being a creative industry that attracted you? 
R: Funnily enough it wasn't actually that. To be honest in general I don't know if I 
find television documentaries creative. I think fum seems to me to be much more 
creative. It wasn't that it attracted me; it was more something about it being 
accessible, being an everyday media that was related to normal people. 
DL: Yeah I can see that, and you know that what you do is going to be watched by lots 
of people 
R: Exactly, and to have an audience. And it's not going to sit on a dusty dry shelf 
being yet another report or pile of paper and nothing seems to happen. 
DL: Just generally, what are your feelings now about working in TV? 
R: I really really enjoy it. I don't see myself being in it forever, I don't think I could 
face the short contracts, the worry about the next job, forever. I just think I don't 
want that in probably 5 years time. But I do, I like the change, I like meeting new 
people. I can just see that the novelty of meeting new people will wear off, when 
you've done it for the 30th time, and obviously this constant need to prove 
yourself, because it is extremely competitive. I mean I've not worked with 
somebody who's bad at their job yet. I think everybody is brilliant, and how on 
earth people choose between people I don't know. And I think that endless 
competition and change I think will lose its appeal for me 
DL: Yeah I think that's interesting because I think there is this constant need in 
television to update your skills all the time. 
R: I love that. at the moment I'm going on my first camera course at the weekend and 
I'm really excited, I'm really excited about learning new things actually, and that's 
part of the job I really like, constantly being pushed to learn new stuff. I just do 
have this worry at the back of my mind that one day you know somebody just 
won't pick me for a job, and the fear of being unemployed is not great ... 
DL: I think that's the real insecurity sense ... 
R: It is a real shame. but then you know my first job I did after university before I 
decided to get into TV, I signed a contract for a year, and actually after 6 months I 
was bored witless, and I know there is that side of my personality which does like 
change. I just sort of also know that at one point in my life I don't think I'll relish it 
as much. Regarding the insecurity I don't think I mind it so much because I think 
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I've been lucky so far, but there is always that worry that one day you might not be 
quite so lucky. 
DL: What sort of ... if you look forward to the future and you've mentioned that you 
might consider leaving the industry in the future, what sort of circumstances might 
you see that happening? 
R: I think if I hit a period of unemployment I guess, or um ... if I ended up 
programmes I really didn't want to be doing, if I had do sort of some kind of other 
programmes, I just don't think I'd be interested. HI ended up working on Big 
Brother I think that would be the time for a change of career. 
DL: But are you happy with the content of programmes you are working on .. .? 
R: Yes absolutely, sometimes I think oh god I should try and diversify, but actually I 
just don't enjoy it, I'm really happy doing what I'm doing. 
DL: Do you think. .. You are obviously working at [xxxx] who specialise in high quality 
programmes, but do you ever feel that you are quite lucky in terms of the content 
you are working on? 
R: I think I'm really really lucky. I don't know how it's happened, I think it's been 
complete luck of the draw, and that's what I do think about working in television, 
it just involves a hell of a lot of luck. And you know I just can't believe it will carry 
on, but ... I just do think I'm lucky to be doing what I'm doing. But I suppose 
everybody does. I mean probably there are loads of people who love making 
programmes about difficult children or whatever. 
DL: In terms of... you've already said that you don't think that television is necessarily a 
job for life. Do you think that you can have a job for life these days? 
R: To tell you the truth, I personally wouldn't want a job for life. I think we've all 
grown up in such a consumer society, and we do want the best all the time, and be 
able to take the best option all the time. No I don't think jobs for life really do 
exist, and I don't think we want them to either. Most people I know are planning 
to do lots of different things in their life. So in a way I just see it as part of the 
society that we are creating around us. 
DL: In terms of the hours you work, what hours do you work? 
R: Well at [xxxx] I'm working really nice hours, I'm sort of working 9.30 'til 7pm 
which is a lot better than other jobs I've done. And I see that as pretty good. But 
still it's a hell of a lot longer than other ... like my flatmates all work 9-5. But then I 
don't mind that. Like I really love my job, I don't mind being in the office doing it, 
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you know I enjoy it. But again I couldn't see that being compatible with family life, 
and I do want to have children at some point. I just think that would be awful. I 
look at some of the directors I'm working with who have little children and hardly 
see them and I just think that's a shame. 
DL: You mentioned it's a very competitive industry. Do people tend to work for 
nothing to get experience? 
R: Well certainly. I mean I definitely did. I did a six month internship in America for 
free, and then I did two months at the BBC for free. I think that's absolutely ... I 
just don't think you've got a hope in hell of getting a job in television without 
doing free work. Or the only way that you would do is if you've got really amazing 
contacts. 
DL: How do you feel about that? 
R: Well, I mean I hadn't done any training for television, and in a way I thought this 
is a free training course. I mean I think that it is a practical job, and you do need to 
learn basically how television works, and unless you've studied it ... I think it would 
be wrong to employ somebody straight out of university. 
DL: Especially when as you say there are so many people doing work experience, it 
would suggest it's more about contact than ability .. .? 
R: Yeah I don't think that's fair at all. I think you do need to learn the nuts and bolts. 
I have come across a few people who have got into, you know they are researchers 
or APs or whatever and they got there through contacts, but I find that they are 
just lacking in the nuts and bolts of what it takes to make television work. I think 
you need to do that kind of transferring tapes, and all that sort of thing, just to 
understand the logistics of how everything works. 
DL: One of the things I'm quite interested in is if people belong to unions. Do you 
belong to a union? 
R: No I don't. I mean I'd love to join a union ifI thought it would help, but I just can't 
see how it would. I mean I don't know what the unions would really be able to do 
for me. That's maybe because I don't know that much. But I just think that ... I 
have to say that I did ... there was that sort of petition a while ago trying to get 
runners sort of better rights. I thought that was a really good thing, because I think 
it's not fair that people should work unpaid for years and years, which it seems that 
some people do have to do. 
DL: Have you ever seen exploitation? 
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R: To tell you the truth when I came into telly a year and a half ago I think people 
were very aware of not exploiting. A company, [xxxx], the first company I worked 
for, they wouldn't have work experience people in for more than a week, because 
they know that it would be breaking regulations, and the BBe as well, I think it's 
only a month that they are allowed to have them, even though I think I did more 
than a month unpaid. But ... So I've personally seen exploitation in the fact that 
people are kept in roles for far too long, when they dearly have skills that are way 
beyond them, but you need to have cheap staff that you can rely on. And certainly 
in not promoting someone you know, then I think that's how companies stay 
within the law. 
DL: What sort of people thinking about what you just said, what sort of people tend to 
get on in TV? 
R: Well certainly the people who seem very young, and seem to have shot up the 
ladder, are people who stand up for themselves and say now, I think I should be a 
researcher now, I should be an AP now. And also people who are good at their 
jobs. It's not just about being bolshy; I mean I think if you are good then I think 
generally you are recognised for that. 
DL: Are there ... so certain sorts of attributes, so it's partly about skills, about also about 
being entrepreneurial perhaps. When you look at recruitment, sometimes 
recruitment in industries like television can seem perhaps to lack a bit of 
transparency in a sense. Do you ever see that? 
R: Well it's a joke really the recruitment process. I mean you just never see jobs 
advertised, which again is very very daunting, you just think god if I haven't got a 
list of contacts, which of course you don't have when you are starting out, how on 
earth will you get follow on jobs. Because they are just not advertised. And that is 
difficult. And coming up the end of a contract you know that it's that way, because 
you can't do a standard application process, it's a matter of talking to people. But 
also in a way it's not cliquey in that jobs are only going to friends, it's just that jobs 
aren't advertised, and people do everything through word of mouth. 
DL: Just thinking about that, how do you tend to find work? 
R: Well it has been through word of mouth, it's been through different directors I've 
worked with, they've all actually said you know I know so and so needs a 
researcher, and they put you in touch with them. But it is such an ad hoc way of 
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doing it, and you think god if what next time they don't have anything for anyone, 
but so far that's how it's worked for me. 
DL: So in terms of the process, it's word of mouth. Is networking quite important? 
R: Well it's essential. It really is. None of the jobs I've got have ever been advertised, 
and it has been ... and although ... I hate the work networking and I hate the idea of 
being nice to people because you want something from them, and actually so far I 
haven't had to do that, so far it's been people I like, and you know who like me. I 
don't know if I could bring myself to do that. You do hear that's what people do; 
they go to the right parties, and the right pubs. I haven't done that, and I don't 
think I could ... I think I'd be awful at it. But then I mean if networking just means 
going for a drink with people you like and hearing about a job then there doesn't 
seem to be anything wrong with that really .... I think in an ideal world, things 
would be a little bit more um transparent I guess. I don't know if transparent is the 
right word, but I guess in an ideal world it would be nice if more jobs are 
advertised. I can see from the companies why people don't. They'd suddenly get 
inundated with a million applications, and it's just an awful lot easier to do it 
slightly word of mouth. 
DL: Having said that, and thinking about the network culture of finding work in 
television, do you think that it's possible that some people might get left out? 
R: Absolutely, and again the networking happens if you've got time to go to the pub 
after work and dedicate your social life to your job as well. I mean I think it's very 
very difficult if you're not prepared to do that. Yeah I definitely don't think it's an 
ideal state of affairs at all. And I know that most of my friends aren't in the 
industry and they all find it kind of amazing, that that's how it works. I don't know 
if really any other profession does work that way. 
DL: I think a lot of creative industries work in that way, and that there's an elision 
between work and play, a kind of night-time economy 
R: But it does spill over so easily. Often if we're out we will be talking about ideas for 
programmes, and ideas for what's going into programmes. You're right, there is a 
very fine line which is great and that's why I love it as well, and that's why I enjoy 
it. 
DL: How would you describe the demographic mix in the industry? 
R: Do you mean gender? 
DL: I suppose I mean age, gender, race and class 
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R: That's another thing that annoys me and another thing that makes me think I 
wouldn't want to be in the industry in ten years time is that there doesn't seem to 
be anybody over 3S in this industry. Or you get higher up execs who are normally 
men. I mean this is my limited experience, you know I'm not saying ... this is just 
what I've seen. Lots of young women and young men, but it just seems like there is 
a sort of pyramid where there are tonnes of us at the base, and then a tiny number 
at the top. I don't want to scrabble for that top position; I don't care enough about 
working to direct my life to that. 
DL: Well, the BFI did a big survey of the industry and found that a lot of women in 
particular were leaving at early 30s 
R: How interesting, because that really is my exact plan. 
DL: A lot having families ... 
R: It has crossed my mind, could I be developing any other skills which might help 
me in other fields of life which I might go into later. And I actually can't think of 
any, because it's quite a unique job. I mean if I handed in my CV to you know a 
school, what would they think? Oh great, she's found 20 contributors, wow. Do 
you know what I mean? I mean there are lot of different skills in terms of 
communicating with people and things like that, but in terms of your day to day 
life, they are quite different from many other professions. 
DL: Just in terms of education ... could you describe your education? 
R: I've got a degree from Edinburgh, and I've also got a masters from Cambridge, 
which again that was a real decision to do that, because I'd always wanted to do 
one, and I'd finally got my foot in the door in telly, and done my first year, but I 
decided that I would do it. I was worried that if I did do it I wouldn't be able to get 
back in again, but I did it anyway, and it was absolutely fine. 
DL: S 0 you did a year in television and then did the masters? Was that in history? 
R: Yes 
DL: Oh right ok. And do you think you need that kind of education for the job? 
R: No I don't think ... to tell you the truth I don't think you even need a degree to 
work in television. It was just what I wanted to do and I was just being quite selfish 
about it. I actually thought it would be hindrance more than anything, that people 
might think 'oh she's a bit up herself and over-qualified, to the extent that I've 
actually left it off some CV s. But I definitely don't think it helps in this industry. 
DL: And what skills do you think are important to have generally in television? 
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R: For what I'm doing, I think people skills are the most important thing. I think the 
thing is that you work really long intense hours, and so the most important thing is 
to be able to get on with people, and kind of be flexible about getting on with 
people. Then I think being really resourceful is really important. You know when 
you've got to find a can-can dancer in 24 hours and they've got to be free, you've 
got to really be able to think on your feet and think laterally, and have good ideas. 
DL: Just thinking about the production itself, could you just describe the production 
process in your area of television .... just in terms of the time frame, and technology 
in terms of HD and self-operating? 
R: Well it makes me feel quite sad. One of the things I really love about my job is 
working with camera and sound operators who are just so experienced and 
knowledgeable and real artists you know, and I really admire that skill and creativity 
with flim. This move towards directors doing a lot of their own shooting seems to 
me a bit sad actually. I mean selfishly it's quite exciting, I'm really excited about 
getting involved in it myself, but really I do think it's going to be detrimental for 
the industry. 
DL: What are the implications of that for quality? 
R: Well, the budgets are ... I'm sure people always say the budgets are low, but it really 
does seem to be the way it's going, and more and more stuff that you see on TV is 
self-shot, but I mean that there's no doubt that it doesn't look as good. It can be 
good when you've got that intimate feel, with kind of observational documentaries, 
I think is quite good. But when you are trying to get beautiful shots I think it's a 
real shame. 
DL: Just a few more questions. Thinking about creativity, I'm interested in how 
government has become so interested in the notion of creativity, creative 
industries ... I just wondered if you've got any thoughts on that, and why creativity 
has become so central to talking about television. 
R: I don't think I know I can only assume that they are so obsessed about it because 
they are worried that there's not enough of it about. I don't know if television is 
that creative really. I don't really know. There is a creative process, but I don't 
think it's creative like a modern artist is. there's just not that space for it, because 
you are constantly trying to market to wider and wider audiences, and I think that 
means that creativity probably has to go down because it's got to have mass appeal, 
so if anything I feel that television is probably getting less creative. 
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DL: How important is it to be entrepreneurial in television? 
R: I mean I think it's essential to be able to think ahead and market yourself, and plan 
your next move. 
DL: So self-promotion is important? 
R: I don't think you can do it without it. 
DL: What does it mean to you being entrepreneurial? 
R: I think to me it means constantly talking to people about the way the industry is 
going, about what companies are doing what, constantly making sure I'm abreast 
of what's going on. I suppose it should mean marketing yourself, but I really can't 
face doing that. But making sure I know what's out there, knowing what the 
options are for me and kind of making myself more marketable so that I'm more 
employable. 
DL: It's a very freelance industry, and you become quite individualised in terms of your 
career progression? 
R: I think there is a tremendous sense of community, I mean that's something I really 
love about it, just everyone I work with is good fun and nice and keeps in touch, 
and I just find that I've got a huge network of friends in the industry. Many of my 
friends just go to work and they come home at the end of the day, and they 
wouldn't stay in touch with people. So in a way I think the slight hardship of it all 
fosters a closer knit support. 
DL: So actually although it's very freelance and individual, there is a wider community 
of freelancers? 
R: Definitely. I mean it's just so nice because every company that you come to there is 
invariably many people who know people who know people that you were working 
with last time. you can go out for drink with people from the old company and the 
new company and you know it's actually a very nice sense ... and in a way I find that 
very reassuring because I sort of think in five years time I'll still be working with ... 
it may not be the same company at all, but we'll all have people in common. And I 
really like that. 
DL: What would the implications be of falling out with someone? 
R: Luckily that hasn't been a problem yet. I think that's absolutely true though, 
definitely you can't fall out with anyone. 
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DL: Everyone I've talked to has said that the most important thing in television is 
getting on with people, and it's interesting that one of the first things you said was 
that 
R: Oh it is, I mean the thing is that if you can't fit in to a team rapidly then you're 
screwed, because if your contact is only three months you know, and if you're a bit 
difficult and scratchy with people then you might get to the end of your three 
months and not have made a friend, and that would be really miserable. 
DL: And also people aren't going to employ you again ... 
R: Exactly, at the end of the day people know that if you're easy to get on with, then 
you're going to be a more amenable person and they are going to want you back 
probably. And I really haven't come across anybody who is difficult yet. Well 
actually I came across one person, but I know she will never be employed by the 
company agaIn. 
DL: What does that mean, in terms of if you are asked to do unreasonable hours, for 
example? 
R: I think there is an element of that. But then I think the companies that are really 
pushing you it tends to be certain individuals that are doing that, and they tend not 
to be widely liked. 
DL: So they are quite well known within the industry? 
R: One of the companies I worked at, there was one really unpleasant one who was 
making everybody stay back later, and none of us would ever work for that person 
again. And I can't believe that the company directors haven't noticed that sort of 
thing. You know what I mean; I just don't think it does you any favours being 
pushy like that. 
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